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his ill-fated foreign journey. Mr Ferrier was also a passenger, and scarcely dared to look on the almost unconscious form of one whose genius he so warmly admired." * It may be there are those who will in coming years speak to their children of similar feelings awakened in themselves, as they watched a feeble frame, whose worn features revealed, amid the light of piercing intellect, acute suffering held down by heroic endurance, in the quiet town of St Andrews.

To philosophy he ever gave his first and unwavering devotion; he doubtless felt himself, and it will probably be allowed by discerning judges, that the genuine interest which he maintained to the last in literature not technically or nominally philosophical, made him in no way less able to preserve his primary allegiance unalloyed. He read works of imagination with deep imaginative sympathy: a strong poetical element in his own nature responded vividly to the subtlest touch of all true poetry. His numerous contributions to 'Blackwood's Magazine' attest to what extent the various sides of literature possessed attractions for him. For special mention may be selected, —The Translation of Tieck's Pietro d'Abano, in August 1839; of Deinhardstein's Picture of Danae, September 1841; The Tittle-Tattle of a Philosopher, December 1841; and the Review of Miss Barrett's Poems, November 1844. To some among the many readers whose admiration for Mrs Browning's genius

* Quoted from Principal Forbes's address to the Students of St Andrews, November 1864.

is deep and sincere, it may not be without interest to peruse an extract from this article, written at a time when her extraordinary powers were far less generally recognised than now:—

"If the poetess does not always command our unqualified approbation, we are at all times disposed to bend in reverence before the deep-hearted and highly accomplished woman—a woman whose powers appear to us to extend over a wider and profounder range of thought and feeling than ever before fell within the intellectual compass of any of the softer sex. If we might venture to divine this lady's moral and intellectual character from the general tone of her writings, we should say, that never did woman's mind dwell more habitually among the thoughts of a solemn experience — never was woman's genius impressed more profoundly with the earnestness of life, or sanctified more purely by the overshadowing awfulness of death. She aspires to write as she has lived; and certainly her poetry opens up many glimpses into the history of a pure and profound heart which has felt and suffered much. At the same time, a reflective cast of intellect lifts her feelings into a higher and calmer region than that of ordinary sorrow. There are certain delicate and felicitous peculiarities in the constitution of her sensibilities, which frequently impart a rare and subtle originality to emotions which are as old, and as widely diffused, as the primeval curse. The spirit of her poetry appears to us to be eminently religious; not because

we think her very successful when she deals directly with the mysteries of divine truth, but because she makes us feel, even when handling the least sacred subjects, that we are in the presence of a heart which, in its purity, sees God. In the writings of such a woman, there must be much which is calculated to be a blessing and a benefit to mankind. If her genius always found a suitable exponent in her style, she would stand unrivalled, we think, among the poetesses of England. . . .

"If any of our remarks have been over-harsh, we most gladly qualify them by saying that, in our humble opinion, Miss Barrett's poetical merits infinitely outweigh her defects. Her genius is profound, unsullied, and without a flaw. The imperfections of her manner are mere superficial blots which a little labour might remove. Were the blemishes of her style tenfold more numerous than they are, we should still revere this poetess as one of the noblest of her sex; for her works have impressed us with the conviction, that powers such as she possesses are not merely the gifts or accomplishments of a highly intellectual woman, but that they are closely intertwined with all that is purest and loveliest in goodness and in truth."

In 1851, when Sir Edward Bulwer Lytton, now Lord Lytton, was preparing to republish his translation of Schiller's Ballads, he frequently corresponded with Mr Ferrier, whose critical judgment and skill in detecting the finer shades of meaning in the orig-

inal German he highly valued, as his dedication to the poems amply testifies.

Mr Ferrier's earliest public essay in metaphysical science consists of the papers, here republished, which, under the title "An Introduction to the Philosophy of Consciousness," he contributed to 'Blackwood's Magazine' in 1838 and 1839, "undertaking," as Sir William Hamilton said, "the solution of problems hitherto unattempted in the humbler speculation of this country." For some years after this he wrote occasional articles in that Magazine, and must have become in the meantime well known to many persons in Edinburgh as one who delighted in exploring questions that task powers of abstraction and subtle thought. In 1842 he was appointed Professor of Civil History in the University, an office at that time neither very laborious nor lucrative, and generally looked upon as likely to be a stepping-stone to some more important professorship. In session 1844-5, during Sir William Hamilton's severe illness, Mr Ferrier acted as his substitute, and taught the class of logic and metaphysics for some time; his zeal and success in the discharge of this task are warmly acknowledged by Sir William in a testimonial given to Mr Ferrier when applying for a chair in another university. In 1845 he was elected Professor of Moral Philosophy and Political Economy at St Andrews, and held that office till his death.

On two occasions he sought to obtain an appointment in Edinburgh; in 1852, on the resignation

of his uncle, Professor Wilson, he became candidate for the professorship of Moral Philosophy, and in 1856 he sought to succeed to the chair of Logic and Metaphysics vacated by the death of Sir William Hamilton. On both occasions the voice of the electors determined otherwise; his name and his immediate influence as a teacher are destined to be pre-eminently associated with St Andrews.

While holding this office Mr Ferrier published, in 1848, a pamphlet (anonymous), entitled 'Observations on Church and State, suggested by the Duke of Argyll's Essay on the Ecclesiastical History of Scotland;' and in 1858 a 'Letter to the Right Honourable the Lord Advocate of Scotland on the Necessity of a Change in the Patronage of the University of Edinburgh.' He also continued to write occasional articles in 'Blackwood's Magazine,' which prove that his professional studies, ardently as they were pursued, did not entirely monopolise his attention.

In the earlier years of his professorship, his lectures seem to have been more devoted to setting forth and criticising the various schemes of mental and moral philosophy which have arisen since the time of Descartes and Locke, than to exhibiting in systematic order new views of his own, except in so far as this cannot be avoided in commenting on the doctrines of others. He wrote of his professional labours to a friend:—"I cancel and re-write about a third of my lectures every year; a circumstance which, if it proves that my lectures were bad to begin

with, also proves that they have some chance of growing better." For two or three years before he published his 'Institutes of Metaphysic' (in 1854) he had regularly developed to his hearers, proposition by proposition, the theory contained in that work. On this theory he frequently corresponded with his friends. It may fairly be presumed that in addressing a subtle metaphysical thinker, capable among few other Englishmen of estimating what had been done for philosophy by Kant, and better acquainted than most with the later labours of Kant's successors, Mr Ferrier would especially aim at aiding the impression which his own new speculations might produce, by distinctness and forcible lucidity in announcing them. For this reason there is inserted at a later page in this volume a letter* written to Mr De Quincey, who had for some time regarded Ferrier as the metaphysician of highest promise among his contemporaries in England or Scotland, and had expressed his conviction in a warmly eulogistic testimonial, which the letter gratefully acknowledges. Letters to various other friends remain, written about the same time on the same subject; but none more characteristic, or exhibiting in clearer outlines the nucleus of his theory.

This work reached a second edition in 1856. It called forth various criticisms, some of which he noticed in a pamphlet, entitled 'Scottish Philosophy,

* This is now transferred to the end of the third edition of the 'Institutes of Metaphysic.'

the Old and the New,' published in 1856. When he composed this essay he believed that his views had been by many misunderstood, by some unfairly represented; and to this circumstance he partly attributed his failure to obtain the Chair of Logic and Metaphysics in Edinburgh. In some passages a warmth of feeling and expression was perceptible, not perhaps surprising in one who felt convinced that injurious and unwarranted misconceptions of his meaning had prevailed against him, but not altogether in harmony with the calmness best fitted to the treatment of philosophical questions, a quality which few thinkers could value more highly than Mr Ferrier himself.* It has been accordingly judged unnecessary to reproduce the whole of this pamphlet; anything that could needlessly give pain the Editors have thought it right to omit, while they hope that nothing essential or possessing significance for the vindication of the Author's system has disappeared from the remodelled form in which it is now presented to the reader, as 'Appendix to the Institutes of Metaphysic.'

* A characteristic extract from a letter to a friend may illustrate his deliberate judgment on this head. He wrote in 1851:—"One thing I would recommend, not to be too sharp in your criticism of others. No one has committed this fault oftener, or is more disposed to commit it, than myself; but I am certain that it is not pleasing to the reader, and after an interval it is displeasing to oneself. In the heat and hurry of writing a lecture I often hit a brother philosopher, as I think, cleverly enough, but on coming to it coolly next year I very seldom repeat the passage. I am not, however, charging you with this fault, but merely putting you on your guard against it."

His labours as a professor were prompted by unsparing energy; they were rewarded by one of the truest evidences of merit, the devoted sympathy and attachment of his pupils. To stimulate their minds to philosophic thought, to lead them to insight rather than tenacity of conviction, and empower them to think for themselves,—this, as the steady principle of his endeavours, is repeatedly set forth in his lectures, and undeviatingly ruled his practice. In all matters of College business his sound judgment and vigorous good sense were acknowledged and looked up to by his colleagues. His students felt sure there was not one among their professors to whose generous consideration of their feelings they might more confidently trust, or whose resolute assertion of all that was due to his own office they must more implicitly respect. They revered him as a guide to truth and wisdom, they loved him as an elder friend and fellow-labourer.

His devotion to contemplative study was so persistent and absorbing, that he was seldom induced to leave his home in St Andrews for excursions to any distant quarters. His friends both in Scotland and England had often to regret the rareness of the visits which he paid them, not only on their own account, but, as they believed, for his sake also. For they could not repress within them the strong persuasion that the intensity of his solitary labours in search of truth was wearing him out, and that whenever he could be induced to intermit the restless mental exercise, usually carried on far into the morning hours,

such relaxation must prove beneficial to his general health. But for him philosophy had deeper charms than for most even of laborious and meditative inquirers. The "difficult air" which surrounds the top of the mountain of speculation, exhausting to common travellers in that high region, was to him as the daily breath of life. Those among his acquaintance for whom such abstruser pursuits had no attraction, could not but feel and acknowledge the largeness of mind and heart which enlivened his social intercourse, which sought for no display, but manifested itself in the readiness with which he entered alike into the common business and recreation of everyday life, and into all general topics of rational interest. The most devoted of all students, he was the last man to whom any one who knew him, or even casually met him, could have thought of applying the description of "pedant." In mixed company, his graceful courtesy, his rich and genial humour, and the fine unstrained benignity which, being heart-deep, inspired his whole manner, secured general admiration and goodwill. There was hardly a social meeting at St Andrews at which his presence, expected or unexpected, would not have been welcomed with genuine gladness; nor could any subject be mooted on which his views, however unobtrusively expressed, would not have been listened to with respectful attention.

His general appearance, and latterly his disinclination to any but the most moderate exercise, sug-

gested the impression that his health was far from robust, but it seemed mostly to preserve an equable tenor till the first violent seizure which prostrated his strength, so that it never could be fully restored. This was an attack of *angina pectoris*, which came upon him (with nothing obvious to account for it) early in November 1861. For several hours he was considered to be in imminent danger, but the vital power was not entirely shattered; a temporary recovery took place, but the weakness which followed prevented him from continuing his lectures till some weeks later. At that time the largest apartment in his house was fitted up as a lecture-room, where his students met, it being judged unsafe for him to undergo the fatigue of moving daily as far as the College class-room. The date of several of his lectures on Greek philosophy shows how little he relaxed his exertions for the instruction of his class, notwithstanding this shock to his physical powers. And indeed those who conversed with him after this date on his favourite topics were aware that his subtlety and penetrating energy of thought were as vivid as ever. But it could hardly escape their notice that bodily infirmity was fast gaining ground upon him; his power of walking became less and less; a very short distance at times seemed to be too much for him; the ascent of a staircase would make him pant and appear overcome almost to exhaustion. Tendencies to asthma had long been observed; dropsical symptoms and affection of the heart assumed a threatening form.

On the whole, after this first formidable attack it began to be manifest that life was but a continued unequal struggle against manifold besieging forces. From this time, though he often spoke hopefully of his state of health, he must have anticipated as far from improbable that any day or hour might bring a rapidly fatal onset of his malady. Towards his friends, during this interval, all that was sweetest in his disposition seemed to gain strength and expansion from the near shadow of death. He spoke of death with entire fearlessness, and though this was nothing new to those who knew him best, it impressed their minds at this time more vividly than ever. The less they dared to hope for his life being prolonged, the more their love and regard were deepened by his tender thoughtfulness for others, and the kindliness which annihilated all absorbing concern for himself. In many little characteristic touches of humour, frankness, beneficence, beautiful gratitude for any slight help or attention, his truest and best nature seemed to come out all the more freely; he grew, as it were, more and more entirely himself indeed. If ever a man was true to philosophy, or a man's philosophy true to him, it was so with Ferrier during all the time when he looked death in the face and possessed his soul in patience. As the light of all his friendships shone ever with steadier brightness, past animosities sank out of sight. At a time when he was too ill to see any visitor, the card was brought to him of a former opponent on philosophical questions,

whose criticisms of his views had been regarded by him as unjust, and had provoked some warmth of language in his reply to them, but who now called to inquire after his health. He was perceptibly touched by this mark of friendly feeling, and exclaimed, "That must be a good fellow!"

Twice in the course of the year 1863, in January and October, an assault of illness more than usually threatening had come on. He had, in the June of this year, travelled to London, to examine in philosophy the students of the London University, and had purposed doing so again in October; but after this attack it was obviously impossible. On the 31st of October, Dr Christison was consulted about his state, and pronounced his case to be past hope of remedy. He opened his class on the 11th of November in his own house, but during this month was generally confined to bed. On the 8th of December he was attacked by congestion of the brain, and never lectured again. His class was conducted by Mr Rhoades, then Warden of the recently-founded College Hall, who, as many others among his colleagues would have been ready to do, willingly undertook the melancholy task of officiating for so beloved and honoured a friend. After this all severe study and mental exertion were forbidden. He became gradually weaker, with glimpses now and then of transitory improvement. So in unfailing courage and resignation, not unwilling to hope for longer respite, but always prepared to die, he placidly, reverently, awaited

the close, tended by the watchful care of his devoted wife and children.

He breathed his last about eleven o'clock on the morning of Saturday the 11th of June 1864; his mortal remains were followed to the grave by many to whom his memory is dear, and rest near those of his father and grandfather in St Cuthbert's Churchyard in Edinburgh.

What Ferrier was, is more surely treasured in the hearts of those who knew him than it can be livingly communicated in language to others: nevertheless it appears due to truth to record the utterances of some friends, who, from their constant and familiar intercourse, had the best means of knowing and estimating him aright. Contributions towards this end have been asked from a few, and granted with ready kindness.

Principal Tulloch, of St Mary's College, St Andrews, writes thus:—

"By the time I came to St Andrews (1854) Professor Ferrier had reached the maturity of his powers, if not of his reputation. The 'Institutes of Metaphysic' were just published, and I had read the volume with great admiration, fascinated particularly by the boldness and brilliant subtlety of its speculations. We soon formed a fast friendship; and as for some years we both remained at St Andrews, in summer as well as winter, we were in the habit of constantly meeting together. His interest in intellectual discussions was unceasing; his love of books, and his

appreciation of literature in all its higher forms, as fresh as that of a youth in the first flush of his studies, and a more delightful companion therefore could not be imagined. There are those who along with me, I am sure, can never forget the pleasantness of those early years in St Andrews, when our friend was still in vigorous health, and eager to encounter any disputant in his favourite subjects. The playful humour which he mingled with the most abstract discussions, the heights of metaphysical argument which he scaled so easily, and in the rare atmosphere of which he was able to sustain himself longer than any other disputant I ever knew, his genial and frank bearing, and the welcome and fairness of spirit with which he always met opposition, gave a great attraction to his conversation.

"Life in his study was Professor Ferrier's characteristic life. There have been, I daresay, even in our time, harder students than he was; but there could scarcely be any one who was more habitually a student, who lived more amongst books, and took a more special and constant delight in intercourse with them. In his very extensive but choice library he knew every book by head-mark, as he would say, and could lay his hands upon the desired volume at once. It was a great pleasure to him to bring to the light from an obscure corner some comparatively unknown English speculator of whom the University Library knew nothing.

"During the summer of 1863, the last of which he

was to see the close, I was with him almost every day. At this time I was myself laid aside from systematic work of any kind, while his obviously failing health and incapacity to walk any distance without suffering invited companionship. His intellectual interest was as keen as ever, but the hope of doing much more was fast dying out. He reflected with satisfaction that he had completed his lectures on the Early Greek Philosophy, and he would fain have been spared for a renewed study of Plato, and a fresh and extended treatment of the Platonic Philosophy. He felt this to be no longer possible; but his mind naturally lingered round his favourite subject, and we spent the summer in reading together some of the Dialogues in which he formerly delighted, and had carefully pencilled with his notes. He took it into his head also to read through Virgil, and I used sometimes to join him in the evenings which he devoted to this purpose. The companionship was a great pleasure to me, and seemed in some degree to relieve the tedium of his bodily languor. The strength and patience of his character, and buoyant energy and varied activity of his mind, were never more conspicuous. We had many earnest conversations, too, about more solemn matters; for it is needless to say that a reason so inquisitive and reflective as Professor Ferrier's had pondered much on the subject of religion. He was unable to feel much interest in any of its popular forms, but he had a most intense interest in its great mysteries, and a thorough rever-

ence for its truths, when these were not disfigured by superstition or formalism. His large thoughtfulness made him indifferent to minor matters, which to many minds represent so much of religion, and he had perhaps too vehement a dislike to certain aspects of pietistic activity; but he had true religious impulses; and Christian truth, expressed in a manly, straightforward, and unexaggerated manner, always impressed him. He was open to the light from whatever quarter it might come; but he also felt that there was much regarding which we must be content here to remain in darkness, and to await the solution of the future.

"There was at all times in Professor Ferrier's character great sweetness and a certain charm of loyal and chivalrous feeling, combined with passionate energy and decisiveness, amounting to obstinacy where his supposed rights or interests were involved. In the last years of his life these stronger features dropped out of sight, and all the gentle chivalry and forbearance of his nature came forth more prominently. He had for some time laid aside all ambition. He had forgiven his philosophical enemies, and even forgotten, as if it had never been, the painful crisis signalised by his pamphlet on the 'Old and the New Philosophy.' He was surrounded by those he loved, and by many attached friends who vied with each other in their respect and affection for him. He felt at the same time that his strength was rapidly failing, and that the end of

his work was not far off. All this exerted a softening influence on his character, and brought out its finer traits. He had long known, there is reason to think, of his weakness, and that there was something mortal in it. He certainly had no faith that any change of scene or any appliance of medical skill would be of avail in his case; and so he quietly, steadily, and cheerfully faced the issue. There was a singular depth and immovableness in his cheerful patience. I do not think I ever heard him complain, and I have seen him in great languor and pain. He might give utterance to a half-playful, half-grim expression regarding his sufferings, but he never seemed to think there was anything strange in them, anything that he should not bear calmly as a man and as a Christian. Neither did he say much of unfinished work which he might have done, although such work had been formerly much in his heart. He expressed few regrets, he spoke of no fears. He looked heroically yet humbly into the future, and did such work as he could with interest and diligence to the end. On the very day before his final seizure, I believe, he was in his library, as was his wont, busy amongst his books.

"Many men can do good and able work in the world, but there are only a few anywhere, in any institution, who invest their work with that nameless personal influence which captivates while it instructs the young, which quickens their int[illegible]l enthusiasm and expands and refines th[illegible]e

process of education. No one was ever more gifted with this rare endowment than Professor Ferrier. There was a buoyant and graceful charm in all he did, a perfect sympathy, cordiality, and frankness, which won the hearts of his students, as of all who sought his intellectual companionship. Maintaining the dignity of his position with easy indifference, he could condescend to the most free and affectionate intercourse; make his students, as it were, parties with him in his discussions, and while guiding them with a master-hand, awaken at the same time their own activities of thought as fellow-workers with himself. There was nothing, I am sure, more valuable in his teaching than this, nothing for which his students will longer remember it with gratitude. No man could be more free from the small vanity of making disciples. He loved speculation too dearly for itself, he prized too highly the sacred rights of reason, to wish any man or any student merely to adopt his system or repeat his thought. Not to manufacture thought for others, but to excite thought in others, to stimulate the powers of inquiry, and brace all the higher functions of the intellect, was his great aim. He might be comparatively careless, therefore, of small processes of drilling and minute labours of correction. These, indeed, he greatly valued in their own place. But he felt that his strength lay in a different direction, in the intellectual impulse which [illegible] own thinking, in its life, its richness, and [illegible]ndour, was capable of imparting.

He conducted his thinking, as it were, in broad day. The student could see every turn and winding of it; and the frankness of his manner gave a singular attraction to the frank boldness of his intellect, and more than anything, perhaps, explained the mingled love and admiration with which he was regarded. And yet, with all his easy cordiality, so manly was he, and so commanding the natural relations of his mind to others, that I do not fancy it could have entered into the head of even the most presumptuous student to take any liberty with him. If it was his happy power to stimulate enthusiasm and call forth interest in the young, he was no less able, in all circumstances, to preserve the most perfect order. And while he awakened affection, he never failed to secure respect."

Professor Shairp of St Andrews writes as follows:—

"In the autumn of 1857 circumstances connected with my appointment at St Andrews led to a long correspondence, which I have not preserved. But the one impression left on me was that of Ferrier's manliness, justness, and high honour, combined with the finest consideration and most delicate courtesy towards all concerned. Not to speak of personal gratitude towards him for having so smoothed the way through many practical difficulties, the whole tone of his letters left on me a delightful impression of his character. I need hardly say that my inter-

course with him during the next seven years was entirely according to this beginning.

"Now and then, when I could, I used to go and hear him lecture; I never saw anything better than his manner towards his students. There was in it ease, yet dignity so respectful both to them and to himself that no one could think of presuming with him. Yet it was unusually kindly, and full of a playful humour which greatly attached them to him. No one could be farther removed from either the Don or the Disciplinarian. But his look of keen intellect and high breeding, combined with gentleness and feeling for his students, commanded attention more than any discipline could have done.

"In matters of college discipline, while he was fair and just, he always leant to the lenient and forbearing side. He was peculiarly considerate of the students in all his dealings with them; and by showing this markedly in his manner, I doubt not he called forth in those who perceived it some feeling akin to his own.

"Till his illness took a more serious form, he was to be met at dinner-parties, to which his society always gave a great charm. In general society his conversation was full of humour and playful jokes. A quick yet kindly eye to note the extravagances and absurdities of men. His remarks were especially racy on those whose enthusiasm outran their judgment, or who insisted on riding their own

hobbies, or forcing their own idiosyncrasies on others who had no mind for them.

"Sometimes, when we found him in his library on a winter afternoon, he would begin talking of Horace, who was a special favourite of his. He used to amuse himself with translating some of the Odes into English verse, and he would now and then read what he had done in this way. These translations were always unconventional and racy, sometimes very felicitous in their turns. They brought out a vein of secret humour running through many of the Odes in which it had not been hitherto suspected.

"At other times I have heard him discourse of Wordsworth, and of the early feelings which that great poet had awakened in him. When he spoke on this and other kindred subjects he brought out a richness of literary knowledge, and a delicacy and keenness of appreciation, of which his philosophic writings, except by their fine style, give no hint. I used sometimes to think that the exclusively abstract line of thinking to which he had in his later years devoted himself, and the demonstrative form into which he had tried to cast his thoughts, had shut out the free play of those imaginative perceptions, with which, unlike most other living metaphysicians, he was by nature richly gifted.

"His malady, which no doubt he himself had known long before, first revealed itself fully to those beyond his own household by the severe illness with

which he was attacked a few days after the installation of Mr Stirling of Keir as Lord Rector. At the dinner given on that occasion Mr Ferrier had, it was thought, caught a cold, which brought on a dangerous increase of heart-complaint. Though he rallied from this for a time, he never was as he had been before. Some more dangerous symptoms showed themselves in the summer of 1863; and I remember, on going to see him when we returned here in the autumn, that he spoke of his own health, not in a desponding tone, yet in a way that showed he had no hope of recovery.

"How he bore the long painful winter that followed you have heard from others, and yourself, I think, had opportunities of seeing. In the visits which I made to his bedroom from time to time, when I found him sometimes on chair or sofa, sometimes in bed, I never heard one peevish or complaining word escape him, nothing but what was calm and cheerful, though to himself as to others it was evident that the outward man was fast perishing. The last time but one that I saw him was on a Sunday in April; it must have been either on the 17th or 24th. He was sitting up in bed. The conversation fell on serious subjects, on the craving the soul feels for some strength and support out from and above itself, on the certainty that all men feel that need, and on the testimony left by those who have tried it most, that they had found that need met by Him of whose earthly life the Gospel histories bear witness. This,

or something like this, was the subject on which our conversation turned. He paused, and dwelt on the thought of the soul's hunger. 'Hunger is the great weaver in moral things as in physical. The hunger that is in the new-born child sits weaving the whole bodily frame, bones and sinews, out of nothing. And so I suppose in moral and spiritual things it is hunger builds up the being.' This was the purport of what he said, though of the words I cannot be sure that I give them faithfully. This was the last time I ever conversed with him."

Professor Campbell of St Andrews says:—

"You have asked me for some personal recollections of my lamented and revered colleague, Professor Ferrier. Though I had seen him at St Andrews in 1854, and once again at Oxford, I date my acquaintance with him from the autumn of 1863, when I was a candidate for the Greek Chair at St Andrews, at a time when he had been already for some months a sufferer. On becoming settled at St Andrews we were most kindly received, notwithstanding his illness, by him and his family; and I have a grateful recollection of his lively interest, more welcome because unobtrusive, in my novitiate as a professor. He also asked me about the work which I had left, in which I said I had gained friendships which made life richer. He said—'You may find that here too.'

"During the early part of my first session, which was his last, while he was still able to meet his class

in his own house, we had several conversations on philosophy, a privilege which after his illness in December could not be permitted me, though I had frequently the pleasure of seeing and of talking with him.

"At this time he was deeply interested in the study of the early Greek philosophers, and I remember his saying: 'I think what they were all driving at was to find *something that will outlive us.*' This was said with much earnestness, and I have now before me the still deeper expression of solemnity and veneration which passed over his countenance when, after speaking of the *duality* implied in all cognition, he added, 'And then in God also—to speculate about *Him*—in God also there must be duality, in so far as He knows Himself.' The tone in which these words were uttered made me feel that true reverence is without fear. I could understand, after hearing it, with what humble and fearless confidence he had said, when some religious question was discussed in his own family, 'I suppose I shall know about this by-and-by.'

"I will only add that, besides his fortitude and cheerfulness, which seemed perfect, there was a courtesy which never flagged or drooped, and a kindly interest, maintained until the last, in the most trifling occupations not only of his own family, but of their friends.

"Perhaps I might have said something of his wonderful popularity with the students, but of that you

will have heard from others. His perfect courtesy, manhood, and native dignity were, with his stimulating intellect, the secret of their love for him.

"I am sorry that I cannot recall more of our brief intercourse, which I shall always be most thankful to have enjoyed."

Professor Veitch, formerly of St Andrews, now of Glasgow, may be quoted in conclusion.

"I first knew Mr Ferrier personally in the winter of 1860-61, as his colleague in the University of St Andrews. At that time his health, though good, was not robust. He seldom walked for recreation, spending his time almost exclusively, when not in his class-room, in his library among his books. Drawn to him partly by the interest of common studies, but quite as much by the attractive nature of the man, I very soon came to cherish for him the warmest affection. Refined, courteous, and genial, no speck of the pedantry which occasionally marks the man of recluse habits was visible in his manner. His devotion to abstract thought had in no degree dried up the freshness or limited the fulness of a mind that was from the first keenly susceptible of impressions from all that is highest and finest in nature and art. His early studies and training had been literary rather than philosophical; the beauty of form and style in which his thoughts were cast bore marks of this early culture.

"His one absorbing intellectual interest was ab-

stract speculation, and that, above all, in the direction of metaphysics. He had a remarkable power, in conversation on metaphysical points, of testing and turning on all sides dogmas received or advanced. I shall ever look back with mingled feelings of pleasure and regret on the long evenings of two-handed discussion which we spent together during the four winters of my residence in St Andrews. For depth of natural interest in the highest speculative questions; for openness, candour, and withal subtlety of fence, I have met no one who has surpassed him. He had, as seemed to me, no great interest in the questions of psychology, or in the details of formal logic; and he had read but slightly in either department. But metaphysic was his delight and his strength. The problem of Being, what it is; how to be analysed; how made intelligible; to get its principle and deduce its forms — was the centre round which his whole thought turned. The solution of the problem which he worked out for himself penetrated his entire life and convictions. His metaphysics were less of a professional accomplishment, and more completely himself, than was probably the case with any man, excepting Hamilton, whom I have known. His interest in ethical speculations seemed to me to be entirely subordinate to his metaphysical; and any ethical doctrine which he reached took its cast from his demonstrative theory of knowledge and existence.

"The play of his intellect was fine, subtle, arrowy

in its keenness and directness. His metaphysical system, whatever may be thought of its compass or truth, was clear as daylight through all its depths. It professed, indeed, to afford a level line of demonstration, on which, when once one sets out, there is no pause until the whole apparent mystery of reality is reached and cleared. His abstractions and refinements were lofty and subtle, but his imagination had always a concrete embodiment for the airiest and least palpable of them. The literary and artistic faculty, to which he had given free scope in his earlier days, was now the handmaiden of his intellect, and set the most abstract of his conceptions in luminous illustrations and exquisite shapes of poetry. He retained the mastery of a style, clear, idiomatic, and brilliant, which, even when he discoursed on metaphysics,

> 'Caught at every turn
> The colours of the sun.'

More intellectually intense than excursive, more taken with the harmony and the march of demonstration than with the requirements and the facts of real life or the teachings of experience, he sought to determine by deduction from principles of reason the essential nature of things, and of existence in its greatest generality. 'Reasoned truth' was with him the highest, the only philosophy; in his entire intellect and interests he was the type of the philosopher of the abstract and deductive school.

"When I first became acquainted with Mr Ferrier

his speculative ardour seemed to be leading him towards a principle of even higher abstraction than that of the 'Institutes.' The author at this time most congenial to his mode of thought was Hegel. He studied Hegel for certainly more than the last ten years of his life, without, as he himself used freely to acknowledge to the end, completely satisfying himself that he had mastered the Hegelian conception,—a fact worthy of note by the fluent praters about Hegel in these times. It was obvious, however, from his conversation, that during these latter years his thoughts were a good deal directed to the realisation of glimpses of this conception, and to its application in various ways. I doubt whether he had in this line reached a point that was entirely satisfactory to his own mind. His speculative efforts were, I suspect, purely tentative.

"As a Professor, he was equalled in power and influence by few who have occupied university chairs. He made men thinkers,—not, however, by any routine of drill or discipline, but by his hold of his subject, the wonderful clearness and force of his prelections, and the outflowing of his personality into all that he said and did. The respect, affection, and obedience of his class were given to him spontaneously as a tribute of loyalty to the man.

"Ferrier's was altogether a strong nature, one in which were blended high and rare qualities, yet harmoniously vigorous. To force of intellect there were added depth of feeling and strength of will;

resolution which, once taken, was indomitable. But never were stern qualities set amid more genial surroundings, or united with greater kindliness, courtesy, warmth, and steadiness of affection. Socially, he was one of the most pleasant, interesting, and attractive of men. No description will ever enable one who was a stranger to him personally to realise the depth of humour and the raciness of wit which were in him. This was quite a part of the man, spontaneous and irrepressible in its outflowings, breaking forth often when least expected, so as to relieve the dulness, it might be, of college deliberations, or infuse pleasantry into the occasional fierceness of university polemics.

"He is now with us no longer; the soul that struggled so hard with the hardest things for human thought has passed away after an afflicting illness, that was borne most touchingly, most heroically. We miss the finely-cut, decisive face, the erect manly presence, the measured meditative step, the friendly greeting; but there are men, and Ferrier was one of them, for whom, once known, there is no real past. The characteristic features and qualities of such men become part of our conscious life; memory keeps them before us living and influential, in a higher, truer present which overshadows the actual and visible."

To his friend and son-in-law, Sir Alexander Grant, was intrusted the disposal and revisal of Mr Ferrier's manuscript compositions. Fitted alike by his interest in the subject, and his affectionate intimacy with the

deceased, for the fulfilment of this pious duty, he readily accepted the task; but his early return, after a few months' furlough, to the labour of an important office in India, compelled him to relinquish the actual publication. Another friend, who had the advantage of consulting unreservedly with Sir Alexander Grant, and being made fully acquainted with his views, undertook, in accordance with Mrs Ferrier's wishes, to prepare these volumes for the press. For the appearance of these lectures in their present form, and for the selection of such among his other writings as are here put together, the second editor alone is responsible.

The lectures on Greek Philosophy were mainly composed, or at least delivered in the shape into which Mr Ferrier finally brought them, about the year 1859. Before this year he had lectured on some periods of Greek Philosophy, and may in several cases have incorporated his earlier with his later lectures. Some parts of the remarks upon Aristotle bear the date 1857 and 1858; others again seem to have been written as late as February and March 1863. Of the discussion referring to the Stoics and Epicureans, some papers have marginal dates of 1857 and 1858, as well as later notices of 1860, 1861, and 1862. The earlier part, as far as the end of the Cyrenaic, Cynic, and Megaric schools, appears to have been more fully elaborated than what follows. His lectures up to this point were carefully written out in two bound manuscript volumes, of which the first bears the title, 'Lectures

on the History of Greek Philosophy.—I. The Pre-Socratic Period. 1859-60;' and the second, 'Lectures on the History of Greek Philosophy.—II. The Socratic Period. 1860-61-62.' The remaining portion was mostly written on loose sheets; these were frequently revised and corrected: in some cases where later lectures have been incorporated with earlier ones, it is not easy to determine precisely how much of the earlier he intended to retain, or how much he considered superseded by the later. Here and there paragraphs are marked "Omit;" these the editor has judged right to exclude from the work, though not clearly certain whether the omission thus directed merely referred to the particular occasion of the lecture being delivered, or was meant to imply a purpose of rewriting or expunging the paragraphs. Some omissions have also been made of passages where the subject handled was not directly Greek Philosophy, but one which, though closely connected with it, has received full treatment in various other works; for instance, the lives of the more eminent philosophers. To include the biography of Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, perfectly suitable as it was in lectures addressed to youthful learners, appeared unnecessary in a review of Greek Philosophy. This rule of exclusion, however, did not always seem applicable to the less illustrious occupants of a place in the history of metaphysical speculation. It appears from the MS. that the lecturer occasionally read to his class articles contributed by himself to the 'Imperial Dictionary of

Universal Biography.' Use has been made of this work, especially in the latter portion of the lectures. The lives of Schelling and Hegel are taken from the same publication, with the kind permission of the publisher, Mr Mackenzie, of Howard Street, Glasgow.*

The second volume contains the papers on philosophical subjects which Mr Ferrier published in 'Blackwood's Magazine,' and a few occasional lectures which appeared to deserve insertion, with one or two specimens illustrating his general literary faculty. It is probable that if he had republished these essays he would have remodelled and rewritten much; possibly omitted many portions; and it would be in nowise surprising if treatises composed at so early a stage in his speculative progress exhibit either a seeming or an actual discrepancy from his later and more matured opinions. It might indeed be matter for juster surprise if such difficulties did not frequently occur in the writings of any original thinker, when separated by a long interval in the date of their production. It should not be forgotten that what, seen from without, may present the look of a partial inconsistency, may often more justly from within be regarded as a reconciliation and union of two different aspects of truth. "There is nothing

* Several other articles in this work are from the pen of Mr Ferrier, and may be distinguished by having his initials affixed. Among those likely to interest the general reader may be noticed Adam Smith, Swift, and Schiller.

to retract, but much to carry forward, and which has been carried forward, as I trust one day to show," was an expression used by him in speaking of these papers. Whether the conflict between his earlier and later views be real or apparent, the editors have not felt themselves authorised to attempt any correction or amplification; these essays are left as they were originally written, with omission of one or two pages quite irrelevant to the purport of the argument. They believe this plan to be in accordance with the spirit which animated Mr Ferrier's own researches: for he was far too fearless and faithful a follower of truth to have hesitated for a moment to throw aside an opinion once held, if shown to be fallacious, or to doubt that from the collision of imperfectly discerned truths a spark might be struck out that would light to further insight. Those to whom the system of this philosopher, when brought nearer to maturity, presents matter of interest, will thus have the best assistance that can be supplied towards tracing its growth through successive stages; they are asked in return nothing but what every labour of thought has a right to claim from a reader, to understand each combination of ideas, where there can be room for doubt, according to their best admissible meaning.

Many may be of opinion that some regions into which the ocean of philosophic discovery spreads, have not been tracked with sufficient diligence by this explorer; such comparative incompleteness may

render his system less valuable in the eyes of some than it will seem to others: there may be readers to whom its fundamental axioms are a stumbling-block. A few may dare to believe that in originality, depth, and truth, it is surpassed by no philosophy which this century has seen produced in Britain.

The sincere thanks of the editors are due to some of Mr Ferrier's early friends, who have kindly contributed the best help they could towards rendering this brief introduction less incomplete than it might have been; Professor Solly, of Berlin, and George Makgill, Esq. of Kemback, are entitled to especial acknowledgement.

E. L. L.

POSTSCRIPT FOR THIRD EDITION.

As a slight indication or specimen of the reception which Ferrier's philosophy, when first published, met with in Germany, two translated extracts are subjoined. It would be easy, but it is unnecessary, to multiply such testimonies. The editors from time to time receive evidence that the impression made by Ferrier's philosophy has not been ephemeral, but that in Scotland, in England, and even in France, young minds are still captivated by Ferrier's manner and stimulated by his thought; and that mature and profound thinkers

recognise in him a metaphysical genius whose achievements the world will not willingly let die.

A. G.
E. L. L.

1. From a notice of Ferrier's 'Institutes of Metaphysic,' by Dr Wirth, one of the Editors of the 'Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik,' vol. xxx. p. 243 (1857):—

"We hail in this volume one of the cheering signs that English philosophy has raised itself above the one-sided empiricism which has long been predominant in it, to a higher standpoint of knowledge, uniting empiricism and idealism; at the same time a sign of the approach towards German idealistic speculation, noticeable too in other instances, among the deeper thinkers on the other side of the Channel. While our German philosophy has descended step by step from the ethereal height on which in earlier days Fichte's Idealism moved, till in some writers it has taken a completely sensualistic form, and so laid the foundation for the most determined materialism—a process analogous to the evolution of Greek philosophy in its second period, beginning with the idealism of Plato, and ending in sensualism, materialism, and lastly, a scepticism despairing of all knowledge — writings like this of Ferrier's seem to prove that, conversely, English

philosophy, after taking an empirical starting-point in Bacon, and being carried on farther in the same direction by Locke, is recently making an effort to take into itself the *a priori* and idealistic element of knowledge. Assuredly this tendency to unite the idealistic element with realism is so interesting and important a phenomenon, that we have every reason to take special notice of it in reviewing this work. The author endeavours throughout to raise himself above the antitheses in which abstract thought so easily becomes entangled, especially that of realism and idealism, and to grasp firmly their unity. . . . He is entirely in the right when he repels the charge that the law of cognition laid down by him is a one-sided or subjective-idealistic principle. He maintains that it never occurred to genuine idealism to deny that things really exist externally to ourselves. Idealism, he avers, not denying this, asks only what is meant by *external*, apart from all relation to an *internal;* and he proves that without this relation the word *external* has and can have no meaning." After a more detailed examination of the work, the reviewer states his aim to have been "to show that what I regard as the genuine fundamental idea of recent German philosophy is now opening a path for itself among our kinsmen the English; and I hope that the differences which I have expressed from the honoured author, if this notice meets his eye, will be regarded in the true light in which they seek to be regarded,

as put forward not with the purpose of impugning that fundamental idea, but rather with the aim of throwing clearer light upon it from a nearly-related point of view."

2. From a notice of 'Lectures on Greek Philosophy,' &c., 2 vols., by Professor Hermann Ulrici, an Editor of 'Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik,' vol. liv. p. 185 (1869):—

"The 'Philosophical Remains' include not the whole but the best and most important portion of the writings on philosophy left by James Frederick Ferrier, Professor of Moral Philosophy and Political Economy at the University of St Andrews, who died 11th June 1864. We know the author through his 'Institutes of Metaphysic,' a work which even in England made a strong impression, and shortly after its appearance received a notice in this periodical which entered into and duly appreciated its views. We lament with the editors the premature death of this eminent man, whom we rank far higher than the newest celebrities for the day of English philosophy (J. S. Mill, A. Bain, &c.)—the more since he had the courage to do battle against the stream of shallow empiricism which English philosophy still follows, and which in consistency leads inevitably to one-sided materialism, sapping not only all ethical science, but all science whatever.

"The first volume contains almost exclusively lectures on the history of Greek philosophy, which Fer-

rier repeatedly delivered before the students of his University. He praises in the introduction Hegel and Zeller as the historians of philosophy who made the first successful attempt 'to grasp the inner soul rather than the external environment of bygone speculations, and to trace the logical concatenation of systems.' . . . The lectures are distinguished by abundant originality of conception, by clearness and thoroughness of exposition, and by the skill with which, entering into his hearers' standpoint and power of apprehension, they succeed in smoothing their road to the understanding of philosophy and its history. Pre-eminently directed to this end is a copious introduction on the essence and conception of philosophy. In this respect they may well be recommended to many of our historians, and to all who have to deliver lectures on the history of philosophy, as models worthy of careful study."

GREEK PHILOSOPHY.

I. THE PRE-SOCRATIC PERIOD.

INTRODUCTORY.

1. In the present session I propose to treat of the history of Philosophy, both moral and metaphysical, on a more extended scale than I have yet been in the habit of doing. Philosophy itself must, of course, engage our attention; because, unless we know what philosophy is, unless we have a clear conception of its aim and results, the history of philosophy must remain a blank, a sealed book, a mere repertory of dead and unprofitable dogmas. But when we have once formed a right conception of philosophy, the study of its history will then be found to react powerfully in confirming and enlarging our knowledge, and in directing and enlightening our energies. The aim of philosophy is to raise us into the region of universal, or, as I may call it, unindividual, thinking; the accidents of reason must fall away, and the

essence of reason must stand forth declared: all that is arbitrary in human thought must disappear; and we must rest on the necessary elements of mind and of the universe. That is the end which philosophy proposes to her votaries, because it is only through this abnegation of particular or optional thinking that universal truth can be attained. This is the end which, on a small scale, must occupy the individual thinker; it is the end which, on a large scale, has occupied all the generations of philosophers from the dawn of speculation until now. Hence, in studying the history of philosophy, we shall find that we are in fact studying only the development of our own reason in its most essential forms, with this difference, that the great problem which, in our minds, is worked out in a hurried manner, and within contracted limits, is evolved at leisure in the history of philosophy, and presented in juster and more enlarged proportions. The history of philosophy is in fact philosophy itself *taking its time*, and seen through a magnifying-glass.

2. The chief aim of the historian of philosophy ought to be, to give a continuity or organised connection to the different parts of his narrative. But to do this, he must endeavour to verify in his own consciousness, and as the indigenous growth of his own mind, the speculations of antecedent thinkers. He may not agree with these speculations; but he ought, above all things, to understand what they mean—what they are in their spirit, and not merely

in the letter. When I say that he must verify these doctrines in his own consciousness, I mean that he must actively reproduce and realise them in his own thoughts, together with the grounds on which they rest. He must be able to place himself in the mental circumstances in which they arose, and must observe them springing up in his own mind, just as they sprang up in the minds of those who originally propounded them. They must be to him, not the dead dogmas of *their* thinking, but the living products of *his own*. They must come to him not as antiquated traditions, but as teeming with present interest, and as fraught with a present and inextinguishable vitality. As an original thinker, he must reanimate these doctrines from within, while as a critic and historian, he is engaged in receiving and deciphering them from without. What he receives from others he must also find as the indigenous growth of his own mind. What he must be able to say to himself is this: Such a system, or such a doctrine, or such a problem, is not what some individual thinker has chosen to think, or has accidentally thought, but it is what thinking itself, in certain circumstances, must inevitably think. It is only when he conceives and executes his vocation in this spirit that the historian of philosophy can be regarded as having verified and reanimated the systems which he is expounding. When he has so verified them—verified them in the manner thus imperfectly described—he has obeyed the primary obligation by which the historian of

philosophy is bound, and has fulfilled a requisition which either contains all other rules, or renders all other rules superfluous.

3. In the older histories of philosophy this rule is but little attended to, this obligation is very imperfectly fulfilled. They abound in learning, but they are lamentably deficient in insight. They are in general mere repertories of disjointed and exploded opinions, of capricious and arbitrary thoughts, which, as presented in these compilations, contain no point of interest for any living soul. The letter is there, but the spirit has altogether fled; there is abundance of the husk, but the kernel is nowhere to be found.

4. Of late years the history of philosophy has been studied in a profounder and more rational spirit. Living insight has been aimed at rather than dead learning. Attempts have been made to grasp the inner soul rather than the external environment of bygone speculations, and to trace the logical filiation of systems. These attempts, it must be owned, have been only partially successful. Much still remains to be done. The ground has been broken; but it cannot be said that the jungle has been cleared, or the roads made. The most diligent pioneers in this good work have been the two German philosophers Hegel and Zeller. But Hegel's work on the history of philosophy labours under the disadvantages incident to a posthumous publication, and seems in many

places to contain mere hints which probably were more fully expanded in the oral delivery of his lectures. Much of it may be described as made up of dark, abrupt, and laconic jottings. Zeller's history of the Greek philosophy is in some respects more complete, and is indeed a very valuable work: but it is too much pervaded, particularly in those places where clearness is most required, by that obscurity, indeed I may say unintelligibility, which seems to be inseparable from the philosophical lucubrations of our Teutonic neighbours. With all these shortcomings, however, I am of opinion that these two historians of philosophy, Hegel and Zeller, are entitled to take precedence before all other inquirers in this difficult field of research.

5. To enable the historian of philosophy to enter on his work with any chance of success, we have now to consider what equipment he requires—requires on his own account, and also on account of those whom he addresses. We have to consider what preliminary study he has to go through before he can prosecute his researches successfully, and what preparatory information he must lay before his audience before he can expect to render intelligible to them the result of those researches. It is principally, I think, in regard to this preparatory or introductory matter that all the histories of philosophy are wanting; and it is for the purpose of supplying this defect, and of remedying it in so far as I can, that I proceed to speak of

what I conceive to be the essential preliminaries to the study of the history of philosophy.

6. The essential preliminary to the study of the history of philosophy is, a clear conception of philosophy itself. Without this the history of philosophical systems cannot be studied to much—or, I would rather say, to any—advantage. It may be thought that philosophy itself is best learned from the study of its history: and there can be no doubt that the latter reacts upon the former in the way of rendering our conception of philosophy more definite, as well as more comprehensive. The conception of philosophy is confirmed and enlightened by the survey of philosophical systems. But without some tolerably definite conception of what philosophy is, and of what it aims at, the study of these systems is a vain and unprofitable pursuit. We must have this conception to begin with—we must have it to found upon—otherwise we cannot expect to derive any intellectual improvement from the study of the history of philosophy; we shall be baffled and bewildered at every turn by the apparent extravagances and unintelligibilities which we encounter. Even when we carry with us a clear conception of philosophy, we are frequently perplexed when tracing historically the mazy windings of speculation; but without this clue we should be utterly lost and confounded.

7. What, then, is the conception of philosophy?

I cannot tell you this in one word or in one sentence. We must make our approaches to it gradually, beginning with what is very indefinite, and making it more definite as we proceed. Let us begin, then, with a definition, which, though it conveys very little information, is quite unexceptionable—is, indeed, what the whole world is willing to assent to—and let us say that *philosophy is the pursuit of truth.* This is the first, and simplest, and vaguest conception and definition of philosophy which we can form.

8. This definition calls for some explanation as to what we mean by truth. When we say that philosophy is the pursuit of truth, we must at any rate have some notion of the object of which philosophy is the pursuit. What, then, do we mean by truth? I commence by calling your attention to a distinction by means of which we may clear up our idea of truth, and bring ourselves to understand what it means; I refer to the distinction of truth into truth relative and truth absolute. When I have explained what these two kinds of truth are, we shall then be able to render our definition of philosophy more distinct and complete by declaring whether philosophy be the pursuit of truth relative or of truth absolute. I proceed, then, to speak first of relative truth, and secondly of absolute truth.

9. *First,* of truth as relative. A relative truth is a truth which is true for one mind, or for one order

or kind of minds, but which is not or may not be true for another mind, or for another kind of minds. All sensible truth is or may be of this character: indeed, all truth which the physical organism is instrumental in bringing before the mind is merely relative. It is merely relative, because with a different organism a different truth would be presented to the mind. This may be readily understood without much illustration. If our eyes were constructed like microscopes, the world would present to us an aspect very different from that which it now wears; if they were formed like telescopes, the spectacle of the starry heavens would be wonderfully changed. If the sensibility of our retina were either increased or diminished, the whole order of colours would undergo a corresponding variation. So, too, in regard to sounds and tastes: alter the organism on which these depend, and what was once true in regard to them would be true no longer; the thunder might sound softer than the zephyr's sigh, or the lover's lute might be more appalling than the cannon's roar. So, too, even in regard to touch: if our touch were strong and swift as the lightning's stroke, the most solid matter would be less palpable than the air. So purely relative is the truth of all our sensible impressions: and many other truths with which we have to do may be admitted to be of the same relative character—to be truths merely in relation to us, and to beings constituted like us, but not necessarily truths to other orders of intelligence.

10. *Secondly*, of truth as absolute. As relative truth is truth which is true for one mind, or for one order of intelligence, so absolute truth is truth which is true for all minds, for all orders of intelligence. It is plain that absolute truth cannot mean truth placed altogether out of relation to intelligence, for that would be equivalent to saying that the highest truth could not be apprehended by the most perfect intelligence, not even by omniscience. To define absolute truth as that which stands out of relation to all reason—as that which is not to be known on any terms by any intelligence—is a position too absurd to require any exposure. All truth, therefore, is in this sense relative, that is, can be conceived only in relation to intelligence; but the distinction between absolute truth and relative truth is, as has been stated, this: that relative truth is what exists only for some, but not necessarily for all minds; while absolute truth is that which exists necessarily for all minds. We shall find hereafter that this distinction is of great service to us in leading us to understand the grounds upon which philosophers generally have set so little store on the truth of our mere sensible impressions. No philosopher ever denied that the intimations of the senses are relatively true, or that we should place implicit confidence in them as presentations relatively true. But many have denied that these intimations were absolutely true, were valid of necessity for *all* minds. The grounds, however, on which those philosophers proceeded, have

been frequently mistaken. Hence many perplexities have arisen, and hence speculative thought has been often unjustly charged with inculcating absurdities, which existed nowhere except in the misapprehensions of its accusers.

11. Having thus explained and defined (intelligibly, I trust, though not fully, and perhaps not convincingly) the distinction between relative truth and absolute truth, we have now to ask, Which of these two forms of truth is the special object of philosophy? The answer is, that the attainment of absolute truth, of truth as it exists for *all* intellect, is the principal, though not the exclusive, aim of philosophy. Philosophy must not overlook altogether the consideration of relative truth, because perhaps a finer analysis will show us that the two are ever blended together in an essential and inseparable contrast. But nevertheless, as I have said, absolute truth is the principal, indeed the proper, object at which philosophy aims; it is the point at which all the higher metaphysicians of every age and of every nation have aimed, and at which it is their duty to aim (however far short of the mark their efforts may be doomed to fall), if they would continue true to their vocation.

12. A question here arises which threatens to cut short our progress: Are man's faculties competent in any degree to the attainment of absolute truth?

The whole prospects of philosophy, according to the conception of it which we are endeavouring to fix, are obviously involved in the answer to this question. If we reply peremptorily that man's faculties are in no degree competent to the attainment of absolute truth, our discussion is at once cut short, and our conception of philosophy is annihilated. Such is the result if we answer this question in the negative. Therefore, while I admit the difficulty and the importance of the question, I am constrained to answer it in the affirmative, although I cannot at present set forth fully the grounds of my decision. I answer it in the affirmative with this proviso — a proviso which may perhaps save me from the charge of speaking too dogmatically—and I say that man's faculties *are* competent to the attainment of absolute truth, provided and in so far as man's mind has something in common with all other minds; in other words, provided there be a universal intelligent nature in which he is a partaker. It is obvious that this community of intellectual nature is the ground, and the only ground, on which man can lay claim to any knowledge of the absolute truth, because absolute truth has been defined as that which exists for all minds; but unless man's mind has something in common with all minds, absolute truth cannot exist for him, can have no meaning in reference to him; while, on the other hand, if he has something in common with all other intelligences, he may lay claim to an interest

in absolute truth, and is competent to attain to it when the requisite exertions are put forth.

13. You thus perceive that the question regarding our competency to attain to absolute truth resolves itself into the new question, Is there in the mind of man a universal part—that is, a part which in all intelligences is essentially of the same character? Intelligence itself seems to constrain us to answer this question in the affirmative. That there is such a part seems to me to be an axiomatic truth of reason. To suppose, for example, that the supreme intelligence has nothing whatever in common with the human intelligence, is to suppose that the one of them is an intelligence, and that the other is no intelligence at all. It is to dissolve the very ground on which we conceive both of them as intelligences. Two intelligences which have nothing whatever in common cannot both of them be intelligences; they cannot be both placed under that category of thought, or indicated by the one word intelligence, because it is only through our thought that they possess some point or quality in common that we can think of them as intelligences; and therefore, to think of them as having no common quality, and at the same time to think of them as intelligent, is to think of them as both having, and as not having, something in common; in other words, it is to think a downright contradiction. This truth, then, in regard to the constitution of the human minds, and of all

minds, namely, that they agree in some respect, seems to be a necessary axiom of reason. In all intelligence there is, by the terms of its conception, a universal, that is, an essential unity of kind, however small the point of unity may be.

14. On religious grounds this unity might be much more largely insisted on. Its postulation is the very foundation and essence of religion. This unity constitutes the very bond, and the only bond, between the Creator and the creature. Deny this connection between the divine and the human reason, and you destroy the very possibility of religion.

15. I admit, however, that the answer which I have ventured to return to this question is one which cannot be expected to command your assent until you have time to reflect upon it more fully, and it is well worthy of your most attentive consideration. It is indeed *the* question of the present day, as it was the great question of philosophy in the time of Socrates and the Sophists. The whole sophistical philosophy proceeded on the assumption that there was, or might be, an absolute diversity of kind in the constitution of intellectual natures; that different orders of minds had not necessarily anything whatsoever in common. From whence it followed that there were as many kinds of truth as there were kinds of mind, *quot mentes, tot veritates;* in other words, that there was no truth at all, no absolute

truth, no truth, in the strict sense of the word, anywhere in the universe. In these few words are contained the sum and substance of the sophistical philosophy, and the arguments by which Socrates endeavoured to rebut the conclusions of the Sophists proceeded on no other principle than that which I have attempted to place before you; the principle, namely, that there is a common nature, known by the name of reason, in all intelligent beings; and that, in virtue of this common nature, man can rise to some extent to the contemplation of absolute truth, which exists, and can exist, only as the counterpart and object of this common reason, of which man, in his degree, is a partaker.

16. But my object at present is not so much to settle the question in regard to the unity or common nature of intelligences, as to place before you a clear conception and precise definition of philosophy, a conception and definition which may be of service to us when we come to deal with the history of speculative systems. I defined philosophy at the outset as the pursuit of truth. I now define it as the pursuit of absolute truth; and farther, having defined absolute truth to be truth as it exists for *all* minds, I add that circumstance to the definition, and I affirm that "philosophy is the pursuit of absolute truth, that is, of truth as it exists for *all* intelligence."

17. What I wished principally to impress upon you in my last lecture was, the distinction between relative truth and absolute truth. All truth is, in one sense, relative; that is to say, whatever we know or think of must be known or thought of in relation to ourselves. All that we know must be known in conformity with our capacities of knowledge, and cannot be known except under the conditions imposed by these capacities. But here is where the distinction lies: relative truth is truth which comes to us in virtue of our particular nature as human intelligences; absolute truth is truth which comes to us in virtue of our common nature, as intelligences simply, what is here looked to being merely the circumstance that we are intelligences at all, and not the circumstance that we are this or that particular kind or order of intelligence. Let us suppose a number of intelligences divided into different kinds, into various orders and degrees; you will observe that, by the ordinary logical doctrine, each of these kinds must embrace something *peculiar* to itself, and also something common to the whole number, however numerous the classes of intelligences may be. Now, what I want to impress upon you is this: that each of these kinds of intelligence will know and apprehend *partly* in conformity with the peculiar endowment of what I have spoken, and *partly* also in conformity with the common endowment of which I have spoken. And what it apprehends in conformity with its *peculiar* capacity is relative truth; what it

apprehends in conformity with its *common* [illegible] is absolute truth. It is further obvious from this explanation that relative truth is, as I have frequently said, truth merely for some minds; while absolute truth is truth for all intelligence: and this analysis of the mind into a common capacity and a peculiar capacity, furnishes us, we shall by-and-by see, the true ground of the well-known distinction of the human faculties into sense, understanding, and reason.

18. To return to our definition of philosophy. Without altering the meaning of that definition, I may slightly vary its expression; for ideas sometimes gain in distinctness by being presented under different forms of expression. Truth, we may say, is that which is—it is the real; so that, instead of saying that philosophy is the pursuit of absolute truth, that is, of truth as it exists for all intelligence, we may say that "philosophy is the pursuit of the absolutely real, that is, of the real as it exists for all intelligence." These two expressions are synonymous; but, perhaps, to some of you the latter form of the definition may be the more significant of the two.

19. This definition may be open to objections; but I cannot think that it is open to any well-founded objections. As objections, however, are actually urged, which are very pertinacious, if not very strong, some notice must be taken of them. They are so obtrusive, and they have carried with

them so much apparent weight, that the dominant philosophy of this country is founded upon a denial and repudiation of the definition which I have ventured to lay down as the only true definition of philosophy. In direct contravention of this, high authorities have maintained that philosophy is the pursuit of mere relative truth, of truth as it exists, not for all, but only for *our* intelligence. And they found this definition on the consideration that man can deal with truth only as it presents itself to his particular mental constitution. Their own doctrine and their objection to our position may be summed under the following query, which they address to : How is it possible for man to know or to speak any truth, except such as exists for his *particular* intelligence? How can he have anything to do with truth? What can he know about truth as it exists for *all* intelligence?

20. I answer, that man can have nothing to do with truth as it exists for all intelligence, can know nothing at all about it, unless there be something in *his* intelligence which links him to *all* intelligence; some point or quality in which his intelligence agrees with all other intelligences; in short, unless there be a universal or common nature in all intelligences. If there be this, if intelligence be to some extent universally the same, then it is obvious that man can know the truth as it exists for all intelligences; for he has merely to look to the truth which addresses

itself to the universal part of his own intelligent nature; this universal part being the same in all, the truth which it apprehends must be the same for *all;* in other words, that which it apprehends must be the truth for all intelligence, and not merely the truth for man's intelligence; it must be absolute and not mere relative truth. On the other hand, if it be true that there is no common nature, no universal faculty in all intelligence, no point in which all minds agree; in that case it must be admitted that the objection is fatal to our definition of philosophy. In that case man can have no dealings with absolute and universal truth; the only truth of which he can be cognisant must be relative and particular. But observe the contradiction in which we get involved if we take up this position. I have already stated what this contradiction is, and therefore I merely repeat my statement, that if we deny to intelligences a common nature in which they all participate, or if we deny to man's intelligence a participation in this common nature, we fall into the absurdity of at once including certain things under the same category of thought, and of excluding at the same time some of these things from that category.

21. My object at present is rather to furnish insight than to inspire conviction. I wish you rather to understand what I say, than to be convinced by what I say; and I think you may now understand distinctly the positions respectively occupied by the

two parties who divide the philosophical world. On the one hand, we have those whom I venture to regard as the true philosophers. They hold, *first*, that there is some principle or quality or faculty common to all intelligence; and, *second*, that in virtue of this *common* faculty man is competent, to some extent, to apprehend the truth as it exists for *all* intelligence; in other words, is competent to apprehend the absolute truth. And founding on these two postulates, they obtain such a definition of philosophy as that which I have given you—a definition which follows at once from these two postulates, namely, that philosophy is the pursuit of the absolute truth, or of the absolutely real; that is, of the true and real as they exist for all intellect. On the other hand, we have those whom I venture to regard as the opponents of true philosophy. They hold, *first*, that there is no principle or quality or faculty common to all intelligence: and, *secondly*, that in consequence of there being no such universal principle, man is not competent to apprehend the truth as it exists for all intelligence; in other words, is not competent to apprehend the absolute truth: and founding on these two postulates, they obtain the following as their definition of philosophy—Philosophy is the pursuit of mere relative truth, or of the relatively real; that is, of the true and real as they exist merely for man's intelligence.

22. You have now before you the two definitions

which express the two conceptions that lie at the root of the two great schools of philosophy that have divided the world; and two more fundamental conceptions of these antagonist philosophies I believe it is not possible to obtain. I have called both of these schools philosophical; but in strict speech we ought to say that while the one of them is philosophical, the other is anti-philosophical, for they are directly opposed to each other, as you may see from the opposite conceptions which each of them entertains in regard to the proper business of philosophy. But we need not quarrel about the use of a word; and, provided the opposition between the two parties be understood, we may apply the term philosophical to both of them.

23. But to render our definition of philosophy complete, something, indeed a good deal, still requires to be added to it. Philosophy, I have said, is the pursuit of the real as it exists for all intelligence. This definition proceeds, as I have said, on the postulate—a postulate which I regard as axiomatic—that all intelligences know and think in some respects alike. It is not necessary, at present at least, to suppose that there are more intelligences than ours in the universe; but *if* there are other intelligences, it is necessary to suppose that they agree in some respect with ours, or, in other words, that all intelligences, actual or possible, have something in common. Now, the question here arises, What is

this universal principle, this faculty which is common to all minds, in virtue of which we are able to apprehend the truth, not merely as it exists for us, but as it exists for all? What can we say in explanation of this faculty?

24. To explain this universal faculty, I shall bring forward a few illustrations as the best means of rendering myself intelligible; or rather, without assuming that we have such a faculty, I shall produce the grounds which compel us to hold that there is something universal, as well as something particular, in our intelligent constitution. When I apply sugar to my palate, and declare that the taste is sweet and agreeable, am I entitled to declare further that sugar is sweet and agreeable to all sentient and intelligent beings? Can I announce this as a truth for all intelligence? Obviously I cannot; and why can I not? Simply because I am under no compulsion so to regard it: I can help thinking it as a truth for all intelligence. And on what ground can I help so thinking it? On the ground that an intelligence with a different organism from mine would apprehend the sugar differently. Therefore the truth for me, namely, that sugar is sweet and agreeable, cannot be laid down as a truth for all intelligence. Take another case. I say, "The earth goes round the sun." Is that a truth for all intelligence? It looks very like one, but it is not one. And why not? you will ask. I answer, for this reason: that a truth for all

intelligence means a truth which is valid for all intelligences which may have existed in the countless ages of the past, or which may exist in the countless ages of the future. Now, I am under no compulsion to think that the earth from all eternity has revolved around the sun, or that it will continue throughout all eternity so to revolve around the sun; in other words, I can help thinking that it always has travelled, and that it always will travel, as it now travels. I can conceive the operations of the universe changed. This, therefore, is not a truth valid at all times for all intelligence. Take another case. I say, The square on the hypotenuse of a right-angled triangle is equal to the squares on the other two sides; or, to take a simpler case, I say that two straight lines cannot enclose a space. Are these truths which exist for all intelligence? Yes, they undoubtedly are. Take the former: it is a truth which is valid for all intelligence. And why do I so regard it? Simply because I am compelled. I cannot help thinking it as a truth which every intelligence which follows the demonstration must assent to. And why can I not help thinking it to be a truth of this character? Because I cannot conceive that any difference in the organism, or any difference in the constitution of the universe, or any difference in the intelligence which apprehends it, should cause it to be apprehended differently. I cannot conceive any mind which understands the demonstration to hold that the squares on the two sides are either greater or less than the square on the third

side; and therefore I maintain that this is a truth valid not only for any intelligence, but valid for all intelligence; and that all mathematical truth, from the simplest axiom up to the most recondite conclusions, is of this character.

25. These observations (which have been somewhat hastily thrown together) are designed to contribute towards establishing this great and important conclusion, that the mind of man consists of a universal part as well as of a particular part, or of what we may call a universal faculty and a particular faculty. To pave the way for a right understanding of this distinction, I adduced these illustrative truths. The first was the truth that sugar is sweet; the second was that the earth goes round the sun; the third was (to take the simplest of the two cases) that two straight lines cannot enclose a space. Now, I have shown you that the first and second of these truths cannot be said to be true for all intelligences; and I have assigned the reason of this, which is, that either the constitution of the person who apprehends them, or the constitution of nature, can be conceived to be changed in so far as regards these truths, and that with the change, either in the constitution of the person or in the constitution of nature, the truth would cease to be true. Therefore they are particular and relative. I have further shown you that the third of these truths can be declared true for all intelligence, because no change in the constitution of the

person who apprehends it, no change in the constitution of nature, can in any degree affect it. This truth, then, that two straight lines cannot enclose a space, is universal and absolute. Thus we have two sorts of truths; a particular order, comprising all the truths represented by our first and second truths, and a universal order, comprising truths represented by our third truth. The particular order may be described as consisting of truths for some, but not for other, not for all, intelligences. The universal order may be described as consisting of truth for all intelligences.

26. What I have now particularly to call your attention to is, that just as there is one order or form of truth which is particular, and another order which is universal, so there is a faculty in man which is particular, and a faculty which is universal. The difference in the truths justifies us in maintaining a difference in the faculties or organs by which they are apprehended. We do not begin by finding that the mind has different faculties, but we begin by finding that the truths which the mind apprehends are very different in their character; that some of them are particular and relative, are truths merely for us; while others of them are universal and absolute, are truths for all intelligence; and in virtue of the objective distinction, as we may call it, we postulate a subjective distinction in the mind which apprehends them. We declare that, in reference to the particular

truths, man has a corresponding particular faculty; and in reference to the universal truths, that he has a corresponding universal faculty.

27. This analysis I regard as the most fundamental distinction which can be drawn in the science of the mind. It lies at the root of the ordinary division of the mind into Sense, Understanding, and Reason. If you were asked in what do these three differ, you would find it difficult to return a perfectly satisfactory answer. In regard more particularly to understanding and reason, you would find yourselves at a loss; for the difference between these two is what no psychology has as yet succeeded in explaining. But say that reason is the universal faculty, the faculty of truth as it exists for all intelligence, and that sense and understanding are divisions of the particular faculty, that is, of the faculty of truth as it exists for some, but not for all intelligence, and light breaks in upon the distinction. You perceive that the faculty which is conversant with truth for all must be different from the faculty which deals merely with truth for some; and perceiving that, you obtain an insight into the distinction between sense and understanding on the one hand, and reason on the other hand; you begin to comprehend something of the constitution of your own mind, and also of mind universally.

28. I have just one more remark to make before I expand my definition of philosophy, by means of

what I have said in regard to the universal faculty in man. It is obvious that this faculty must be the power, or seat, or place of necessary thinking, that is, of thoughts which we cannot help thinking, thoughts of which the opposites are pure nonsense; and in like manner it is obvious that the truths with which this faculty deals must be necessary truths, truths which cannot help being as they are, truths which cannot be otherwise than they are, and the opposites of which are pure nonsense. There is thus an objective necessity in truth, and a subjective necessity in thought, and the one of these corresponds to the other. For example, we say it is an objective necessary truth that two straight lines should not be capable of enclosing a space. And we say it is a subjective necessary thought that two straight lines should not be thought capable of enclosing a space. But what you have chiefly to attend to is, that wherever a necessary truth is apprehended, a truth which cannot be otherwise than it is, there the faculty of necessary truth, the universal faculty, comes into play, there necessary thinking takes place, there we think a thought which we cannot help thinking.

29. These considerations enable me to add something to my definition of philosophy, and to give it out in the following terms, which are the most definite, as well as the most complete, which I can at present devise. Philosophy is the pursuit of absolute truth, or of the absolutely real that is, of the true and

real as they exist for *all* intelligence; and this pursuit is conducted under the direction of the universal faculty in man, or, in other words, is conducted under the direction of necessary thinking.

30. If you attend to the definition of philosophy which I have given you, you will perceive that it comprehends two important points: it states both what the truth is which philosophy pursues, and what the faculty is which is engaged in the pursuit. The first part of the definition declares what the truth is which philosophy pursues: it says that philosophy is the pursuit of absolute truth, that is, of truth as it exists for all intelligence. This may be called the objective part of the definition; it declares what is the proper object of philosophy. But the definition would be incomplete unless we added something in explanation of the faculty by means of which the object of philosophy is to be attained. Therefore we subjoin:—And this pursuit is conducted under the direction of the universal faculty in man; in other words, is conducted under the direction of necessary thinking. Man's faculty of necessary thought is properly called his Reason. So that the definition expressed shortly is this: Philosophy is the pursuit of absolute truth conducted under the direction of reason. But the definition under this compendious form expresses a mere vague truism, unless you keep in mind what we mean by absolute truth, and also what we mean by reason.

31. There is one difficulty which this definition leaves unresolved, and that is the question, Whether the truth of which philosophy is the pursuit be a *kind* of truth or an *element* of truth; in other words, whether absolute truth can be apprehended by itself, or whether it must always be apprehended in union with relative truth? In short, whether each, the absolute and the relative, is a form of truth which can be apprehended without the other, or whether each can be apprehended only in combination with the other? This question I have considered under Proposition VI. of my 'Institutes of Metaphysic,' where I have stated my own opinion, that the two must always be apprehended together. But as this is a point which can be settled only as the result of our researches, and as the whole history of philosophy shows that it is a very undecided question, I think it better to make no allusion to it in the definition, but merely to affirm that absolute truth is the object of philosophy, without saying whether absolute truth is a kind or is an element of truth. And, in the same way, I do not at present discuss or decide the question, whether reason be itself a faculty or merely an element of a faculty, sense being the other element which goes to make up the completed faculty.

32. Philosophy having been thus defined, we are now in a position to define the history of philosophy. This definition is very easily given—it follows as a matter of course. If philosophy be the pursuit which

ave described, the history of philosophy must be history of that pursuit, and accordingly we define history of philosophy as the history of the pursuit bsolute truth, or of truth as it exists for all intelnce; and the history, moreover, of this pursuit, as ducted under the direction of the universal faculty man, that is, under the direction of necessary king, or, more shortly, of reason.

3. These preliminaries being understood, the hisan of philosophy ought now to have a tolerably inct conception of the work which he has to take hand. The task which he has to undertake is now parent, although it may be beyond his power to cute that task even moderately well. It is obus that the great business of the historian of philphy must be to note and to point out how, and to t extent, philosophy, as manifested in its history, esponds with philosophy as laid down in its defin. It is obvious that if philosophy, as manifest its history, does not correspond at all—indeed, ss it corresponds to a very large extent—with sophy as laid down in its definition, the definimust be false. It is incumbent, therefore, on the rian of philosophy to show this correspondence. is the principal work he has to perform. He be able to show that the spirit of speculative ry when looked at in itself, is borne out by the of speculative inquiry when looked at in its ical progress.

34. The definition of philosophy thus expre
the bond of union which unites the different s
tems, and serves as a clue by which the prog
of the historian may be directed. The histo
may sometimes lose sight of this clue, at other ti
he may perceive it very indistinctly, but in gen
he will be able to trace it as a fine thread run
through and binding together the different syst
which come under his inspection. The clue, in sh
on which he must fix his eye, is the circumsta
that the truth which philosophical systems aim a
absolute, and not relative, truth; that is to say
truth as it exists for all, and not truth as it ex
merely for some, intelligence.

35. The difficulty of following out this princi
must be confessed to be great; and this difficul
arises mainly from the fact that the philosoph
whose system we have to examine and estimate, n
distinctly realised, or held clearly before their mi
that conception of philosophy which is expresse
our definition. Hence they frequently appear t
engaged in researches which have little or no
nection with that pursuit which we have define
the proper vocation of philosophy. They frequ
appear to reach results which fall very far sh
the absolute truth, results very different from t
which we might expect philosophers to place b
us. They frequently appear to entertain the
wayward and capricious opinions, instead of

lided by the strict necessities of reason. But if we ep in mind this consideration, that the moving rces of speculation, as of everything else, operate ecretly long before they openly show themselves, we hall not consider it surprising that the outward exression of philosophy should often differ extremely om its inward spirit; that its invisible life should ten find a very inadequate exponent in its visible rm; that the written letter should often indicate ery imperfectly the unwritten meaning. It has only en by slow degrees that the mind of man has tained to a distinct consciousness of the right conption of philosophy as the pursuit of truth as it ists for all intelligence, and to the right concepon of the means to be employed in that pursuit, mely, necessary thinking. Yet there is sufficient vidence to show that both of these conceptions were t the bottom of the endeavours of the very earliest hilosophers, and were the animating principle of heir researches.

36. Nothing is more perplexing to the student of he history of philosophical systems than the oppoition to his ordinary modes of thought which these ystems usually present. They seem quite alien rom his ordinary ways of thinking. Their thoughts re not as his thoughts, and he cannot understand ow their views of things should be so different from is. The explanation is, that while he is imbued ith truth as it exists for *his* mind, with relative truth

appealing to the particular part of his nature, these systems are aiming at the attainment and exhibition of truth as it exists for all minds, of absolute truth, appealing to the universal part of man's nature. In these attempts they may be far from successful; but knowing what their aim is, and knowing that there must be a difference between truth considered as universal and absolute, ultimate and elementary, or truth as it is for all, and truth particular, relative, or as it is for some, we are in a position to comprehend their drift and scope; and although they may fail to convince us, we shall in general be able to understand them.

37. For example, throughout the whole history of philosophy we find sensible knowledge held in but slight esteem. The truths of the senses are denied to be truths at all in the proper and strict acceptation of the word truth, and we are referred away to some other form of truth, of which no very clear account is given. To the young student of philosophy this is a most disheartening and perplexing procedure. He cannot understand why the truths of sense should be set aside as of little or no account, and why another set of truths, which seem to him far less satisfactory, should be brought forward in their place. And in no work, either on philosophy or on its history, does he find any very satisfactory reason assigned for this preference. But let him be told, and let him be called upon to consider, that the truths of

the senses are not necessarily truths for all minds, but only truths for beings with senses like ours—are, in fact, only truths for *some* intelligences; and let him be further told, that the truth which philosophy aims at is the truth as it is for *all* intelligences; and he will be no longer surprised at the disparaging tone in which sensible truth is spoken of in the history of philosophy. He may be of opinion that philosophy is wrong in this, inasmuch as he may think that all truth for man resolves itself into mere sensible truth. But whether philosophy be right or wrong, the student now *understands* distinctly the ground on which philosophy proceeds in holding as of little or no account the knowledge which comes to man through the senses. He sees that the reason why philosophy undervalues sensible knowledge is, that such knowledge is the truth only for some, but not for all intelligence. And he sees, further, that philosophy, if she is to be true to the terms of her own definition, not only may, but must, affix a brand on all sensible knowledge, stamping it as comparatively invalid and irrelevant.

IONIC SCHOOL.

THALES.

1. I NOW proceed to consider the philosophy of Thales, if indeed the term philosophy may be applied to so meagre and barren a system. Thales and the other inquirers of the Ionic school appear at first sight naturalists (*physici* rather than *philosophers*). When these systems are looked at in their letter they seem to be entirely physical; it is only when their spirit is attended to that they can be pronounced to some extent philosophical. First, then, What did Thales regard as the ultimately real, the absolutely true? For, as was formerly said, this is what philosophy undertakes, or at least endeavours, to ascertain. The determination of this question is identical with the search for unity amid multiplicity; in other words, is identical with an agency after some common principle, which is the groundwork of all things, and which remains unchanged amid all the changes of the universe. What, then, according to Thales, is the ultimately real, the one in the many, the per-

manent principle of the universe, the principle to which all intelligence must yield assent?

2. Thales answers, that this principle is *water;* that water is ultimately real—the groundwork and origin of all that is. It is probable that by the term water he did not mean the element under the ordinary and palpable form in which it is presented to our senses, but under some more subtle or occult form of moisture or fluidity.

3. That water plays a most important part in the economy of nature is a truth too obvious to be overlooked. All the functions of animal and vegetable life depend on the presence of this agent, and it is scarcely possible to conceive the world subsisting without it. If any one element may be regarded as the parent of all that lives, as the condition on which the beauty and magnificence of nature depend, water has probably the best claim to be regarded as that element. Without moisture the universe would be a heap of ashes: add moisture, and the desert blossoms like the rose. These are reflections which could scarcely fail to present themselves to the earliest observers of nature; and, accordingly, we find that Thales gave expression to these reflections in the doctrine which announced that water was the principle and origin of all things.

4. Aristotle, commenting on the doctrine of Thales,

confirms these remarks. In his Metaphysics (B. i. ch. 3) Aristotle says, that Thales was probably led to the opinion that water is the universal principle "from observing that all nourishment is moist, that heat is generated from moisture, and that life is sustained by heat. He observed that the seeds of all things were in their nature moist—this moisture they must derive from water; and hence Thales," continues Aristotle, "held that water was the principle from which all things proceeded."

5. Aristotle then goes on to consider how far this doctrine of Thales may have been traditional. "There are some," says he, "who think that our very remote ancestors entertained theological speculations of the same character concerning nature. For they made Oceanus and Tethys the parents of generation; and water, under the poetical name of Styx, this they made the oath of the gods; for that which is the most ancient is the most respected; but the oath is the most highly respected of all things." The meaning of this is, that the gods swear by Styx, that is, by water; but the gods swear by what they respect most, but what they respect most is the most ancient and the most permanent of all things, in other words, is the ultimately real and true; and, therefore, water being that which they swear by must be the ultimately real and true. Thus, you observe that Aristotle traces the opinion of Thales up to a theological tradition respecting the

oath of the gods. There is an old dogma, he says, that the gods swear by water; but what the gods swear by must be the most ancient, the most sure and steadfast—must be the ground of everything—the very kernel, as we may say, of the universe. Therefore, water must be the ground or kernel of everything. Thales translated into philosophy this old mythological tradition.

6. Here it naturally occurs to one to ask how Thales derived the various objects of the universe from the single principle of water? The only explanation offered is, that these diversified objects are formed by means of a process of thickening or of thinning, which water undergoes. Aristotle's words in reference to this process, although it is somewhat doubtful whether he is speaking of Thales when he uses them, are *πυκνότης καὶ μανότης*, *i.e.*, a thickening and a thinning, a close consistency and a loose consistency. Water, when its consistency is loose, becomes vapour or air, when its consistency is still looser it becomes a fiery ether; in the same way thickened water becomes slime, and slime, when further condensed, becomes earth. In other words, the rarefaction of the watery principle yields air and fire; the condensation of the watery principle yields slime and earth, and out of the earth all things are produced. Water is thus a very Proteus, which presents itself to us under manifold forms in all the objects we behold. What we *call* water is only one

of these forms. Perhaps we may understand this by considering that it is really impossible to say what the *proper* form or peculiar nature of water is. Water fluid is water commonly so called; water solid is ice; water rarefied is vapour or steam, and no man can say that the one of these is more water than the other. *We* assume fluidity as the normal state of water, and reckon ice and steam deviations from this; but it would be just as correct to assume ice or steam as the normal state.

7. If we further ask how the machinery of the universe is originally set in motion—how this condensation and rarefaction of water is brought about? the only answer we obtain is, in the words of Diogenes Laertius (Lib. i. § 27), who says that, according to Thales, the world is animated and full of gods: or, in the words of Plutarch (De Placitis Phil. i. 7), who says that Thales has proclaimed God as the intelligent principle (*νοῦς*) of the world: or, in the words of Cicero (De Nat. Deor. i. 10), who says, "Thales Milesius . . . aquam dixit esse initium rerum, Deum autem eam mentem quæ ex aqua cuncta fingeret;" *i.e.*, Thales the Milesian asserted that water is the origin of all things, and that God is the presiding or quickening mind who formed all things out of water.

8. That Thales contended for some sort of universal soul or life in nature is in the highest degree

probable; but that this soul was conceived by him as an intelligent principle, or that he inculcated the natural theology which Plutarch and Cicero gave him credit for, is disproved by the assertion of Aristotle, who says expressly that Anaxagoras, a philosopher considerably subsequent to Thales, was the first who held that intelligence was the principle of the universe. Thales, therefore, cannot be held to have propounded a scheme of natural theology.

9. The philosophy of Thales reduces itself to the following five points: *first*, he contemplates the universe from a physical point of view; *secondly*, he seeks for a principle of unity, he inquires after the common element, the primary and permanent essence of all things; *thirdly*, he finds this in something sensible and material, namely, in water or moisture; *fourthly*, he accounts for the various appearances of nature, for the different objects which the universe presents to us, by means of a thickening or a thinning of the original element, water—water is the substance, the essential, and these are merely its phenomena; *fifthly*, he ascribes to the universe a power of motion and of life by which the various changes that take place, and the various objects it contains, are produced. These five heads embrace, I think, the whole philosophy of Thales, in so far as it is known to us.

10. The results of this system, when regarded as

facts, are, it must be confessed, unsatisfactory enough. They are, indeed, utterly worthless. Considered as a statement of facts, the system has no interest whatever, either physical or philosophical. The facts are not true, and the explanations explain nothing; but even though the facts were true, and the explanations explanatory, they would be of no speculative value, for they are merely a description of the universe according to sense, and not according to reason.

11. To see any merit in this early system we must turn away from it in its dogmatic form; we must let it go as a statement of fact, and must look merely to its general spirit and tendency. When we look to this, we are able to rate at a higher value these inefficient essays in philosophy. The very conception of reducing the diversified exuberance, the infinite plenitude, of nature to the unity of one principle, showed a speculative boldness which proved that a new intellectual era was dawning on mankind. To perceive that truth was to be found in the one, and not in the many, was no insignificant discovery. To be convinced that a thread of simplicity ran through all the complex phenomena of the universe was the inauguration of a new epoch—was a great step taken in advance of all that had gone before—was, in fact, the very first movement which gave birth to science among men. This incipient generalisation, or tendency to generalise, as we see it put forth in these old philosophies, is the earliest attempt made by the

mind of man to reduce to comprehension nature's infinite details; and as such it stands opposed, *first*, to the mythological spirit of those ancient times; *secondly*, to the ascendancy of the senses; and, *thirdly*, it proves that the cogency of necessary truth was now beginning, although obscurely, to be appreciated.

12. I shall say a few words on each of these points separately. *First*, the spirit of generalisation, or the tendency to carry up the phenomena of nature to the unity of one principle, or to the simplicity of a few principles; this tendency is directly opposed to those old poetical dreams respecting nature, which gave birth to the Greek mythology. Mythology ran riot in a plurality or multitude of powers which it invoked, and to which it assigned the government of the universe; but philosophy, on the contrary, aimed at a unity of agency or causation in all things. In the old Greek mythology the number of divine agents (or celestial powers, greater and lesser) was infinite. While there was one general patron-god for woods and forests, each grove had, moreover, its presiding divinity; even each particular tree had its tutelar protector. There was one patron-god who presided over seas, rivers, and fountains; but each river and fountain had also its particular nymph, and I believe that I speak within the limits of the mythological spirit when I say that each individual wave floated its tiny god. The same may be said of every mountain and cave, and of every other natural object.

Even the cloud-compelling Jove himself, even he owed his supremacy as the general father of gods and men, and as the general ruler of the universe, rather to the elevated region in which he was supposed to dwell, the summit of cloud-capped Olympus, than to the notion of any universal presidency which he exercised over all created things.

Now, to these poetical fancies the philosophy of Thales, crude as it is, stands opposed. The mythological disposition aims, we may say, at finding the manifold in the manifold. It is satisfied with the infinitude of nature, and makes no attempt to reduce her phenomena to finitude and unity. If it is animated by the desire to reach the ultimately real, it is directed in this pursuit, not by the reason, but solely by feeling and imagination. Philosophy, on the other hand, aims at finding the one in the manifold. It attempts, by means of some principle, to reduce to unity the innumerable phenomena which press upon us from every side. Its researches are guided, not by the imagination, but by the reason. Even the philosophy of Thales evinces this tendency. It indicates a disposition of mind antagonistic to the mythological disposition, and therefore, meagre though it be, it is entitled to be regarded as the fountainhead of the great river of science which is now flowing through the world.

Secondly, another point of interest to be found

in the philosophy of Thales, when we look away from the letter of the system, and regard rather its general scope, is that it stands opposed to the authoritative deliverances of the senses. That the mind of man should throw back and away from it the rich fulness and the diversified forms of sensible existence, and should strive to reduce them all to one primitive element, this was a bold and a novel procedure. It showed that the mind, in its pursuit of the ultimately real, was beginning to emancipate itself from the ascendancy which the senses had hitherto exercised in determining its decisions. It showed that the senses were beginning to lose their authority as the criterion of ultimate truth, and that a tendency to appeal to a different tribunal, the tribunal, not of sense, but of thought or reason, was beginning to declare itself. It was not truth for some, truth acquired through the particular faculty, that was now aimed at, it was rather truth for all; truth to which every mind could and must respond, whether it had senses such as ours or not; truth, in short, for the universal faculty in our nature. This emancipation of the philosophic mind was carried, indeed, to no great length in the school of Thales and the other Ionic speculators. Sense, in fact, still remained the criterion of truth; all that can be affirmed is, that there was a *tendency* to rise to a different standard, the standard of thought and reason, in the settlement of philosophical questions —the tendency to find something which should

be true for *all* intellect, and not merely for our intellect; and this tendency showed itself unmistakably in the reduction of all sensible phenomena to one sensible principle — to wit, water, or moisture.

But, *thirdly,* another important feature in the philosophy of Thales, when we look to its general spirit, is its recognition of the necessities of thought. It is founded on necessary thinking. There is, indeed, no necessity for our thinking that water is the unity, the common principle in all things; but there *is* a necessity for our thinking that there is *some* unity, *some* common principle in all things. This is what we cannot help thinking. It is a necessity of reason that we should think some central principle in all that is. There must be an element of agreement in all things. Because, to suppose two things absolutely and in all respects different from each other, would involve the supposition that one of them was a thing, and that the other was not a thing at all. But the supposition is that both of them are things, therefore they cannot differ absolutely, but must agree in some respect; and that respect in which they agree is their unity, their common quality, or as we frequently express it, their universal. That there is a universal, then, a point of unity or agreement in all things, this is a necessary truth of reason. This truth is the basis of all intelligence, and the recognition of it is the basis of all philosophy. *What* the universal

in all things is, is a very different question, and one not easily settled, as the whole history of philosophy shows. It certainly is not water, as Thales maintains. But that there *is* a universal, some common ground, in all things, this is a truth which forces itself upon us whether we will or not. It is no opinion, no arbitrary excogitation, but a thought which we cannot help thinking, a law or category binding on all intelligence. And the chief merit or value of the philosophy of Thales consists in its having recognised implicitly, for I cannot say that it did so *explicitly*, the necessity of this truth or law.

13. In estimating, then, the philosophy of Thales according to its general scope, we find the following points to be approved of as philosophical. *First*, this system inquires after the ultimately real. *Secondly*, it is a substitution, to some extent, of philosophic thought in the room of the creations of fancy, inasmuch as it is antagonistic to the mythological manner of viewing things. *Thirdly*, it is a rejection, to some extent, of the authority of the senses as the criterion of truth, and it is the establishment, to some extent, of a new criterion; and, *fourthly*, it is founded implicitly, though not explicitly, on the recognition of necessary truth, inasmuch as it proceeds on the idea that unity, or a universal, is the ultimately real in all things. These four points contain, I think, all that can be called philosophical in the system of Thales; and these points are gathered not directly from the

system itself, but are obtained by considering its general scope and tendency.

14. When we look to the system itself, when we try it by its letter and not by its spirit, in other words, when we regard it as a dogmatic statement of facts, it is seen at once to be exceedingly imperfect; to be destitute, indeed, of all philosophical value. There is no rational proof given, no sufficient evidence adduced, to show that water is the principle of all things. Still less is any rational explanation afforded as to how the various forms of actual existence are evolved by means of a thickening and a thinning of water; and the system leaves us completely in the dark in regard to the active or formative energy by which things are produced. But, setting these imperfections aside, the two objections most fatal to the system are these: *first*, that the universal which it sets forth is a mere sensible universal; and, *secondly*, being such, it is not a true universal, not a universal at all. The consideration of these two points will conclude what I have to say on the philosophy of Thales, and will open the way for the system of his successor Anaximander, in which an attempt is made to obviate the objections referred to. You will thus perceive how the system of Anaximander is affiliated to that of Thales. This connection, this genesis of one system out of another, is in fact the most important matter to be attended to and kept in view in studying the history of philosophy.

The first objection is, that the universal which the system of Thales sets forth is a mere sensible universal. This is obvious from the consideration that, let us form what conception of water we may, we still think of it under some form of sensible representation. It is originally made known by the senses; and however delicate and subtle the form may be in which we endeavour to construe moisture to our minds, it still retains, in our conception, to a greater or less degree, the form under which we originally apprehended it. In other words, water or moisture is, in the first instance, an object of sense, a sensible presentation; and when we imagine it, or construe it to our minds, in the second instance, it is always a sensible representation.

In regard to the *second* ground of objection, I shall merely remark that water, the universal principle of all things according to Thales, being a sensible universal, is consequently not a necessary truth, not a truth for all intelligence, but only for those who are endowed with senses similar to ours. And consequently this system must be set aside as insufficient, inasmuch as it does not meet the requisitions of philosophy, philosophy being, according to our definition, that science which aims at the attainment of absolute truth, that is, of truth as it exists, not for some, but for all intelligence.

ANAXIMANDER.

15. The next philosopher of the Ionic school was Anaximander. This philosopher was born in the year 610 B.C., and died in 547 B.C. Miletus was his birthplace, and he was the friend and disciple of Thales. He is said to have lived for some time in the island of Samos, at the court of the great Polycrates, where also Pythagoras and the poet Anacreon were at that time residing. Anaximander is said to have been the first philosopher who put down his thoughts in writing. He made a map of the earth and the sea, in which it is probable that a good deal of conjecture was embodied. He invented the sun-dial, and was celebrated generally for his attainments in mathematics, and for his invention of mathematical instruments.

16. The German historian of philosophy, Ritter, followed by Mr Lewes, takes Anaximander out of his place in the Ionic school, and connects him rather with the Pythagoreans. They do this on the ground that his speculations were rather mathematical than physical. It seems to me, however, that the position usually assigned to him as the immediate successor of Thales, and as a member of the same school, is his right place in the history of philosophy. And, accordingly, I have ranked him among the Ionic philosophers, both on account of his birthplace and of his phil-

osophy, which seems to have been an attempt to develop and improve the system propounded by Thales.

17. The three following sentences from Diogenes Laertius, from Simplicius, a commentator on Aristotle, and from Aristotle himself, contain the substance of the philosophy of Anaximander, in so far as it has been handed down to us. Anaximander, they tell us, laid down the infinite or unlimited (*τὸ ἄπειρον*) as the principle and element of all things; and not any determinate matter, such as water, air, and so forth. This was his principle, because that which is the ground of all must be susceptible of receiving every form or variation. Accordingly, he assumed the infinite or indeterminate as a principle adapted to every species of production. "That indeterminate not being itself any particular thing, is capable of becoming any particular thing. This principle is itself without beginning, being the beginning of all other things; it embraces and governs all—it is the divine, the immortal, and the incorruptible." Such is the substance of Anaximander's doctrine, as gathered from the three authors referred to. (Arist. Phys. iii. 4; Simplic. *ad loc.*; Diog. Laert., ii. 1.)

18. In explanation of these words, this may be added, that if we attempt to explain all things by means of a material principle or element, we can easily see that that principle must in itself be indeterminate, without form or quality; for, suppose it

to be determinate, or to have a form, in that case it becomes one of the very things which call for explanation. In other words, the question instantly arises, Whence *this* determinate matter? And suppose that the answer again is, It arises out of determinate matter, this determinate matter again requires explanation, and so on for ever, so that no approach at all is made to an explanation if, in explaining the origin of determinate or apparent matter, we are always referred to an antecedent determinate matter; and therefore, if this explanation of the origin of material things is to be held good for anything, w must ultimately be thrown in upon a matter whic is altogether formless and indeterminate. This the conception which Anaximander appears to hav reached, and which he expressed by the term ἄπειρον the conception of a *materia prima*, a matter which, having no form or determination in itself, is capable of receiving all forms or determinations. That which is open to, and recipient of, all forms or qualities must in itself be invested with no form or quality; otherwise it would be foreclosed against the reception of other qualities.

19. Such is the ἄπειρον of Anaximander, in which we seem to find the germ of the distinction between matter and form, a distinction which afterwards became conspicuous in several schools of philosophy and which, when construed into logic, became convertible with *genus* and *difference*; genus was matter

form was difference. The ἄπειρον of Anaximander was a πρώτη ὕλη, a first matter, from which all form or difference had been stripped, or rather to which no form or appearance was as yet appended, although Anaximander seems to have accorded to this matter a power of developing or secreting differences.

20. As an illustration of this conception, you may take the case of flour baked into bread. The bread, I shall say, exists as loaves and cakes in every variety of form. You explain these loaves and cakes as determinate flour, as flour determined or fashioned in a multiplicity of different ways. But then flour is itself something determinate, and therefore you will next be asked, What is flour the determination of? What is its principle? You must assign as its origin either something determinate or something indeterminate. If you assign something determinate (wheat, for example) as its origin, you are again asked, But what is the origin of the wheat? Again your answer must yield something determinate or something indeterminate. If determinate, then the same question recurs, and your explanation goes for nothing. It has reached no ultimate, so that you are driven in the last resort to assign an indeterminate matter as the ultimate origin of the bread. This indeterminate matter is this matter without form, the ἄπειρον of Anaximander.

21. So far, then, the position of Anaximander is an

advance beyond that of Thales. The principle of Thales (water, namely) was too definite and particular to serve as the common ground or basis of all things. Being already qualified, it was not open to all qualification. Anaximander thought that this objection was obviated by his ἄπειρον. This, being unmodified in itself, was susceptible of all modification; being absolutely unconditioned, it was capable of becoming conditioned to any extent; and accordingly he adopted this as his universal, and set it forth as the principle of all things. The ἄπειρον was perhaps the prosaic and philosophical name for the chaos of the poets. In the language of Ovid—

> "Ante, mare et tellus, et quod tegit omnia, cœlum,
> Unus erat toto Naturæ vultus in orbe,
> Quem dixere chaos, rudis indigestaque moles.
> Quaque fuit tellus, illic et pontus et aer:
> Sic erat instabilis tellus, innabilis unda,
> Lucis egens aer; nulli sua forma manebat,
> Obstabatque aliis aliud, quia corpore in uno
> Frigida pugnabant calidis, humentia siccis,
> Mollia cum duris, sine pondere habentia pondus:
> Hanc Deus et melior litem natura diremit."

22. To this matter, originally indeterminate and unconditioned, Anaximander seems to have ascribed some inherent power of assuming form or of secreting differences, and thus the various objects of the universe arose. The process is very insufficiently explained. All that we can say is, that Anaximander's doctrine probably was that things have assumed the forms in which we behold them in consequence of certain affinities and certain repugnances pervading

idless and chaotic mass in which everything lay blended and enveloped.

The only two points, then, in the system of ximander seem to be these: *first*, the principle of hings, the universal in nature, the groundwork of universe, the ultimately real and true, is, according him, an unbounded, indeterminate, formless matter; he calls ἀρχή, the beginning, and ἄπειρον, the united; and *secondly*, to this ἄπειρον he seems to have igned some power of self-limitation, through which hape was given to the different objects of the senses.

24. When we look to the mere letter of Anaximander's system, we find in it as little to satisfy the demands of reason as we found in the system of Thales, when embraced according to the letter. Even from he scope and spirit of the system we cannot gather much which is of philosophical or speculative value. Perhaps the chief merit of the system lies in its tendency to bring to light the opposition between the nite and the infinite. All true philosophy, I conceive, is based on a conception which conciliates, or educes to one, these two, the finite and the infinite. ut that this conciliation may take place, the opposion between them requires first of all to be signalised. nd Anaximander seems to have been the first in he history of philosophy who marked the distinction. inite things, the various objects of the universe, hese cannot be explained out of the finite. Such an

explanation explains nothing, because it lay as the ground of the explanation, the very thing explained. The finite has to be accounted for. it is certainly not accounted for when we say the finite accounts for it. It is obvious, there that the finite must be an outcome from the infi that is, its ground or principle must be the nega of the finite. The negative is a very important ment of conception; it is essential to the very con tution of reason. Affirmation seems to be the mo principle of intelligence; but the power of negat is equally necessary; without this, intelligence co not work—all would be a blank. Anaximan seems to have been the first thinker who recognis the power and significance of the negative. H *ἄπειρον* is the negative of the finite. But he does n carry out his own principle. The finite being con vertible with the material, the right inference woul have been, that the infinite, being the negative of th finite, was also the negative of the material, was th non-material; but Anaximander falls short of th conclusion. His *ἄπειρον*, though the negative of th finite, is still regarded by him as some sort of form less or unlimited matter.

ANAXIMENES.

25. Of the life of Anaximenes, the third phil pher of the Ionic sect, we have little or no rec He was probably twenty or thirty years younger

ander, and may have been born about 590 He also was a Milesian.

. As Thales had fixed upon water, and as Anaander had fixed on the infinite or unbounded, the universal principle, the ultimately real in all ings, so Anaximenes fixed upon air as the common nciple of the universe. Anaximenes thus fell back the ground occupied by Thales, that is to say, he ose as his principle a natural determinate element. the same time, by selecting an element less palple, less visible, less formed than water (air, namely), e seemed to aim at combining into one the principle f Thales and the principle of Anaximander. The principle of Thales was too sensible, too material, too definite, to be the universal in all things. The principle of Anaximander again was too indefinite to be comprehended. But air combines the two. It is sufficiently indefinite to be universal: it is sufficiently definite to be perceived and understood. It is, in short, a determinate infinite. Such appears to be the position occupied by Anaximenes in the philosophical genealogy which we are sketching. He attempted to effect a sort of compromise between the philosophy of Thales and the philosophy of Anaximander.

27. In representing air as the essential and animating principle of all things, Anaximenes appears to have made a nearer approach to the conception of

mind, soul, or spirit, than had yet been ma
must remember that, although we are nowada
miliar with these words, and attach to them som
of idea, it was very different in these early t
Then no such words as mind, soul, spirit, and c
quently no such conceptions, existed; and when
conceptions first began to dawn, they were clothe
in words which originally signified breath or
(animus, ψυχή, spiritus, πνεῦμα—the original sense
these words is breath or wind): so important did
appear to the ancient framers of speech that th
supposed it to be the sustaining and moving pr
ciple not only of our physical life, but of our intel
gent and spiritual functions.

28. This opinion, which Anaximenes either adopted or originated, was carried out still further by his pupil, Diogenes of Apollonia, a city in Crete. This philosopher held that the air was itself sensible and intelligent; and that it was through his participation in this ethereal principle that man both felt and understood—a doctrine which was revived at a late perio by Campanella, a philosopher of the sixteenth century whose works have fallen into more complete oblivion than they deserve. Campanella published a work entitled 'De Sensu Rerum,' in which he contends that all nature possesses some sort of intelligence and sensibility, although it is only in man that this intelligence and sensibility attain to self-consciousness. His reason for this opinion is given in these words:

quid est in effectibus, esse et in causis; ideoque vita et mundum sentire" ('De Sensu Rerum'); which, with a little expansion, may be translated—"Whatever is in the effects, that is also in the causes. Man's sensations are the effects of the actions of the elements and the world, therefore the elements and the world are endowed with sensations." But I shall say no more at present either about Campanella or Diogenes of Apollonia. I mention the latter merely in connection with Anaximenes, whose disciple he was, and as the fourth and last name in the older Ionic school which it is at all necessary to particularise. Heraclitus was also an Ionian, but he comes later, and is therefore not to be classed with the three of whose names and opinions I have endeavoured to give you some account.

29. Without carrying further our exposition of these systems, and without entering on any detailed criticism of their merits or demerits, I shall just make this concluding remark: that these systems are truly philosophical, in so far as they aim at the attainment of a unity, a universal in all things, and in so far as they are animated and carried forward by the conviction, obscure and inexplicit though that conviction may have been, that the universal in all things is the ultimately real—is the truth for all intelligence; and that they aim at such a unity, and that they are, to a large extent, actuated and inspired by such a conviction, this, I think, is undoubted.

So far they proceed under the direction of re
necessary thinking, and so far they are truly
sophical. But, on the other hand, they are truly
philosophical in their details, or in their attempt
show *what* the universal in all things is. The
universal is certainly not water; it is certainly
formless or unlimited matter; it is certainly not
for though we are under the necessity of thinl
some universal in all things, we are not under
necessity of thinking this as water, or as forml
matter, or as air; therefore these elements are
forced on our acceptance by any necessity of thoug
therefore they are only relatively, and not absolute
true, they are only truths for some and not truths f
all intelligence: they are at the utmost merely truths
for the senses and the understanding, not for the
reason; they are merely disguised sensibles, and, as
such, we cannot accept them as the veritable univer-
sal of which philosophy is in quest.

ITALIC SCHOOL.

PYTHAGORAS.

1. THE notices of the Pythagorean philosophy which have been transmitted to us, whether in its earlier or in its later manifestations, are scanty and extremely obscure. With the later manifestations we need not trouble ourselves. They are founded on spurious data, or at least on data which are not sufficiently authenticated. They are mystical in the extreme, and their symbolism is utterly incomprehensible. The earlier form of the philosophy, in so far as it is extant, is preserved in the fragments of Philolaus, and in a few notices by Aristotle. Philolaus was a contemporary of Socrates, and flourished about 420 B.C. Aristotle was a good deal later: so that there was an interval of nearly a hundred years between Pythagoras, who was in his prime about the year 540, and the earliest expositor of his opinions with whom we are acquainted. These two, Philolaus and Aristotle, are the principal sources of our knowledge of the Pythagorean philosophy in its earlier form. For

the later manifestations of this philosophy Empiricus, who lived in the first half of the century A.D., must be studied.

2. Aristotle lays down the general principle the Pythagoreans in the following terms: "Number," he says, "is, according to them, the essence all things; and the organisation of the universe its various determinations, is a harmonious system numbers and their relations." "The boldness of such an assertion," says Hegel, "impresses us as very remarkable; it is an assertion which strikes down one blow all that our ordinary representations declare to be essential and true. It displaces sensible existence, and makes thought and not sense to be the criterion of the essence of things. It thus erects into substance and true being something of a totally different order from that form of existence which the senses place before us." (Werke, xiii. 237-38.)

3. What Pythagoras and his followers meant precisely by number it is not easy to say. One point seems to be certain, that number, in the Pythagorean sense denoted law, order, form, harmony. It is said that Pythagoras was the first who called the world κόσμος or order, thereby indicating that order was the essence of the universe—that law or number, or proportion or symmetry, was the universal principle in all things.

4. If we compare this position with that occu-

f the Ionic philosophers, we shall perceive is an advance, an ascent, to some extent at rom sense to reason. In fact, the great dis- on between sense and reason is now beginning clare itself. To revert for a few moments to Ionic philosophy. This philosophy is an advance rdinary thinking; ordinary thinking is held cap- by the senses. It accepts their *data* implicitly, without question. In the estimation of ordinary nking, things *are* precisely as they *appear:* and eir diversity is more attended to than their unity. a word, ordinary thinking has eyes only for the rticular, and is blind, or nearly so, to the universal. he Ionic philosophy rose into a higher position. It imed at unity: it sought for a universal amid the diversity of sensible things; and this was an advance, a step in the right direction. The Ionic philosophy tood on a platform somewhat higher than that of rdinary thinking. But still this platform is far from ing the platform of reason. The unity which the nic philosophers sought for among sensible things as sought for by means, and under the direction, of nse itself. It was a mere sensible universal; water, infinite matter, or air; in short, it was something itself material, and therefore something which, nstead of being itself the universal in all things, did self require to be brought under a universal, or re- uced to unity under a higher principle. It was, in act, a particular universal, in other words, a contra- diction. The Ionic school, we may say, never rose

above the region of sense, although within t
gion they certainly rose into a stratum of atm
elevated above that of ordinary thinking.

5. Let us now pass to the Pythagorean philos
Whether the Pythagoreans emancipated themsel
completely from the thraldom of the senses, or w
ther such an emancipation be either practicabl
desirable, I shall not now attempt to determine;
this is certain, that their speculations shot up hig
into the region of pure reason than did those of th
Ionic predecessors. Number is more an object
reason, and less an object of sense, than either wat
or air; and therefore we say that, while the positio
of the Ionic school is more that of sense than that
of reason, the position of the Pythagorean school is
more that of reason than that of sense.

6. Number is a truer universal than either wate
or air, or any other sensible thing. It is possib
that the conception of number may not be an ad
quate conception of the universal in all things; tha
it may not be identical or coincident with the co
ception of the ultimately and absolutely real; but
is certainly a nearer approximation to this than an
conception which we find set forth in the systems o
the Ionic philosophers. The test of which is this
Suppose you had to explain something about the uni
verse to an intelligence different from man's unless
that intelligence had senses similar to man's, ne could

erstand what you meant by water, or air, or
r fire, or colour, or sound, or heat, or cold:
tever his senses were, or whether he had any
or not, I conceive he would understand what
neant by *number*, he would know what *one*
t, and what *many* meant. He would not under-
intuitionally what a tree was, and he could not
ade to understand it intuitionally: but he might
rstand it symbolically, by being informed that
d everything else was a unity which admitted of
g resolved into multiplicity, and that each of the
tions was again a unity. Unless he could be
le to understand this—in short, unless he could
m some conception of number—it seems to me that
e would not be an intelligence at all. And there-
ore it may be said that number is a true universal,
hat is to say, it is a necessary thought; it expresses
omething which is the truth for *all*, and not merely
he truth for *some*, intelligence. At any rate, it is a
der and truer universal than either water or air,
any other sensible thing.

7. We are now able to understand the appar-
tly very paradoxical assertion of the Pythagoreans,
mely, that number is the substance of things, the
sence of the universe; and we are able, moreover,
perceive in what sense this doctrine is true. The
hole paradox is resolved, the whole difficulty is
leared, by attending to the distinction to which I
ave so often directed your thoughts, the distinc-

tion between truth for *all*, and truth for
otherwise expressed, the distinction between t
versal faculty in man, and the particular fa
man. If we hold that the substance of thing
be found in that which is the truth for *some*, in
words, that it is to be apprehended by the parti
faculty in man, in that case we shall certainl
hold that number is the substance of things; o
contrary, we shall hold that earth, or water, or a
matter generally, is the substance of things, bec
this is what falls under the apprehension of the
ticular faculty in man. But if we hold that the s
stance of things is to be found in that which is
truth *for all*, that the essence of things centres
that which is the truth for *all* intelligence, in oth
words, that the essence of things is to be apprehende
by the universal faculty in man; in that case w
shall certainly not hold that earth or water, or matt
generally, is the substance of things, for this is n
necessarily the truth for all intellect; on the oth
hand, we shall experience no great difficulty in hol
ing that number is the substance of things, becau
number is the truth for all, and is that which fa
under the apprehension of the universal faculty
man. You can thus readily understand the Pyth
gorean doctrine, even though you may be not qui
willing to assent to it, that number is the essenc
of the universe, the ultimately and absolutely rea
Number is this, because number is the truth of th
universe for all intelligence; matter and its qualitie

the essence of the universe, not the ulti-
and absolutely real, because they are not the
or all, but only the truth for some intelligence,
s, for intelligence constituted with senses like

To clear up this philosophy still further, it is
that I should state to you the grounds on which
d that number is an object of reason, that is, of
universal faculty in man; in other words, is an
t of *all* reason, and is not an object of sense,
f the particular faculty in man; in other words,
ot an object merely of *some* intelligence. M
son, then, for holding that number is an object
ıre thought rather than of sense is this; that ev
nse has its own special object, and is not affected
y the objects of the other senses. For instance,
ght has colour for its object, and can take no cog-
sance of sound. In the same way hearing appre-
nds sound, and takes no cognisance of colour. In
e manner we cannot touch colours or sounds, but
y solids. Neither can any man taste with his
es, or smell with his ears. If number, then, were
object of sense, it would be the special object of
e one sense; but it is not this. It accompanies
apprehension of all the objects of the senses, and
ot appropriated to any sensible objects in particu-
. It is not, like all the other objects of sense, the
ecial object of any one sense, and therefore I con-
lude that it is not an object of sense *at all*, but an

object of thought or reason. When we loo
colour, what we see is colour, what we think
i.e., number; when we look at many colours
we see is colour, what we think is many, *i.e.*,
ber. This distinction, the distinction by which
ber is assigned to reason, and not to sense, is, I t
an important aid towards understanding the P
gorean philosophy.

9. Number is a necessary form of thought u
which we place or subsume whatever is prese
to the mind. Hence form, which is another n
r number, and not matter, is the essence of all thi
least of all intelligible things. It is *the* truth a
stance of the universe—its truth and substanc
ot only in so far as it exists for us, but in so far a
it exists for intelligence generally. Without numbe
they are absolutely incomprehensible to any intell
gence. Take away number, that is to say, let t
universe and its contents be neither one nor ma
and chaos, or worse, is come again. We are involv
in contradictory nonsense. Number, then, or for
and not matter, as the Ionic philosophers contende
number, and not the numberless, or *ἄπειρον* of An
mander, is the true universal, the common grou
the ultimately real in all things. With Pythago
form or number is the essential, matter the unes
tial: with the Ionics matter is the essential, a
form or number the unessential. In their respect
positions the two schools stand diametrically oppo

Pythagorean is certainly a stage in advance
onic.

In the account which I have hitherto given
the Pythagorean philosophy, I have taken the
ent of its principle from Aristotle, and, found-
on his text, I have endeavoured, by means of a
ritical reflections of my own, to impart to it some
ligibility, and to show you that there is some
ing, and also some truth in the assertion, that
ber is the essence of all things. I go on to speak
he Pythagorean philosophy as represented by
olaus. Philolaus was probably the first of the
thagoreans who committed to writing any of their
aster's doctrines; for neither the founder of the
hool, nor his immediate disciples, appear to have
t their opinions on record. Philolaus was, as
said, a contemporary of Socrates. He wrote a
rk on the Pythagorean system, with which Plato
ms to have been acquainted. Some fragments
this work are extant, and were collected and
lished in 1819 by a German scholar, Augustus
eckh.

1. In this work we find these words: "Every-
ng," says Philolaus, "which is known has in it num-
for it is impossible either to think or know any-
ng without number." He thus makes number the
rce and condition of intelligence, and the ground
the intelligible universe. But the following is

even more important: "It is necessary," say
laus, "that everything should be *either* lim
unlimited, or that everything should be *both* li
and unlimited. Since, then, it appears, that t
are not made up of the limiting only, nor of t
limited only, it follows that each thing consis
of the limiting and the unlimited, and that the w
and all that it contains, are in this way formed o
justed." This is a remarkable extract, for it s
that the Pythagoreans had to some extent anticip
the great principle of Heraclitus, namely, that e
thing and every thought is the unity or concilia
of contraries; a principle, the depth and fertilit
which have never to this day been rightly app
hended or appreciated, far less fathomed and e
hausted.

12. In his dialogue entitled Philebus, Plato touch
on this Pythagorean doctrine. For the word *περαίν*
τα, which is Philolaus's expression for the limiti
he substitutes *πέρας*, the limit; and the union of
two (the limit and the unlimited) he calls *μικτόν*,
mixed. So that, according to Pythagoras (and Pl
seems to approve of the doctrine), everything is c
stituted out of the *πέρας*, and the *ἄπειρον*, the li
and the unlimited, and the result is the *μικτόν*, tha
the union of the two. This principle, afterwards
plied to morals, led to Aristotle's doctrine of the *μεσ*
τητος, or of virtue as a mean between two extremes. T
πέρας in the physical world was a limit or law in

the infinite lawlessness of nature: the μεσότης in the moral world was a limit im-. the infinite lawlessness of passion.

get a little further insight into this matter, nsider the conception of the μικτόν. This, I , is equivalent to the limited. Now, let us hat it is, in any case, that is limited? Perhaps will say that it is the limited that is limited. that would be an inept answer. What would be· sense of limiting the limited, the already limit- That would be a very superfluous process. refore, if the limit is to answer any purpose, must be applied, not to the limited, but to the limited; and this, accordingly, is the way in hich the Pythagoreans apply it. The limit is an ement in the constitution of the limited; the un- nited being the other element.

4. Here is another way of putting the case. Take instance of the limited, any bounded or limited ng, a book, for example. No one can say that e book is without limits. The limit, then, is cer- nly one element in its constitution. But is the it the only element? Does the book consist of thing but limits? That certainly cannot be main- ned. There is something in the book besides its re limits. What is that something? Is it the ited? Clearly it is not; because the limited is e total subject of our analysis; and, therefore, to

hold that the limited is the other elemen
equivalent to holding that the whole sul
analysis was a mere part or element of th
The limited (the book) is what we are anal
therefore it would be nonsense to say that t
was one factor in the analysis, while the
the other factor. This would be analysing
thing into that total thing and something else.
if the limited cannot be the other term of the an
sis, that other term must be the unlimited. W
else can it be? The limited, then—in this case
book — consists of the limit and of the unlim
and these are the two elements which go to the
stitution of everything. Suppose the limits—
example, the two ends of a line—taken away,
no ends left, that which would remain would be
unlimited. But that cannot be conceived, you
say. Certainly it cannot. But it can be concei
to this extent, that if that part of a line which
call its ends or limits be taken away, and no
limits posited, then the remaining part, consid
in and by itself, is necessarily the unlimited. T
element, which truly cannot be conceived with
the other element, is the ἄπειρον of the Pythagorea
and it cannot be conceived for this reason, that c
ception is itself constituted by the union or fus
of these two elements, the limit and the unlimi
Such is the Pythagorean doctrine, and it seems
me to be not only perfectly intelligible, but a
perfectly true.

nother form which the Pythagoreans em-
o express their principle was the expression
, the one, and ἀόριστος δυὰς, the indeterminate or
inite two. Of these terms, the latter, in parti-
is very obscure, and has been very insufficiently
ned. I will endeavour to throw what light
them I can out of my own reflections. First
, these terms seem to be merely another form
pression for the πέρας and the ἄπειρον; the μονὰς
one is the πέρας or limit; the ἀόριστος δυὰς is the
ειρον, the unlimited and indeterminate. Every-
ng in being limited is one. This is expressed by the
m μονὰς, which stands for the sameness or identity
things; but the diversity of things is inexhaustible;
d this capacity of infinite diversity is indicated by
e term ἀόριστος δυὰς, indefinite difference; so that,
cording to the Pythagoreans, the general scheme of
e universe, as regarded by pure reason, is identity,
mbined with a capacity of infinite diversity. Nei-
er of the terms has any meaning out of relation to
e other. But let us for a moment consider each
rm by itself; ἀόριστος δυὰς, taken by itself, stands
r absolute diversity. Everything in the universe is
solutely different from every other; all things are
rticular, and they are held together by no universal.
ne ἀόριστος δυὰς, in short, signifies, when taken by
self, the unbounded and inexhaustible particular.
he μονὰς, again, taken by itself, stands for their
nity; it signifies their feature of agreement. In a
ord, it is their genus, just as the ἀόριστος δυὰς is a

general expression for their difference. *Mo*
Pythagorean term for the universal; *ἀόρισ*
is the Pythagorean term for the particular;
neither of these is capable of being conceived
out the other. The true conceivable limit, wh
considered as a thought or a thing, is the re
their combination.

16. We shall perhaps get more light throwi
these terms if we consider them under a purely ari
metical point of view. It might be thought th
these words, *πονὰς* and *ἀόριστος δνὰς*, simply signif
one and two, or one and indeterminate two. B
that is not at all the meaning which the Pythagorea
attached to them. According to the Pythagorean
every number consisted of these two parts; the *μονὰ*
and the *δνὰς* were not numbers, but were the me
elements of number. This seems a perplexing pos
tion, yet it is susceptible, I think, of explanatio
For example, every number is different from eve
other number; 1 is different from 5, 5 is differe
from 10, 10 is different from 20, and from 100, a
so on. But every number also agrees with eve
number; and in what respect is it that all numbe
agree? They all agree in this respect, that eve
number is *once*, or one times that number, whatev
it may be; 5 and 10 and 20, and so on, agree
being *once* 5, *once* 10, and *once* 20. Each of the
is *one* times what it is, so that they all agree in co
taining the *μονὰς*, or one. If you were to say five, o

and did not mean once five, or one times
e , your words would have no meaning. Nei-
r you yourself nor any one else would know what
meant. But when you say *once* five, and then
n, you not only express an agreement, you also
a difference between five and ten. Now, the
term for this difference is *ἀόριστος δυὰς*, and
ὰς or diversity is said to be *ἀόριστος* or indefi-
because it varies indefinitely—once 10, once 20,
e 30, once 40, once 1000, once 1,000,000—the
ce term, the *μονὰς*, never varies, but the other term,
e *δυὰς*, as expressed by 20, 30, 40, 1000, 1,000,000,
ries indefinitely, and its variations are inexhaust-
le; hence it is called *ἀόριστος*. Perhaps the simplest
ranslation of *ἀόριστος* would be the indefinite *any*;
όριστος δυὰς, *any* particular number. I conceive that
this way the Pythagorean doctrine, that the *μονὰς*
nd the *ἀόριστος δυὰς* are the elements of number,
ay be explained. Neither is the number *one* any
ception; it, too, is composed of the *μονὰς* and the
ριστος δυὰς. *One*, like all other numbers, is differ-
t from any other number. In what respect does
differ from all other numbers? It differs from
em in being one. In what respect does it agree
th them? It agrees with them in being *once* one,
one times one, or *one* one. When we say "one,"
usually mean "*one* one;" but we do not always
necessarily mean this, but may just as well mean
00 or 1000. One, viewed strictly, stands for once
ny number; and therefore, when it stands for the

numerical one, it should be, and it is, con
the mind as one one. One one, then, is
arithmetical number, and, if so, we must be able
show that its elements are the μονὰς and the δ
for these are, according to Pythagoreans, the el
of all number without exception; and this
shown without much difficulty. One one
word, in that expression, stands for the mon
point of agreement in all numbers? The fir
does so. We say *one* one, *one* five, *one* ten, *one* h
dred. All these numbers agree in being one—
once what they are. Then, again, which word in t
expression *one one*, stands for the duad—the diversi
the point in which one one differs from all other nu
bers? The second *one* does so. One *one*, one *five*, on
hundred. The second word in each of these expres
sions expresses the difference of each of these nu
bers. One one is different from one five in its seco
term, but not in its first. From these remarks it a
pears, I think, that even number one is no excepti
to the Pythagorean law, which declares that the e
ments of all number are the monad and the duad, a
that these are not themselves numbers. Thus, by c
sidering numbers, we obtain light as to the constit
tion of the universe. Everything in the unive
has some point in which it resembles everything el
and it has some point or points in which it diff
from everything else; just as every number has so
point in which it resembles all other numbers, a
some in which it differs from all other numbers.

monad and the duad being the elements number must be viewed as antecedent to number. ere is thus a primary *one* which is the ground or out of which all arithmetical numbers proceed. here is also a primary duad from which num- rive their diversity. These two enter into nposition of every number (even into the com- n of the numerical one), the one of them to all numbers their unity, or agreement, or ity; the other of them giving to all numbers their rsity. The primitive numbers, the numbers an- dent, as we may say, to all arithmetical numbers, e the Pythagorean monad and the Pythagorean uad. Of these, the former expresses the invariable nd universal in all number; the latter, the variable and particular. And inasmuch as the particular is nexhaustible and indefinite, the duad is called ὁριστος or indeterminate. Better to hold them ele- ents of number than numbers.

18. As an illustration of the spirit of this phil- ophy, let me show you how a solid, or rather the heme of a solid, may be constructed on Pythagorean rinciples. Given a mathematical point and motion, e problem is to construct a geometrical solid, or a ure in space of three dimensions, that is, occupy- g length, breadth, and depth. Let the point move -move its *minimum* distance, whatever that may e; this movement generates the line. Now let the ine move. When you are told to let the line move,

your first thought probably is that the point should be carried on in the same direction—should be produced; but you see at once (the moment it is pointed out to you) that such a movement is not a movement of the line, but is still merely a movement of the point. You cannot move the line, then, by carrying it at one or at both ends. To move the line you must move it laterally. That alone is the movement of the line. The lengthening of the line is, as we said, merely the movement of the point. The movement of the line then generates a surface. You move the surface. Here, too, you must be on your guard against continuing your lateral motion, for that is merely a continuation of the motion of the line, and this is not what is required. You are required to move not the line, but the surface; you must therefore move the surface either up or down into the third dimension of space, namely, depth; and these three movements give you the scheme of solid. You have merely to suppose this scheme filled with visible and palpable matter, that is, with something which is an object for the particular faculty in man to obtain a solid atom; and out of atoms you can construct the universe at your discretion.

19. It seems at first sight a marvellous piece of foolishness that a philosopher should ascribe to empty unsubstantial number a higher degree of reality than he allows to the bright and solid objects which constitute the universe of matter. The ap-

aradox is resolved when we consider the truth which the philosopher is in quest of. t searching for truth as it presents itself to ts constituted *in a particular way*, furnished, mple, with such senses as ours. If that were e was in quest of, he would very soon find e wanted in the solid earth and the glowing But that is not what he is in quest of. He ing for truth as it presents itself to intellect *sally*, that is, to intellect *not* provided with n senses. And this being his aim, he conceives such truth is to be found in the category of mber, while it is not to be found in stocks and ones, and chairs and tables, for these are true only *some* minds, that is, to minds with human senses; at the other is true to *all* minds, whatever senses ey may have, and whether they have any senses all or not. Slightly changed, the line of Pope ght be taken as their motto by the Pythagoreans,

"We think in numbers, for the numbers come."

ey come whether we will or not. Whatever we nk, we think of under some form either of unity multiplicity. Number seems to be a category of son and universality.

20. This explanation seems to relieve the Pythaean principle from all tincture of absurdity, and render it intelligible, if not convincing; admit at truth and reality are rather to be found in what

is true for all minds, than in what is true
minds; and admit further, that number is
all minds, and that material things are not
all minds (but only for minds with senses
what more is required to prove that truth and
are rather to be found in number than in n
things? The whole confusion and misappre
with which the Pythagorean and Platonic, an
other systems, have at all times been overlai
their origin in an oversight as to the kind of
which philosophy aims at apprehending. I
ophers themselves have seldom or never expla
the nature of the end which they had in view, eve
when they were most intently bent on its attainmen
Hence they seem to run themselves into absurditie
and hence their readers are bewildered or repelle
But let it be borne in mind that the end which phi
osophy pursues is the truth as it exists for intelle
universal, and not for intellect *particular*—for int
lect unmodified, and not for intellect modified—
intellect whether with senses like ours, or with sens
totally different; and the apparent paradoxes of t
Pythagorean and other ancient philosophies will
changed generally into articles of intelligible bel
and will stand out for the most part as grand a
unquestionable verities, at any rate, as nearer
proximations to absolute truth than anything whi
the mere senses can place before us.

ELEATICS.

XENOPHANES.

1. THIS sect derived its name from the town where principal philosophers resided, Elea or Velia, a eek settlement in southern Italy. The leaders of Eleatic sect were Xenophanes, Parmenides, and no, to whom may be added Melissus. The general aracter of this school is, that its speculations rose o a higher region of abstraction or pure thought n those either of the Ionic or of the Pythagorean osophers. While the tendency of the Ionic irers was physical, and while that of the Pytha- ans was mathematical or arithmetical, the Elea- sect may be characterised as dialectical in their edure. We shall see by-and-by what the move- t in thought was which procured for this school title of dialectical.

2. Xenophanes, a native of Colophon, one of the ncipal Ionic cities in Asia Minor, was the founder this philosophy. A contemporary of Pythagoras,

he lived during the sixth century B.C., and
was protracted to an extreme old age, we n
it as extending almost from 600 B.C. to 500

3. At this time the art of prose writing
begun to be cultivated. The opinions an
ments of Xenophanes were accordingly del
verse. He seems to have been a compo
reciter of various kinds of poetry, some fragi
which have been preserved in the writings of
æus, Sextus Empiricus, and some other a
authors. These relics have been collected, alo
with those of Parmenides, by Karsten, a Dut
scholar, and were published by him in 1830.

4. The doctrines of Xenophanes were rather the
logical than speculative. One of his principal ain
was to disabuse the minds of his countrymen of t
ideas about the gods which had been instilled i
them by the poems of Homer and Hesiod. In
opening fragment he proclaims a doctrine of mo
theism, and condemns anthropomorphism, or t
creed which fashions God after the likeness of n

Εἷς θεὸς ἔν τε θεοῖσι καὶ ἀνθρώποισι μέγιστο
Οὔτε δέμας θνητοῖσιν ὁμοίιος οὔτε νόημα.

"There is *one* mightiest God among gods and m
like to mortals neither in body nor in mind."
this being he says: "Without labour he governs
things with the power of reason," *ἀλλ' ἀπάνευ*

φρενὶ πάντα κραδαίνει. "Men, however,"
nagine that the gods are born, are clothed
arments, and endowed with our form and
e. But if oxen or lions had hands, and could
t and fashion things as men do, they too would
the gods after their own similitude, horses
ing them like horses, and oxen like oxen." He
finds severe fault with Homer and Hesiod on
t of the disgraceful actions which they attri-
the gods, and strongly reprehends the pre-
superstition in regard to the generation or
logy of the gods. Aristotle refers to this
t. ii. 23), where he remarks, "It is a saying of
ophanes that those who assert that the gods are
are equally impious with those who maintain
they die. For both equally affirm that there is
me when the gods are not." But opposed as
phanes was to the popular superstitions, and
us as he was to correct them, he professes him-
nwilling to dogmatise about the gods or about
ing else. "For," says he, "naught is with
nty known; mere opinion cleaveth to all
s—δόκος δ' ἐπὶ πᾶσι τέτυκται."

Nevertheless, in his philosophy, of which I now
d to speak, he aims, to some extent at least, at
ty and truth. The great distinction or anti-
around which the whole Eleatic philosophy
and gravitates is the antithesis of the one
many, the permanent and the changeable.

the universal and the particular, in Gr
and the πολλά. This antithesis is merel
of expression for the antithesis between re
sense. Or, if we may distinguish between the
forms of the opposition, we may say that the one
pression, the permanent and the changeable, or th
and the πολλά, denotes the antithesis in its ob
tive form; the other expression, reason and s
denotes the antithesis in its subjective form.

6. To adjust rightly the terms of this fundam
antithesis, to determine the nature of the rela
which subsists between its two extremes, is
main problem of the Eleatic philosophy. We l
to consider, then, how Xenophanes its founder w
to work. Xenophanes seems to have dwelt n
steadily than any other philosopher, whether Io
or Pythagorean, on the conception of the on
of unity as the essence of all things. His
ception of unity as the principle of the uni
and as a primary necessity of thought seem to
been more determinate than that of any of hi
decessors or contemporaries. He held that th
was everywhere; and Aristotle adds, that X
phanes, looking forth over the whole heavens,
is, the universe, declared that the one was God.
first position of Xenophanes, accordingly, i
there is a unity in all things, and that this u
God. It is in and through God that the uni
a universe, that is, has unity.

7. Another predicate of unity is permanence. The ity which is God is also the permanent and un-angeable, that is to say, it is exempt from genera-n and corruption. It cannot be born or produced, that which is produced proceeds either from that ich is the same as itself, or from that which is not same as itself. But the permanent cannot pro-d out of what is the same as itself; because this ng already the permanent, cannot produce or give e to the permanent. Neither can the permanent ceed out of what is not the same as itself; for s would be the production of the positive out of negative—the generation of Being out of not-ing, and a violation of the Eleatic axiom, *Ex nihilo il fit.* Or, more shortly stated, the reasoning of nophanes is this: What is, or the permanent, not arise out of what is, or the permanent, be-se the two are identical. Again, what is, or the rmanent, cannot arise out of what is not, or the n-permanent, because what is cannot spring from at is not. Nonentity has no power of generation. e one permanent and unchangeable, the unity in things, or, according to Xenophanes, God, this nciple is from everlasting to everlasting. This is ground of all, the ultimately and absolutely real. s alone is the certain and the true.

8. Such being the primary position of Xenophanes d the Eleatics, a question arises in regard to the her member of the fundamental antithesis of

which I spoke, namely, the changeable. What d
this school of philosophy say about that? Chan
or "motion" (which was the generic word usual
employed by the older systems to denote eve
species of change), this was too obtrusive and pr
minent a feature in the constitution of things
be overlooked. It is in dealing with this questi
that the dialectical, *i.e.*, the logical and metaphysic
character of the Eleatic school reveals itself. (It
here for the first time that the dialectical moveme
of human thought comes distinctly into play.
the Ionic school the adjustment of the relation b
tween the unchangeable and the changeable was n
attempted at all, or attempted after the crude
fashion. In the Pythagorean school the conciliati
of the one and the many was rather taken for grant
than discussed and explained. They either ignor
or touched but lightly on the problem and the di
culties which it involved. The Eleatics, I say, we
the first who seriously addressed themselves to i
consideration. And it is on this account, in part
least, that their school has been characterised
dialectical or logical and metaphysical, while t
Ionics were characterised as physical, and the Pyth
goreans as arithmetical and mathematical.

9. When we take up this question—the quest
in regard to the relation between the unchangeab
and the changeable, the one and the many—what
first strikes us is the repugnancy of the two terms

the antithesis. The antithesis is ultimate or damental, that is to say, there is nothing higher n it in the region of thought, no higher cate- y under which these two extremes may be con- ated or reduced to unity. It denotes a radical and roughgoing opposition. This, at any rate, is the nt of view from which at first we are compelled to ard it, and this is the point of view from which nophanes and the other Eleatic philosophers re- led the antithesis. The necessities of thinking ned to them to declare that the distinction was plute and irreconcilable. A strict logic seemed necessitate this conclusion.

0. But now observe what follows from this con- on. This follows from it, that whatever epithet redicate is applied to one of the terms of the an- esis, the counter-predicate must be applied to the er term. Unless this were so, the opposition would be absolute and complete. It follows, then, that re call the unchangeable, or the one, true, we must the changeable, or the many, untrue; that if we the unchangeable, or the one, real, we must call changeable, or the many, unreal. In short, if we that the one, the permanent, or the unchange- e, *is*, we must say that the many, the fluctuating, unchangeable, *are not*. Such was the logic by ch the Eleatic school found themselves compelled naintain the nonentity (the comparative nonentity least) of all sensible existence. For it was the

data of sense, the universe as apprehended by t
sense, it was this which constituted the changea
element in the fundamental antithesis with wh
they had to deal.

11. This dialectical movement—a movement
urged against them by their adversaries, but
forced upon them by the logical necessities of t
position, and one to which they readily yielded—
movement comes more to the surface in Parmen
and Zeno than it does in Xenophanes. But it sho
itself to some extent in Xenophanes, and in him
first find an implied though not explicit severa
made between the intelligible world and the sens
world, between the world of reason and the w
of sense, and the former represented as the sphe
reality, the latter as that of unreality.

12. Xenophanes did not hold that there was
sensible world; no idealist ever maintained t
although we shall see by-and-by that under
stricter interpretation of his system Parmenides
forced to such a conclusion. But I say Xenopha
did not hold that there was *no* sensible world.
held, however, that it had no reality, no reality
itself, but only a reality in and for the mind of m
which reality was, in fact, no reality at all. It v
a mere subjective phenomenon, and possessed
such truth as that which reason compelled us
attribute to the permanent one, which, according

od. His tenets on this point may ollows: Suppose that the sun is a, and that his light is broken by multitude of lesser lights, of all rms; and suppose that the sea is s of this multitude of lights, this of shifting colours, this plurality of dancing , would this consciousness contain or represent truth, the real? Certainly it would not. The jectively true, the real in itself, is in this case the n in the heavens, the one permanent, the persistent colour and in form. Its diversified appearance the sea, the dispersion of its light in a myriad olours, and in a myriad forms, *is* nothing, and represents nothing which substantially exists, but is only something which exists phenomenally, that is, unsubstantially and unreally, in the sea. Take away the sea, and these various reflections no longer are. This dancing play of lights is a truth only for the sea, not a truth for the land; there the light falls differently; therefore it is not a universal truth, and nothing in strict philosophy being admitted as true which is not universally true, it is not, strictly speaking, a truth at all. Such is the way in which we may suppose Xenophanes to illustrate his position in regard to sensible existence. This form of existence has no existence *in and for itself*, no existence irrespective of the mind and the senses of man, no existence at all resembling that which must be conceded to the one, the permanent and the real; but an

existence in all respects the opposite of what it is before an existence in all respects unreal.

13. Finally, we may say of Xenophanes that he seems to have approximated more closely than has yet been done to the realisation of what has been called a double consciousness; a rational consciousness, on the one hand, cognisant of the permanent One, as positive existence, as the real and true in itself; and a sensible consciousness, on the other hand, cognisant of the changeable many, as negative existence, as unreal and untrue in itself, and as possessing, in comparison with the genuine and absolute reality of the unchangeable one, only a spurious and relative reality. Keep well in mind the thorough-going repugnancy between the one and the many, the intelligible and the sensible, inculcated in this school; remember that whatever predicate is applied to one member of the antithesis, the opposite predicate must be applied to the other member of it, and you will obtain a clue to the doctrines of these philosophers, and will understand, however hard you may find it to agree with, their dogmas in regard to sensible existence, and the phenomena of the material universe.

PARMENIDES.

14. I pass on to Parmenides. This philosopher is the central figure in the Eleatic sect, a man of imposing presence and authoritative aspect. His personal

influence on his contemporaries was powerful and extensive, and the shadow of his great name stretched down through many generations of antiquity, inspiring reverence and wonder. In the dialogue of Plato entitled 'Theætetus,' Socrates, speaking of Parmenides, says: "This man appeared to me, if I may use Homer's language, to be at once august and commanding (*αἰδοῖός τε ἅμα δεινός τε*), for I have conversed with him, and listened to his eloquent discourses when I was very young and he very old;" and in the dialogue entitled 'Parmenides,' Socrates describes him "as a man with white hair, beautiful to behold and about sixty-five years of age."

15. I have mentioned the Platonic dialogue entitled 'Parmenides.' I may therefore take the opportunity of remarking, that although Parmenides is introduced as the principal speaker in that dialogue, and although it is to some extent an exposition of Eleatic principles, it is, at the same time, so mixed up with Plato's own dialectic, that it cannot be accepted as an exact account of the Eleatic doctrines. On the surface it appears to be the poorest quibbling, the merest verbal hair-splitting about the one and the many; but to those who go into its depths, and who observe how each member of the antithesis converts itself into its opposite in the very act of being thought, it will appear as the most wonderful and subtle piece of metaphysic ever given to the world. It is the very quintessence of Platonism. It is not

however, the philosophy of Parmenides himself. It is Parmenides carried forward into a subsequent phasis of philosophy; it is Parmenides platonising.

16. The philosophy of Parmenides, in so far as we have it from his own hand, is contained in some fragments of a poem entitled *Περὶ φύσεως*, concerning nature. The poem opens with an allegory, the literal meaning of which is, that the poet, impelled by his passions, goes in quest of truth. At first the senses are his guides. At length he reaches a spot where the gates stand which open on the paths of truth and of error. *Δίκη*, that is, justice, or wisdom, or understanding, is the guardian of the gates. She receives him favourably, and points out to him which is the road of reason and truth, and which the road of sense and opinion, bidding him follow out the one and avoid the other. The pathway of inquiry, she says, is twofold: the one way is that which affirms being and denies not-being; this is the way of truth and reason: the other is, the way which denies being and affirms not-being; this is the way of error and sense. The following is a translation or paraphrase of a few of the lines; the horses which bear him along are the passions, the nymphs are the senses:

"Far as the mind can reach conveyed me impetuous horses,
Speeding along God's highway, which runs through the secrets of nature.
Nymphs directed my course, the nymphs of the sun were my escort;

to the spot

ere stood Justice, holding the keys that unlock

ressed her the nymphs, and blandly answered the

,

e gates with her keys, so that the chariot might enter.
aking me by the hand, she spoke these words of assurance:
youth, borne from afar to my house by the horses that brought thee,
Led by omens of good, thou hast come to the dwelling of Wisdom.
will show thee the way it behoves thee to follow devoutly;
lso the road of appearance, where nought but fallacy reigneth.
ome, then, this is the true road, which says that Being alone is,
nd that not-Being is not: whereas the pathway of falsehood
eacheth that not-Being is, and that Being immutable is not.
n the first of these roads thy mind may travel securely;
ut if it enters the second, 'twill be lost in the mazes of error.'"

—KARSTEN, i. 2, p. 28.

uch, in translation, is an imperfect specimen
newhat imperfect poem, a poem which, even
d come down to us entire, would present few
that would be readily intelligible to our modern
ensions. The first part of the poem, which is
d *Τὰ πρὸς ἀλήθειαν*, that is, "concerning truth,"
ues to ring the changes upon truth as that
centres in Being, Being one and immutable,
g not apprehensible by the senses, but only by
reason. It also describes falsehood as centring
not-Being, as the multifarious, the particular, the
sible, the non-existent, and the inconceivable.
he poem has a second part, not very consistent with
he first, entitled *Τὰ πρὸς δόξαν*, that is, "concerning

the phenomena of the sensible univ
tion to the tenets propounded in t
find in Plato's works, particularly in
entitled 'Sophista,' some notices of the
of Parmenides, and the other Eleatics, re
Being and not-Being. But these speculations m
be worked out mainly by means of one's own refle
tions. We have only a few crumbling bones fro
which to construct our skeleton as we best may, a
to give it, if that be possible, some semblance to t
remains of an organic creature.

18. The whole philosophy of Parmenides cent
I think, in these two points; *first*, the concep
Being; and, *secondly*, the determination of t
tion between Being and not-Being. Let us
each of these points separately.

19. *First*, then, of the conception of Bein
set forth Being as the universal, as that in
all things are identical, to declare that Being
truth of the universe; this, to us, who live in
latter times, may seem to be a very trivial and
structive dogma. But we have to remember, for
thing, that we, as soon as we were born, have ente
on an inheritance of thoughts and of words fr
which these early thinkers were altogether cut o
They had to think out and to devise what we fi

its first revelation, a divine spark
ed the irrational darkness of man's
e, and bespoke the presence of a rea-
eflective mind. This consideration may
ve to explain how the conception of being should
pear to us to be at once the shallowest, and yet
uld be, in itself, the most fundamental and essen-
of all the conceptions of reason. But there is
also to be considered. There is this question to
asked: How far does the philosophy which sets
Being as the universal principle, how far does
lly with our definition of Philosophy; the defini-
which declares that philosophy is the pursuit
tainment of truth as it is for all, and not
s it is for some intelligence? I conceive that
osophy of Parmenides corresponds, if not
ly, at any rate largely, with our definition.
not the truth of the universe for *our* minds,
ny minds *in particular;* but it is the truth
niverse for *all* minds. Being is a necessary
ion, a conception valid for all reason. An
ence which had no conception of Being could
an intelligence at all. Attempt to explain to
lligence with no such senses as ours—attempt
ain to him the sensible universe, the universe
ppears to the senses, and he would not under-
d you. But tell him that the universe *is*, that it
Being, and to the extent of that conception he

his own thought *is*. He would under
meant by Being (remember I am su
be an intelligence, and therefore ab
although he has no such senses as ours
understand this, because the thought of being
itself being. Being, then, is a wider universal—th
is to say, it is more a truth for all intellect, for int
lect in its very essence—than any principle set fo
in the Ionic school, than water, or infinite matter
air. It is a wider universal even than number,
principle of Pythagoreans. It may possibly be a q
tion whether an intelligence might not work wit
thinking number; but it can be no question whe
an intelligence can work without thinking
Deprive it of this category, and you annil
intelligent functions. It may turn out
that Being is only a half category, only half
sary thought. Meanwhile, however, we acce
a necessary conception of reason (without i
whether it be a whole or only a half conc
we accept it as a true universal, as that in
all has unity, as a truth valid for all intellect.
we regard the system of Parmenides, in whi
truth was first enunciated, as a true philosoph
much as it comes up, to some extent at least,
standard of our definition.

20. *Secondly*, of the relation of Being and not-Be

as determined by the system of Parmenides. Here we find the fundamental antithesis of which I have spoken carried out by the dialectic movement of thought into its most extreme opposition. This antithesis has come before us as the universal and the particular, the intelligible and the sensible, matter and form, the one and the many, the permanent and the changeable: it now comes before us as Being and not-Being. This is a form into which the antithesis is inevitably forced, forced by a logical necessity. If the one term be Being, the other must be not-Being, otherwise it would be the same term over again, and there would be no antithesis. Whatever the one member of the antithesis be, the other must be its direct opposite; otherwise the antithesis would not be fundamental, it would have its found tion in a higher unity. Run over each pair of ter Here the particular is obviously the non-universal it were the universal there would be no antith there is no antithesis between the universal and universal. The particular, then, is the non-univ and we may express the opposition as the univ and the non-universal. In the same way the int gible and the sensible is equivalent to the intelligi and the non-intelligible; matter and form is equ lent to matter and not-matter; the one and the is equivalent to the one and the not-one; the nent and the changeable is equivalent to th nent and the not-permanent. So likewise, make Being one of the terms of the ant

must be faced by not-Being as the other term; nothing else would yield an opposition. We cannot oppose Being to Being; and therefore not-Being is the only counter-term to Being.

21. The antithesis, then, of the one and the many, the intelligible and the sensible, the permanent and the changeable, has passed in the Eleatic school into that of Being and not-Being. The next movement of thought in dealing with this relation is the question, Does not-Being exist? Is there any not-Being at all? It is difficult, I believe it is impossible, to state in precise terms how the Eleatics answered this question. In the first part of his poem Parmenides seems to maintain that there is no not-Being; in the second part of it he accords to not-Being a sort of spurious existence. In fact, answer the question in either way, and the difficulties that arise are insuperable. Suppose, in the first place, we say that there is no not-Being, then the whole material world, all sensible existence, is annihilated, for this is not-Being. The world of sense stands logically opposed to Being in the fundamental antithesis of thought, as the particular to the universal, the sensible to the intelligible, the many to the one. This solution, then, which abolishes the one member of the antithesis, abolishes likewise the material world. The other member, Being, alone is left. And what sort of universe is this? It is a universe in which there is no plurality, no unity, no difference of one thing from another,

no motion, no change anywhere, nothing but a dead immovable uniformity. The many is identical with not-Being; there is no not-Being, therefore there is no many, but only one. The changeable is identical with not-Being; there is no not-Being, therefore there is no changeable, but only an unvarying permanent. The universe, according to reason, is evidently in a quandary. Mere Being can never change, because there is nothing to change it. But may not Being be added to Being, and may not change be the result of the synthesis? No, there cannot be a synthesis of only one element. Being added to Being is merely a repetition of one and the same factor, and nothing can come of that, nothing can emerge in the shape of a new product. The universe of the Eleatics having been reduced to one homogeneous element, Being namely—*i.e.*, the universal without the particular—has in it no change, no variety, no life; it is mere stagnant undiversified unity. That is the difficulty which the Eleatics have to face when they maintain that there is no not-Being at all.

22. Suppose then, again, Parmenides to admit that, in some sense or other, not-Being exists. The question is, in what sense? It is difficult to see that this can be admitted in any sense without running into a contradiction. The admission, however, if allowable, would save the phenomena of the material universe. So much may be conceded. For, suppose it were urged against Parmenides that, in identify-

ing sensible existence with not-Being, he had annihilated the former, his answer would be; No: I do indeed identify sensible existence, or the material world, with not-Being; but then I hold that not-Being has a sort of existence (spurious enough, I grant you, but still a sort of existence), and therefore the material universe, which is identical with not-Being, has a sort of spurious existence. That answer, I say, would be sufficient to save the material world and its phenomena from the logical extinction which would overtake them under the other alternative. In conceding this, however, I am not sure, on second thoughts, that I have not conceded too much. Let us investigate a little more closely this spurious kind of existence which, under one interpretation of his system, Parmenides attributes to the presentations of sense. It will be found, I think, that this kind of existence, instead of being merely spurious, is contradictory, and is obtained in defiance of all the laws of logical thinking. We must revert for a moment to the fundamental antithesis of Being and not-Being. In his search after unity Parmenides found Being. This he constituted into a world by itself, a world apart. This is the one. But there is also the not-one or the many, and this is not-Being. But if the one or Being be constituted into a world by itself, the many or not-Being must likewise be constituted into a world by itself; you cannot isolate one thing from another without isolating that other from the first. But what happens when the world of not-Being

is isolated from the world of Being? This happens, that the particular is prescinded from the universal; you are called upon to conceive particulars under the presidency of no universal; in other words, you are called upon to conceive a contradiction. The spurious existence which we supposed might be attributed to not-Being, and therefore to natural things, is a mere subterfuge, which, when examined, resolves itself into a contradiction. I don't say that such an attribution is inconsistent with the principles of every philosophy, but it is certainly inconsistent with the principles of the Eleatic philosophy; for this philosophy makes no attempt to conciliate the two members of the antithesis of which I have so often spoken, but, on the contrary, does all it can to draw them asunder into their widest opposition. And therefore it perishes beneath this twofold contradiction. The world of Being (the intelligible world of the Eleatics) is a contradiction to all reason, because it is the sphere of the universal prescinded absolutely from the particular; and the world of not-Being (the sensible world of the Eleatics) is also a contradiction to all reason, because it is the sphere of the particular prescinded absolutely from the universal. In the one world there is absolute unity without any diversity; in the other there is absolute diversity without any unity, and neither of these can be conceived.

23. In summing up the philosophy of Parmenides,

I would call your attention to the distinction between sense and reason, which appears to be more distinctly announced in his system than in any other that had preceded. I am not aware that he calls λόγος or reason the faculty of truth for all, and δόξα or αἴσθησις the faculty of truth for some; but this is evidently his meaning, this was the substance of his distinction between λόγος and αἴσθησις; the latter he did not consider to be properly the organ of truth at all, but only the former. The main points of detail in the system are these: *First,* Being is the universal, the element in which all things agree. This is apprehended by reason. *Secondly,* The particular or non-universal in things is not-Being. This is apprehended by sense. *Thirdly,* No attempt is made to conciliate, but rather to separate absolutely, the members of this antithesis. This separation of the antithesis necessarily preceded the conciliation of the antithesis, otherwise there would have been no antithesis at all. *Fourthly,* The consequence is that the universe of Parmenides falls asunder into two contradictories, a world of unity on the one hand, where there is no diversity, and a world of diversity on the other hand, in which there is no unity. *Fifthly,* His attempt to save the material phenomena by attributing to not-Being a spurious Being (if indeed he does make this attempt) is altogether unsuccessful; for he has carried Being wholly over into the intelligible world, and therefore the sensible world, or the world of not-Being, cannot on his principles have any Being at all conceded to it.

Sixthly, The two contradictories which have been explained break down the system of Parmenides.

24. The philosophy of Parmenides, meagre as its principle, and unsatisfactory as its issues may seem, is a genuine product of the speculative spirit of the world straining towards the light. It is a true philosophy; it has its roots in the necessities of thought. It goes forth in pursuit of the universal, the truth for all intellect. It finds this in the conception of Being; but it mistakes a half conception for a whole one, so that, instead of establishing a whole, it only establishes the half of a necessary thought: in other words, it issues in a contradiction. Nevertheless, this philosophy is great, great in itself, greater in its effects on succeeding thinkers. It is no arbitrary excogitation of an individual mind. It is a product of the universal reason grappling with the universal truth. It represents a speculative movement common to the understandings of all thinking men, a movement through which every mind that reflects must inevitably pass, a catholic crisis in the development of thought itself. It is indeed their broad catholicity, their unindividual thinking, their speculating for the race, or rather, I may say, for all intelligence, and not for themselves, which gives to these old philosophers their interest and value. In this respect Parmenides must be ranked among the highest of those wide and essential souls through which the universal reason has expressed, although not adequately, its everlast-

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ing laws, and given an articulate shape to the thoughts that wander through eternity.

ZENO.

25. Zeno, like Parmenides, was a native of Elea. If we may believe Plato, he was twenty-five years younger than Parmenides. Both of them are said to have taken an active part in the administration of the affairs of their native city. Zeno was a resolute opponent of tyranny, and is reported by some authorities to have died a martyr in the defence of liberty.

26. Zeno is styled by Aristotle the father and founder of dialectic; and if the evolution of the issues contained in the philosophy of Parmenides entitle a man to this appellation, he deserves it well. Zeno was the author of those subtle and paradoxical puzzles respecting motion, the solution of which has for the most part baffled logicians even down to the present day. These puzzles, which ought not to be regarded as quibbles (although this is the light in which they are usually looked at), are full of deep significance as illustrative of the laws and progress of thinking. They show how thought is absolutely at variance with itself, and thus, by bringing the opposition fairly to the surface, they prepare the way for its ultimate conciliation under the presidency of a higher principle. Some of the paradoxes are expressed in the words, "Achilles can never overtake

a tortoise"—"the flying arrow rests." And generally the impossibility of motion is the leading paradox in the philosophy of Zeno. I may touch upon some of these hereafter: meanwhile, I shall make a few remarks on the principle on which he founds, and on the difference between him and Parmenides.

27. The only difference between Parmenides and Zeno seems to be this, that the one of them argued the affirmative and the other the negative side of the same question. Parmenides took the affirmative side, and argued that Being, the one alone, truly existed. Zeno took the opposite side, and argued that not-Being, the many, had no true existence. The dialectical movement of thought, namely, the opposition between the one and the many, Being and not-Being carried to an extreme, this is, of course, in both cases the same. But if we are to make a distinction between the procedure of Parmenides and that of Zeno, the distinction which I have now pointed out to you is the one which we must draw.

28. In what I have as yet said I am not sure that I have quite reached the ultimate foundation on which the Eleatic philosophy rests. At least I am not sure that I have given it sufficient prominence, or distinguished it with sufficient clearness from the collateral considerations that went along with it. I shall now attempt to make these ultimate points clear, because it is only by getting thoroughly to the

root of the matter that we can understand either the motive or the character of the Eleatic speculations. To express their principle, then, almost in one word, it is this: that opposite determinations cannot be combined in the same object, that contrary predicates cannot be assigned to the same thing. They hold, for example, that what was one could not be not-one, *i.e.*, many; and that what was many or not-one could not be one. They held that what was universal could not be non-universal, *i.e.*, particular; and that what was particular or non-universal could not be universal. They held that what was intelligible could not be non-intelligible, *i.e.*, sensible; and that what was non-intelligible or sensible could not be intelligible. The same rule was applied to their own ultimate generalisation of Being and not-Being. What was Being could not be not-Being, and what was not-Being could not be Being. What was could not not be, and what was not could not be. To Being, the one, the universal, the intelligible—the predicate not-Being could not be applied; and to not-Being, the particular, the sensible, the many—the predicate of Being could not be applied. In short, the incompatibility of opposite predicates or determinations attaching to the same subject, this is the ultimate foundation, the fundamental position, of the Eleatic philosophy.

29. Now, the question here arises, a question, however, which I shall merely broach without discus-

sing; the question, Are contrary, opposite, or, as I will call them, contradictory determinations incompatible in the same subject? If they are, then I hold that the philosophy of the Eleatics must be accepted with all its consequences. There is no escape from the paradoxes of Zeno if this principle be true. And, certainly, at first sight it appears not only to be true, but to be forced upon us as true by the very necessities of reason. It seems to be a necessary truth of thought that a thing cannot be one and not one, cannot be universal and not universal, cannot be infinite and finite, and, in fine, cannot be and not be: and, accordingly, this principle has been recognised as a necessary truth in most of the schools of philosophy, even by those which abjure the conclusions of Parmenides and Zeno. Reserving this question for subsequent discussion, I may just here remark that this principle, so far from being a necessary truth of reason (however like one it may look), is, on the contrary, a downright contradiction, an absurdity to all reason; and that its opposite, namely, the principle that opposite determinations are not only compatible in the same subject, but are necessary to the constitution of every subject—this is a necessary truth of reason, is, in fact, the law of the universe, the law of the universe of things as well as of the universe of thought, and that its discovery and enunciation rest with Heraclitus.

30. Reserving for a future opportunity what I

have to say on Zeno's subtle paradoxes in disproof of motion, and also his position that opposite predicates or attributes cannot attach to the same subject, I shall now offer a short summary of the Eleatic philosophy. The general scope and substance of the Eleatic philosophy may be summed up under the following heads:—*First*, the Eleatic philosophers assumed Being, and nothing but Being, as their universal, their truth for all reason; this with them was the τὸ ὄν, or the real. *Secondly*, they denied or discarded the opposite of this, τὸ ἕτερον or τὸ μὴ ὄν, the not-Being. *Thirdly*, they denied this on the ground that the same thought or the same thing could not contain or consist of opposite determinations or contrary predicates. *Fourthly*, the consequence was, that there was no diversity, no plurality, no difference, no life, no generation, and no decay; in short, no change or movement in the universe, according to them; nothing but a dead and unvarying uniformity, a stagnant fixedness, more inanimate than nonentity itself. Being, according to Parmenides, was strictly synonymous with the permanent. Hence his conclusion followed at once: the world of Being is the world of permanence. In the world of permanence there is and can be no change, otherwise the permanent would not be the permanent; therefore, in the world of Being there is and can be no change. Or it may be put in this way, the world of Being excludes not-Being; not-Being is essential to change; therefore, the world of Being excludes change. To under-

stand how not-Being is essential to change you have but to consider that all change is the cessation, or putting off, or not being of one state or determination, and the putting on or being of another state or determination. But in the world of Being there can be no not-Being of any state or determination, because this is the sphere of pure unmixed Being, and not-Being is absolutely excluded from it. And, therefore, inasmuch as not-Being is absolutely excluded from this sphere, and inasmuch as not-Being is essential to constitute change, it follows that all change is necessarily excluded from this sphere. In other words, in the world of Being there is no change, no creation, no becoming; that is, no coming into Being and no going out of Being; there is a mere dead unvarying uniformity. That is the world of reason and of truth according to Parmenides; and it is fairly, indeed inevitably, reached upon his principles, which are, that the world of Being and of not-Being stand towards each other in a relation of irreconcilable antagonism, and that opposite determinations cannot belong to, and may not be predicated of, the same subject.

31. Let us now consider shortly the position of Zeno. In the world of change there is no Being. This is the same thesis viewed negatively. Parmenides showed that what is, cannot change; and his ground or fulcrum of proof was, that Being excludes not-Being, and not-Being is essential to change; for

instance, the not-Being of solidity is essential to the Being of fluidity. On the other hand, Zeno proves that what changes, cannot be; and his fulcrum is that not-Being excludes Being. To repeat his position: in the world of change there is no Being. The proof is this: if the world of change included Being, it would include the permanent, because Being and the permanent are identical; but the permanent is excluded from the changeable by the very terms of the conception, therefore Being is excluded from the world of change; in other words, in the world of change there is no Being. Such is the negative supplement by means of which Zeno reinforced the positive argument of Parmenides. In the sphere of Being, or the one, the universal, says Parmenides, there can be no not-Being (and consequently no change), because to introduce not-Being here would be to assign opposite determinations to the same subject. And in the sphere of not-Being, the many, the particular, says Zeno, there can be no Being (and consequently nothing but change), because to introduce Being here would, in like manner, be to assign opposite determinations to the same subject. The reasonings of the Eleatics are impregnable if their principle, namely, that contrary determinations cannot belong to the same subject, be conceded.

HERACLITUS.

1. It may help to keep distinctly before your minds the chief characteristic or distinction of the various systems we have been considering, if we designate by one word the principle for which each of them contends. They are all searching for the common quality or feature, what we call the universal, in all things, something which is true for all minds. If they can attain to this, they conceive that they have reached the ultimately real, the absolutely true. According to Thales, then, *water* was the universal; according to Anaximander, *infinite* or *indefinite* matter was the universal; *air* was the universal of Anaximenes. According to the Pythagoreans, *number* was the universal principle; while, with the Eleatics, the universal in all things was *being*.

2. We now come to a philosopher who inaugurated a new era in speculation. Heraclitus comes upon the scene; and the universal for which he contends is *movement, change*. This principle is different from all those which have been enumerated. It is indeed

more distinct from them all than they are distinct from one another. It therefore marks a new crisis in the development of philosophy; so that while we may class the previous systems together under the general title of the philosophy of Being, inasmuch as they all deal in some way or other with Being, we place the system of Heraclitus under a different head, and designate it as the philosophy of Becoming. This is the only word in our language which corresponds to the γιγνόμενον of the Greeks; but it is an unfortunate word in being both inexpressive and ambiguous. It often stands for the proper, the decent. Of course that is not the sense in which it is here used. It is used in some sort of antithetical relation to Being, a relation which we must endeavour to determine. For in these two words, ἔστι and γίγνεται, ὂν and γιγνόμενον, centres the most cardinal distinction in the Greek philosophy, a distinction corresponding in some degree to our substantial and phenomenal. This distinction was mainly due to Heraclitus.

3. It is quite true that in previous systems we frequently encounter the conception of change, or of becoming, so that Heraclitus cannot be said to have been the first who entertained the conception. He was the first, however, who elevated change to the rank of a principle, who made it in fact *the* principle, the universal in all things. Previous philosophers had made change derivative, and had attempted to

account for it without much success. Aristotle says, that the Ionic philosophers had failed completely in their attempts to explain change or motion. Nor were the systems of other philosophers more successful. Indeed, we have seen that Zeno, so far from explaining, was compelled to deny it, and declare it to be an impossibility. The difficulty was occasioned by these philosophers having regarded motion as derivative and secondary. Heraclitus made it original and primary. They began with Being, or the fixed. He began with Becoming, or the unfixed. This was with him the first, the principle, the universal, the truth for all. This was, at any rate, a new position in philosophy. We shall return to its consideration when we have made a few remarks on the personal history of Heraclitus.

4. This philosopher was born at Ephesus, one of the chief Ionian cities on the coast of Asia Minor; and if the dates usually given be correct, he rather preceded Parmenides and Zeno. And on this account he is frequently classed along with the other Ionic philosophers, and placed immediately after Thales, Anaximander, and Anaximenes, and one or two others of that school. Another reason assigned for classing him with the Ionic school is, that he is usually regarded as having fixed on a physical element as his principle. Just as Thales represented water, and Anaximenes air, as the origin of all things, so Heraclitus is reported to have derived all things from fire.

Fire, it is said, is the element which he regarded as primary. Much stress, however, is not to be laid on this circumstance; and it affords no good reason for classing him with his Ionic predecessors, or for placing him before Parmenides and Zeno. For the fire of which Heraclitus speaks is not to be regarded as itself his principle, but merely as a symbol of his principle, merely as a physical emblem or illustration of that unceasing motion or change which he holds to be the very essence of the universe. Notwithstanding these considerations, therefore, I have thought it right to place him after the Eleatics, for the chronological difference between him and them is but slight. The three philosophers, Parmenides, Zeno, and Heraclitus, were contemporaries during a part, at least, of their lives; and therefore, although the latter may have been rather the oldest of the three, still, as his speculations appear to stand in the order of thought subsequent to those of the Eleatic school, I have thought this consideration a sufficient justification of the arrangement which I have adopted in reference to the philosopher of Ephesus. We hear that, although sprung from a family of repute, and entitled to aspire to the highest offices in the state, Heraclitus refused to have anything to do with the affairs of government. His pride or his patriotism equally prevented him from accepting favours offered by foreign despots. In privacy and independence, prizing his own thoughts above all other possessions, Heraclitus lived and died, the deepest, pro-

bably, if also the darkest of all the thinkers of antiquity.

5. The researches and meditations of Heraclitus seem to have exercised a very powerful influence on the philosophical spirit of antiquity. Like some fine and subtle essence, his presence may be traced, and has made itself felt, in almost every period of speculation; but corresponding to its fineness and subtlety, has been the difficulty of laying hold of it, and of reducing it to an intelligible form. In modern times his fragmentary and obscure remains have been religiously collected and amply commented on by scholars of distinguished erudition and ability. The chief of these are the Germans, Schleiermacher and Lassalle. The light, however, which these inquirers have thrown on the speculations of Heraclitus seems scarcely proportioned to the diligence with which they have prosecuted their labours.

6. The following are some of the fragmentary utterances of Heraclitus, which have been gleaned from the writings of various ancient authors. Heraclitus says, all things flow (*πάντα ῥεῖ*) and nothing stays (*οὐδὲν μένει*). He likens the universe to a river, the waters of which are continually passing away; and he says that no man can bathe twice in the same stream, because a stream is never, even for a single second, the same. He says that a thing, in separating itself from itself, unites itself to itself;

that in going asunder, it goes together; and in going together, it goes asunder; in short, that separation and union are inseparable, and the same; that separation *is* union, and union *is* separation. He says that strife or opposition is the father of all things; and that harmony arises only out of the union of discords. And, finally, giving to his doctrine, which is, that everything consists of antagonistic or heterogeneous elements—giving to this doctrine its highest or most abstract expression, he declares that *everything is and is not;* a formula which, in modern times, has been adopted by Hegel, and has proved a stumbling-block and rock of offence to all who have ventured on his pages. Such are some of the chief expressions in which Heraclitus is reported to have embodied the substance of his speculations. They contain the whole of his philosophy, in so far as it has been handed down to us; and it is obvious that they merely repeat the same idea with very slight variations.

7. The one idea of which these varied phrases are the expression is the idea of change. When he says that all things are in a continual state of flux, that a thing agrees with itself, and yet differs from itself; when he says that strife is the father of all things, that everything is its own opposite, and both is and is not, or whatever his phraseology may be; he means that things are continually changing, or that the whole system of the universe is a never-resting process, a Becoming.

8. We have now to ascertain what Heraclitus precisely means by Becoming. Becoming is a different conception from Being, yet it is not easy to see wherein the difference consists. Let us begin with our ordinary conception of Becoming. We say a thing becomes different from what it was, meaning thereby that it has undergone some change or series of changes. Our meaning here is, if I mistake not, that the thing is first in one definite state of Being, that next it is in another definite state of Being, that then it is in a third definite state of Being, and so on; and these states, though differing from each other, are all of them, in our estimation, states of Being. Our conception, I repeat, is this, that the thing is first in a particular state, and that it rests in that state a longer or a shorter time; that when it changes it passes into another particular state, in which it rests during another period of time longer or shorter. Becoming, then, in our ordinary conception of it, is merely a succession of states of Being, a series of existing changes which any object undergoes, and each of which lasts for some definite period of time.

9. But if this be our conception of Becoming, it is difficult to see wherein that conception differs from the conception of Being. It is merely the conception of a succession of different states, each of which *is*—is Being; while Being is the conception of one such state. But this seems to be no distinction at all.

We may be assured, then, that this, our ordinary conception of Becoming (which, in truth, is no adequate conception of it at all, because it confounds Being and Becoming)—we may be assured that this was not the conception entertained by Heraclitus and the other philosophers of antiquity. Their idea of Becoming was not the idea of a series of consecutive states of Being.

10. To get at the conception of Becoming, as entertained by Heraclitus and others, we must not identify, but we rather must contrast it, with that of Being. I do not say that the conception of Becoming excludes that of Being, but it is certainly to some extent opposed to it. What then is the principal feature in the conception of Being? By ascertaining this we shall be able to declare what its opposite is, and thus we shall reach the proper conception of Becoming. The principal feature in the conception of Being is rest, fixedness. Now, the opposite of this is the principal feature in the conception of Becoming. It is unrest, unfixedness. A thing never rests at all in any of the changing states into which it is thrown. It is in the state and out of it in a shorter time than any calculus can measure. In fact, the universe and all that it contains are undergoing a continuous change in which there is no pause; and therefore, since pause or rest is necessary to the conception of Being, the universe cannot be said to be in a state of Being or fixedness, but in a continually fluxional

condition, to be a process, a becoming, that is, something always changing, and no one of its changes enduring or stopping during any appreciable interval of time. If the change could be arrested for a single instant, that would yield a moment of what might properly be called Being; but inasmuch as no change can be so arrested, the universe is a continual creation, a continually varying process, a Becoming.

11. You will obtain, I think, a distinct conception of Becoming as distinguished from Being, if you will attend to the following illustration. Take the case of a falling body, a stone dropped, let us say, at a distance of one hundred feet from the surface of the earth. It travels, you are aware, with a continually accelerated velocity. Natural philosophers can tell you how long it will take to reach the earth. By artificial contrivances they can calculate the ratio at which its velocity becomes increased. But no natural philosophy can calculate or can tell you what the particular velocity of the falling body is at any given moment, however short. The truth is, that the stone never has any particular, that is, any definite and constant velocity. Its velocity is always changing. It is not as if it had a certain constant velocity for the smallest conceivable time, the 1,000,000th part of a second, and then an increased constant velocity for another 1,000,000th part of a second, and so on. If that were the nature of its velocity, it would serve to illustrate our first and erroneous conception of Becom-

ing, but that is not the nature of the velocity. It is continually changing. The velocity, therefore, of the descending stone never *is* any one velocity; it is always becoming another velocity. Its velocity, therefore, has no Being, because Being implies some continuance or permanence. It is properly called a Becoming. Such is one illustration by means of which you may be aided in familiarising your minds to the conception of Becoming, or process as distinguished from that of Being.

12. The illustration I gave you in the preceding paragraph may aid you in forming a conception of what is signified by the word Becoming, and of what Heraclitus meant by saying that all things are in a state of flux. The velocity of the descending stone is a phenomenon to which the term *is* cannot be properly, or at least without some qualification, applied at any moment of its transit. Take the smallest period of time you choose, say the one hundred millionth fraction of a second, and the changes in the velocity of the stone within that period are utterly incalculable, they are infinite. It is, I believe, with matters of this kind that the differential calculus deals. You will hear more about that elsewhere. Here we must deal with the question rather metaphysically than mathematically. I say then that the velocity of the stone changes infinitely, undergoes infinitude of changes, within any given time, however short. And this consideration prevents us from say-

ing that any of its velocities are, or that they have a Being, that is, a continuance. Each of the velocities in the very act of being that velocity vanishes in another velocity, so that we never can say of it that it is that velocity. In the very act of being what it is, it is not what it is. Such is an illustration of what Heraclitus means when he says, *πάντα ῥεῖ καὶ οὐδὲν μένει.*

13. Take another illustration of this conception of Becoming. Suppose yourselves gazing on a gorgeous sunset. The whole western heavens are glowing with roseate hues. But you are aware that within half an hour all these glorious tints will have faded away into a dull ashen grey. You see them even now melting away before your eyes, although your eyes cannot place before you the conclusion which your reason draws. And what conclusion is that? That conclusion is that you never, even for the shortest time that can be named or conceived, see any abiding colour, any colour which truly *is*. Within the millionth part of a second the whole glory of the painted heavens has undergone an incalculable series of mutations. One shade is supplanted by another with a rapidity which sets all measurement at defiance, not because our power of measurement is limited, but because the process is one to which no measurement applies. Before any one colour has had time to be that colour, it has melted into another colour, and that other colour has, in like manner, melted

into a third before it has attained to any degree of fixedness or duration. The eye, indeed, seems to arrest the fleeting pageant, and to give it some continuance. But the senses, says Heraclitus, are very indifferent witnesses of the truth. Reason refuses to lay an arrestment on any period of the passing scene, or to declare that it is, because in the very act of being, it is not; it has given place to something else. It is a series of fleeting colours, no one of which *is*, because each of them continually vanishes in another.

14. The sunrise furnishes another illustration. The dawn steals gradually over the earth and sky; and never at any moment can we say that the degree of light is definite and fixed. It is continually changing. It is continually becoming stronger and stronger: and yet at no instant can we say or think, here one degree of clearness ends, and here a higher degree of clearness begins. In truth, none of the changes have either any end or any beginning, so imperceptibly are they fined away into each other. Neither here nor in the case of the sunset, nor in that of the falling stone, can we strike in at any point and say, here one change terminates, and here another change commences. The whole series is so close and continuous that the end of one change is the beginning of another change. The end of one change seems to be what Heraclitus calls the ὁδὸς ἄνω, the road upwards; and the beginning of another change is what he calls the ὁδὸς κάτω, the road downwards; and hence he says that these

two are one and the same, inasmuch as the end of one change is always the beginning of another, just as the beginning of one change is always the end of another. There can be thus no absolute beginning and no absolute end, for every beginning is the end of something else, and every end is the beginning of something else. The variation in the temperature of the day, or of the seasons, may afford another illustration of the conception of Becoming. The temperature is never, I believe, even for the shortest instant, exactly the same; and the reason why it seems to us to be sometimes invariable is, because our feelings and our instruments are not sufficiently fine to measure its incessant and continuous changes. But perhaps the whole phenomena of growth and decay furnish the best examples in illustration of the Heraclitean conception of Becoming. Growth is a continual change. The growing creature, whether animal or vegetable, is continually becoming different from what it is. The process never stops—never stops in such a way as to enable us to say, now the animal or the vegetable *is*, and has ceased to become. It never truly is, inasmuch as its state is never fixed and permanent. It is always passing on into another state, in which there is no rest or pause any more than there was to the preceding one. We might suppose the oak, the monarch of the woods, to grow up from an acorn into a stately tree, and to go to decay, and all this to take place before our eyes in a few minutes, and the process would not truly be more transi-

tional, or more difficult to arrest at any one stage, than it now is, when it occupies a thousand years. As is the growth of the oak-tree, so, according to Heraclitus, is the growth of the universe. It is a process which is for ever ending, and for ever being renewed.

15. These considerations lead me to call your attention to some points of contrast between the philosophy of Heraclitus and that of the Eleatic school. In the opinion of the Eleatics, the truth of the universe, in so far as it is true, is Being, fixed and abiding Being. This they say it is in the estimation of reason. To the senses, indeed, it is ever changing. But the report of the senses is not to be trusted. They do not reveal to us the real truth, that is, truth for all, but only the apparent truth, that is, the truth for some intellect. So say the Eleatics.

16. The position of Heraclitus is diametrically the opposite of this. In his opinion, the truth of the universe is not Being but Becoming. It is not a fixed and abiding existence, but a fluxional and ever-changing process. This it is in the estimation of reason. To the senses, indeed, it appears, or much of it appears, to be permanent and at rest. The process of Becoming seems frequently to the senses to have made a pause, and to have subsided into Being. But the report of the senses is not to be trusted, they are bad evidence of the truth. They mistake for Being what

is merely slow change, just as they might mistake slow motion for rest. Reason alone reveals to us the truth; and this declares, as the truth for all intellect, that the universe is a process of Becoming, and not a system of Being.

17. From these remarks you may perceive in what respect the Eleatics and Heraclitus differed in their opinions as to the senses. They both held that they were untrustworthy, that is to say, that they were not the organs of ultimate and universal truth. So far they agreed. But they differed in this, that whereas the Eleatics discredited the senses because they presented the universe to us in a fluxional or ever-varying condition, and thus deceived us as to its true character, which, according to them, was that of fixedness, Heraclitus, on the contrary, discredited these, because they presented the universe to us, or at least many of its objects, in an apparently fixed and unchanging condition, and thus deceived us as to the true character of sublunary things, which, according to him, was that of fluctuation. According to the one party the senses mislead, because they make us regard the permanent as changeable; and, according to the other party, they mislead, because they make us regard the changeable as permanent. Both parties, however, agree, as I have said, in holding that they do not make known to us the absolute truth; and therefore Mr Lewes, in his 'History of Philosophy,' is certainly mistaken when he says,

that Heraclitus "maintained that the senses are the sources of all true knowledge, for they drink in the universal intelligence."—P. 57, 2d ed.

18. Let us now return to the conception of Becoming, which we must examine a little more closely, and endeavour to analyse. Keeping in mind what I have said about the universe being a process of never-pausing series of changes, no one of which has either a beginning or an end, so infinite are they, and so finely woven into each other, let us ask whether, taking this view of the universe, Being cannot be predicated of it at all. The answer is, that Being can and must be predicated of it, otherwise we should have no subject whereof to speak. But not-Being must also be predicated of it, as I shall now endeavour to show you. At a given instant the universe is in a particular definite state; it must be in this state to have Being, because a state which is not definite is not a state at all. Call this definite state, then, Being. But the universe is a process, that is, it is continually varying; therefore it is out of this particular state, in the very act and in the very instant of being in it. Call its being out of this particular state its not-Being, just as you called its being in it its Being, and you get the universe in Being and in not-Being at one and the same instant. It at once is and is not. Such is the only explanation I am able to give of the expression of Heraclitus, in which he says that "all things are and are not."

19. This conception of the universe, as both Being and not-Being, is indeed not easy to master. It is, I believe, the hardest in all metaphysics. Yet the conception is, I conceive, both true and intelligible, if the universe be, as Heraclitus says, a Becoming. Let me repeat the explanation. Let us begin by agreeing that the universe is at every instant *in* a definite state of Being. But at every instant it is *out* of that definite state of Being, and is in another definite state of Being, because it is continually varying. Now, in virtue of its being always at any given instant in a definite state of Being, we say that it has Being; while, in virtue of its being out of that definite state of Being in the very instant in which it is in it, we say that it has not-Being. I may return to this conception hereafter. Meanwhile, I leave it to your own reflections, and shall abstain from overlaying with a weight of words, which, instead of rendering it clearer, might only have the effect of rendering it more obscure. The result of our analysis is, that Being and not-Being are the two elements, the two abstract factors, into which Becoming resolves itself when analysed.

20. We have seen in the preceding paragraph that Being and not-Being are the elements or moments of Becoming. In all Becoming these two, according to Heraclitus, are involved. Indeed, in his philosophy he seems to have laid the main stress rather on the negative than on the positive factor in the process.

While the Eleatics exclaimed *all is*, Heraclitus rejoined that it is truer to say *all is not*—not meaning, of course, that there is absolutely no universe, but intimating that the universe is not a definite and completed and unchanging existence, but is an ever-varying process, and that in considering the ongoings of nature the negative moment, the moment of disappearance, the moment in which each change vanished, in short, the moment of not-Being, was fully as important as the positive moment, the moment of appearance, the moment in which each change arose, in short, the moment of Being.

21. Being, then, and not-Being are, according to Heraclitus, the elements or moments of Becoming. To understand this, just consider once more what is meant by Becoming. By a process or a becoming is meant continual change, not change by what we may call leaps and starts. *In natura nihil fit per saltum;* In nature nothing is ever done by a jump. Nature changes not by jerks, but smoothly and continuously. The changing states are so continuous, so finely graduated into each other, so infinitely minute, that each of them passes away in the very instant in which it is. Each of them, in the very act of being, is merged in its successor. Now here we are compelled to say that each of these states is. This our reason necessitates; but then, inasmuch as each state is not stationary, but is ended as soon as it is begun, we are equally compelled by our reason to

say, each state is not. Each change, we may say, dies in being born, each state is and is not. Yet again we are under the necessity of saying, *omnia fiunt per saltum*, for we are compelled to hold that each of these states is, is a definite state, otherwise there could be no succession. Now the conception of Becoming is that in which these two opposite determinations of Being and not-Being are conciliated and made one; and we can now understand how the universe, if a process, should at once be and not be. We may not be satisfied with this doctrine, which represents the universe as an existing fluxion, or as a fluxionary existence, that is, as a process, the two essential moments of which are Being and not-Being. We may not agree with this doctrine, but I think that we should now have made some approach towards understanding it, and that we have thus overtaken to some extent the duty incumbent on the historian of philosophy, which is to impart insight rather than to produce conviction.

22. The conception of the curved line, or circle, as generated by the moving point, affords perhaps another good illustration of Becoming, as involving opposite determinations, that is to say, as made up of the two constituents Being and not-Being. The circle is generated by the motion of a point which is continually changing its direction. That statement, I believe, would be accepted by mathematicians. Now, simple as this statement seems, it is utterly unintel-

ligible, unless we are prepared to accept the Heraclitean doctrine of a thing being what it is not, and not being what it is. We say the circle is generated by the motion of a point which is continually changing its direction. Now let us examine this assertion carefully. We observe the fact that the point must have a direction, otherwise it could not continually change it. Now what is the direction which the point has and which it continually changes? The direction obviously is a straight direction, the direction is a straight line, and it is by getting out of this direction continually that it produces the curve or the circle. We must say, then, that when the point first starts it moves in a straight direction. Let it be moved just enough to enable you to conceive motion, and you will find that you must conceive it as moving straight, as moving *in* a straight line. Having then conceived this first motion in a straight line as something infinitesimally small, you may suppose the point to turn and make an angle, and then to move straight through another space infinitesimally small; you may suppose, I say, the circle to be generated in that way. But is the figure which you have thus generated a circle? It is not a circle: it is a polygon, with sides innumerable and infinitesimally small. If this were a circle, the circle would admit of being squared, and that, you are aware, is a problem which cannot be fully, but only approximately, resolved. This figure, then, I say, is not a circle: it is a polygon, although, from the extreme

minuteness of its sides, it may seem to be a circle. We have not formed our figure aright; we must try again. But first let us observe how we have blundered in our construction. We supposed the point to move in a straight line, the shortest that can be conceived, and then to change its direction, and move in another straight line, the shortest that can be conceived, and then to change its direction, and move in the direction of a third straight line, the shortest that can be conceived, and so on; and we thus constructed our apparent circle, which turns out to be a polygon. What, then, is our blunder? Our blunder, in one word, is this; that we supposed the point to be moving in a straight line, and *then* out of that straight line in the direction of another straight line; in short, we supposed the movement in the straight direction, and the movement out of the straight direction, to be successive, and not simultaneous. We must now, then, correct our blunder, and reconstruct our figure. The point at starting must move *in* a straight direction. There can be no doubt about that, we cannot conceive it otherwise; but it must in that very same movement move *out* of a straight direction. It must move both in it and out of it. It must travel continually in the direction of a straight line, and at the same time continually out of the direction of a straight line. It must move in a straight direction and out of a straight direction at once. Indeed this is what mathematicians themselves declare when they say that in forming the circle the motion

of the point is continually changing its direction. The word *continually* here implies that the point is ever moving *out* of the direction *in* which it is moving. It implies that the changes in the point's direction are not successive but simultaneous, that it is moving in a direction in which it is *not* moving, and not moving in a direction in which it *is* moving; that the motion in the straight direction both is and is not, and that the motion out of the straight direction both is and is not. The tangent proves that the point's motion is everywhere straight; the circle itself proves that the point's motion is everywhere not straight. The point cannot move *entirely* in a straight direction, making turns and angles at intervals, otherwise we should obtain, as we have seen, and as is, indeed, quite obvious, a polygon, and not a circle: neither can the point move entirely *out* of the straight, otherwise the direction which is continually changing would be altogether lost. The conclusion, then, is, that the point at every limit or infinitely in all portions of its transit is moving both in and out of a straight direction, and that these two opposite determinations, or contrary predicates, are conciliated and made one in the movement which generates the curve.

23. This and the other examples which I have adduced have been brought forward as aids by which you may habituate your minds to conception of continuous change, that is, of a series of changes so in-

finitely minute that each of them ends in beginning, at once is and is not. Time is itself an instance of this. The present time *is*, it is the limit between the past and future; but it has no calculable duration: in being it is not. Its coming is its going. It disappears in appearing. It for ever vanishes in a new present. All present time, then, has Being and not-Being. It is past in the very act of being present. Time seems to have supplied to Heraclitus (according to an expression of Sextus Empiricus) one of the best exemplifications that can be adduced of a process or a Becoming, that is, of a flux in which Being and not-Being are one. Time is perhaps the best symbol by which the conception of Becoming, as the unity of Being and not-Being, can be expressed. The present moment *is*, otherwise there would be no time at all; the present moment *is not*, otherwise there would be no past and no future, nothing but an everlasting now.

24. To get some further insight into this rather difficult speculation, and to test Being and not-Being as the necessary moments of one indivisible conception, the conception of change; let us try whether change can be explained when we regard these two not as essential moments of one indivisible conception, but each of them separate conceptions. Let us consider Being and not-Being as two separate conceptions, and let us try whether we can explain change on that supposition. Let us say, then, that a

thing is in a fixed definite state of being. We want it to change. Now it is obvious that it must change either *per continuum*, that is, with no intervals between the changes, or *per saltum*, that is, with intervals between the changes. If it changes *per continuum* we obtain a series of vanishing states, each of which disappears in appearing; is not, in the very moment that it is; each of these passes at once into another state, and forces us to say of it that in being it ceases to be. In this case, then, we are driven to have recourse to not-Being as an element essential to the conception of change. And we have been forced to regard them not as separate conceptions, but as the necessary moments of one indivisible conception. Suppose the changing states to be represented by the letters A, B, C, D, the state A appears, and in appearing disappears. But A's disappearance *is* the appearance of B, which in like manner disappears in the very act of appearing; but B's disappearance is the appearance of C, which no sooner appears than it vanishes in D, and so on. Now here the moments of Being and not-Being are inseparable; A's being is A's not-being, A's not-being is B's being, B's being is B's not-being, B's not-being is C's being, C's being is C's not-being, C's not-being is D's being, and so on. Each appearance is a disappearance, and each disappearance is a new appearance, and so the changes proceed, each vanishing in the other in such a way that we may say of them all, they are and are not. Such I believe to be the only true conception which

we can form of change, the only correct explanation of it which can be given. And such, also, I believe to be the way in which nature works.

25. But let us try the other alternative; let us suppose that change takes place *per saltum*, or with intervals between each state. This, indeed, is the only way in which we can suppose it to take place, if we hold asunder Being and not-Being, regarding them as separate conceptions, and not as the inseparable elements of one conception. Let us suppose, then, that the thing is in a fixed and definite state of being; and that its changes take place *per saltum;* that is to say, that the thing is first in the state A, in the state called the appearance of A; that secondly it is in the state in which A disappears—in the state, that is, of A's disappearance; that thirdly it is in the state we call B; fourthly in the state we call B's disappearance; fifthly in the state we call C; sixthly in the state we call C's disappearance, and so on. Now, here it is obvious that just as the appearance or being of A is not the disappearance or not-being of A, so neither is the disappearance or not-being of A the appearance or being of C. What then happens? This happens, that there is an interval between the appearance or being of A, and the appearance or being of B, in which interval the thing is in no state at all. This is the interval between A's disappearance and B's appearance. A's being is not A's not-being, because on this supposition Being and not-

Being are held asunder as separate conceptions. And neither is A's not-being or disappearance B's being or appearance. Therefore, I say, there is an interval between A the former state of the thing, and B the subsequent state of the thing, an interval in which A is ended and B not begun. In what state is the thing during that interval? The answer is, that it is in no state at all. And this is the ridiculous and contradictory conclusion to which we are driven, if we suppose change to take place by leaps, and that Being and not-Being, instead of being mere elements of one indivisible conception, are themselves distinct and completed conceptions.

26. By way of illustration, take the following example: Let us suppose that water is undergoing the process of freezing, and that it has reached a certain degree of solidity. Call this state of solidity A; and let us say that this state does not disappear in appearing, but that it lasts for some definite period, say a minute. But if A's appearance lasts for a definite time, A's disappearance must also last for a definite time. Because if we suppose that A's disappearance instantly ceases, and *is* the appearance of a new degree or state of solidity—call it B—we are violating the very terms of our supposition. Our supposition is, that appearance or being, and disappearance or not-being, are separate conceptions, and therefore we must not suppose that the disappearance of A *is* the appearance of B. We must suppose

that A, the first degree of solidity, has disappeared, and that B, the second degree of solidity, has not yet come on. In other words, we must suppose that the water has lost one degree of solidity without acquiring any other degree of it; we must suppose that the water in freezing is, at intervals, in no degree of solidity at all; in other words, we must suppose an absurdity.

27. Now, view the freezing process in the way in which I think we ought to view it, and you will perhaps perceive how inseparable Being and not-Being are as the elements in our conception of the process. Let the water be in the degree of solidity A; but A cannot maintain itself. In appearing it disappears; but its disappearance cannot maintain itself. Its disappearance *is* the appearance of B, a new degree of solidity. In like manner B cannot maintain itself; its appearance is its disappearance; but its disappearance is the appearance of C, a new degree of solidity; and so on the process goes continually and without breaks or intervals until a thaw sets in, and then the [illegible] is repeated in an inverse order, fluidity being [illegible] in the place of solidity.

[illegible] I have given you have been [illegible] more obvious truths of [illegible] more obvious and a[illegible] these e[illegible]

meditating on these examples, I think you may bring yourselves to understand something of the doctrine of Being and not-Being, as inseparably united in Becoming. You are not, however, to suppose that in cases where the changes are not thus apparent, no changes are taking place. The process may often be imperceptible; yet I believe that change is continually going on everywhere, and in every particle in the universe. If time, in a thousand years, tells perceptibly upon the granite boulder, we may be assured that at every instant it is telling upon it. Every particle of it is continually undergoing some minute change, some change so minute that it vanishes in the very act of being born, and seems to be no change at all. And the whole universe, I am inclined to think, is in this fluxional, this at once existent and non-existent predicament. Such, at least, is the doctrine of Heraclitus. Change is his universal. This conception is, according to him, a necessity of reason, a truth; indeed, *the* truth for all intellect. And the elements of this conception are Being and not-Being in indissoluble union, not mere Being with the Eleatics, not mere not-Being [illegible] ing cannot be got rid of. Reason must th[illegible] but in the very same thought rea[illegible] not-Being. The unity of these [illegible] life and of all nature, and [illegible] he words, a process, a b[illegible]

doctrine of Heraclitus, I may remark that the distinction between the universal faculty and the particular faculty in man, is expressed more distinctly in his fragments than in those of any of the philosophers who preceded him. The universal faculty he calls κοινὸς or ξυνὸς λόγος, the particular he calls ἰδία φρόνησις. The κοινὸς λόγος is evidently the quality or power common to all intelligence, the principle in which they all agree. The ἰδία φρόνησις is evidently the quality or power peculiar to different kinds of intelligence. The one principle, the κοινὸς λόγος, lays hold of absolute truth as it is for all; the other principle, the ἰδία φρόνησις, lays hold of relative truth, truth as it exists for *some*, that is, for man considered as a peculiar intelligence. It is through the κοινὸς λόγος that we apprehend Becoming as made up of Being and not-Being. The understanding and senses could never make known to us this truth, they lead us away from its recognition. In virtue of [illegible]nse and understanding, the ἰδία φρόνησις, we regard [illegible]universe as a stationary existence, subject, no [illegible] to changes; in virtue of reason, the κοινὸς [illegible]ve regard it as a continual alternation of Being [illegible]ing, and we see that the latter no less [illegible]s essential to the ongoings and con- [illegible]nsidered as a constantly vary- [illegible]cess.

his ethical speculations. The substance of his ethical doctrine is this, that man lives and acts rightly in so far as he lives and acts in conformity with the κοινὸς λόγος, the universal reason in which he participates, but which does not properly belong to him; and that he lives and acts wrongly in so far as he lives and acts in conformity with the ἰδία φρόνησις, or that part of his nature which is more properly his own. The κοινὸς λόγος, when its behests are obeyed, leads him away from his own private and personal aims; it lifts him above the sphere of his own selfish interests, and teaches him to think of something far greater than himself: the ἰδία φρόνησις, when it is yielded to, binds him down within the sphere of his own selfishness, and makes him regard his own private advantage as the great and sole end of his existence. Thus viewed ethically, the κοινος λόγος may be called the great moral law, the ἰδία φρόνησις may be called "man's own conceit." Heraclitus thus seems to have been the first moralist who identified man's true moral nature with the universal fac in man, and man's wrong and immoral nature his particular faculty. This ethical doctrine much more fully to light under the tr subsequent moralists, and therefore I myself at present with having your consideration.

31. In my summa tus

which his system stands to the philosophy of the Eleatics. *First*, then, the main themes with which both he and they were engaged in their attempts to reach and fix the absolute truth were Being and not-Being. Both parties agreed in fixing their attention on these two; but they differed in this respect, that whereas the Eleatics regarded Being and not-Being as distinct and separate conceptions, and as irreconcilable opposites mutually exclusive of each other, Heraclitus regarded them but as elements or moments of one conception, the conception, namely, of Becoming. Such very shortly, is the fundamental agreement and the fundamental difference between Heraclitus and the Eleatic philosophers. What they regarded as distinct conceptions, he regarded as the factors of one conception.

32. This being understood, the *second* point to consider is this, that with the Eleatics Being is the truth, Being is the universal principle, Being is the intelligible for all intellect; while, with Heraclitus, Becoming is the truth, Becoming is the universal principle, Becoming is the intelligible for all intellect. Being, say the Eleatics, is a necessary truth, a thought which all intellect *must* think. Not so, says Heraclitus; it is Becoming which corresponds to this description; and Becoming embraces Being merely as one of its elements, not-Being forming the other moment of that conception. Now, you will observe that Heraclitus, in taking up this position against

the Eleatics, does not deny altogether the truth of their principle. He does not deny that Being is a necessary truth, a truth for all intellect. He rather admits this. But he holds at the same time that it is only a half thought, and not a whole thought. It is a half conception, which requires to be supplemented by its other half, the factor, namely, called not-Being. The unity of these constitutes the true and total conception; and that true and total conception is expressed by the term Becoming.

33. In the *third* place, to decide between these conflicting parties, Heraclitus on the one hand, and the Eleatics on the other; to determine the merits of their respective principles, and to get some insight into their systems, we must observe how these principles work, and how far they are explanatory of the changing phenomena of the universe. The Eleatic principle will not work at all. This system comes instantly to a dead-lock; or rather it cannot get under way, for it is impossible to explain change, if we hold asunder Being and not-Being, and regard them as two separate conceptions. The more we reflect on it the more are we convinced of this impossibility. Consider; a thing is in a particular state, which state is its being. Call this state A. I wish it to change; I wish to get it into some other state, call it B. But to get it into the state B, I must get it out of the state A; to put on B it must put off A. I shall suppose, then, that I get it out of the state A,

that it puts off A. Is it now in the state B? has it put on B or any other state? It certainly has not; for you will observe that, just as the Being of A is a separate conception from the not-Being of A, so the not-Being of A is a separate conception from the Being of B—that is, of any other state. The thing, on the terms of this philosophy, is in no state at all. It has ceased to be A, but it has not got into B. It is an intermediate predicament of pure negation or nonentity, a predicament which we can only characterise by calling it the not-Being of A, and the not-Being of B; B standing for any other positive state. In short, the thing, as I said, is in no state at all, and that is an absurd supposition, an absolute inconceivability. Such is the perplexity in which we are landed if we hold asunder Being and not-Being, and fix them as two separate conceptions. Indeed, so sensible were the Eleatics of the force of such reasonings as that which I have placed before you, that, instead of attempting to explain change, they boldly denied its possibility. They saw that it could not be explained on their principles, and therefore they maintained that all change was mere illusion; that, in fact, there was properly no such thing, and that the universe, according to reason, and in its truth, was immutable and uniform. I have stated that the Eleatics constituted Being and not-Being into two separate conceptions, and that the difficulties which beset their philosophy had their origin in this separation. This statement I

conceive to be quite correct, although you ought to bear in mind, as some slight qualification of it, that the Eleatics, after having made the separation referred to, put away from them as unworthy of all consideration the conception of not-Being, and confined themselves exclusively to the conception of Being. They discarded not-Being as an overt principle of their philosophy. But from their having fixed Being as a conception by itself, which excluded not-Being, we may fairly infer that they fixed not-Being as a conception by itself, which excluded Being. But however this may be, it is certain that change cannot be explained, cannot even be admitted, on the principles of their philosophy.

34. It is otherwise in the system of Heraclitus. He begins, not with Being or the fixed, but with Becoming or the fluctuating. According to him, the principle, the beginning, the starting-point of all things is change, and therefore he is not under the necessity of explaining it, that is to say, of deducing it from anything anterior. He does explain it, or at least he throws out certain dark and brief words, by pondering over which we are at length able to explain it for ourselves. What, then, do we understand to be Heraclitus's conception of change or Becoming, a conception by means of which he avoids the perplexities in which the Eleatic thinkers got involved? His conception is, that Becoming is a unity which involves the two moments of Being and not-Being.

I have already illustrated this unity at considerable length, I must now therefore deal with it very shortly. Stated abstractly, the conception is this: According to Heraclitus, a state of being is itself a state of not-being, that is, it is even in being gone as soon as come; which state of not-Being is itself another state of Being, which other state of Being is itself a state of not-Being, which state of not-Being is itself another state of Being; and so on. Viewed in this way, we must say of the universe, that at every instant it both is and is not; it is, there can be no doubt about that; but then the changes in the universe are so continuous that it also is not; that is to say, it is not this definite universe which we conceived we had laid hold of, but another; which other again is not—is not this definite universe, but another; and so on. We can never catch it. Take our former illustration. A thing is in the state A; how is it to come out of that state and get into the state B? We saw that on Eleatic principles that problem admitted of no solution. What is Heraclitus's answer? Heraclitus's answer is, that the thing is *already* out of the state A; that in the very act of being in that state it is out of it. The two moments, the moment of being in it and the moment of being out of it, are one, and constitute one indivisible conception, the conception of Becoming; and then, just as the being in the state and the being out of it are one, so the being out of it and being in another state, the state B, is one; and so on the process goes. It is infin-

itely too fine for sense to approach the apprehension of. The changes manifest to the senses might more properly be called catastrophes than changes. Thus, when I place a piece of wax before the fire and it melts, what I perceive is a change from opaque solidity to transparent fluidity. But fluidity is the catastrophe; it is the precipitated result of an accumulated series of changes in the wax, which are no less than infinite. Each of these changes—or call them states, for at each change the wax was in a particular state—each of these states no sooner is than it is not. In appearing it disappears; but the disappearance is the appearance of a new state. The whole process is a series of vanishing fluxions, each of which in being ceases to be. But I have already illustrated this matter in so many ways that I must now desist. What you have to bear in mind as the gist of the Heraclitean solution of the problem of change is this, that the Being of every state in which a thing is, *is* the not-Being of that state; and that the not-Being of that state *is* the Being of another state; for that is what is meant by the unity of Being and not-Being, and by these two being elements of one conception, and not each of them a separate conception by itself. Viewed abstractly, the unity of these two contraries, Being and not-Being, may appear a paradox and an absurdity, but from the explanations and illustrations I have given you, perhaps you may be inclined to accept the doctrine as intelligible, if not as convincing. If you accept the doctrine as

intelligible, you will perceive that it carries with it a solution of the problem of change. How does a thing ever get out of one state into another? Because, says Heraclitus, in being *in* the state in which it is, it is already out of it. Being in it, is being out of it; and being out of it *is* being in another state. The two are identical; and therefore I am not called upon to explain any further how the process is brought about. The process, indeed, is its own explanation.

35. Although the utterances of Heraclitus are exceedingly obscure and fragmentary, so fragmentary, indeed, as scarcely to be entitled to the name of remains, and although it is difficult or impossible to bring out the points with all the clearness and cogency that might be desired, I am nevertheless convinced that some great truth lies here: that here, if anywhere, is the embryo of the solution of the enigma of the universe. I am convinced that the unity of contraries is the law of all things; that all life, all nature, all thought, all reason, centres in the oneness or conciliation of Being and not-Being. A firm grasp of this doctrine, a clear insight into its truth, and a vigorous enforcement of it and of its consequences, would lead to the construction of a truer philosophy than that which is at present so much in vogue. That philosophy is founded entirely on the denial of the unity of contrary determinations in the same subject. It takes two opposite conceptions, and hold-

ing them apart it shows that reason is baffled in its attempts adequately to conceive either of them. It is in this way that Sir W. Hamilton and Mr Mansel achieved what they conceive to be a great triumph in proclaiming, or, as they think, in proving the impotency of human reason. But what if the conceptions thus set in opposition to each other are not conceptions at all, but are mere moments or elements of conception? If they are so—and I believe that they are so—that would make a great difference. The antagonism would no longer exist, or, if it existed, it would be a very different kind of antagonism from that for which Hamilton and Mansel contend. It would be an antagonism building up one indivisible conception, and, therefore, an antagonism essential to the very life and essence of reason itself, and not an antagonism by which reason is placed at variance with itself, and thus confounded, disabled, and paralysed.

EMPEDOCLES.

1. The next inquirer with whom we have to deal in our survey of the history of ancient philosophy is Empedocles of Agrigentum.

The philosophical remains of Empedocles consist of some fragments of a poem *Περὶ φυσεως*, or concerning nature; for, like Xenophanes and Parmenides, he recorded his opinions in verse. This didactic poem is rather physical and physiological than phil-

osophical, and we can extract from it but little that is of speculative interest and value. It contains, however, some forcible expressions, and was highly esteemed by Lucretius, who, in his own poem, 'De Rerum Natura,' seems to have adopted it to some extent as his model, and who speaks of it and of its author in the following terms, which we cannot but regard as somewhat exaggerated in their eulogy:

> "Carmina quin etiam divini pectoris ejus
> Vociferantur, et exponunt præclara reperta,
> Ut vix humanâ videatur stirpe creatus."
> —LUCRET., I. 731-733.

The fragments of this poem of Empedocles were collected about twenty years ago, and published, along with those of Xenophanes and Parmenides, by Karsten, a Dutch scholar, to whom I formerly referred.

2. The three features in the philosophy, or rather in the physics, of Empedocles by which it is best known are: *First*, His enunciation of a distinction which, although of no great scientific value, has kept its place in the popular mind even to the present day. I refer to his division of the constituents of the universe into the four elements, fire, air, earth, and water. Empedocles is said to have been the first who enumerated these four as the roots, ῥιζώματα, of all things. *Secondly*, All things, he held, were formed out of these four elements by a process of mingling and of separation. This mingling was a mere mechanical aggregation or agglutination of the different elements,

so that all objects were, *in themselves*, fire, air, earth, and water, whatever might be the appearance which they presented *to us*. And, *Thirdly*, This process of mingling and separating was set in motion and governed by two principles, φιλία and νεῖκος; φιλία, friendship or love; and νεῖκος, enmity or hate.

3. After all my study of Empedocles and his expositors, I am unable to find in him anything better than a confused scheme of crude and fanciful physics. I shall therefore dismiss him, after having directed your attention to a certain dogma which has occupied an important place in the history of philosophy, and which, although current before the time of Empedocles, was first laid down by him in distinct and emphatic terms. The dogma to which I refer is the saying that like can be known only by like. "Similia similibus cognoscuntur;" that is to say, the thing which knows must be of a nature cognate or analogous to that which knows it; or, as Empedocles expresses it, "We perceive earth by means of earth (the earth, that is, of which we ourselves are made), we perceive water by means of water, and air by means of air, fire by means of fire, love by means of love, and strife by means of strife;" that is, it is by means of the earth, the water, the air, the fire, the love, and the strife of which our own nature is composed, that we are able to apprehend the earth, the water, the air, the fire, the love, and the strife that are external to us. A crude enough doctrine, as thus stated,

and yet one which may not be altogether devoid of truth, and which, at any rate, may furnish food for meditation.

4. But my principal reason for alluding to this dogma is on account of the prominent place which has been assigned to it by Sir W. Hamilton in the history of philosophy. From this maxim, "Similia similibus cognoscuntur," he derives the theory of a representative perception; that theory which it was the business of Dr Reid's life to overturn. The theory was, that the mind had no immediate cognisance of external objects, no cognisance of objects themselves, but only of certain vicarious images or representations of them. On what ground does this opinion rest? It rests, says Sir William, on the dogma that like can be known only by like. Real things being unlike the mind—the mind being spiritual, while they are material—they cannot be known by the mind; they cannot be its direct or immediate objects, but their images, being incorporeal—in other words, being of a nature analogous or like to the mind—can be known, and are alone known, by the mind in the intercourse which it holds with external things. Deny this dogma, then, affirm its opposite, that the mind can know what is altogether unlike itself, and of a different nature from itself, and you cut away the ground on which the doctrine of a representative perception rests. Such is the purport of Sir W. Hamilton's statement. You will find the

point handled in his 'Discussions on Philosophy,' p. 61, 2d edition.

5. The philosophy of Empedocles is, for the most part, rather physical than speculative. This preponderance of physics is indeed the general character of the pre-Socratic systems. Their metaphysical import is rather implied than expressed; and what appears on their surface is generally a mere farrago of crude and fanciful, and often unintelligible, descriptions and explanations of the phenomena of the natural world. Of such materials the poem of Empedocles, *Περὶ φύσεως*, was mainly composed, if we may judge from the fragments which have been handed down to us, and therefore we may be excused for passing over the greater part of its details without notice. There are, however, certain general considerations involved in the lucubrations of this philosopher which are not without speculative interest, and on which I now propose to touch, although I shall deal with them very shortly. These points are the relation in which the philosophy of Empedocles stands towards antecedent systems, and the relation in which it stands towards the Atomic theory, by which it was immediately succeeded.

6. Instead of supplanting the conception of Being by the conception of Becoming, as Heraclitus did, Empedocles adhered to the Eleatic principle, and attempted at the same time to reconcile with it the changes and operations of the universe. He saw that

change was impossible, if Being was laid down as invested with one uniform or homogeneous quality; out of such uniformity no diversity could proceed. He therefore supposed that Being was distinguished from itself by original differences of quality; in other words, he supposed several kinds of Being, and then postulating two principles, one of affinity and the other of repulsion, φιλία and νεῖκος, he conceived that by the union and the repulsion of these different kinds of matter, all the phenomena and ongoings of the universe might be explained. He thus conceived that, while he embraced the Eleatic principle of Being as the ground of all things, he at the same time avoided their conclusions, by which the universe was locked up in a state of dead, immovable stagnation.

7. This modification of the Eleatic principle seems sufficiently obvious, and the explanation which it affords of the phenomena of change seems sufficiently plausible. But neither the modification of the principle, nor the explanation arising out of it, is logically tenable. The supposition is, that there are different kinds of Being, that is, of matter to begin with. Being is originally distinguished by certain qualitative differences. But here the question arises, Do these different kinds of Being consist of *mere* Being? Is matter with its qualitative diversities still *mere* Being throughout? If it be so, then we have only one element, and from this nothing can emerge but absolute, unvarying uniformity. If, on the other hand, matter with its qualitative differences consists

of Being and some other element, that other element can be nothing else than not-Being, for not-Being alone can be placed in opposition to Being in the ultimate analysis of thought. Place anything else in opposition to it, and you will find that you are opposing Being to Being; in other words, are laying down no antithesis at all.

8. But without dwelling on the unsatisfactory logic of Empedocles, we may sum up the substance of this system under these two heads. *First*, he accepts the Eleatic principle of Being; and, *secondly*, by modifying this principle, in other words, by postulating different *kinds* of Being, or of matter endowed with inherent *qualitative* diversities, he endeavours to obviate the consequences of the Eleatic position, *we* think, with very indifferent success. But the two points now referred to are those which you ought to keep in mind in connection with the philosophy of Empedocles; because their consideration throws light on the origin of the Atomic philosophy, of which I am about to speak. Empedocles, as I said, clung to the Eleatic principle of Being, and endeavoured to account for changes by means of certain qualitative differences which he supposed to be originally inherent in Being. The Atomists cling to the same principle, but, discarding all qualitative differences, they conceived that change was explicable on the ground of mere quantitative differences in matter.

ATOMIC SCHOOL.

1. LEUCIPPUS and Democritus were the propounders of the Atomic theory of the universe. The Atomic philosophy is founded on the supposition that the ultimate elements of the universe are particles exceedingly minute and absolutely least. By absolutely least is meant small in the last degree—so small that the particle cannot be smaller. Such a degree of smallness is, of course, a fiction, for we cannot conceive anything arrested at a stage at which its quantity cannot be supposed to be diminished. The Atomic philosophers, however, supposed that such an arrestment did take place in nature. They supposed that all things were composed of particles, so little that they could not be less, particles which could not be severed by any force; and these particles they called atoms, using that word to denote their indivisible character.

2. The atom may be further described as that which entirely fills the space which it occupies. You will observe that any aggregate of atoms, any

material thing which we behold, occupies considerably more space than it fills. This is proved by the consideration that everything admits of compression. All sensible matter, therefore, is porous; dense as some kinds of it may appear, the particles even of the most compact matter are never actually in contact, consequently all bodies occupy more space than they fill, or perhaps we should rather say, appear to fill more space than they actually do fill. All matter is interspersed with vacant cavities or interstices. The atom alone has no such interstices; it alone fills actually the same space in which it is.

3. The atom, then, besides being the absolutely least, is also the absolutely full, while the interval between atom and atom is the absolutely void, empty space. Empty space is thus the supplementing conception which the Atomic philosophers conjoin with their conception of the atom. What Being and not-Being were to Heraclitus, the full and the empty (*τὸ πλῆρες καὶ τὸ κενόν*), or atoms and the void, were to the Atomists. These (the full and the empty) were the principles of their system; and out of these they conceived that the constitution of the universe, and all the appearances which it presents to our senses, might be explained.

4. Another consideration to be kept particularly in view in studying this system is, that the atoms

were not distinguished from each other by any differences of quality. In point of quality they were homogeneous, or of the same kind; their differences are quantitative merely, that is to say they differed from each other in size, weight, figure, arrangement, agility of motion, these being mere quantitative differences; but they did not differ from each other in being hot or cold, luminous or dark, sweet or bitter, wet or dry, for these are qualitative distinctions. Such distinctions were held to have no reality in *rerum natura;* all objective reality and objective difference were reduced to quantity alone.

5. The atoms were thus closely analogous to the pure Being of Parmenides and the Eleatics. They were of one uniform quality, if, indeed, quality could be attributed to them at all. The distinction between the two schools, the Eleatic and the Atomic, was that while no differences, either qualitative or quantitative, had places in the pure Being of the Eleatics, the Atomic philosophers represented their primordial constituents as differing, as has been said, in size, shape, arrangement, &c. In like manner the Atomic school differed from Empedocles, who had attributed differences of quality to his four elements, fire, air, earth, and water. Empedocles had thought that this postulate was necessary in order to account for the changing phenomena of the universe. The Atomists were of opinion that these changes might be accounted for without any such postulate.

6. The aim of the Atomic philosophers was to explain the greatest number of phenomena by means of the fewest possible principles. This striving after unity or simplicity is indeed the great aim or characteristic of all philosophy. It is what we have frequently described as the pursuit of the universal in all things; and in joining in this pursuit the Atomists made but common cause, and had the same object in view, with the rest of their brethren. What we have to consider more particularly in regard to them is, *first*, the effect which their principles had in simplifying the theory of the universe; and, *secondly*, the effect which their principles had in simplifying the theory of human perceptions and sensations. These are the two points in which, I think, the interest of the Atomic philosophy centres: *first*, the tendency of their doctrine to afford a simpler explanation of the phenomena of the universe; and, *secondly*, a simpler explanation of man's perceptions than any hitherto propounded. I do not say that their explanation is true or successful, but it has, at any rate, the merit of simplicity. Let us consider separately each of the two points adverted to.

7. *First*, Before the time of the Atomic philosophers things were supposed to have qualitative as well as quantitative differences. That things differed from each in quantity, in size, in shape, and weight, for example, was sufficiently obvious; and it was thought to be no less obvious that they differed

from each other in quality; that fire, for example, had a different quality or qualities from water; that sugar differed in quality from salt; that light differed in quality from sound; that wood differed in quality from stone and from iron, and so on. All these qualitative differences the Atomic theory abolished, or tended to abolish. It sought to reduce them all to the simplicity of mere quantitative differences. The atoms were held to have no qualitative differences. They differed, as has been said, from each merely in shape, arrangement, and position (*σχῆμα τάξις καὶ θέσις*), perhaps also in magnitude and weight. And it was the different configuration and arrangements of these exceedingly minute particles which imparted to the different objects in the universe their *apparently* qualitative differences. The atoms of fire, for example, are the same as those which compose water, only their size, weight, shape, and arrangement are different, and hence arises what seems to be a qualitative difference in the objects which result from their combination. So of sugar, and salt, and flesh. Here the *same* elements are differently combined; and hence sugar and salt appear to differ in quality. So of light and sound. The ultimate particles of these two are the same; but their configuration and arrangement are different, and hence a qualitative difference seems to subsist between them. So of wood, and stone, and iron. In reality there are no qualitative differences among these things, but only differences arising from the shape,

and number, and arrangement of the insensible atoms of which these things are composed,—in other words, mere qualitative differences. For example, if you ask, Why is water soft and flowing? the answer would be, that the minute atoms of which it consists are smooth and round, and do not fit into each other—like small wheels or globes, they roll over each other, hence its yielding and fluid nature. Why, again, is iron fixed and unyielding? The answer is, because its minute and insensible particles are not smooth and round, but are jagged and uneven—have, as it were, teeth by which they cling to each other, and, thus cohering, form a compact and solid body. But in both cases the atoms are in themselves of the same quality; they are merely different in shape, size, arrangement, and these are not qualitative but quantitative differences. In short, there are *in reality* no differences in the universe, except differences of quantity. All qualitative differences are unreal, and are merely apparent. So much, then, for the way in which the Atomic philosophy simplifies, or aims at simplifying, whether successfully or not, the theory of the universe, by abolishing quality, and by reducing all the diversities of natural agents to a difference of quantity merely.

8. The *second* point of interest in the Atomic philosophy is the new theory of sensation and perception which it involved. It had hitherto been supposed that there were certain qualities in objects corre-

sponding to our sensations, and by which our sensations were induced. This was a matter on which probably no great attention had been bestowed; and therefore we cannot say very exactly what the previous doctrine in regard to sensation and perception may have been; but we are safe in affirming that it had been loosely assumed that there were, as I have said, certain qualities or agents corresponding to our sensations, and by which our sensations were induced. That, I think, we may say, was the general opinion, as it is indeed the vulgar, if not the philosophic, opinion to this day. When we feel the sensation of heat, we suppose there is some corresponding quality in the fire, or whatever the agent may be which induces it. When we see coloured objects we think that the colours are in the objects themselves, or, at any rate, that there is some quality in the object which causes our sensations of colour. When we have the sensation in our mouths of sweet or of bitter, we suppose that these different tastes are excited by different qualities in the objects. The Atomic theory corrected or modified this opinion, and this correction followed as a consequence of the Atomic doctrine in regard to the constitution of material things. If the atoms, the ultimate constituents of all things, are identical in point of quality, and differ only in size, shape, position, and arrangement, it follows that there can be nothing in real nature corresponding to what we call heat or cold, or sweet or bitter, or colour. These are merely sensations in us;

not only are they mere sensations in us, there are, moreover, no qualities in things by which they are induced. How, then, are these various sensations induced? They are induced by the quantitative differences of the atoms. For instance, the atoms which occasion the sensation of heat, the atoms which occasion the sensation of smell, the atoms which occasion the sensation of taste, of touch, the atoms which occasion the sensation of sound, the atoms which occasion the sensation of colour—all these atoms are the same in themselves, only, in consequence of their different magnitudes, and shapes, and motions, they affect our sentient organism differently, and hence arises the variety in our sensations. The atoms which induce the sensation of heat are, we may suppose, exceedingly fine, sharp, and agile; the atoms which occasion our sensations of taste are perhaps less subtle and less sharp; and so in regard to the other atoms by which our other sensations are excited. Thus a mere quantitative difference in the atoms, their sharpness or smoothness, their subtlety or comparative grossness, their slowness or velocity, is held to be sufficient to explain all our varied sensations. And thus, too, a mere quantitative difference in the atoms will explain not only the different impressions which arise in our different senses, but also the different impressions which arise in the same sense. Thus the configuration of the atoms which induce the taste of bitterness, is different from the configuration of atoms which induce the sensation of sweet-

ness; and thus the quality of syrup in itself is not different from the quality of vinegar, only the atoms of which each is composed are differently figured and arranged, and hence affect the palate differently. The same explanation would of course apply to the phenomena of the other senses. Different colours are seen because the atoms of light affect the retina differently, some of them impinging on it with greater force and rapidity than others. Such is the manner in which the Atomic philosophers explained the phenomena of sensation and perception. To things themselves they allowed mere quantitative differences, such differences as consist in number, size, figure, motion, weight, and arrangement. These are the only differences which *truly* exist, which are *in rerum natura;* because these are the only differences which exist in the atoms of which things are composed. All qualitative differences, such as heat and cold, sweet and bitter, colour and sound—all these they placed in the sentient subject, and regarded as mere affections of the mind or nervous system. Thus the world had reality only in so far as quantity was concerned. In regard to quality, it had no reality out of or beyond the mind of man; and thus, while quantitative difference was real and objective, qualitative difference was only apparent and subjective.

9. It is obvious that this theory of sensation bears a close resemblance to the doctrine frequently propounded in more recent times in regard to the pri-

mary and secondary qualities of matter. The doctrine, as you know, is this, that the primary qualities are extension, figure, and solidity; that these exist objectively in the things themselves, and that we have a direct perception of them as they thus exist; while again the secondary qualities, such as heat and cold, colours and sounds, tastes and smell, are subjective affections existing merely *in us*. These are not properly the qualities of matter, but are rather the names of our sensations. The difference, however, between this doctrine and that of the Atomists consists in this circumstance, that while the modern propounders of the doctrine have held that there were certain *occult* qualities in matter corresponding to our sensations of heat, colour, taste, smell, and so forth—occult qualities by which these sensations are induced—the Atomists had recourse to no such hypothesis. They conceived that the nature of the atoms, which has been already explained as consisting in differences of shape and arrangement—they conceived that this was quite sufficient of itself to account for the variety of our sensations, and accordingly the hypothesis of occult qualities really existing in material things, and inducing our sensations, formed no part of their system. Our sensations were explained on mechanical and quantitative grounds as resulting from the different shapes and degrees of solidity in the atoms by which our organs of sense were affected. The Atomic theory of sensation and perception was thus considerably simpler than the doctrine

propounded by Reid and others in regard to the primary and secondary qualities of matter; and it certainly was quite as philosophical.

10. I conclude this account of the Atomic doctrine by remarking that, even in this system, we may observe that tendency which I have said is the characteristic more or less of all speculative philosophy, the tendency, namely, to aim at truth for *all* rather than at truth for *some* intelligence. This tendency is not so conspicuous in the Atomic scheme as it is in some other systems; but even here it is unmistakably manifested. What the Atomists called the full and the empty, atoms and the void, which was their expression for what are nowadays called the primary qualities of matter—these are more universal in their character than such qualities as heat and cold, sweet and bitter, luminous and dark; these latter qualities could not be understood except by intelligences endowed with senses like ours; but the full and the empty, in other words, atoms and the void, would, in all probability, be intelligible to pure intellect, and certainly approach more nearly to the character of truths for all intellect than do any of those truths which are known to us as the secondary qualities of matter.

ANAXAGORAS.

1. The next Greek philosopher of whom we have to speak is Anaxagoras. Anaxagoras was born at Clazomenæ, one of the Ionian towns in Asia Minor, in the year 500 B.C. He was thus somewhat older than Democritus, and even than Leucippus; but as his system may be regarded as contemporary with that of the Atomists, I have thought it better to treat of them before treating of him. Though sprung from a rich and distinguished family, Anaxagoras surrendered all his possessions to his relatives, and betook himself to the study of philosophy. He settled in Athens in his early manhood, probably between the years 480 and 460 B.C.; and from this time Athens began to be the centre of those emanations of philosophic thought which had heretofore shown themselves only in the colonies.

2. As a resident within the walls of Athens, Anaxagoras dwelt for many years, enjoying the friendship of Pericles, and other distinguished citizens, to whom he imparted freely his philosophical opinions.

Of the intercourse which subsisted between Pericles and Anaxagoras, Plutarch speaks in the following terms: "The philosopher with whom Pericles was most intimately acquainted, who gave him that force and sublimity of sentiment superior to all the arts of the demagogues, who, in short, formed him to that admirable dignity of manners, was Anaxagoras, the Clazomenian. This was he whom the people of those times called *νοῦς*, or intelligence, either in admiration of his great understanding and knowledge of the works of nature, or because he was the first who clearly proved that the universe owed its formation neither to chance nor necessity, but to a pure and unmixed mind, who separated the homogeneous parts from the other with which they were confounded. Charmed with the company of this philosopher, and instructed by him in the sublimest sciences, Pericles acquired not only an elevation of sentiment and a loftiness and purity of style, far removed from the low expressions of the vulgar, but likewise a gravity of countenance, which never relaxed into laughter, a firm and even tone of voice, an easy deportment, and a decency of dress, which no vehemence of speaking ever put into disorder. . . . These were not the only advantages which Pericles gained by conversing with Anaxagoras. From him he learnt to overcome those terrors which the various phenomena of the heavens raise in those who know not their causes, and who entertain a tormenting fear of the gods by reason of their ignorance. Nor is there any

cure for it but the study of nature, which, instead of the frightful extravagances of superstition, implants in us a sober piety, supported by a rational hope."—'Life of Pericles,' c. 4, 5, 6. At length some of the doctrines of Anaxagoras gave offence to the fickle populace. He was accused of impiety towards the gods. Pericles defended him in vain. He was banished to Lampsacus in Asia Minor, where he died, in the year 428 B.C., at the age of 72. In this place he was so highly esteemed that the inhabitants raised altars to his memory, and his popularity was kept in remembrance by the circumstance that the schoolboys of Lampsacus were allowed at his own request a holiday on the anniversary of his death.

3. The philosophy of Anaxagoras centres in the two following points: *first*, his doctrine of what are called ὁμοιομερῆ, a term of considerable obscurity, and which, so far as I can find, has never been elucidated satisfactorily; and, *secondly*, his doctrine of νοῦς or intelligence as the universal in all things, and as the designing and directing principle of the universe. In discussing the system of Anaxagoras, I shall confine myself to these two points.

4. Anaxagoras's doctrine of ὁμοιομερῆ or ὁμοιομέρεια is discussed by Lucretius, in the first book of his poem, *De Natura Rerum*, line 830, where he says—

"Nunc et Anaxagoræ scrutemur ὁμοιομέρειαν."

The result of his scrutiny or examination I give you in Creech's translation of Lucretius:—

> "For this it means; that bones of minute bones,
> That flesh of flesh, and stones of little stones,
> That nerves take other little nerves for food,
> That blood is made of little drops of blood,
> That gold from parts of the same nature rose
> That earths do earth, fires fire, airs air compose,
> And so in all things else alike to those."

This popular or poetical version of the doctrine of Anaxagoras does not carry us very far in the way of understanding it. Taken literally, the word ὁμοιομερῆ signifies things made up of similar parts, or, perhaps more explicitly, things made up of particles similar to the things themselves. But the more complete and exact interpretation of the doctrine seems to be this, that in everything, and in every fraction of everything, there is a fraction of everything; in each there is a sample of each; in other words, all is in all. Such, stated in a somewhat abstract form, is Anaxagoras's doctrine of the ὁμοιομερῆ, a name probably invented, not by himself, but by some subsequent philosopher—I believe, by Aristotle.

5. Let me endeavour to throw some light on this doctrine by handling it in a less abstract fashion. I shall endeavour to make it clear by means of some homely and familiar illustrations. Let us suppose the world and all that it contains, the world and all its produce, animal, vegetable, and mineral—let us suppose this to be chopped up into the finest mince-

meat that can be conceived. Let us suppose it pounded to a pulp or powder more impalpable than any mince-meat; let us suppose this powder to become fluid, and then to be so stirred and mingled that all its particles, even down to a degree of tenuity far beyond what can be conceived, shall be mixed through and through each other; if we suppose this, it is obvious that we should obtain a mass of matter, each portion of which, however minute, would contain samples of all the ingredients which entered into the composition of the whole. To suppose otherwise—to suppose that each particle did *not* contain samples of *all* the ingredients—would be to suppose the amalgamation not perfectly effected. But we have supposed the amalgamation to be perfect; and, therefore, I say it is obvious that whatever portion, great or small, we take of this mass of matter, that portion will necessarily contain precisely the same ingredients, and the same number of ingredients, as are contained in any other portion of this same mass. In each particle, however great or however small, all the particles will be contained which enter into the composition of the whole mass. Now I conceive that any portion, big or little, of this mass would correspond to what Anaxagoras means by the ὁμοιομερῆ. Suppose that ten thousand different kinds of matter, or that matter qualified in ten thousand different ways, went to compose our mass, in that case, if the mixture be complete—and we are supposing it complete—in that case each portion of the whole would contain portions of these

ten thousand kinds of matter, and to whatever degree of fineness you might carry the division, that is to say, however small you might conceive the portion to be, it would still contain portions of these ten thousand kinds of matter. In short, the composition of the whole and the composition of its minutest parts would be precisely the same. The whole consists, we are supposing, of ten thousand kinds of matter; each particle of it (carry the division to whatever degree of minuteness you please) also consists of ten thousand kinds of matter. That, I conceive, is what is meant by saying that everything and every particle of a thing consists of particles similar to the thing or particle itself.

6. The mass of matter which I have endeavoured to describe to you, and the close intermingling of whose parts I supposed to be brought about by artificial means—this mass is, according to Anaxagoras, matter in its original condition. In order to aid our conception of what Anaxagoras means by the ὁμοιομερῆ, I suppose the universe, the present orderly universe, to be beaten up, with all its diversities, into a sort of pulp or powder of uniform consistency throughout. This pulp or powder, which, in my description of it, is set forth as artificially produced, was, in the estimation of our philosopher, the natural state of the universe before an organising intelligence went to work upon its materials, and elicited order out of chaos. In its primitive and chaotic state the world is a mass, every ingredient of

which is so intimately mixed with and through every other ingredient, that each portion of it, however infinitesimally small, is a sample and representative of the whole; in other words, contains everything which the whole contains, or, as we may otherwise express it, is identical with the whole in quality though, of course, not in quantity. Thus every particle is *in parvo* what the whole mass is *in magno*. Every particle, however small or however great, thus understood as containing within it all that the whole contains, is, I conceive, what Anaxagoras means by the ὁμοιομερῆ. I may here remark that when I spoke of each of the ὁμοιομερῆ as embracing ten thousand different kinds of matter, or as being itself matter with ten thousand qualities, I did so merely for purposes of illustration; for Anaxagoras himself sets no limits to the different kinds of matter, or to the number of qualities which may be embraced within each of the ὁμοιομερῆ. He seems to have regarded the kinds or qualities of matter as infinite, or, at any rate, as not to be measured or limited by any assignable number.

7. Bearing in mind what matter is, according to the conception of Anaxagoras, in its original character and constitution, let us now consider how this conception stands related to the doctrines of the Atomical philosophers. We find that the system of Anaxagoras stands opposed to the Atomic theory in two essential particulars: *first*, it denies and

rejects the doctrine of atoms as the orignal or ultimate constituents of things; and, *secondly*, it insists on the existence of qualitative differences in things. I shall say a few words on each of these points.

8. *First*, The ὁμοιομερῆ are, in all respects, the opposite of the atoms. The atoms are absolutely simple, that is to say, are elements in the proper sense of the word. The ὁμοιομερῆ are infinitely complex, that is to say, are not elements, in any sense at all. They are not elements because each of them contains an infinite variety of particles, and each of these particles, again, is not elementary, because each contains an infinite variety of particles; which particles, again, are not elementary, because each contains an infinite variety of particles, and so on for ever. Each particle of the matter, divide and subdivide it as often as you will, still contains *in parvo* all that was contained in the particle with which you commenced your operations, so that while the Atomists hold matter in its original condition to be absolutely simple, Anaxagoras holds that matter in its original condition is infinitely complex. The Atomists hold that matter in its primitive state is simple, and that in its secondary state, when things have been formed by the different combinations of the atoms, it is complex. Anaxagoras holds that matter in its primitive state is complex; and that in its secondary state, when things have attained to symmetry and order, it is simple—comparatively

simple, that is to say, more simple than it was in the original entanglement and involution of all in all. We may therefore say, that with the Atomists the construction of the κόσμος, or ordered universe, is a process in which matter passes from simplicity to complexity, while with Anaxagoras it is a process in which matter passes from complexity to simplicity. According to the Atomists, simplicity is first in the field, complexity supervenes; according to Anaxagoras, complexity is first in the field, and simplicity supervenes. This antagonism may not perhaps be in all points exact, but it is certainly sufficiently marked to constitute a fundamental difference between the two systems.

9. The other point in which the system of Anaxagoras stands in a relation of opposition to the Atomic theory is its doctrine of qualitative differences. The Atomic philosophers held that all difference was quantitative, not qualitative. I explained how, according to them, all the variety observable in the different objects of the universe might be accounted for by the diversity in point of size, shape, arrangement, and motions of the atoms of which these things were composed. Anaxagoras, on the other hand, was of opinion that quality held a very important place, and played a very important part, in the original constitution of matter. He held, as I have said, that there were innumerable kinds of original matter; which is merely another mode of

saying, that matter is originally endowed with innumerable qualities. He conceived that qualities, or inherent differences, existed in things, and that the attempt to deduce these qualities from mere quantity was equivalent to deducing them from nothing, was deriving them from a source which did not contain them and could not produce them—was, in short, a violation of the maxim which was at that time accepted as the canon of all right reason, *Ex nihilo nihil fit.* The deduction of quality from quantity was a deduction of something from nothing, and was consequently an impossibility and an absurdity. Hence Anaxagoras concluded that quality was coeval with quantity, and was equally original with the original matter of the universe. And he held, further, that these qualities were innumerable or infinite, inasmuch as new qualities might continually manifest themselves, and inasmuch as (in obedience to the canon just referred to) no one quality was capable of being transmuted into any other. When a new quality appears we cannot suppose it to spring from nothing, for that would violate the maxim, *Ex nihilo nihil fit;* neither can we suppose it to spring from another quality, for that would equally violate the maxim; therefore, we must suppose that it was in existence all the while, and from the very first, only that it was latent; and further, as these new qualities are or may continually present themselves, we must conclude that they are infinite or innumerable. Such are the two points in which I think the philo-

sophy of Anaxagoras stands opposed to the doctrines of the Atomists.

10. I stated in paragraph third that the philosophy of Anaxagoras centred in these two points; his doctrine of the ὁμοιομερῆ, and his doctrine of νοῦς, or a designing and directing intelligence. In summing up the first of the two topics, I request you to observe that all that I have hitherto said has been in reference to Anaxagoras's conception of matter in its original and primary condition. His doctrine of the ὁμοιομερῆ has special reference to matter in this crude and primitive state. How far the doctrine applies to matter in its secondary, that is, in the more finished and orderly condition in which *we* behold it, this is what we shall have hereafter to consider; so far as we have gone, we may say that we have dealt not with the κόσμος, but only with the chaos of Anaxagoras. We have endeavoured to describe the world as he supposes it to exist before it has been subjected to the operations of a designing and directing intelligence.

11. The second topic which falls to be considered in treating of the philosophy of Anaxagoras is, as I have said, his doctrine of νοῦς, or intelligence, as the designing and arranging principle of the universe. Referring to this doctrine, Aristotle remarks, that "the man," to wit, Anaxagoras, "who first announced that Reason was the cause of the world and of all orderly arrangement in nature, no less than in living

bodies, appeared like a man in his sober senses in comparison with those who heretofore had been speaking at random and in the dark."—Metaph. i. 3.

12. Aristotle compliments Anaxagoras thus highly because he was the first to introduce into philosophy the conception of ends or final causes. The argument founded on final causes has been largely insisted on in modern times. It is known popularly as the argument from design, the argument which, from the contemplation of the marks of forethought and contrivance observable in the objects and operations of nature, rises to the conception of a one all-wise, all-powerful, and all-benevolent Artificer of the universe. This argument, which is also called the argument *a posteriori* for the being and attributes of God, has been handled in modern times by many writers of distinguished ability, among whom may be mentioned with special commendation Dr Paley, and our own eminent Principal, Dr Tulloch, of St Mary's. These authors have worked out the argument in all its bearings, and their writings cannot be too strongly recommended to students, whether of philosophy or theology. But the argument was broached more than two thousand years ago by the philosopher of whom we are treating. Anaxagoras, as I said, was the first to introduce into philosophy the conception of ends or final causes, a conception which implies an intelligent principle as the upholder and designer of all things. He was

thus the founder, we may say, of what is nowadays termed Natural Theology as distinguished from Revelation. The doctrine of Anaxagoras will come out more clearly if we compare it with the position occupied by the philosophers who preceded him.

13. Previous to the time of Anaxagoras, philosophers had speculated concerning the *beginning* or *origin* of things, but not concerning their *ends* or *purposes*. The changes and operations of nature were too obtrusive not to compel them to have recourse to some active principle or principles whereby these changes might be explained. In the Ionic school some vital force was admitted, some *anima mundi*, by which the condensation or rarefaction of the primeval element was brought about. In the Eleatic school, in so far as they departed from the strict logic of their system and admitted change into the universe, some active principle or influence was laid down as the efficient cause of the changes. By Heraclitus, who contended that the whole universe was a continual flux or process of change—by him strife or contention was set forth as the parent or producer of all things, *πόλεμος τῶν πάντων πατήρ*, war as the begetter of all things. The efficient agents of Empedocles were *φιλία* and *νεῖκος*, friendship and enmity. And the Atomists invested their atoms with certain principles of attraction and repulsion, by which their combinations and separations were determined. I mention these particulars for the purpose of show-

ing you that before the time of Anaxagoras philosophers, in forming the conception of cause, beginning, or origin, had never risen above the conception of power, force, energy, activity, or efficiency. They undoubtedly conceived that the operations of the universe were brought about by some efficient cause, by some force competent to produce them—that an all-powerful energy was at the bottom of the ongoings of nature. But this power, though irresistible, was blind and unintelligent. At least, so far as the speculations of these philosophers went, no proof had as yet been furnished that the power in question was intelligent as well as omnipotent; efficiency, and not intelligence, was its characteristic.

14. Anaxagoras struck into a new direction. He looked rather to the ends than to the beginnings of things, rather to the purposes for which things were designed than to the sources from which they sprang. This at least was the tendency of his philosophy, although we cannot say that it was more than a tendency, for he did not advance far in the new path which he had opened up. He did not turn to much account the new conception on which he had hit; but he did effect something. He turned the thoughts of philosophers into an unexplored channel. He introduced into philosophy a conception which, even in its germ, was great. Looking to the ends which the objects and operations of the universe served, and seeing that these ends were *good*, he concluded that

they were the work of a cause which was in itself wise and good. He led philosophers to combine the notion of intelligence with the notion of power or efficiency, which heretofore had been the sole attribute assigned to the moving principle of the universe. Intelligence, as well as omnipotence, was set forth in the scheme of Anaxagoras as an attribute of the first great cause.

15. The recognition of ends or final causes in nature is equivalent to the admission of an intelligent principle as the orderer and director of the universe. It would lead me away from the scope of the present discussion were I to go into any illustrations or details of the argument from design, but I may say a few words in explanation of the principle on which it proceeds. In arguing from ends or final causes, in other words, from design, we necessarily make the idea of a thing precede its realisation; we place thought before action, and thus we necessarily lay down thought, intelligence, or reason as the first, the beginning. If thought or intelligence be the first, the beginning, by what term shall we designate the ultimate or the end? The most expressive and comprehensive term by which this can be designated, is "*the good.*" This term for ends in general is as old as the days of Anaxagoras. Let us now attend to these two conceptions, intelligence or *thought* considered as the beginning, and the *good* considered as the end. And let us suppose an illustrative case drawn from human nature: it may, perhaps, assist us

in forming some imperfect conception of the divine intelligence and its ends. Let us suppose that a savage has the thought of some good, or some end. Now he must think of this as a particular good or particular end; no man can think of good in general or end in general. Let his thoughts then of good or end be the thought of a house to shelter him, a thought which has not yet occurred to any other of his tribe. This thought is certainly the thought of something good, good for himself, perhaps also good for others. He desires to compass this end. But on consideration he sees that he cannot compass this end without means, means in the shape of wood, stones, and lime. These means then become a new end, an intermediate end, which he must compass before he can attain the ultimate end, the house. But on consideration he sees that he cannot compass this new end without means, means in the shape of tools. These means, the tools, then become a new end, another intermediate end which he must compass. But he sees on consideration that he cannot compass this new end without the aid of mechanical study and the assistance of his fellow-men; mechanical knowledge and human assistance thus become a new and intermediate end. But again, on considering the matter, he sees that he cannot overtake this new and intermediate end, he cannot betake himself to study, or obtain the aid of his fellows, unless he has a store of provisions laid in to support him while he is studying mechanics, and also to support his neighbours while they are assisting him. The acquisition of a stock

of provisions thus becomes a new intermediate end; and this we shall say is the proximate end, the end which he must aim at and overtake in the first instance, before he can expect to accomplish any of the other ends. From this simple case, thus roughly drawn out, you may perceive what a succession of ends may have to be gone through before the ultimate end is overtaken, and how each means becomes in its turn an end, until the whole series is gone through. You may also, from this illustration, understand the difference between final cause, efficient cause, and natural cause. In this case the final cause of the house was the good or comfort of the savage; the efficient cause was the active power of the savage, which enabled him, we shall suppose, to carry through all the operations required before the house could be constructed; and the material cause was the provisions, the mechanical knowledge, the assistance received, together with the stones, wood, and lime of which the house was built. From this plain (although very rough and hasty) illustration, you may understand—and this is the point I wish you to bear in mind—how, in considering the subject of ends, thought is necessarily regarded as preceding execution; how intelligence and foresight necessarily go before realisation. Suppose that the savage had set about hoarding up provisions blindly, and without any purpose in view; suppose that he had studied mechanics, and got his neighbours to assist him in fabricating tools and machines blindly and without any purpose in view; suppose that he had set himself and them to

cut wood and to hew stones blindly and without any purpose in view; suppose that he had set them to build a house blindly and without any purpose in view, a house which was not purposely designed to minister either to his own good or to the good of any other creature; in short, that the idea of an ultimate end or good never entered his mind, and that nothing that had been done was done with the view of giving satisfaction either to himself or others; then I am sure that, however much we might admire the power and energy of the savage, we should have a very poor opinion of his intelligence; we should deny, indeed, that his proceedings had been directed by any degree of thought or intellect at all. We might consider him a powerful, but we could not regard him as an intelligent, agent.

16. I leave the application of this illustration very much to yourselves. I may just suggest that if you suppose the universe made for no good purpose whatever, that is, made just as you might suppose a house built by a man blindly, and into whose head no notion of the comfort or utility of a house ever entered; if that be your supposition, then, however active and powerful you may conceive the author of all things to be, you cannot conceive him to be intelligent; while on the other hand, if you suppose that the universe exists for some good purpose, that it answers in all its parts and arrangements some great and beneficent end, however dim and limited your knowledge of that end may be; then,

if that be your theory, you are compelled by the necessities of reason to suppose that thought and intelligence are the attributes of Him who has ordered all things for the best, whether He binds the sweet influences of the Pleiades or loosens the bands of Orion.

17. To return to Anaxagoras, and to sum up his philosophy in a very few words. *First,* there are ends in nature, that is to say, purpose and order pervade the universe; purpose and order are only other names for the good; but purpose, order, good, imply forethought and intelligence; therefore, the first cause and principle of all things is all-wise and intelligent; in other words, is mind or understanding, *νοῦς*. *Secondly,* this mind is not mixed up with the *ὁμοιομερῆ*. It is totally different from them. Were it mixed up with their substance it could not be capable of moving and controlling them. Another principle would be required to account for the operations of nature. But it is not mixed up with them; hence it can order and direct them. Under its control, combinations and separations take place among the *ὁμοιομερῆ*, by which their original constitution is altered. Like draws to like, and unlike separates itself from unlike. The *ὁμοιομερῆ*, however, so far preserve their original constitution, that each of them, or each thing which an aggregate of them composes, takes its character from the preponderance of certain kinds of matter, without losing entirely all, or perhaps any of the other kinds of matter which went to the com-

position of the primitive ὁμοιομερῆ. Thus bread, although it apparently excludes bone, and flesh, and blood from its composition, does not really exclude them, because a man can be nourished upon bread; that is to say, in the human system bread is converted into bone, flesh, and blood, and therefore these existed in the bread before it was taken into the human system. I give you this illustration, not as physiologically or chemically correct, but for the purpose of illustrating Anaxagoras's doctrine, which is, that the properties, and indeed we may say the contents, of the various articles in nature are very different from what they appear to us to be. The doctrine proceeds on the principle that no kind of matter can be changed into any other kind, that no quality of matter can be changed into any other quality. Hence, when we find that bread gives rise to bone and flesh, we must either suppose that the bone and flesh are still bread, or else we must suppose that the bread was, or at any rate contained, bone and flesh. To argue otherwise would, in the estimation of Anaxagoras, be equivalent to maintaining that something could spring out of nothing.

18. There are two interesting questions connected with the philosophy of Anaxagoras, which I shall merely broach at present, without discussing them. These are, *first*, the consideration of the extent to which Anaxagoras may have been influenced in the construction of his system by the study of his own consciousness, and by the reflection that he himself,

his own mind, was the universal in all the objects that came before him, the rallying point in which they were reduced to unity. That reflection generalised would have yielded him his doctrine of νοῦς or intelligence as the principle and foundation of all things; and, *secondly*, we might ask whether Anaxagoras has not reached a truer universal, a principle which is more a truth for all intellect, than any philosopher who preceded him. You will observe that with all these philosophers it was the thought of *something*, and not pure thought itself, which was the principle. Thus, with the Pythagoreans, it was the thought of number, that is, it was number rather than thought, which was the principle; with the Eleatics, it was the thought of *Being*, that is, it was Being rather than the *thought* of Being, which was the principle.

19. So in regard to Heraclitus, and the other philosophers whom we have considered. It was always the thought *of* something, rather than thought itself, which was laid down as the principle. But Anaxagoras laid down thought itself—not the thought of this or of that, but thought itself—as the universal in all things, and this universal being intellect itself, must necessarily be more a truth for all intellect than any that we have yet come across.

20. Significant and suggestive as the philosophy of Anaxagoras is, Socrates complains that it fell short of its promise,—'Phædo,' p. 98.

II. THE SOCRATIC PERIOD.

THE SOPHISTS.

1. THE course of Greek speculation now brings me to speak of the Sophists, a class of teachers and thinkers who, in general, have occupied no very high place in the world's esteem, but in whose favour a reaction has of late years taken place. The Sophists came upon the scene when Athens was at the height of her glory. Greece was now the foremost nation in the world, and pre-eminent amid that nation stood forth the Athenian people, with Pericles, the son of Xanthippus, at their head. Around his name, so great in oratory and statesmanship, are clustered a constellation of names equally brilliant in poetry, in science, and in art; and from him this period of Greek history, so rich in every form of intellectual excellence, has derived its name; it is known as the age of Pericles.

2. At this time the Sophists made their appearance as the inaugurators of a new, or, at least, of an extended, system of education. Greece was now alive, to an extent unknown before, with every kind

of mental activity and excitement. Material prosperity, if it ministered to sensual indulgences, inspired at the same time higher cravings, and afforded scope and leisure for the consideration of questions affecting man's moral and intellectual interests. It was felt that the old and simple modes of instruction were not adequate to the requirements of the time, and that the newly awakened spirit must work out its purposes by means of a more complex and artificial apparatus. What suited their forefathers did not suit the present Athenians, and still less the rising generation.

3. The Sophists took advantage of this movement; they arose out of it, they headed it, and proclaimed themselves ready and willing, for a handsome pecuniary consideration, to instruct the rising generation in all the accomplishments necessary to secure their advancement in the world. If they did not supersede the elementary discipline at that time in vogue, they undertook to engraft upon it a more complete and advanced system of instruction. Such was the proposed vocation of the Sophists. How they discharged it is a question on which much debate has been expended; probably not so well as they themselves imagined, and perhaps not so badly as their revilers are in the habit of asserting.

4. In considering the Sophists and their vocation, there are two characters in which they present them-

selves to our notice: *first*, as teachers generally; and, *secondly*, as philosophers. In his account and defence of the Sophists, which you will find in vol. viii. of his 'History of Greece,' Mr Grote has stated that the Sophists were not properly a sect, but were merely a class or profession. By a sect is meant a society which is held together by a unanimity of sentiment and opinion; by a class or profession is meant a body of men who exercise a particular vocation, but who do not all practise it in the same way, or necessarily agree in their doctrines. For example, it cannot be said of the professors in our universities that they are a sect. We can only say of them that they are a class. They all teach; but they do not all teach the same doctrines or in the same way. In like manner, says Mr Grote, the Sophists were not a sect, they had no common groundwork of opinion, they were merely teachers; and each man taught what he pleased to the best of his ability and in his own way. It seems to me, however, more correct to say that, viewed merely as general teachers, the Sophists were a class or profession; but that, viewed as philosophers, they properly constituted a sect. For although they may have differed a good deal in their philosophical opinions, they all agreed, as we shall see, in assuming a common principle as the basis of their speculations. And accordingly I have laid down these two points of view under which I think they may be regarded: *first*, their character as general teachers, in which

case they may be said to belong to a profession; and, *secondly*, their character as philosophers, in which case they may be said to constitute a sect. I shall make a few remarks on the Sophists, considered under each of these points of view.

5. The general character of the teaching of the Sophists may be summed up by saying that they adapted themselves to the wants of the times. They took their age as they found it, and they did not attempt to improve it; at least, this was not their professed aim. They undertook to teach their pupils how to get on in the world, how to play a successful part in life; and rhetorical power being one great means, being, indeed, *the* one great means towards success, they strove above all things to impart oratorical accomplishments to those whom they instructed. But in such a system of instruction there is a strong temptation to sacrifice substance to show. Where rhetorical skill is regarded as paramount, the higher ends of education are apt to be overlooked, for readiness and fluency of speech may proceed out of emptiness, no less than out of fulness of mind; hence the questionable or equivocal character of the method of instruction attributed to the Sophists. That they were useful in their day and generation is not to be doubted. That their pupils frequently derived from them substantial knowledge, along with the flimsier acquisition of rhetoric, may be readily admitted. But the main stress of their teaching being based rather

on the attainment of the superficial than on the attainment of the solid, their character as instructors of youth has come down to us laden with an obloquy which may have been exaggerated by their opponents, but which was certainly not altogether undeserved.

6. The *second* point to be considered in our estimate of the Sophists is the character of their philosophy. Our limits will not permit me at present to go deeply into the details of this subject; but there may be the less occasion for doing so, inasmuch as we are able to present in one celebrated maxim the sum and substance of their philosophy. This dogma is the saying, that "*man is the measure of the universe;*" a maxim attributed to Protagoras, but which may be accepted as the watchword and common principle of all the Sophists.

7. The meaning of this saying is, that truth, morality, and beauty are altogether relative, that there is nothing absolute or unchangeable in their nature. The maxim is, indeed, under one point of view, a condensed expression for the whole philosophy of the relative. Whatever a man holds to be true is true for him; whatever he holds to be right and good is right and good for him; whatever he holds to be beautiful is beautiful for him: and thus there is no absolute or universal standard either of truth or of morality or of beauty. It is obvious that where this doctrine is carried out in detail it must have the

effect of exploding truth, virtue, and beauty, considered as realities. It destroys them as objective and essential qualities. It obliterates their absolute and immutable character. It represents them as hinging on the precarious constitution of mankind, and as shifting with their shifting sensibilities.

8. It would be an interesting inquiry to trace in detail the causes which gave rise to the philosophy of the Sophists. I must at present be satisfied with remarking that the two main sources from which it emanated seem to have been Anaxagoras's doctrine of the *νοῦς*, or mind, as the supreme principle in nature, and the doctrine of the Atomic school in regard to sensation and perception. I shall say a word or two on each of these points.

9. *First;* Before the time of Anaxagoras, nature, in her external and objective character, had been held to be greater than man. Lofty as the aims and aspirations of the preceding philosophers had been, they had scarcely risen to the conception of an intelligent power superior to nature. Anaxagoras rose to this conception, he rose to the conception of spirit as above nature, of mind as greater than matter. Heretofore men, philosophers as well as others, had bowed down before nature. Now there was a principle found greater than nature, and before that principle nature herself must bow down. This principle is mind, and wherever else mind may have a place, it

dwells certainly in man: so that man is now set up as superior to nature. It is rather for nature to pay homage to him, than for him to pay homage to nature. In a word, instead of the universe being the measure of man, that is to say, instead of the universe imposing its forms and modes upon man, man is the measure of the universe, and imposes his forms and modes upon it. Such is the deduction of the Sophistical dogma in so far as it may be traced to Anaxagoras. His doctrine, that mind was the supreme principle, that there was nothing higher, was converted by an easy transition into the maxim that man, the mind of man, is the measure of all things; that is, the mind of man shapes and determines the truth.

10. *Secondly;* The new doctrine in regard to perception, either advanced by Leucippus and Democritus, or deducible from their speculations, afforded strong support to the fundamental principle of the Sophists. Heretofore it had been thought that the secondary qualities of matter, such as heat, cold, bitter, sweet, sound, and colour, possessed an objective existence in things, that they had a reality in themselves; now, it was declared and argued, on strong grounds of reason, that these qualities had no objective and independent existence, but that they depended entirely on the sentient mind of man. There was, in short, no such thing as heat or cold out of relation to feeling, no such thing as bitter or sweet out of relation to the sense of taste, no such thing as colour out of

relation to the sense of sight, no such thing as sound out of relation to the sense of hearing. In fact, take away man and his senses and you take from the universe all these qualities. Hence, in so far at least as these are concerned, it may be said emphatically that man is the measure of the universe; his constitution determines its constitution. It is his nature which gives to things their colour, their sound, their taste, their touch, and their smell.

11. These observations regarding sensation supplied to the Sophists a very strong ground, as they thought, on which to build their assertion that man is the measure of all things. They generalised this maxim. They laid it down in utmost latitude of signification, and their consequent conclusion was, as I have said, that there was nothing true in itself, or right in itself, or beautiful in itself; just as a thing was not sweet in itself, and not red in itself, but took that taste and that colour from the sentient nature of man, so nothing was true in itself or good in itself, but everything derived these qualities from the mind of the person contemplating them.

12. There is only one way in which these Sophistical arguments can be met and rebutted, and that is by drawing a distinction between the essential and true nature, and the unessential and contingent nature of man; in other words, between his universal nature, the nature he has in common with all

intelligence, actual or possible, and his particular nature, the nature which is peculiar to him as a human being. If that distinction be made out, truth, virtue, and beauty stand secure and unshaken; for no one would claim for truth a more absolute character than this, that whatever is accepted as true and right by all intelligence, that is absolute and immutable truth and right. To fix, then, a standard of truth, of morals, and of beauty, we must first fix a standard of intelligence; in other words, we must show, or at least hold, that there is a nature common to all intelligence, and that man participates in this universal nature. If that can be shown, truth and morals are established as immutable; if, on the contrary, it be held that there is no standard in intelligence, no common nature in all reason, it must at the same time be conceded that there is no standard in truth or in morality.

13. From these remarks, it is obvious that there is a sense in which the principle of the Sophists may be accepted as sound and valid. Man is the measure of the universe, in so far as he participates in the nature of all intellect. In so far as he has a faculty of the universal, a universal faculty, he is cognisant of truth absolutely; but in so far as his particular faculty, his senses and understanding, is concerned, he is not the measure of the universe, not the recipient of truth as it is for all, but only of truth as it is for him; that is to say, the recipient of mere appar-

ent truth, or of that which, strictly speaking, is not truth at all.

14. It was, however, in the latter sense that the Sophists gave out that man was the measure of the universe. They did not draw the distinction, but we may say that virtually they acknowledged no universal faculty in man. They regarded his particular or sensational nature as his essential constitution, and this sensational nature they set up as the measure of all things. In short, their dogma, viewed theoretically, led to this conclusion,—whatever appears to any individual to be true, that for him is true; and viewed practically, it led to this conclusion,—whatever appears to any individual to be advantageous, that for him is right.

15. Socrates, as you are aware, stood forward as the opponent of the Sophists. And he did so on the ground which I have indicated. The Sophists had set up man as supreme. They had represented truth and virtue as contingent on his constitution. But then they had regarded his constitution as precarious, variable, and particular. Here was where the error lay. Socrates accepted their position; he conceded that truth and virtue depended on the constitution of man; not, however, on the variable and particular part of his nature, but on the invariable and universal part of his nature, on that faculty which he has in common with all intelligence. And, arguing in

this way, Socrates revindicated for truth and morals the absolute and immutable and real nature of which they had been deprived by the argumentation of the Sophists.

16. In these remarks I have given you merely a very general sketch of the doctrines of the Sophists. I have indeed done little more than announce the leading principle of their philosophy, showing you very briefly how this principle—the maxim, namely, that man is the measure of all things—how this principle, if carried out as the Sophists interpreted it, must have the effect of unsettling both truth and morality. I have also indicated very briefly the counter-principle which Socrates opposed to theirs, and by means of which he reasserted the claims of absolute truth and absolute morality, this principle being the position that man is indeed the measure of the universe, but that he is this, not in his contingent and individual, but in his essential and universal character. I shall have occasion to go more fully into the details of this subject when I come to speak of Socrates and Plato. Meanwhile, the following may be accepted as a short summary of their position. The Sophists hold that man can know things only as they are related to his faculties of knowledge; an undeniable truth, which, however, they conjoined, virtually, if not expressly, with this more questionable position, that man has no faculty of the universal, that is, no faculty for the truth as it

exists for all reason; that there is no common nature in all intelligence; that man's reason is a *particular* kind of reason. These two positions, *first*, that man can know things only in relation to his own faculties—and, *secondly*, that there is no common nature, no essential agreement in all intelligence; these two positions afforded a ground for the conclusion that truth must vary according to the variations of the mind contemplating it; that it was fluctuating and unstable, indeed, that in the strict sense of the word there was no truth at all; while, at the same time, they afforded a ground for the conclusion that morality was altogether arbitrary and conventional, depending on the changing humours of society, and even on the wayward caprice of individuals.

17. I may conclude by mentioning the names of three of the most celebrated Sophists. These were Protagoras, Gorgias, and Prodicus; of these Protagoras was the most distinguished. He was a native of Abdera in Thrace, was born 480 B.C., died about 410 B.C. Gorgias was born in Sicily; he was a contemporary of Protagoras, and was born about 480 B.C. He is said to have lived more than a hundred years. Prodicus was a native of the Island Ceos; he was a good deal younger than the other two, but the dates of his birth and death are uncertain. To this philosopher, Sophist though he was, one of the finest moral fables of antiquity is ascribed, commonly known by

the title 'The Choice of Hercules.' It is related in Xenophon's 'Memorabilia,' B. ii.

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18. To understand the position, and the conduct, and the character, and the philosophy of Socrates, it is necessary that we get all the light we possibly can in regard to the tenets of the Sophists. I therefore go on with the consideration of their opinions.

19. In order to reach still more definite results, let us consider what their psychology, that is to say, what their doctrine, was in regard to the nature of man considered as an isolated individual, or viewed in his unsocial capacity. You will observe that man presents himself to our notice under two points of view; as a member of society, and as a man simply, and irrespective of all social relations; in other and shorter words, as a citizen and as an individual. Now, the question is, What are the attributes and constituents of man considered as an individual? What are they as distinguished from his attributes and constituents, considered as a member of society? Let us try to separate between that which man receives directly from nature, and that which he imbibes sensibly or insensibly from his companionship with his fellows. This, indeed, is the great problem which, although perhaps never very clearly enunciated, is, and has ever been, the business of moral philosophy to resolve. Probably the Sophists had as clear an apprehension of it as

any subsequent philosophers; at any rate they were the first to broach it. In their language the question would be put thus, What is man by nature (*φύσει*), and what is he by convention and fashion (*νόμῳ*)? The exposition of what man is by nature would constitute the psychology of the Sophists: the exposition of what he is by convention would constitute their ethics. But it is not difficult to see that, arising out of their psychology and immediately connected with it, there would be what we may call a code of *natural* ethics, as distinguished from that code of conventional or social or artificial ethics to which the name of ethics is more properly applied. Indeed this word ethics is properly applied to man only when in society; still it may be allowable to apply it to man in a pure state of nature when we explain it as meaning those natural commands which prompt and impel every sentient creature to gratify its wants.

20. Before touching on any of these points, either on the psychology or the ethics of the Sophists, let me call your attention to an important consideration which throws, I think, much light on their mode of inquiry. The consideration is this, that whatever can be shown to be imposed upon man by Nature, must be more binding and authoritative than that which is imposed upon him merely by society. Nature's commands must be obeyed first, because Nature is primary and fundamental; society's commands must be obeyed only in the second instance,

because society is less real, less cogent than Nature; and where the two commands are at variance, where Nature pulls one way and social morality another way, Nature must be yielded to, because nature is weightier, and in every way more venerable, than convention. That doctrine, you will observe (and it is a doctrine which carries with it a good deal of plausibility), opens a door to the inroads of every species of licentiousness. I do not believe that the Sophists themselves ever opened that door very wide; but they indicated its existence, and some of them certainly left it ajar, to the perplexity and alarm of all right-minded citizens. This consideration may serve to show that the estimate usually formed as to the dangerous and pernicious tendency of the Sophistical speculators, although exaggerated, is not altogether wrong. This remark is somewhat digressive. I return to the psychology of the Sophists, on which I shall say a very few words.

21. This prime question of moral philosophy, as I have called it, is no easy one to answer, for it is no easy matter to effect the discrimination out of which the answer must proceed. It is a question, perhaps, to which no complete, but only an approximate, answer can be returned. One common mistake is to ascribe more to the natural man than properly belongs to him, to ascribe to him attributes and endowments which belong only to the social and artificial man. Some writers—Hutcheson, for example, and he

is followed by many others—are of opinion that man naturally has a conscience or moral sense which discriminates between right and wrong, just as he has naturally a sense of taste, which distinguishes between sweet and bitter, and a sense of sight, which discriminates between red and blue, or a sentient organism, which distinguishes between pleasure and pain. That man has by nature, and from the first, the possibility of attaining to a conscience is not to be denied. That he has within him by birthright something out of which conscience is developed, I firmly believe; and what this is I shall endeavour by-and-by to show, when I come to speak of Socrates and his philosophy as opposed to the doctrines of the Sophists. But that the man is furnished by nature with a conscience ready-made, just as he is furnished with a ready-made sensational apparatus, this is a doctrine in which I have no faith, and which I regard as altogether erroneous. It arises out of the disposition to attribute more to the natural man than properly belongs to him. The other error into which inquirers are apt to fall in making a discrimination between what man is by nature, and what he is by convention, is the opposite of the one just mentioned. They sometimes attribute to the natural man less than properly belongs to him. And this, I think, was the error into which the Sophists were betrayed. They fell into it inadvertently, and not with any design of embracing or promulgating erroneous opinions. We shall see by-and-by how Socrates availed himself

of this error in the psychology of the Sophists, and how he corrected it.

22. In answer to the question, What, and what alone, appertains to man by nature? the Sophists replied in one word, *sensation*. It is certain that man has by nature certain senses, and that he is naturally sensitive to pleasure and to pain. He has also, as part of his constitution, certain appetites, passions, and desires. Some of these, however, exist only in society, and are probably created only by our contact with society. The other appetites and passions which man brings with him into the world are so intimately connected with organic pleasure or pain that they may be placed under the head of sensation, and thus sensation, or a susceptibility and experience of pleasure or of pain, is properly all that belongs to man by nature. That this attribute is natural to him is what cannot be for a moment doubted. He comes into the world feeling, that is, alive to enjoyment or suffering, at every pore. In regard to all his other attributes, we cannot be sure that they are not entirely due to the influences and operation of society.

23. To what extent the Sophists admitted *thought* to be an indigenous property of man seems somewhat uncertain. It is probable that they did not admit it as anything different from sensation. They either slurred it over without much notice, or they regarded it as the natural sequent or accompaniment of

sensation, and as itself resolvable into sensation. This latter attribute, together with certain appetites and desires, these alone, in the psychology of the Sophists, were the original furnishings of human nature. Sensation was the foundation on which the whole superstructure of humanity and of society rested. The Sophists were thus the first inquirers who distinctly propounded a philosophy of pure sensationalism, that is to say, a doctrine which refers all the phenomena of thought, and all the operations of the mind, to sensation as their ultimate source and origin. This doctrine has had many advocates, both in ancient and in modern times. The English philosopher, Locke, lent it his countenance, although not without some reservations. The French philosophers of the eighteenth century put aside these reservations, and proclaimed a doctrine of sensationalism without any qualification; but the first who propounded the doctrine were the Sophists. Their psychology began and ended in sensationalism.

24. In a state of nature, then, and apart from society and all its relations, man, according to the Sophists, is a mere creature of sensation, including under that term certain appetites and desires, and the experience of pleasure and of pain. This is what man is in himself; he is, as he comes from the workshop of nature, a mere series or complement or congeries of sensations. That, say the Sophists, is what man, the individual or isolated

man, is, as distinguished from the social or gregarious man. Out of this psychology a system of what we may call natural ethics would evolve itself. To a creature made up of sensations the law of self-preservation and of self-enjoyment must be the most authoritative of all commands. Such a being must necessarily pursue its own gratification; for pleasure is sweet and attractive, pain is hateful and repulsive, to all the organised creation. Hence, whatever confers pleasure on the individual will be passionately run after and approved of, whatever inflicts pain will be anxiously shunned and condemned. "Nature," says Jeremy Bentham, "has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pleasure and pain. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do, as well as to determine what we shall do." Whether, and in what sense, pleasure and pain may be said to be the two sovereign masters of mankind in a state of society, I shall not at present stop to inquire: but it is certain that they must be the only two governing principles of man, viewed as a mere sensational being, and considered as he is in himself and out of all relation to his fellows. His ethics, in such a case, could scarcely be called selfish, for selfishness implies not only an exclusive regard to one's self, but a disregard to the claims of others. But there are no others at present in the case, and therefore their claims cannot be disregarded; but in so far as an exclusive regard to one's self is concerned, the natural ethics which arise out

of the psychology of the Sophists must be pronounced to be virtually of a purely selfish character. The same law of nature which makes a man susceptible of pleasure and of pain, giving no other guides, imposes on him the duty of securing the one and of avoiding the other to the utmost degree in which they can be secured and avoided.

25. Thus furnished by nature, man is turned adrift into the world. He comes upon the scene equipped with sensations which constitute his very existence, and with a natural code of ethics which oblige him to preserve himself and to enjoy himself as much as he possibly can. Thus the isolated man, man as he comes from nature, man with his individual interests, is the measure of the universe to himself. Whatever his sensations bring home to him as true and real is true and real *for him*, whatever it may be *in itself*. His sensations are *for him* true and real, although all beyond should be illusion or nonentity, and these sensations are *for him* the universe. Then again, whatever promotes agreeable sensations is right *for him*, whatever it may be *in itself;* whatever promotes disagreeable sensations is wrong *for him*, whatever it may be *in itself*. Thus man is, as the Sophists say, the measure of the universe. His individual nature measures and determines its reality. His individual nature measures and determines what in the universe is right and what in the universe is wrong.

26. But although man comes into the world thus naturally equipped, he finds there much that is at variance with these natural provisions. He finds established in society a code of morality which is by no means in accordance with what we have called the ethics of nature. By the ethics of nature man is bound to regard his own interests as paramount, and to look after these alone; by the ethics of society he is called upon to respect the interests of others, as well as to abridge or sacrifice his own pleasures, and to lay a restraint on his self-indulgent appetites. These new regulations square but badly with the injunctions laid upon him by nature. And the purport of the Sophistical teaching was, I conceive, to point out the inconsistency, without offering any adequate solution. Their object was to stir up inquiry, and as a preliminary to this, it was necessary to induce perplexity of mind. Doubts and difficulties must present themselves before any clearness of thought can be attained. These doubts and difficulties and contradictions were evolved by the argumentative exercitations of the Sophists; and I conceive that their exhibition was absolutely essential to the progress of philosophy, and as a step to something better. Let us honour and not disparage the Sophists for having been at the pains to throw these embarrassments (what the Greeks called ἀπορίαι) in the way of thinking men. They argued that the morals of nature were opposed in much to the morals of convention, that the morals of nature were

supremely authoritative, inasmuch as they were grounded on nature herself. Nature herself is here the ground of our obligation, and under her behests we are bound to pursue to the utmost our own pleasure and avoid our own pain. But on what are the morals of society grounded? On something much less authoritative, on mere convention or arbitrary agreement among men. But these conventional rules are, or at least appear to be, less obligatory than the injunctions laid upon us by our own appetites, passions, and desires. Why, then, should they be obeyed? what, in short, is the ground of the moral obligation imposed upon us by society? The ground on which man's obligation as an individual rests is, as I have said, obvious enough; it rests upon nature herself. But man's obligations as a citizen do not rest on nature, for they stand opposed to much which nature dictates. On what, then, do they rest? what is the ground of social moral obligation? For the raising of this question we are mainly indebted to the Sophists, to the spirit, if not to the letter, of their inquiries; and the question seems to have been brought to light in some such manner as I have described, namely, by playing off the natural or isolated man against the social and artificial man—the individual, taken simply and as he is in himself, against the individual taken socially, and as he is in company with his fellow-men.

27. I have said that the Sophists furnished no

adequate solution to the question as to the grounds of the moral obligation which society imposes on its members, nor did they profess to furnish any, their object being rather to induce perplexity and provoke discussion. But some solution they certainly did attempt, and some of their views were not unlike those propounded by the Utilitarians of the present day. I shall merely touch upon these answers. Some of the Sophists contended that might was the ground of moral obligation; that the strong, who were able to enforce conformity, determined what was right, determined this either by positive enactments or by the force of public opinion, and that hence the weaker were constrained to obedience through fear. Another party, according to Plato, contended that although injustice was right by nature, inasmuch as nature prompted a man to grasp at everything he could reach without giving heed to the claims of others, still it was wrong by convention, for this reason, that the man who committed injustice would be sure at one time or other to suffer from injustice; and therefore, in order to avoid this suffering, which to him would be wrong and grievous, he would refrain from committing injustice, however right and agreeable he may think it. According to this doctrine, it is good for each man to commit acts of injustice on others, it is bad to have acts of injustice committed on one's self; and hence, as it is impossible to avoid the latter without also giving up the former, men agree to abstain from

acts of injustice, doing so, not because they conceive injustice to be bad when they actively inflict it, but because they conceive it to be bad when they passively endure it. The pain which they feel when they suffer from injustice outweighs, for the most part, the pleasure which they feel when they commit it; and hence injustice comes to be stamped with general reprobation, and its opposite with general applause. Such an explanation represents self-interest in its most undisguised form as the ground of moral obligation. Others, again, would argue that the advantage and wellbeing of the community, of which each man was a member, was promoted by the observance of these moral rules; and hence the promotion of this welfare was a sufficient reason why these rules should be observed. The promotion and maintenance of the wellbeing of society was thus set forth as the ground of moral obligation. This is no other than the modern doctrine of Utilitarianism.

28. These solutions, however, were felt to be inadequate and unsatisfactory. It was felt, in particular, that no true conciliation was effected by such explanations between what we have called the natural ethics of the individual and the conventional ethics of the citizen. The question still remained unanswered, Why, when a man could commit injustice with the certainty of impunity both in the present and in the future, he should not commit it? On what ground, and for what reason, it might still be

asked, should he, in such circumstances, not commit injustice? No Sophistical theory was able to answer that question; or if they answered it at all, their answer was, that a man in the position indicated should just follow the bent of his natural inclinations and commit injustice, doing what seemed to him good in his own eyes, and not what was reckoned good in the estimation of society. The commands of nature carry more authority than the laws and regulations of society; therefore, when they can be obeyed with impunity, they ought to be, and they will be, obeyed. Such was the spirit and tendency of much of the Sophistical mode of argumentation.

SOCRATES.

1. THERE were two ways in which the perplexities occasioned by the argumentations of the Sophists might be encountered and rebutted. The one way was by abjuring all inquiry, and by falling back, in blind faith, on the old traditional morality as a matter too sacred to be questioned or investigated. This was the course adopted by the orthodox or civic or conservative party in Athens, the party of whom Aristophanes may be taken as the mouthpiece and representative. Looking merely to the mischief which the agitation of the Sophists tended to produce, and had perhaps actually produced, they became clamorous in their denunciations of these new pretenders to wisdom. They set their faces against the freedom of thought and of inquiry which these innovators had inaugurated. Their subtlety they regarded as empty quibbling—as a quibbling, however, which was dangerous to the institutions and the interests of society; and their reasonings, they held, should be put down rather by persecution than by argument. That was their idea of the way in

hich the Sophists should be dealt with. This party
k its stand on the ancient beliefs, it clung to the
l order and to the prescriptive morals which it
inherited from time immemorial, as a divinely
ted system. It reverenced them all the more
account of the obscurity in which their origin
was shrouded; and it threatened vengeance against
all who, by intellectual sophistications, would in-
fringe or imperil institutions so venerable and so
benign.

2. The other way of dealing with the Sophists was that which Socrates followed out. Unlike the orthodox party, he was far from being at variance with the Sophists in regard to the fundamental position which they had taken up; on the contrary, he cordially agreed with them as to the propriety, indeed the necessity, of subjecting the institutions of society and everything in which man was interested, or about which man could speculate, to the ordeal of a rigorous examination. No Sophist was ever more keenly bent on free and searching inquiry than he: and this is the reason why he has frequently, and not erroneously, been identified to a large extent with that party. If Socrates had been compelled to make his option between the Sophists and the old stubborn citizen party at Athens, there is little doubt which side he would have chosen. He would have thrown in his lot with the Sophists; for this party was at any rate awake and flexible with intellectual

life and movement, whereas the other party was st and stolid, was sunk in a dogmatic slumber, stationary if not retrograde. But Socrates was compelled to choose between these two pa another course was open to him, and on that course he entered. He agreed with the Sophis calling for free inquiry; but he demanded, further that that inquiry should be thoroughgoing and complete, more thoroughgoing and complete than it had been under the management of the Sophists. This, then, was the preliminary ground on which Socrates opposed the Sophists; *their* inquiry into the nature of man he held had been partial, inadequate, and superficial; his professed to be more radical, more searching, and more comprehensive.

3. We have now to consider in what respect Socrates deemed the inquiry of the Sophists to be partial and incomplete, and how he endeavoured to supplement it; but, first of all, let me apprise you, that in attempting to work out the philosophy of Socrates, I shall be compelled, in the absence of full and accurate historical data, to draw considerably on my own reflections for materials, and to fill in details which, though implied and hinted at, are not explicitly presented in any of the remains which are extant of the Socratic doctrines. In attempting to give a consistent and intelligible account of the Socratic system, both as it is in itself and as it stands opposed to the doctrines of the Sophists, I

shall be obliged to attribute to him opinions which even Plato does not articulately vouch for as belonging to Socrates. I shall be under the necessity of showing that he virtually, although obscurely, raised and resolved questions which were not expressly or definitely propounded until after his time. This, therefore, has to be kept in view, that although all that I shall attribute to Socrates has, I conceive, a sufficient warrant in the general scope and spirit of his philosophy, there will be some things in my exposition for which no exact historical authority can be adduced. This course will, at any rate, conduce to intelligibility; and it is better, I conceive, to be intelligible by overstepping somewhat the literal historical record, than to be unintelligible, as we must be, if we confine ourselves slavishly within it. It is bad to violate the truth of history, but the truth of history is not violated, it is rather cleared up, when we evolve out of the opinions of an ancient philosopher more than the philosopher himself was conscious of these opinions containing. Such an evolution I propose to attempt in dealing with the philosophy of Socrates.

4. We have already seen that the psychology of the Sophists represented the natural man as centring entirely in sensation. Sensation, with its pleasures and its pains, was so prominent and importunate, the knowledge which it imparted, or appeared to impart, was so various and so assured—

assured at least in so far as the individual affected by the sensations was concerned—that it threw all the other mental phenomena completely into the shade. The Sophists indeed held, as I have said, that there were no other mental phenomena, no phenomena which were not resolvable into one form or other of sensation, no phenomena which had not their origin in this all-comprehensive endowment. But the question may be raised, *Is* sensation thus exclusive and all-comprehensive? Is it the all in all of human nature? Is it the one and only endowment of man, viewed even in his most elementary condition as an isolated and unsocial individual? That was precisely the question which Socrates raised, and he answered it in the negative. Man is not a mere series of sensations. Even in his most primitive state, and as he comes from the hands of nature, there are elements within him entirely different from sensation. This position was equivalent to declaring, that the analysis or inquiry of the Sophists had been partial and incomplete. And such, I said, was the position taken up by Socrates at the outset.

5. I remarked on a former occasion, that thought or thinking was a phenomenon, was rather *the* phenomenon, which the Sophists had neglected to take into account. In prosecuting their inquiries they had, of course, made use of thought, for they could not have conducted their researches or their arguments without it; but they had employed it merely as the

instrument, and not as the object of their researches. They did not turn a reflective eye upon the instrument or medium through which their observations were made. Just as the astronomer does not look *at* his telescope, but looks through it at the stars, so the Sophists overlooked thought itself, and attended merely to what was revealed to them through its means. But, in consequence of this oversight, their analysis was exceedingly defective; because, while it is quite proper that the astronomer should overlook his instrument, the telescope, inasmuch as some star, or whatever the object may be, is all that he is professing to examine, it is by no means proper that thought, the instrument of the philosopher, should be overlooked in the same way. Thought is not only the philosopher's instrument, it is also the object or part of the object which the philosopher is called upon to investigate and explain. He professes to examine human nature; if, therefore, he merely employs thought in the examination without making it part of the thing examined, he is not faithful to his calling, he is leaving out of the survey an element which the survey ought to embrace; his observations, accordingly, will be imperfect, and his report false and incomplete. This was what befell the investigations of the Sophists. Their report of human nature was defective, because it left out of account the element of thought, an element which, no less than sensation, although in a much less obtrusive degree than sensation, is a characteristic

endowment even of the natural man. Thought was the element which Socrates found fault with the Sophists for having overlooked.

6. Here, perhaps, an objection might be raised. It might be said that thought has no place in the economy of the purely natural man, but that it owes its being entirely to the action and the influences of society. It might be argued, in the language of modern schools, that thought is a secondary and derivative, not a primary and original formation. It is not improbable that this was what the Sophists actually maintained. I said formerly that they either ignored thought, or merged this phenomenon in the phenomena of sensation. Perhaps this assertion should be qualified by the statement that there was still another way in which some of them disposed of the phenomenon of thought, another point of view under which they regarded it, and that was, its conventional character and origin. They may have held that thought was due to the social circumstances in the midst of which man was placed, no less than the rules of morality were due to these same circumstances. And if this were the case, if this could be made out, it would leave sensation as the sole fundamental constituent of human nature; in which case, the contradiction between nature and convention, the opposition between what man was in himself and what he was through his contact with society, the discord or antagonism between the natural ethics of sensation and desire

and the artificial ethics of social life, would remain unreconciled. In short, all the perplexities and doubts and difficulties called forth and set in motion by the speculations of the Sophists would continue uncounteracted, and would subsist in full activity and force. As part, therefore, of the Socratic dialectic, it was quite indispensable to show that thought was an indigenous endowment, a quality of human nature no less than sensation, appetite, and desire. This proof, accordingly, was the main part of the business which Socrates was called upon to perform. He had to prove that thought was man's by nature, and that it was entirely different from sensation, and its accompaniments, passion and desire. Here I shall have to introduce, as I said, some links of speculation which are not to be found in any extant record of the Socratic doctrines; but I believe that I shall deviate in no respect from the spirit of the Socratic procedure, and that I shall advance nothing which has not a basis and warrant in the principles of the philosopher himself.

7. To determine whether thought is natural or acquired, is primary or derivative, we must of course ascertain first of all what thought *is*, what it is *in itself*, and as distinguished from everything else. This can only be effected by self-reflection, by rigorous self-examination. Hence the maxim which Socrates assumed as the very watchword of his system, as the very condition on which alone any phil-

osophy is possible, *γνῶθι σεαυτόν*, know thyself. That is very easily said, and to some extent, and in a superficial way, it is perhaps very easily done. But to do it really and effectually, to know ourselves truly, to get to the bottom of what we are as thinking beings; to know what thought is in itself, and as distinguished from sensation, to perceive that it is our very essence, and to make others perceive this also; this is indeed no easy matter, but, on the contrary, the hardest task in which a philosopher can be engaged. This precept, *γνῶθι σεαυτόν*, has usually been employed as the text or motto of an empty and commonplace morality. Know thyself, and thou shalt know how frail and fallible thou art. Thus interpreted, the maxim loses much of its vitality and significance: it becomes irrelevant, and indeed misleading: it turns the footsteps of inquirers off into a wrong path. For the proper question is not, What is the strength or the weakness, the extent or the limitations, of man's capacities? That is a subordinate question. The true question is, What is the *nature* of these capacities? what is thought itself? Tell us afterwards what you please about its weakness or its limitations; but tell us first of all what it is in itself. When we say, then, that *γνῶθι σεαυτόν* is the first injunction of philosophy, we are not to understand this precept as having any reference to the *quantity*, that is, to the strength or the weakness, the power or the impotence, of our capacities, but only to their *quality*, that is, to their nature and essence.

This is by far the more profound and important of the two inquiries, although the maxim which inculcates it has been usually assumed by moral declaimers as a text from which they might expatiate on the other theme—the weakness, namely, and the fallibility of man.

8. We have, then, studiously to examine ourselves, with the view of ascertaining what thought is, and how it is distinguished from sensation. It is a common saying, both in ordinary discourse and in metaphysical disquisition, that thought is *free* and *active*, that sensation is *necessitated* and *passive;* in other words, that our mental freedom and activity consist in thought, while our mental receptivity or passivity consists in sensation. The mind is free and active when it thinks: it is compelled and passive when it feels. This statement is perfectly correct and true, but it does not carry us far. These words "free and active" throw no light whatever on the nature of thought, until *after* we have discovered what thought is; and then, but not till then, do we see that they are proper epithets to apply to it. To ascertain, then, what thought is, we are thrown entirely upon our own reflection. I must confess that I have found in books very little help towards clearing up the mystery. Books, indeed, lend us only the feeblest assistance. They tell us, as I have said, that thought is free and active; but there they leave us, to find out the meaning of these words for

ourselves. To find out this meaning, to ascertain what that is to which these epithets apply, we are thrown on our own resources, on our own meditations; and to these accordingly I now propose to have recourse.

9. Suppose that I am pricked or scratched with a pin. I feel a sensation, a sensation of pain. I feel this whether I will or not. I cannot help myself. Here I am necessitated and passive. The sensation is imposed upon me, is given to me, without my having had any hand in bringing it on. Suppose, now, that, besides feeling this sensation, I think it. Now, can any of you tell me wherein the distinction here stated consists, the distinction, viz., between feeling the pain and thinking the pain? That there is some distinction is obvious. But what it precisely amounts to, or wherein it lies, is not so obvious. I know very well that you must experience great difficulty in conceiving what the distinction can be between feeling a sensation—the pain, for example, occasioned by the prick of a pin—and thinking that sensation. The two, the feeling and the thought of it, are so inseparably blended, that it seems as if no analysis could divide them. The sensation of the pain seems so closely incorporated with the thought of the pain, the sensation, at least, seems to bring the thought along with it so instantaneously as its necessary sequent or adjunct, that the two seem to be not two, but only one. Hence philosophers, while they

have admitted some sort of distinction between the two, have at the same time treated the distinction as if it were no distinction at all. In their hands it has evaporated in mere empty phrases, and none of them, so far as I know, has ever told us distinctly what sensation is as distinguished from thought, or what thought is as distinguished from sensation. I can assure you, however, that the difference between them is most extreme and momentous. It is so extreme as to justify and bear out the doctrine that man is absolutely distinguished from the lower animals by the power of thought, that thinking is, in fact, his differentia—a doctrine frequently proclaimed, although even the philosophers who have proclaimed it most zealously have never themselves been able, so far as I know, to explain distinctly wherein the distinction consists, or to tell us precisely what thought is as distinguished from sensation.

10. This distinction I shall now attempt to explicate, tracing out what seem to me to be the lines, although they are very faint, of the Socratic design. But, as preparatory to my explication of the nature of thought, let me first try to explain what sensation precisely is. The nature of thought will be better understood when contrasted with the nature of sensation. *First*, then, of sensation. Each sensation, whatever it may be, is that sensation, and not more than that sensation. It is precisely *it*, and nothing less than it, nothing more than it. For example,

the pain I feel from the prick or scratch of the pin is that particular pain only. It is not another case of pain either similar to or different from the pain which I am actually feeling. No, it is that pain alone, and nothing but that pain. Reflect carefully on this matter; examine your own sensations, and I think you will be convinced of the truth of what I say. When you feel a pain or a pleasure you do not feel *any* pain or *any* pleasure; but only *that* pain or *that* pleasure which occupies you at the time. You do not even feel *any* pain or *any* pleasure of some particular kind, but only that single pain or that single pleasure. Again: when you feel the prick or scratch of a pin, you do not feel it as *my* pain or as any other person's pain, but only as your own pain. Further, you do not feel it as taking place to-morrow or yesterday; but only as taking place in the present time. Further still, you do not feel it as taking place in Edinburgh or in London, but only as taking place in St Andrews, and only in one spot in St Andrews, namely, in that particular part of your own body which is impinged upon. It is the character, then, of each sensation to be precisely the sensation which it is. When we feel merely, we are limited, strictly and literally limited, to the single feeling which engages us, to the single time and to the single place in which the feeling occurs. Feeling or sensation is, in the strictest sense of the word, a *singular*. That is its characteristic, and this we must suppose to be the condition in which the lower animals are placed.

They are limited to sensations, and each sensation being only and exactly what it is, in other words, being what we call an absolute singular, the lower animals never rise above singulars. They are, in truth, a mere series of sensations, which *we* suppose to be united in their persons, but which they (the animals) do not suppose to be either united or disunited, because such a supposition would imply the presence of a power very different from sensation, a power of reducing these different impressions to the unity of one consciousness, which power the animals have not, and of which I am now about to speak.

11. Let us now, in the second place, consider what the nature of thought is. *Secondly*, then, of thought. The characteristic of thought is exactly the reverse of that which I have described to you as the characteristic of sensation. Thought is contradistinguished from sensation in this, that the thought of a particular thing is never the thought of that particular thing only, but is always the thought of something else as well, of something more than that particular thing. So that we may say with truth, although the expression is somewhat paradoxical, that each thought is never exactly what it is. It is never exactly and literally and exclusively what it is, in the same way as each sensation is always exactly and literally and exclusively what it is. Perhaps it would be more correct to say that the object of each thought is never

that object exclusively; and thus that a sensation, when it is the object of thought, is never that sensation only, but that what is thought of is always that sensation, and something more. In explanation of this, let us revert to our former illustration. You should now be able to tell me what takes place in your minds when you feel the pain occasioned by the prick of the pin, and what takes place in your minds when you think of that pain. You should now be able to distinguish between thought and sensation. Consider the matter, and you will find that the distinction is this: When you feel the pain, you feel that pain merely, that particular pain, and no other; but when you think that pain, you do not think that pain merely, you think other pains as well; that is, you think *any* pain of that kind, and even, to some extent, other pain not exactly of that kind. The present pain is merely apprehended as a sample of what may occur again. It is thought of as an instance of pain, which, of course, implies the thought of something more than it. That is undoubtedly the process which your mind performs in thinking, and unless it goes through that process it does not think the pain at all; you merely continue to feel it, but you cannot be said to think it. In thinking the pain, then, your mind travels out of and beyond the particular pain which you are feeling. Your sensation never travels beyond that pain. For instance in thinking the pain, you think it, or may think it as affecting me or anybody else; but you do not an

cannot, *feel* it as affecting me or any one except yourself. In thinking it you can think it as the pain of yesterday or to-morrow; but you do not, cannot, feel it except as the pain of the present time. Again, in thinking, you can think it as pain in Edinburgh or in London; but you cannot feel it except in the place where it is, namely, in your own organism. I have said that in thinking the pain you *can* think other cases of the same or similar pains. I now say that you not only can, but you must, do this if you really think the pain. The very essence of thinking consists in having more before the mind than the case more ostensibly present to it. The instant you think the pain, you do, and must, in that act, think other cases (potential cases they may be) of the same. Thought cannot, by any possibility, be held fast to one singular instance of a thing, whether that thing be a pain, a pleasure, a material object, or anything else. If it were or could be so bound, it would not be thought, but feeling. When you look at a chair, so long as you have merely a sensation of it, your sensation is a sensation of that particular chair, and of nothing else. Such a state of mind is scarcely conceivable; but we may conceive it to be the predicament in which our domestic animals are placed when they contemplate our household furniture. Such a state of the *human* mind, I say, is hardly conceivable, because in looking at a chair we instantly think it. But in thinking it what do we do? We think not only it, but much besides. We think it as one of

a number of chairs, either actual or possible chairs, it does not matter which. It is a specimen of what may be before the mind again, and again, and again; and not only that—those things of which the present chair is a type or instance, and which I have denoted by the words again, and again, and again — these things are, in some sort, actually present to the mind along with the chair which is before it, although it is very difficult to say in what way they are present to it. This at any rate is certain, that to regard the chair as a type of other chairs, to view it as one of a class, as a specimen of which more examples are possible, this is to think it. This is what the mind does, and must do, in thinking anything, whether its object be a material thing or a sensation of pleasure or pain, or anything else whatsoever. The mind is always occupied with more than that particular thing, and in this respect thinking is diametrically different from feeling, which is never occupied with more than the particular sensation present. To think is to have the mind occupied with a thing and a class.

12. We are very apt in ordinary discourse to use the words thought and feeling as synonymous, and thus to confound the processes which each respectively expresses. For example, a man says, I feel a pain to-day similar to one which I felt yesterday; and in speaking thus he seems to himself to feel a resemblance between the two pains. But in that supposition he is completely mistaken. It is impos-

sible for him to feel this resemblance, he can only think it; and in thinking it he must have viewed the pain of yesterday as one of a number of possible cases of pain; that is to say, he must have taken into account something over and above the mere pain itself, and in thinking it (viz., the resemblance) he must also have viewed the pain of to-day as a case of which other instances were possible, and of which another instance had occurred yesterday; that is to say, he must have actually taken into account something over and above the mere present pain itself. It is thus not the mere feeling of the two pains which enables him to make the comparison, and to pronounce that they resemble each other, for in neither case is it possible for the mere feeling to indicate anything beyond itself. It is the thought of each sensation, that is, it is the thought of each sensation, and of something more than each sensation, which enables the man to make the comparison, and to pronounce on the similarity of the pains.

13. The preceding remarks, gathered up into short statement, will amount to this. In answer to the question, What is sensation? I answer, A sensation is always particular; it is not possible for a sensation to be more than a particular sensation; and if we suppose sensation to have an object, it is always a sensation of a particular object, and of this merely. In answer to the question, What is thought? I answer, A thought is never particular; it is not possible

for thought to be merely particular. A thought is never the thought merely of a particular object, but is always the thought of something more than this. The question, you will remember, with which we are at present engaged, is this: What is thought? what is it in itself? The answer is as I have given it to you. Thought is always the thought of something more than that, whatever it may be, which ostensibly occupies the mind. And further, the true and exact distinction between sensation and thought I conceive to be this. In feeling a sensation, what is really and truly felt is always that sensation merely, and is nothing more than that sensation. In thinking a sensation (or anything else, but at present I limit the statement to sensation), what is really and truly thought is never that sensation merely, but is always something more than that sensation. Such, in the briefest and clearest expression which I can give to it, is what I hold to be the fact in regard to the difference between sensation and thought.

4. I have said that in thinking the mind is always occupied with *something more* than that which is apparently and obviously before it. For example, in thinking a present sensation (keep, if you choose, to the pain occasioned by the scratch of a pin), in thinking this present sensation, the mind always thinks, and must think, something more than this sensation. Unless it does this, it does not think the sensation, it merely feels it. I conceive, then,

that after careful reflection—and to understand what I am saying, you must reflect carefully on the operation of your own minds—after careful reflection you will be ready to concede that in thinking, the mind is, in point of fact, always really occupied with something more than that which is obtrusively and manifestly before it. Such you will admit to be the fact. But you will naturally raise the question, What is that "something more" by which we allege that the mind is possessed in all cases in which it thinks? What precisely is this "something more" which, we say, characterises all thought, this something which is always present to thought, over and above the object obviously thought of? What is it precisely? Now, gentlemen, that question is not so easily answered as it is asked. It is indeed the question which has tasked to the uttermost the powers of all great philosophers from Socrates, and more particularly from Plato, downwards. Plato elaborated and propounded his theory of ideas as a solution of th question. We shall consider this theory more pa cularly hereafter. Meanwhile, without troubling selves with that or any other theory or solutio the question, what I wish you at present to ha clear and vital apprehension of is, *the fact* which su theories are designed to explain. Are you satisfi that in thinking a thing, the scratch of a pin, or book, or a walking-stick, a tree or a stone, you alwa think *something more* than that particular thing Are you satisfied or not that this is the fact? If you

are not satisfied that this is the fact, then, any attempt to explain what this something more is, would of course be thrown away; for you do not admit there is anything more to your thought than the object manifestly before you. But if you are satisfied that this *is* the fact, then, although you may be altogether in the dark as to *what* this something more is, still, you now know what the fact is, in the clearing up of which every generation of philosophers has been sedulously occupied from the days of Socrates until now. And such knowledge, knowledge of fact, whether we can explain it or not, this is, I conceive, no inconsiderable acquisition; for before we can understand, or even approach, the solution of any problem, we must know what the fact is in which that problem has originated. This you now know; you now know what *the fact* is, that in all thinking there is "something more" than the thing directly thought, nd that this fact has given rise to the problem, What that "something more"? and that the Platonic ry of ideas, and all the modifications which that ry has undergone, are so many attempts to com- a solution of that question.

15. Without going at present at all deep into the cussion as to what this "something more" is, this mething over and above the particular which is volved in all thought, I may just remark that this something more" has been designated by the names of class, genus, general conception or concept, or uni-

versals, terms with which your logical studies must have rendered you more or less familiar. Now, these terms, according to the meaning which we attach to them, are either very misleading, or they throw much light on the subject, viz., the nature of thought, which we are at present considering. These expressions, as usually understood, are held to express merely one of the modes in which thought manifests itself, its other mode of manifestation being its apprehension of particular things or singulars. Having apprehended these, in the first instance, thought is then supposed to fabricate classes or general conceptions, or universals, by means of abstraction and generalisation, that is, by separating the qualities which things have in common from the peculiar or differential qualities which they have, and by giving names to these common qualities, which names (names such as man, animal, and so forth) are significant of the classes to which the things belong. That doctrine I regard as exceedingly misleading. It is the doctrine taught in all our logics and psychologies. But I regard it, nevertheless, as erroneous in the extreme; erroneous for this reason, that it deceives us as to what thought is in itself, blinds us as to its true nature.

16. It seems to me that thought begins absolutely with classes, general conceptions, or universals, and that it cannot begin otherwise. Thinking is, in its very essence, the apprehension of something more

than the particular; and, therefore, to represent it as dealing, in the first instance, with the particular merely, is to represent it as being what it is not its nature to be. To think is precisely not to think of any singular thing exclusively, but to think it as an instance of what may be again, and again, and again. Every thought transcends the particular object thought of; and that transcendence is not one mode in which thought operates, it is the only mode; it is thought itself in its very essence. To take our former illustration. When I feel the prick of the pin, I either do not think it at all, or, if I think it, I do not think *it only*, I think as one of other possible cases of the same. I think as one of a class, I think it under something wider than itself, under a class, a conception, a universal. I do this, I say at once, in the very first act and first instant of thought. I do not think first of the pain as an absolute singular, and then place it under a class by thinking of what it has in common with other pains. That is not what I do, although this is usually said to be what I do. I am convinced that thought *begins* by regarding the pain as one of a class; *begins* by thinking something more than the particular pain itself, and that that something more is a class, a genus, a conception, a universal, or, in the language of Plato, an idea.

17. The main points contained in our discussion from p. 197 and onwards, may be recapitulated as follows:—1st, According to the psychology of the

Sophists, man is by nature a mere sensational creature. 2d, Out of such a psychology arises a code of natural ethics which is at variance with the conventional ethics of society; hence arose perplexity of mind, if not licentiousness in conduct, and practical embroilment in the affairs of life. 3d, Socrates maintained, in opposition to the Sophists, and as the groundwork of his argument against them, that man is not a mere sensational creature by nature, that he is more than this, that by nature he has thought as well as sensation. 4th, This may be redargued on the part of the Sophists by the assertion that thought (if it be not ultimately resolvable into sensation, which they generally held it to be; but if it be not that,) is at any rate not original, but acquired; is not due to nature, but is due to our contact with society. 5th, This, then, is the question to be discussed, Is thought original or is it derivative, is it a primary or is it a secondary formation? 6th, To settle this question we must first settle what thought is in *itself*, and what it is as distinguished from sensation. 7th, We have settled that thought differs from sensation in this, that sensation is always occupied with the particular only, while thought, on the contrary, is always occupied with "something more" than the particular is always occupied with the universal. 8th, Now then, we have settled the question as to what thought *is in itself*. Thought is, in its very essence, the apprehension, not of the particular or singular, but of something more than this. 9th, What this "some-

thing more" is has been a subject of interminable inquiry and discussion among philosophers. Whatever this "something more" may be explained to be, one important point is gained in our being made conscious *of the fact*, that in thought there always is and must be something more than the particular thing which obtrusively occupies the mind. The fact is the main thing; how it is to be explained, and what terms are to be used in the explanation, this is of less consequence. 10th, The terms employed to express and to explain this "something more" are the words class, genus, general conception, universal, idea. 11th, These terms, according as they are understood, denote a right theory of thought or a wrong one. If these words be understood to mean that thought begins absolutely with classes, genus, general conceptions, or universals, in other words, that thought begins absolutely with "something more" than the particular thing before us, they express a right theory of thought. If, on the other hand, these words be understood to mean that thought begins with singulars, and passes on to the fabrication of classes, genus, general conceptions, or universals, in that case they imply a wrong theory of thought; and although it is useful to know how logic explains the origin of these classes or genera, or general conceptions, and although we may admit that there is some ingenuity, and even some degree of truth, in the explanation, and that there may be cases in which conceptions are formed by abstraction and

generalisation, as our common books on logic teach, still we must be on our guard against accepting this logical explanation of conceptions as a true theory of what thought is in its absolute nature. The other doctrine, which holds that thought does not construct universals out of singulars, conceptions out of particulars, but begins absolutely and at once with universals or general conceptions, this, I conceive, is by far the truer doctrine of the two; although, on account of its profundity, it is more difficult to drag it into light, and present it in an intelligible form. This may be said to be the ancient or Platonic doctrine in regard to the nature of thought; the other doctrine is more modern.

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18. In the present Lectures I am engaged, as you are aware, in expounding the drift of the Socratic speculations; and consequently I must, of course, be of opinion that the explanation I have given you as to the nature of thought is virtually one of the Socratic doctrines. Here, however, you may ask what ground I have for this opinion. What warrant have I for attributing to Socrates the doctrine in regard to thought which I have laid before you? I answer that I have no very direct warrant for this, but that I find in the Platonic doctrine of ideas sufficient data to bear me out. The Platonic doctrine of ideas has its origin, I conceive, in the opinion that thought is of the nature which I have endeavoured to ex-

pound. But if Plato entertained this opinion in regard to thought, it is in the highest degree probable that Socrates did the same; for the philosophy of Plato is founded, for the most part, on principles laid down by Socrates, and is, in fact, little more than a development of these principles. My warrant, therefore, for holding that Socrates entertained the opinion in question is the undoubted fact that Plato, his immediate disciple and follower, entertained that opinion.

19. In entering on a further stage of our inquiry, I may remind you that the point towards which we are tending, the conclusion at which we are aiming, is this, that thought is quite distinct from sensation, is man's by nature, is original and primary, not secondary and derivative. It was either by resolving thought into sensation, or it was by representing it as conventional and acquired, that the Sophists had been enabled to throw into confusion both the theory and the practice of morals. In order to confute them, it was therefore necessary, above all things, to show that thought was not resolvable into sensation, but was altogether distinct therefrom, and also to show that it was original to man, and not due merely to the influences of society. To establish these two points was, I conceive, the special aim of the Socratic inquiry, which I now proceed to carry forward. We have now, then, to consider how far the conclusion which we have reached as to the nature of thought will assist us to the further conclusion which we

wish to reach as to the originality of thought. This further conclusion cannot be reached at once. We must reach it through an intermediate conclusion, through the conclusion, namely, that thought is free. This, then, is our proximate aim. Out of the data which we have reached as to the nature of thought I shall endeavour to prove to you that thought is necessarily free.

20. Facts are, in general, more intelligible than speculations, and also, in general, more satisfactory. I shall therefore endeavour to show you what the facts are in virtue of which I pronounce thought to be free. These facts will show you what we mean by saying that thought is free. We have seen that when a man feels a sensation, and that when, moreover, he *thinks* this sensation, he thinks not only *it*, but something more than it. He thinks it as one of which there are or may be other instances. He thinks it as one of a class of sensations. He places it under a general notion, under a category or universal. He does this as a matter of fact. Now, what is implied in this fact? In that fact there is implied this further fact, that the man's thought frees or disengages itself from the particular sensation which is felt, and takes into account other sensations as well. It thinks the present impression as an instance which may occur again, as an example, a specimen, a type which may be repeated; and thinking it as such, it of course thinks virtually of other

cases. But in thinking other cases, it necessarily travels out of and beyond the particular case before it. But in travelling beyond this particular case, it of course frees itself from it. Thought is not tied down to this or to any particular case; if it were, there would be no thought, there would be mere sensation. What is meant, then, by our saying that thought is *free* is simply this: we thereby express the fact that thought is not restricted and bound down to the particular sensation felt, but *frees* itself from it in the very act of taking into account something more, that is to say, other impressions which are not felt, but which are virtually thought of, in addition to the one which actually engages the mind. The two facts, then, in virtue of which we pronounce thought to be free, are, *first*, the fact that thought always travels beyond the particular sensation or impression which engages it, and takes in something more; and, *second*, the fact that, in doing so, thought is necessarily free, that is to say, it frees itself from the particular sensation or impression referred to, it is not engaged by it exclusively.

21. It is of the utmost consequence that you should verify in your own consciousness the truths in regard to thought and sensation which I have laid before you, and which I have yet to lay before you. You must practise the *γνῶθι σεαυτόν*, otherwise all that I am saying will go for nothing. There is one thing, however, which I must impress upon you

by way of caution; you must not expect to be able to verify the fact of sensation and the fact of thought apart from each other; you must not expect to be able to study the phenomenon of sensation by itself and prescinded from all thought. That is impossible: because, in the very act of studying the sensation, you must think it; so that it is impossible to lay hold of it by itself. The two cannot be separated in such a way as may enable you to report upon sensation without taking thought into account as well. But still, although the two must be taken together, this need not prevent us from obtaining a distinct conception of each, or from perceiving that the one element is quite different from the other, that each is, indeed, the opposite of the other.

22. Having thus put you on your guard against encouraging an expectation which cannot possibly be fulfilled, I go on to stimulate your own reflections with the view of assisting you to reach a still clearer understanding of the distinction between thought and sensation, the bondage of the latter and the liberty of the former. Let us consider the contrast between the two. When a man feels a sensation (say the scratch of a pin), the sensation never disengages itself from itself in such a way as to make the man feel other sensations. The feeling of a sensation is never the feeling of that sensation and of other sensations besides; it is the feeling of that sensation only. Hence sensation, each sensation, is

bond, not free; each of them has no range beyond itself. It is quite otherwise with the thought of a sensation. The thought of a sensation is not limited to that sensation. I mean that the very first time, and in the very first instant, in which a sensation is thought, the thought is not limited to that sensation; if it were limited to it, it would be mere sensation, not thought. It takes in something more, it has a range, it extends to other sensations as well. Thought thus disengages itself from the particular sensation, it puts a negative upon it, it in a manner denies that the sensation is it, the thought; it starts away from the sensation, and brings down upon it a universal, a conception which embraces other possible sensations as well. Instead of saying that thought disengages itself from the particular sensation, it would be more correct to say that this disengagement is itself thought. There is not, first of all, the thought of the sensation and then the disengagement of the thought from the sensation, and its extension to other instances of the same. No; the process is better described by saying that the disengagement, the disenthralment from the sensation, is itself the thought of the sensation. The two are identical. The thought does not precede the disengagement, nor does the disengagement precede the thought: but the thought is the disengagement and the disengagement is the thought. So that we may say of thought that it is a mental disengagement from every particular sensation, a mental refusal to be

limited to any particular sensation, and a liberation from the same; while we may say of this mental disengagement, refusal, and liberation, that it is no other than thought. On the other hand, sensation is no disengagement from a particular sensation, no mental refusal to be limited to a particular sensation; it is no liberation from a particular sensation, but is, on the contrary, an absolute acquiescence in the limitation and thraldom by which each sensation is characterised.

23. After what I have just said, you should have no difficulty in perceiving that thought must be active as well as free. These two words, indeed, signify the same thing. If the freedom of thought consist in its disengaging itself from the particularity of sensation, it must, of course, be active in effecting this disengagement. This disengagement is manifestly an act, and in putting forth this act the mind is in a condition quite different from its passive state when recipient of sensation. But I need not dwell on this point. I may just remark that you should now be able to attach some meaning to the words *free* and *active* when applied to thought — a more distinct meaning, perhaps, than you have been accustomed to apply to them when used in that connection.

24. We have now reached the conclusion at which we have been aiming, and which must be made out

if we would plead with effect the cause which Socrates advocated against the Sophists. That conclusion is, that thought is not only quite distinct from sensation, but that, in virtue of its freedom and self-origination, it is, moreover, a primary and indigenous product of the mind. The Sophists held that sensation, appetite, and desire, that these alone, were our primary attributes, were the only indefeasible principles of our nature. But we have seen that thought is more original and primary, if I may say so, is ours by a more indefeasible title, than sensation, appetite, or desire. Thought, in fact, is ourself, our essential self, inasmuch as it is originated by the free activity of the mind. The other endowments referred to are the mere accidents or accompaniments of ourself. Thus the tables are turned upon the Sophists. So far is it from being true that man is originally by nature a mere sensational creature, that it would be more correct to say that man in his true nature is a mere thinking creature. Thought, and not sensation, is his peculiar characteristic. Thought is his essential property. It is that which makes him what he is. It constitutes his being more truly than sensation, appetite, and desire. For these are necessitated, are forced upon him from without. But thought is free and active. It is originated by the mind itself from within, and therefore belongs to it more closely and essentially than any other endowment.

25. I have not yet spoken directly of self-con-

sciousness, but in the foregoing remarks I have given you what I conceive is the true speculative history of the rise and manifestation of that mental act. To complete my explanation of self-consciousness I have still a few observations to make, and then we shall proceed to consider what bearings the conclusions we have established have on the doctrines of the Sophists. Man alone is characterised by self-consciousness. This endowment certainly does not belong, and is not to be attributed to, the lower animals. They have feeling, sensation, appetite, passion, desire; but they certainly have no thought or consciousness of themselves, no self-consciousness, in the proper sense of that word. There is, however, an improper sense in which every sentient creature, as well as men, may be said to be self-conscious. What is that sense? By pointing out that sense we shall be better able to apprehend and explain what true self-consciousness is. When a sentient being experiences a sensation, it may be said to *feel itself*, as well as the sensation. (Observe, I do not say that it thinks itself; that is a very different matter.) But it feels itself as that which is experiencing the sensation. It shuns or endeavours to get rid of painful sensations: it courts and endeavours to procure pleasurable ones. When a cat lies by the fire or in the sun, it enjoys an agreeable warmth. We cannot doubt that it feels itself doing so. When a dog is hungry, or has got his foot hurt, we cannot doubt that he feels himself in a painful predicament. But in neither of these cases,

nor in any cases of a like kind, is any approach made to the *thought* of themselves by these animals. They have the feeling of themselves, but no conception of themselves. And if we choose to call this feeling of themselves by the name of self-consciousness, we may attribute to them self-consciousness; but if by self-consciousness we mean having a conception of themselves, we must deny that animals have any self-consciousness, for we cannot allow that they have any conception of themselves. I think that the term ought to be used in this latter acceptation only, and that although we may speak of animals having a feeling of themselves, we should never say that they have self-consciousness or a conception of themselves.

26. But perhaps you may imagine that there is no very great difference between the feeling of oneself and of one's own pains and pleasures, on the one hand, and self-consciousness, or the thought of oneself and of one's own pains and pleasures, on the other hand. The following remarks, then, may help to convince you that the difference, both in itself and in its consequences, is momentous and extreme. When an animal feels itself and its own sensations, it does not, and it cannot, feel another animal and another animal's sensations. For example, when a dog feels itself hungry or suffering from a sore foot, it does not feel the hunger of another dog or the pain in another dog's foot. It feels only its own hunger

and its own pain. It can feel only itself and its own sensations, whatever these may be, and no augmentation of these will enable it to go beyond itself: indeed, we might say the more it feels its own sensations, the more these are intensified, the more these occupy it, the less does it feel the sensations of any other animal. Hence animals have no sympathy for each other. This want of sympathy is a necessary consequence of their being tied down to the feeling of themselves and of their own sensations. Under this limitation it is impossible for them to take others into account, and the pains and pleasures which others may be experiencing. For, as I have said, one sentient being can never feel the sensations of another sentient being; and therefore, if it be limited, as animals are, to mere feeling, it must be utterly indifferent to others and to their pains and pleasures. This indifference characterises all animals, many children, and some men, in whom the sensational element is unduly preponderant. What civilisation and society would be without sympathy, it is difficult, or rather it is not difficult, to imagine. Neither society nor civilisation could exist. Such would be the consequence if people had merely the feeling of themselves and of their own sensations, appetites, and desires.

27. If we now turn to the consideration of self-consciousness, or the conception of oneself and of one's own pains and pleasures, a conception which I

supposed you might be inclined to confound with the mere feeling of oneself; if we turn to the consideration of this conception of oneself, we shall perceive how completely it is distinguished from the feeling, both in itself and in its consequences. It has been already explained to you that thought in all cases embraces something more than is directly and obtrusively thought of; that it extends beyond the particular to the universal; that when a sensation is felt and thought of, other sensations are thought of as well. In the same way the thought of me extends to other *mes*. When I have the conception of myself, this conception is the conception of all *mes*, and not merely of me in particular. When I *feel* myself and my own sensations, I do not, cannot, feel another man and his sensations; but when I think myself and my own sensations, I think other men as well, virtually all other men and their sensations. I think myself and my pains and pleasures as an instance of which there are or may be myriads of other instances. Mere feeling, the mere feeling of myself and my sensations, would never enable me to do this. But thought enables me, indeed thought compels me, to do it. Thought clears the bounds of mere feeling: thought, in the very act of being what it is, necessarily overleaps the limitations of feeling. Hence thought, the thought of oneself and of one's sensation, is the ground and the condition of sympathy. Without this thought there can be no sympathy; but along with this thought, sympathy more or less

arises. Sympathy lies at the root of civilisation and of society. Hence all that is good in man's condition is founded ultimately on the power of thought, in that act in which the mind disengages itself from its own particular self, and from its own particular sensations, appetites, and desires, and takes into account other people and the interests of other people as well. Society, with all its beneficial institutions, thus arose out of thought, out of self-consciousness, out of the conception of oneself; whereas the mere feeling of self would for ever prevent society from being established among men, would for ever envelop the world in the darkness of barbarism, and keep away the dawn of civilisation.

28. The whole social edifice rests ultimately upon the freedom of thought, and arises out of it. *First*, there is freedom, that original and uncaused act by which the mind thinks itself, its own sensations, appetites, and desires, and in doing so frees or disengages itself from them; or, stated with equal truth in the converse way, that original and uncaused act by which the mind disengages itself from itself, from its own sensations, appetites, and desires, and in doing so thinks them: for, as I formerly said, the disengagement and the thought, the freedom and the conception, are identical; and we cannot say which comes first and which second; they are simultaneous in their operation. *Secondly*, there is self-consciousness, the consciousness or conception of one-

self and of one's own sensations. But inasmuch as all thought is a disengagement from that, whatever it may be, which more obtrusively occupies the mind, and is thus a getting beyond and away from the particular, so, in the conception of self, I am not tied down to my own individual self: my conception extends beyond this, it embraces, in fact, the whole human race. It is not possible for me to think myself merely. In thinking myself, I think all other selves. Note here the very marked antithesis between feeling and thought. In feeling myself, I must feel only my particular self, and I cannot possibly feel others as well. In thinking myself, I cannot think only my particular self; I must of necessity think others as well. *Thirdly*, there is sympathy. This arises out of self-consciousness. The conception of myself being the conception of other selves as well as of me, not only enables, but compels me to take some interest, more or less, in them as well as in myself. Thus sympathy has self-consciousness for its foundation. Self-consciousness is the condition of sympathy, and not only that; wherever self-consciousness is manifested, there some degree of sympathy must be put forth. In virtue of self-consciousness, sympathy is not only possible, it is also actual and imperative. *Fourthly*, there is society. This arises out of sympathy. Without a fellow-feeling, mutual goodwill, and a community of sentiment, society could not subsist for a day, social intercourse would be impossible; so that freedom of

thought is ultimately, and at bottom, the lever which raises man up into the position in which we now find him existing. It is the root out of which spring all the blessings of civilisation. Take this away, and it would resolve human society into a commonwealth, or, I should rather say, an anarchy, of kangaroos or ourang-outangs.

29. The doctrine which I have just propounded in regard to the relation between self-consciousness and sympathy may enable us to modify Adam Smith's theory of moral sentiments, which has been already under our review; and to render that theory, if not impregnable, at any rate more complete than it now is. Adam Smith, as you are aware, explains our moral sentiments by means of the principle of sympathy. Our faculty of moral estimation, our power of passing moral judgments either on ourselves or on others, is resolved by him into our power of sympathy, and is indeed nothing but the operation of this principle. But in working out this system Adam Smith seems to have thought that sympathy is a native and original affection of the human heart, just as hunger and thirst are natural affections of the human organism. He seems to have thought that people felt sympathy for others just as naturally as they felt their own pleasures and their own pains. This opinion I regard as incorrect. I hold that we have originally, or in the first instance, no sympathies with other people in the way in which we have origi-

nally, and from the very first, a sense of our own weal or woe. I conceive that we become sympathetic only after the idea of self has been called forth, and this is an idea which does not show itself in our very early years. But until it does declare itself, our sympathy has no existence. In proof of this you have only to observe how little sympathy very young children have in the sufferings or enjoyments of each other. In them the idea of self is either not developed at all, or it is but feebly developed; the mere feeling of self is predominant or all-absorbing, and hence they are wrapped up in their own sensational and emotional world, and take little or no interest in the happiness or misery of their companions. But gradually as this idea unfolds itself, the emotion of sympathy begins to dawn. In the light of this conception they see that others are just themselves over again; and, taking an interest in themselves, they come to take an interest also in all those whom the idea reveals to them as fashioned after the same model with themselves. The idea of self is no exclusive or egotistic principle; the feeling of self is egotistic and exclusive; but the idea of self is universal and comprehensive. It is the true equaliser of the human race. It is the principle which enables us to understand and, so far as the mere individual feeling will permit, to act according to the Divine precept of doing to others as we would that they should do unto us. Thus self-consciousness, as was formerly explained to you, is essential to the existence of sym-

pathy, and sympathy is thus a passion which, unlike our more elementary appetites and desires, has its roots in thought, and is brought about through the intermediation of an idea. This circumstance has, I think, been overlooked by Adam Smith.

30. If Adam Smith erred in regarding sympathy as an affection of as original and elementary a character as our appetites and some of our desires, Hobbes erred, on the other side, in regarding it as forming no part of man's original nature at all, but as a secondary and derivative formation springing out of fear, which made men combine into societies for mutual aid and protection against other societies which might be disposed to do them harm. Hobbes denies that man has by nature any sympathy with his fellows. He holds that all our original passions and instincts are unsocial, or, indeed, antisocial; and in entertaining this opinion, Hobbes, I think, is so far right. He is right thus far, that prior to the dawn of self-consciousness, all our principles of action, our appetites, affections, and desires, are unsocial; they aim merely at the attainment of our own personal pleasure, and at the avoidance of our own personal pain. But after the dawn of self-consciousness, the social affections are developed, sympathy comes into existence, and this sympathy is as truly a part of our nature as any of our other affections are; the only difference between it and those which are more primitive being this, that it (sympathy, namely) exists only after

self-consciousness has declared itself, whereas the others exist before that idea has been called forth. And hence Hobbes, although, as I said, to some extent right, is also so far wrong, inasmuch as he scarcely seems to admit that sympathy is in any sense natural to the human heart, or a natural attribute of man. He is, however, right in his opinion that sympathy is not *so* original, *so* natural to man, or at least so immediately manifested, as those appetites and desires which show themselves in the earliest period of his existence, and spring up without the intermediation of thought, or of any idea being required for the manifestation.

31. But these latter remarks are somewhat digressive. I return to the subject with which we are more properly engaged. You should now perceive how directly the results which we have reached strike at the root of Sophistical argumentation. Socrates meets the Sophists on their own grounds, and foils them with their own weapons. Assenting to their leading principle, he may be supposed to address himself to them thus, "Whatever is natural, you say, is more authoritative than anything which is conventional; νόμος must always give way to φύσις. I grant it; but what is φύσις? What is man's nature? *You* say it is sensation; and if that be true, all your deductions follow in a sequence, the logic of which, I admit, is irresistible. But that is not true. It is not true that man is merely a sensational being; he is, moreover,

a thinking being, and thought is more properly the man himself than sensation. This is his φύσις, and this φύσις, I admit, is more authoritative than any νόμος, than any convention or agreement among men. But what does this nature enjoin? What are the ethics of nature now when thought is taken into account as forming the principal part of man's nature? They must be very different from the ethics evolved out of a psychology which either takes no notice of thought, or resolves it into a mere form or product of sensation. They must enjoin something very different from what is enjoined by the code of Sophistical or sensational morality, and they do enjoin something very different. The ethics of sensation say, Follow out your sensations, gratify them to the full, and at all hazards please your appetites and your desires to the uttermost, for sensation and its adjuncts, appetite and desire, constitute the true nature of man. But my code of ethics (I still suppose Socrates speaking), my code of ethics say no. Thought is the true nature of man. Therefore you must follow out what thought involves and what thought prescribes, for then alone will you be obeying that φύσις which, on your own showing, is the most obligatory and authoritative of all things. But if thought be the essence of man, the essence of thought, as has been already sufficiently explained, is freedom, is a liberation from sensation, appetite, and desire. Thought is itself, as we have seen, a disengagement from these, not that man in thinking is ever without sensation of one kind or

another; but man in thinking is always free from their dominion. Self-preservation is the first of duties; but the preservation of our thinking, that is of our true, selves, can be effected only by laying a restraint on our sensations, appetites, and desires, and by refusing to be their slaves. Thus alone is that self preserved which consciousness or conception reveals to us as our true self. It exists and maintains itself only through an antagonism perpetually waged against those otherwise enslaving and monopolising forces, our sensations, passions, and desires. Our nature is, as you say, the most authoritative of all things, and we are under the most stringent obligation to obey its commands. But we obey these commands not when we yield to the dictates of sensation, appetite, and desire, but when we antagonise these forces, and hold them at bay by means of that freedom of thought which is our birthright and our essence." So far we may suppose Socrates to speak.

32. I now remark, in my own name, that the ethics of nature, as expounded by Socrates, are shown to be in harmony, for the most part at least, with the ethics of society. *Φύσις* and *νόμος* are reconciled. Society merely enforces what nature has already prescribed. Thus the contradiction between the natural man and the conventional man, on which the Sophists were wont to lay so much stress, is overcome and appeased. The social man is merely the development of what man is in himself. The citizen is

merely the perfection of the individual. The state itself is nothing but the individual in a brighter form, and in more enlarged proportions.

33. The foregoing details may perhaps have enabled you to form a tolerably adequate conception of the groundwork of the moral philosophy of Socrates, both in its polemical character as a refutation of the Sophists, and in its positive character as a body of sound and scientific ethical doctrine. I have gone into the controversy between Socrates and the Sophists at considerable length, because I conceive that in this controversy are to be found all those elements of dispute which again and again have divided the philosophical world both in ancient and in modern times. We shall see hereafter, in particular, that the controversy between Hobbes and his opponents—at the head of whom stands Butler as one of the most conspicuous, although other moralists (Cudworth, for example) had entered the lists before Butler appeared—we shall see, I say, that this controversy bears a close resemblance in some of its features to the polemic carried on two thousand years before between Socrates and the Sophists. Hobbes took up the ground of sensationalism as the basis of his philosophy very much as the Sophists had done before him, and he found no principle of pacification among men, no curb for their unruly appetites and passions, except the strong and armed hand of a supreme and irresponsible dictator. But-

ler attempted to show that principles of pacification existed in the nature of man himself in his social instincts and benevolent affections. In this attempt Butler was merely treading in the footsteps of Socrates, although with a feebler and less scientific step. Socrates had, I conceive, a deeper insight into the nature of man than Bishop Butler. Instead of regarding, as Butler did, our social and benevolent affections as original parts of our nature, in the same sense in which hunger and thirst are original parts of our nature, Socrates regarded them as brought about through the intervention of thought. So, at least, I am inclined to interpret his philosophy. He regarded these social affections as having no place in the economy of man until after his self-consciousness had been called forth; and in this opinion Socrates seems to me to be unquestionably right. Butler, however, regards the social affections as standing on the same footing with hunger and thirst, affections which certainly declare themselves prior to any manifestation of self-consciousness. So far, therefore, I am of opinion that the Athenian sage was superior to the English bishop both in speculative depth and in scientific precision. But, without insisting on that point, what I wish you to observe is, that my reason for going at such length into the moral philosophy of Socrates is because I conceive that by laying down thought, or, more strictly, the free act of self-consciousness, as the groundwork of ethics, it supplies the truest of all foundations for a

system of absolute morality, and contains the germ of all the ethical speculations, whether polemical or positive, which have been unfolded since his time.

34. I shall make no further attempt at present to reduce the philosophy of Socrates to greater precision than has been done in the foregoing exposition. I go on to call your attention to a few points connected with Socrates and his philosophy, with which you should be made acquainted before we dismiss this subject. The *first* point is, that all rational knowledge must be elicited from within the mind, and cannot be imparted to it from without. The Socratic art of education, therefore, consists rather in a skilful method by which the mind is made to evolve truth out of itself, than in a method by which truth is communicated to the mind by another person. The *second* point is the somewhat paradoxical assertion, that all virtue is knowledge and all vice ignorance. The *third* point is the assertion that no man is *voluntarily* vicious. The *fourth* point for consideration is, What, according to Socrates, is the supreme good, the chief end, of man? The *fifth* consideration is, What, in the system of Socrates, is the ground of moral obligation? The *sixth* point for consideration is, How virtue and happiness are reconciled and united in the system of Socrates. On some of these points it may be difficult, perhaps impossible, to come to any very satisfactory conclusion; but I shall do what

I can to throw light upon them, by saying a few words upon each.

35. *First.*—In several parts of the Dialogues of Plato, Socrates announces himself, with considerable humour, as a person devoted to the same calling as his mother Phænarete, who practised the obstetric art; the only difference between them being that, whereas she assisted women with her skill, he helped to deliver the minds of men of the ideas of which they were in labour. The analogy between his mother's profession and his own was referred to by Socrates in order to show that he could no more impart, and that it was no more his business to impart, truth and knowledge to the minds of his hearers, than it was her business to bear the child, and impart it to those whom she was called upon to deliver. In both cases it was their business to elicit something from within, and not to communicate anything from without. More particularly was this true in regard to the birth of intellectual knowledge; for, according to Socrates, the mind contained within it truths which external experience or communication with others might call forth, but which no external experience and no communication with others could instil or impart. The mind must originate them within itself. As an example of this kind of truth, the whole science of mathematics may be adduced. In the dialogue of Plato entitled Meno, Socrates is represented as educing from the mind of a young slave, by

means of judicious questioning, some of the more elementary truths of geometry. As a very simple illustration, I may take a geometrical axiom, and I ask a person quite unskilled in mathematics, whether, if equals be added to equals, the wholes will be equal or unequal. If he understands the question, he will at once answer that the wholes will be equal. But I did not teach him that truth; no one imparted it to him. I merely put the question to him, and he found out for himself the right answer for himself at once. It sprang up within him; and if it had not sprung up within him, he never could have received it from without. If a student of geometry were to say, My reason for assenting to the axioms is because Euclid or my teacher has assured me that they are true, and I take their word for it—if a student, I say, were to speak thus, he would show that he had no understanding of the simplest elements of geometry. But what you have to observe is, that the whole science of mathematics is truly of the character which Socrates describes. The just inference is, that the entire science is properly, even in its most complicated demonstration, called forth from within the mind, and not communicated to the mind from without. In Plato's hands this doctrine passed into the assertion that all knowledge is reminiscence; is the recollection of what the mind knows, and actually knew in some former state of existence, and still potentially knows. Such a doctrine must be limited to what may be called rational knowledge,

the knowledge of necessary truths, as distinguished from historical knowledge, which certainly cannot be elicited from the mind by any process of manipulation, however skilful. But it is only of rational knowledge, knowledge which depends altogether on thinking, that Socrates and Plato speak. In subsequent times this opinion—all rational knowledge is reminiscence—has reappeared in the doctrine of innate ideas; a doctrine which Locke was supposed at one time to have completely overthrown and extirpated, but which has so much vitality that it has shown itself again and again since his time, and flourishes even now with renovated youth and vigour. The ultimate ground of this opinion is to be found in the doctrine I formerly explained to you, the doctrine of thought as a free and self-originated act. No external power, no force brought to bear upon him *ab extra*, can make a man think; because thinking is in fact a freedom from all external compulsion, and a rejection thereof; therefore a man must think, if he thinks at all, for and from himself. He cannot be made to think at the bidding and under the compulsion of others, as he may be made to feel at the bidding and under the compulsion of others. Hence every science, the truths of which are truths of thought, must be called forth from within the mind of the learner, and cannot be impressed upon him from without.

36. The *second* point is the assertion that all virtue

is knowledge, and all vice ignorance. This apparently paradoxical assertion may perhaps be interpreted in this way: If a man only knew and kept constantly in view what his true nature was, he would aim only at that which conduced to the wellbeing of that nature; and aiming only at this, he would be unwavering in the practice of virtue, for it is by virtue alone that the wellbeing of his true nature is secured. For example, if a man knew and never lost sight of the knowledge that thought is his true nature, that freedom is the essence of thought, that thought is the antagonist of sensation, passion, and desire, that it is by thought that man is disengaged from these, the enslaving forces of his being, and established in this true personality;—if a man knew, and kept constantly in view, that such was his true nature, he would aim at the preservation and wellbeing of that nature by laying a suitable restraint on those lower impulses and propensities which at all times threaten to invade and impair it, and thus he would continue steadfast in the pursuit and practice of virtue; for virtue is nothing but a restraint laid upon the natural lusts and passions of the soul. Hence, if man's knowledge of himself was perfect, his virtue too would be perfect; and in proportion as his knowledge approaches to perfection, so too would his virtue approach to perfection. But man's knowledge of himself is, for the most part, not only imperfect, it is absolutely null. His ignorance of his true nature is such, that he mistakes for his

true nature that which is not his true nature at all. He thinks that his true nature centres in his sensations, appetites, and desires; hence he conceives that his true wellbeing will be promoted by an indulgence in these as unlimited as can be procured. Hence he falls into vicious courses. But this happens in consequence of his ignorance; of his ignorance of what constitutes his true nature, and of his consequent ignorance as to the means by which the wellbeing of that nature should be promoted. Thus, as all virtue has its origin in knowledge, in a knowledge of what our true nature is, so all vice has its origin in ignorance, in an ignorance of what the nature of ourselves really and truly is. This farther may be said: whatever man pursues, he pursues in the idea that it is good for him. When he pursues evil, therefore, he does so because he mistakes it for good; in other words, he does so in ignorance of its true nature. Had he distinctly known what this, its true nature, was, he would have avoided the evil after which he is running. More shortly stated, no man runs after evil viewed as evil, but viewed as good: he embraces evil under the disguise of good; that is to say, he embraces it unwillingly. This doctrine is in keeping with the Socratic position, that all vice is a sort of madness, and that the perfection of virtue is the perfection of sanity, or reason, or wisdom. Aristotle has objected to Socrates, that, in reducing virtue to knowledge, he has emptied our virtuous affections of that warmth and heartiness by

which they are characterised. His objection is not without force, and it shows that the Socratic doctrine is not altogether complete. So far as it goes, however—and I think it goes a long way in rendering virtue intelligible—it seems to me to be a sound and rational speculation.

37. The *third* point is, that no man is voluntarily vicious. This conclusion follows as an immediate corollary from what was said in the preceding paragraph. No man wills to do that which is adverse to his true interests. But a man may mistake his false for his true interests; hence he may enter on a course of action which is at variance with his true interests, and thus he may fall into vice. But he cannot be said to will this vice; for all the while he is willing to promote his own true interests, only, through ignorance as to what these are, he has fallen on a course of conduct which secures only his false interests and promotes only his false happiness; and this is the way of vice, and not the way of virtue. Hence it is only through ignorance of his own true interests that a man is vicious, and not because he wills to be so, for a man wills only his true interests; and if he always knew what these were, he would continue in the practice of virtue, for virtue alone can secure them.

38. The *fourth* point for consideration is, what, according to Socrates, is the supreme good, the chief

end of man? I conceive that Socrates agreed with all the ancient moralists in holding that his own happiness is the supreme good, the chief end of man. But then this happiness must be his true, and not his apparent or illusory, happiness; but man's true happiness must centre in his obedience to the law of his true Being, and not in his obedience to the dictates of his unessential Being. But the law of man's true being is freedom; freedom from the yoke of sensation, passion, and desire. Therefore man's proper happiness, his supreme good or chief end, is to be found in a due subjugation of our appetites and desires, and not in their unqualified indulgence, as is inculcated by those moralists who, not knowing themselves, do not know what the true and essential nature of man is.

39. The *fifth* point for consideration is, what, in the system of Socrates, is the ground of moral obligation? I conceive that, in the system of Socrates, the ground of man's moral obligation is to be found, where we have already found his happiness or chief end; is to be found, that is, in his true nature itself. Freedom from the dominion of his lower affections, his sensations, appetites, and desires, is the true nature of man. He is, therefore, under an obligation to maintain this nature, for self-preservation is the most indefeasible law of the universe; but he can only maintain it by keeping up that disengage-

ment from sensation, appetite, and desire which thought, his true Being, had already effected even in bringing itself into existence. In his own nature, therefore, there is a law, the law of freedom, which calls upon him to restrain his lower impulses, his greed and his injustice, when these threaten to become inordinate; and this law of freedom is no other than the law of moral obligation, and it has its ground in the true nature of man.

40. These points having been explained, it is not difficult to see how happiness and virtue, the *sixth* point under consideration, are reconciled and united in the system of Socrates. The true nature of man consists in thought, but the essence of thought is freedom; freedom, or disengagement from the bondage of his lower principles and propensities, such as sensation, appetite, and desire. Thus the law of man's true nature is freedom, freedom from thraldom of his lower propensities. But the happiness of every creature is promoted when it obeys the law of its true nature; its happiness is thwarted when it disobeys that law, therefore man's happiness is promoted when he keeps himself disengaged from the sensational affections of his nature, and does not allow them to overmaster him. But this resistance to the promptings of our passions is itself virtue. Therefore the same law, the law of freedom, which determines a man to happiness, to his true and solid

happiness, through the subjugation of his animal propensities,—this same law determines him also to virtue, for virtue is nothing but the subjugation of these same animal propensities; and thus happiness and virtue are shown to be coincident.

THE CYRENAIC, CYNIC, AND MEGARIC SCHOOLS.

1. THE impression which Socrates made on the minds of his countrymen generally, and even on men who differed widely in their genius, their character, and their sentiments, was deep and powerful; and his influence was not diminished, it was rather increased and rendered more intense and lasting, by his heroic and signally impressive, although unostentatious, death. Socrates having left behind him no written memorials, all that his friends could do would be to record and publish his opinions as they had gathered them from his own lips. And these opinions would be coloured and modified more or less by the peculiar mental constitution of each reporter; or, at any rate, each would fasten on that side of the Socratic philosophy which he understood best, and which was most in harmony with his own convictions. Accordingly, we find that some of the disciples of Socrates expounded his philosophy, in its more popular aspect, as a useful guide in the practical affairs of life; among these the most dis-

tinguished were Xenophon, who in his 'Memorabilia' has recorded the sayings and doings of Socrates in their bearings on the business of mankind, and Cebes, to whom a work is questionably attributed entitled *Πίναξ*, or the Table, which sketches, on Socratic principles, an allegorical picture of human life. Its moral is to show that virtue alone can make us truly happy, and that pleasure is a snare and a delusion, whose charm lasts only for a time. Others, again, or I should rather say one other of his immediate followers, comprehended the whole scope and design of his philosophy; and this disciple was Plato. Plato alone fathomed the depths, both moral and metaphysical, of the Socratic speculations. He has interfused them with the splendours of his own genius, and has given them to the world in a style, the eloquence of which has never been surpassed, if indeed it has ever been equalled. Plato stands out as the only adequate exponent and representative of the Socratic philosophy in all its phases. But, intermediate between Plato on the one hand, and the popular expositors just referred to on the other hand, there are presented to us three schools of Socraticists, who, being more scientific in their treatment of the philosophy than Xenophon or Cebes, are at the same time much less complete and comprehensive than Plato. These three Socratic sects are the Cyrenaic, the Cynic, and Megaric. They are frequently termed the imperfect or one-sided Socraticists.

2. How these schools arose, and how they acquired the title of imperfect Socraticists, may perhaps be understood from the following consideration: The conception of "the good" was a conception which had been largely insisted on in the philosophy of Socrates; but it was, at the same time, one which he had left indefinite and unexplained. Nowhere, and at no time, does he seem to have explained exactly what "the good" was, or what he precisely and consistently meant by that term. That Socrates regarded happiness as the good, is tolerably plain; but then it is equally plain that he regarded virtue as the good. Hence arose ambiguity, and hence arose confusion and discord among his disciples. It is no answer to the question, What is the good? to say the good is both happiness and virtue; for by the good is meant the ultimate, the supreme, or highest good; and two goods cannot, both of them, be the highest, at least their conciliation requires to be explained; in all cases the supreme can be only one. If, indeed, the identity of the two had been established in some such way as I endeavoured to establish it above (p. 265), following out what I conceive to be the drift of the Socratic speculations —if their identity had been established, then perhaps the question as to the supreme good or chief end of man might be admitted to have been sufficiently answered. It might have been said, the good is the identity or conciliation of happiness and virtue; and that answer would have been unambiguous. But this

conciliation had not been effected, or effected but obscurely and imperfectly, in the course of the Socratic disputations. Hence the question still remained unresolved, and still recurred, What is this good which is so frequently and earnestly insisted on? is it happiness or is it virtue? Which of these is the *summum bonum*, the chief end, of man? Their reduction to unity had not been clearly shown, so that the one or the other of these alternatives had to be chosen. The Cyrenaics chose the alternative which placed the good or chief end of man in happiness. The Cynics chose the alternative which placed the good or chief end of man in virtue. I believe that the Socratic philosophy contained, as I have said, a principle by which these two, happiness and virtue, were conciliated and made one; but this principle had not been fully developed; and these two sects, the Cyrenaic and the Cynic, did nothing to develop it. The one of them dwelt on happiness as the ultimate good of man, almost to the exclusion of virtue; the other dwelt on virtue as his ultimate good, making happiness altogether subordinate.

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3. The question in regard to happiness has been much debated in almost every school of moral philosophy—in those of ancient, no less than in those of modern, times. It is, indeed, the cardinal question of ethics; for although some systems endeavour to shelve this question, and to bring conscience and

virtue and duty more prominently into the foreground as the proper topics of ethical investigation, still I believe that these latter can receive an adequate and intelligible explanation only when considered in subordination to the more comprehensive discussion which has happiness for its theme. Schemes of morality may err in two ways—either by representing duty and virtue as ultimate ends, to the exclusion of happiness, or by representing happiness as the ultimate end, to the exclusion of duty and virtue. In either case we obtain a system which is incomplete, one which is neither sound in itself, nor likely to meet with any general acceptance. Pure Eudaimonism, which teaches that happiness is all in all, however acceptable it may be *practically*, is a doctrine which cannot be *theoretically* approved of; while Asceticism, which contends for the abnegation of happiness in the pursuit of duty and virtue, is a scheme which will never enlist many practical adherents, however numerous its theoretical advocates may be. The only way of avoiding the errors incident to either extreme, and of effecting a rational compromise, is by instituting an inquiry into the nature of human happiness, with the view of ascertaining the relation in which it stands towards conscience and virtue and duty; and accordingly it is to this question that we now deliberately address ourselves.

4. The inquiry concerning happiness resolves it-

self into two questions—*First, Is* happiness the chief end of man? and, *secondly, Ought* happiness to be the chief end of man? The one of these questions is a question of fact, Is the fact so? The other of them is a question of propriety, Ought the fact to be so? Although our answers to these questions may ultimately coincide, and we may find that what is, is what ought to be—in other words, that happiness both is and ought to be the chief end of man—it may still be well to keep the two questions separate at the outset, and to treat of each in succession.

5. The philosophy of the Cyrenaic school, founded by Aristippus, proceeds on the assumption that happiness is, in point of fact, the good, the supreme good, or chief end of man; and this assumption, so far from being discountenanced by the philosophy of Socrates, is involved in that philosophy as one of its most vital principles. Viewed as a matter of fact, we must admit that his own happiness, whatever it may consist in, or whatever may be the means to be employed in the attainment, is the end which each individual has most at heart, and at which he ultimately aims. This is the end after which all men most eagerly strive. Happiness is the goal which, consciously or unconsciously, we are all struggling to reach. Milton has written two epic poems in which he commemorates our fallen and our restored condition. He has written 'Paradise Lost' and 'Paradise Regained.' But the true epic of humanity—the epic

which is in a constant course of evolution from the beginning until the end of time, the epic which is daily poured forth from the heart of the whole human race, sometimes in rejoicing pæans, but oftener amid woeful lamentation, tears, and disappointed hopes—what is it but Paradise sought for?

6. Hence there has been a tendency in the minds of all men, whether rude or civilised, both in ancient and in modern times, to accept this fact as they found it; to set forth happiness as the *summum bonum*, the supreme good, the ultimate end of all human endeavour, the magnet whose power of attraction no human being could successfully resist. The general tendency of opinion, I say, has been to acknowledge the universal dominion exercised over man by the desire of happiness, and to accept this principle as his supreme rule of action, and as the basis of all ethical disquisition, whether practical or theoretical. To have denied that happiness was man's chief good and his ultimate aim, would have appeared to be flying in the face of truth, and setting nature herself at defiance.

7. But although philosophers, as well as mankind at large, have generally agreed that happiness is the greatest good, or the chief end of man, philosophers have differed as to what happiness itself is—as to what it consists in. By an easy transition, some people come to regard happiness as convertible with

self-indulgence, or as centring in mere sensual pleasure. This was the most palpable, most vivid, and most intelligible sort of happiness with which they were acquainted; while physical pain, on the other hand, was the only misery which they could readily understand: and accordingly, in the early and rude periods of society, sensational pleasures were eagerly pursued, as the only true and distinct constituents of happiness, while sensational pains were carefully avoided, as the only true and distinct constituents of misery; and these are regarded as the true elements of happiness or of misery. Of course, instances would occur, even during such times, in which individuals, and even multitudes, would encounter danger and death under the excitement of some strong passion. But I speak of man in his ordinary state, and when left to the guidance of his natural and normal inclinations. These would prompt him to court sensational pleasure, and to shun sensational pain, whenever it was in his power to do so.

8. This, accordingly, was the opinion entertained by Aristippus in regard to happiness. He viewed it as convertible with pleasure; and in this respect he differed widely from the sentiments of Socrates, who, whatever his opinion as to happiness may have been, certainly did not regard it as centring in the pleasures and enjoyments of sense. Thus Aristippus, dissenting from the opinions of his master, although he may have supposed that he was reducing these

opinions to greater clearness and precision, and conceiving happiness in its most obvious and palpable and intelligible form, in the form in which it was viewed by the vulgar, advocated a system of hedonism, as it has been called, from the Greek word ἡδονή, in which mere sensual pleasure is set forth as the great good and ultimate end of man.

9. It is evident that the sensational ethics of Aristippus had their roots in the sensational psychology, of which I have already spoken at sufficient length in expounding the opinions of the Sophists. They arose, not out of the comprehensive and profound γνῶθι σεαυτὸν of Socrates, which resulted in the discovery that the true nature and essence of man was thought, but out of the superficial and contracted γνῶθι σεαυτὸν of the Sophists, which had issued in the conclusion that sensation was the staple and the essence of humanity. If sensation be the true and proper nature of man, the pursuit of sensational enjoyment must be his true and proper duty, and in attaining sensational enjoyment he must attain his true and proper end. If sensation be man's true nature, the pleasures of sensation must be man's true good. The ethics of Aristippus are thus in perfect logical consistency with the psychology on which they were founded. The only way in which such ethics can be overruled, is by combating the psychology which is their groundwork; in other words, their refutation must be founded on the proof that

the true nature of man does not centre in sensation but in something very different; namely, in the free and self-originated activity of thought. But this part of the Socratic philosophy Aristippus had overlooked or misunderstood.

10. But although Aristippus represented pleasure as the chief end of man, we are not to suppose that he broached his system, or advocated this doctrine of hedonism, for the purpose of *exciting* man's desires, or of *stimulating* him to the pursuit of mere sensual indulgences. That, in his opinion, would have been a very unnecessary task, a work of supererogation. He must have held that man required no philosophy to urge him forward in the path along which he was already so vehemently propelled by his nature. But although man requires no stimulus to urge him forward in the pursuit of pleasure, he may require, and he does require, a monitor to direct him in the pursuit, and even at times to hold him back; and this monitor appears in the moral philosophy of Aristippus. It is true that the hedonism which he inculcates chimes in with the ordinary sentiments of mankind, in so far as it holds that sensational enjoyment is the chief end of man: it admits that, by the very law of life, pleasure is to be pursued, that pain is to be shunned; but it differs from the ordinary sentiments of mankind in this respect, that while they would impose no restraint on our pursuit of pleasure, or in our avoidance of pain, the philosophy of Aris-

tippus teaches that these are to be pursued and shunned only under certain restraints; that is, only on the terms which prudence dictates. The philosophic position of Aristippus was this: he accepted as an undeniable truth the fact that pleasure was fixed by nature as man's ultimate aim; but seeing that this end would be defeated by reckless and inordinate indulgence, it exhorted to moderation and self-restraint; exhortations which were much needed, inasmuch as nature, although she speaks to man in very distinct and decided terms when she summons him to enjoyment, delivers herself in terms by no means so articulate when she warns him to refrain.

11. The class of systems to which the hedonism of Aristippus belongs have existed during every period, the earliest as well as the latest, in the history of ethical philosophy. They are known under the names of Hedonism, or the philosophy of pleasure, from ἡδονή; of Epicureanism, or the philosophy of ease and enjoyment, from Epicurus, its founder; of Eudaimonism, or the philosophy of happiness, from εὐδαιμονία; and in modern times they pass generally under the name of Utilitarianism. All these schemes, in whatever minor respects they may differ, agree in this respect, that they accept as a fact not to be gainsaid the truth that the *summum bonum*, the supreme good for man, is his own felicity; and that this felicity is for the most part, or principally, of a sensational character. The systems thus characterised

stand, as you are aware, in no very good repute; they are usually represented as inimical to virtue, preaching maxims of immorality, as inculcating a life of enjoyment and self-indulgence; but it is truer to say of them that the scope and tendency of their exhortations rather is to impose a check on the vehemence of man's passions, to curb his appetites, and to set limits to his irregular inclinations. Even the lowest of these systems, even mere hedonism, goes as far as this; it does not inculcate the pursuit of pleasure; it assumes that that requires no teaching, having been already sufficiently taught by nature; but it holds that, in connection with this pursuit, there is something which does require to be taught, something in respect to which nature affords us no lessons; and that is, prudence and moderation in the indulgence of our appetites and desires. Indulge your appetites and inclinations, say these systems, speaking with the voice of nature; but indulge them wisely and with moderation, they add, speaking with the voice of philosophy, otherwise the very happiness which is your aim will be dashed to pieces in the moment of enjoyment. It is a mistake, therefore, to suppose that these systems are essentially of an immoral character. Their standard of morality may not be high, but it rises above the standard of mere nature. Nature's dictate is, Pursue pleasure. These systems add, But let your pursuit be guided and controlled by prudential considerations. And in so far as this advice was attended to in the primitive ages

of mankind, we may surely believe that something was thereby reclaimed to the moral world from the waste regions of rude and undisciplined nature.

12. I proceed to give you a short account of the moral philosophy of the Cynics. If it was the tendency of the Cyrenaic school to push to an extreme the doctrine that man's good or happiness consisted in his attainment of mere sensational enjoyment, so the tendency of the Cynics was to go into the opposite extreme, and to maintain that man's good or happiness consisted in his freedom from pleasures of sensation. The Cyrenaics inculcated, as man's chief good, an indulgence, in so far as prudence permitted, in sensual gratifications; the Cynics, on the other hand, inculcated, as man's chief good, an abnegation, in so far as nature allowed, of all such gratifications. These counter-opinions came out more fully afterwards in the systems of the Epicureans and the Stoics, of which I shall have occasion to speak hereafter. Meanwhile, you have to bear in mind that the precursors of these later and more celebrated sects were the Cyrenaics and the Cynics.

13. The Cynical philosophy, of which Antisthenes is regarded as the founder, contended that man's true good was virtue, and not pleasure; and that virtue consisted in a freedom from all sensational indulgences. This freedom, too, might be said to be man's true happiness. Not pleasure, but the negation and

rejection of pleasure, was the ultimate good, the chief end of man. This philosophy taught that man's wants and desires should be reduced to the smallest possible amount; that all sensational enjoyments must be as much as possible forsworn, as being of an enslaving tendency, and as at variance with the true nature of man.

14. I remark, in conclusion, that this doctrine obviously has its roots in the Socratic psychology, which I formerly endeavoured to expound to you; in the doctrine, namely, that thought, and not sensation, is that which constitutes the true nature of man; that thought, the opposite of sense, is itself an act in which man frees himself from sensation, appetite, and desire; and that, therefore, this act or thought itself testifies in its very origin what the duty of man is, what the obligation is under which he lies; testifies, namely, that he is bound to rise superior to the lower promptings of his nature, and to refuse to be the slave of the passive modifications of his soul. Such is the groundwork of the Cynical ethics. They were built upon a right foundation. They inculcated self-restraint, not on mere prudential grounds, as the Cyrenaics did, but on deeper grounds, lying in the very constitution of man himself; for they held that it was only through self-restraint, or a liberation from his sensational condition, that man was truly man. Their error lay in their pushing this doctrine to an extreme, and in preaching and prac-

tising it in a form too abstract for human nature to endure; for in a right and complete ethical system allowance must be made for the unessential as well as for the essential elements of human nature; the sensational no less than the higher and antagonist elements of his being must be taken into account. All that is necessary is that the lower principles should not be allowed to predominate: it is neither necessary nor possible that they should be altogether extirpated or suppressed. Such extirpation or suppression was what the Cynical philosophy inculcated, and therefore it erred in being abstract and extreme; and in being abstract and extreme it became partial and one-sided; in a word, it became a form of imperfect Socraticism.

15. The founder of the Megaric sect was Euclid, a philosopher whom you must not confound with the mathematician of that name. On the death of Socrates, in the year 399 B.C., Euclid retired to his birthplace, Megara, a town distant about twenty-six miles from Athens; and here he established the Megaric school of philosophy. The chief characteristic of this school was, that it set forth "the good" as the main category, the leading universal in all things. Whatever was real was good. The Megaric philosophers derived their doctrines from the Eleatics no less than from Socrates. What the Eleatics called Being, that, namely, which must be thought of in all that is thought, the Megarics called the good. Everything

is good in so far as it *is*. Evil is mere defect, want, privation. Evil is a mere negation; the good alone is positive. Whatever truly exists, or is thought of as truly existing, must exist as good, and must be thought of as good. The good, then, is the common quality, the element of agreement in all things which exist; it is the supreme category of the universe. The Megaric school was likewise famous for the logical puzzles with which it perplexed itself and its neighbours. One of these was called the Sorites, or the heap. Is one grain of corn a heap? it is asked. No. Are two grains? No. Three grains? No. And so on, until the person interrogated either says now there is a heap, in which case one grain will have made the difference between a heap and no heap, which seems to be absurd; or else he will say that no number of grains make up a heap, which seems still more absurd. Another puzzle was called Cornutus, or the horned. You have that which you have not lost, have you not? Yes. Then you have horns, for you have not lost horns.

16. In the novel of 'Don Quixote,' a Megaric puzzle, or a case which may be regarded as such, is brought under our notice. Sancho Panza, having been appointed governor of the island of Baratria, has to deal with many perplexing law cases when seated on the bench, and among others with the following: There was a bridge over a river in the neighbourhood, which a certain rich man had built for the benefit of travellers,

and close by it there stood a gallows. The condition on which people were allowed to cross the bridge was, that they should speak the truth in regard to whither they were going. If they lied, they were to be tied up to the gibbet. Now on one occasion a traveller came to the bridge, and on being asked whither he was going, he replied that he was going to be hanged on that gallows. This answer threw the toll-keepers into great perplexity. For supposing that they hanged the man, in that case he had spoken the truth, and it was their duty to have let him pass. But again, supposing that they let him pass, in that case he had told a lie, and it was their duty to have hanged him. In these perplexing circumstances they appealed to the wisdom of the governor Sancho, and he pronounced the judicious verdict, that in so doubtful and difficult a case it was better to lean to the side of mercy, and allow the traveller to go free, even at the expense of logical consistency.

17. To say a word in conclusion, and by way of summing up these three systems. I remarked at the outset that Socrates had left the conception of the good very vague and indeterminate. He had strong utilitarian, even eudaimonistic, tendencies. But it is equally true that he strove to promulgate a profounder morality than that of mere utility or eudaimonism. He wavered, however, between the two; at one time he appears as a mere utilitarian, who makes happiness all in all; at another time he incul-

cates a higher morality, the aim of which is rather the perfection than the happiness of our nature. Hence two paths of moral inquiry were opened up to his disciples. The Cyrenaics, led by Aristippus, entered on the one of these paths, and proclaimed happiness, in the sense of mere pleasure, as the *summum bonum*, or ultimate good, for man; while the Cynics led by Antisthenes, maintained that virtue, or the perfecting of his nature, was man's true end, and that this end was to be attained only by repressing his desires and curtailing his wants within the smallest possible limits. The Megarics, again, left the Socratic conception of the good in its original indetermination; or, at any rate, the only explanation of it which they suggested was, that the good in itself and true Being in itself were identical—a proposition not without value and significance, when we consider that man, in fostering his true being is promoting his true good, and that he attains to what is truly his good just in proportion as he attains to what is truly his being. So much, then, in regard to the imperfect Socraticists, the Cyrenaic, the Cynic, and the Megaric schools of philosophy.

18. Before going on with the history of philosophy, I shall introduce at this place an ethical discussion of a somewhat digressive character, attempting to explain a subject on which I touched in the preceding paragraph: I mean the obscurity in which Socrates left his conception of the good, and his vacillating

attitude in regard to the question whether is happiness or virtue the *summum bonum*, the great end, of man. No particular blame attaches to Socrates on this score, for I think it may be said with truth, that in no ethical work whatsoever is any satisfactory and conclusive answer to be found to this question, no answer which settles the problem on scientific principles. In the remarks which I have now to make, I shall perhaps be no more successful than others have been before me. I shall not indeed attempt a complete solution of the question; I shall merely indicate the direction in which I think the solution is to be found.

19. The question, then, is this: Is happiness or utility, or wellbeing of one kind or another, the great and sole end of man—the goal at which all his efforts point, and towards which they tend? or is something else, something different from happiness, the proper end and object of his pursuit? This is the question which still divides and perplexes the philosophical world, as it perplexed them in the days of Socrates. On the side of utility, as its strongest champion, stands Mr J. S. Mill; on the other side stands Dr Whewell, who contends for the right as something distinct from the useful, and who holds that a man must aim at doing *right*, however disastrous the consequences may be to himself and to the world. This, I say, is the great moral question of the day. I put aside at present the theory of the selfish moralists,

who maintain that a man's own personal happiness is what he always aims at. I enlarge the question, and take it up as the most enlightened utilitarians state it; and I ask, Is the happiness of *ourselves and others* the proper end of our exertions, or is something different from this the proper end of our exertions? That, I again say, is the question, and it divides moral philosophers into two opposite camps.

20. As preliminary to the settlement of this question, I remark that man may be viewed in two different characters—*first*, as man simply; and *secondly*, as man susceptible of pleasure and pain, enjoyment and suffering, happiness and misery. Now, I conceive that one scheme of morality will be applicable to him when viewed under the first of these relations, and that another scheme of morality will be applicable to him when under the second of these relations. First, let me explain what I mean by man considered as a man simply. By man simply I mean man as a mere being or existence, and not as a happy or miserable being. We can abstract happiness and misery from man, and yet leave him in existence as a man. But there are some qualities which we cannot abstract in thought from man, and leave him in existence *as a man;* and these qualities are thought, reason, self-consciousness. Take away these qualities, and man ceases to be man, he becomes an animal; but take away enjoyment or take away suffering from a man, and he does not cease

to be a man; he does not become an animal. Man, then, considered as *man simply,* is man endowed with thought, reason, self-consciousness. These cannot be disunited, for these are his very essence. Such is the character and constitution of man, considered as man simply. *Secondly,* of man considered as susceptible of pleasure and of pain. This point requires no explanation. Pleasure and pain, I may merely say, are not essential to man, as thought and intelligence and self-consciousness are. Man can be man without them. You can readily understand that happiness and misery are something which are superinduced upon man; at least, are not so intimately his as those other qualities which have been specified—viz., thought, reason, and self-consciousness.

21. We have now to ask, What kind of moral scheme will be applicable to man, considered simply as man? The answer is, that the scheme of morals which will suit him will be such as the anti-Utilitarians contend for. Happiness cannot be his *summum bonum,* nor can misery be his *summum malum,* for, considered as man simply, he has no sense either of happiness or of misery. Something else, therefore, must be his chief good and his chief evil; something different from happiness must be what he pursues; something different from misery must be what he shuns. What must these be? They can be no other than the maintenance or the perfection of his being

on the one hand, and its impairment or imperfection on the other hand. The obligatory law, the duty which binds him, will be to do everything to maintain and strengthen his power of thought, of reason, of self-consciousness, and to avoid everything by which these may be weakened or overpowered. In short, his morality will consist in his doing all that he can to maintain and preserve and strengthen himself as a man simply—that is, as a rational and thinking being—and in his avoiding all that may imperil his rational existence. He will maintain himself as a moral being in maintaining himself as an intelligent and self-conscious being; and if we suppose, as we very well may, that virtue consists in the perfecting of our nature, the end of this being will be virtue, and there will be no happiness, none, at least, different from virtue itself, to distract him from this end. Such then, I think, is the morality applicable to man considered simply as man. It consists in the pursuit of virtue, in the perfecting of our rational nature, and not in the pursuit of happiness. Here then we have a morality which would please the anti-Utilitarians. I may add that, on such a condition, it would be a man's duty to strive not only after his own natural perfection, but to assist others in striving after theirs.

22. But this condition is only a part of our condition as human beings. Man is man simply, but he is also more than this; in his actual state, he is in

man susceptible of pleasure and pain, of happiness and the reverse. We have now to ask what is the moral scheme applicable to man in this more complicated state. A new element has been introduced into his condition; that, namely, of happiness and misery, and the moral code by which he is to be directed must be accommodated so as to suit and take into account this new element. The modification or addition which the moral code must receive will be understood if we consider the nature of happiness or pleasure, and the nature of misery or pain. The former of these has attractions almost irresistible; the latter has a power of repulsion which naturally drives us back as far as it is possible for us to recoil. Here then we have something which sets itself up as a new *summum bonum* and as a new *summum malum*, as a *summum bonum* and *summum malum* different from those which attracted and repelled man considered simply as man. Then, the proper end of man's pursuit was the perfection of his rational existence. Now, the proper end of man's pursuit seems to be, indeed I may say *is*, something different from this; it is happiness, the happiness of himself and others; in a word, his conduct is now tested by its utility, that is, by its tendency to promote or to obstruct the interests and wellbeing of himself and of mankind.

23. It now then appears as if we had two chief ends set up as the proper objects of human pursuit.

The one end comes before us when we put happiness and misery aside, and look at man simply as man. In this case the proper end of all his actions and aspirations will be to maintain and strengthen his true being; that is to say, his rational nature. The other end comes before us when we take happiness and misery into account, and view man as susceptible of these qualities. In this case, the proper end and aim of man's existence will be the attainment and the diffusion of happiness. Both should be treated and adjusted in a complete system of moral philosophy.

24. Now it may often happen that there will be no discrepancy between these two ends. We may admit that they are usually in harmony with one another, and that in attaining the one end we attain the other as well. But cases must, and do, occur in which both of these cannot be attained; cases may occur in which a man, in attaining what he conceives to be, and what indeed is, his happiness, must sacrifice the perfection of his rational being; or again, cases may occur in which a man, in maintaining the perfection of his rational being, must sacrifice what he feels to be his happiness. In these cases, which end must he cling to, and which end must he give up? I answer that he must cling to that end which consists in the preservation and perfecting of his rational nature, and must give up that end which consists in happiness or pleasure, whether that hap-

piness be his own or that of others; and I give this answer for this reason, that it is of more importance that man should be *a man,* truly a man, than that he should be a *happy* man. To be happy, we must first of all be men, and to be men we must first of all be rational. Whatever, therefore, strikes at the root of reason or thought is to be avoided, however much it may promote our happiness, for our reason is our existence. But it does not follow that whatever strikes at the root of our happiness is to be avoided, however much it may promote our rational perfection, for our happiness is not our existence. On these grounds I conceive that when the two ends come into conflict, the preference is to be given to that end which is regarded by man considered as man simply; for this end, its preservation and attainment, is his very essence and existence: and that the preference is not to be given to that end which is set in view before man considered as susceptible of happiness and misery, for in this end his essence and his existence do not centre, happiness and misery being merely accessories to human nature, and not human nature itself.

25. In the latter part of yesterday's lecture I was led into a discussion of a somewhat digressive character. It arose out of the ambiguity in which Socrates had left the conception of the good, meaning by that word the great and proper object of all human pursuit. Is happiness the chief end of man?

Is this the object which he is designed unremittingly to pursue on his own account, and to the utmost of his ability to diffuse on account of others? Or is virtue his chief end? Is the right as distinct from the useful, the just as distinct from the expedient, the object which it is his duty to strive after? Socrates does not seem to have returned any very explicit answer to this question; and hence he has not settled definitely *what* the good for man is, inasmuch as he has not declared categorically whether it is happiness or virtue. From the spirit of the Socratic teaching we may infer that he regarded virtue as the supreme good; but the scientific grounds on which he rested this conclusion are not apparent. Nor are they apparent in the writings of any subsequent moralists. Many moralists have declared that we must do what is right at all hazards, that we must act rightly irrespective of all considerations of utility. And when we ask why? why must we act rightly? the only answer we get from them is, that we must act aright because it is right to do what is right. This mode of reasoning—and I believe it is a fair representation of the reasoning of Dr Whewell and the other anti-utilitarians—is not very satisfactory. The anti-utilitarian moralists may, however, be regarded as returning an articulate answer to the question, What is *summum bonum*, the chief end of man? They declare that it is *virtue*.

26. On the other hand, the utilitarians or Eudai-

monists define the good as centring in happiness. To act aright is to act in such a way as will promote either our own happiness or the happiness of those around us, or the happiness of the world at large. Whatever conduct has this effect is right conduct; whatever conduct has a contrary effect is wrong conduct. In answer, then, to the question, Why must I do what is right? the utilitarian answer is, Because by so doing you will contribute something to the well-being of the world. It is your duty to act in a particular way, in the way which we call right, because by acting in this way you will promote the happiness of yourself and others, and will thus attain the end which all human beings are born to strive after. Here, also, we have a categorical answer to the question, What is the *summum bonum*, the chief end of man? The utilitarians declare that happiness is the good.

27. This theory of the good which makes it convertible with happiness seems to labour under a defect precisely the opposite of that which we charged against the anti-utilitarian scheme. There we were disposed to accept the conclusion, but to find fault with the premises as insufficient or null. Here we are indisposed to embrace the conclusion, although the premises seem reasonable and strong. That a particular action should redound to the advantage of myself or others seems a very sufficient reason why it should be performed. The advantage expected to arise from it seems to make the performance of it a

duty. That is an intelligible position, more so than the ground occupied by the anti-utilitarians. We feel, nevertheless, that there is something defective in the scheme which sets aside virtue as the good, and enthrones happiness in its place. So far as we can see, there is a flaw somewhere in the system of the utilitarians, and also in the system of their opponents. We are not willing to throw virtue overboard, and join the utilitarians in setting up happiness alone as the supreme good for man; nor are we willing to join their opponents in throwing happiness overboard, and in setting up virtue alone as the ultimate object of his pursuit. We must try whether we cannot fall on some method by which the two, virtue and happiness, may be conciliated, conciliated on scientific grounds.

28. It was as a step towards this conciliation that I drew your attention, in my last lecture, to a distinction which may be of service to us in our attempt to adjust and to resolve this difficult moral question as to the supreme good: I mean the distinction between man considered as man simply, and man considered as susceptible of happiness and of misery. I stated what was meant by man simply, and what his qualities were, and also what man was in his more complex condition as the subject of happiness or the reverse. I stated that a different system of morals would apply to him in the simple state from what would apply to him in the complex state; in

other words, that the good or ultimate end would be different in the case of man simply, from what it would be in the case of man as capable of happiness and of misery. In the former case, it would be the preserving and the perfecting of his rational nature; in the latter case, the end would, to a large extent, be happiness or pleasure—that is, something less intimately connected with himself than the perfection of his intelligent nature. I also stated, that these two ends might frequently coincide, in which case no collision would arise; but they also might come into conflict, and when this happened, I stated that the end called happiness must be sacrificed in favour of the other end, which we may very well call virtue. I also gave you my reason for this conclusion, and it is one which, though then briefly stated, appears to me to be more scientific, logical, or reasonable than any which I have yet fallen in with. Stated again, very shortly and simply, the reason why we should sacrifice our happiness to our virtue is this, that in sacrificing happiness to virtue we do not cease to be men, we only cease to be *happy* men; but in sacrificing virtue to happiness, we do cease to be men, because virtue is the preservation and perfecting of our rational nature, and therefore whatever is at variance with virtue is at variance with the preservation of our true being, and is *pro tanto* a curtailment or destruction of our moral and intelligent life.

29. Let me illustrate this subject somewhat further.

Suppose that a man had no pleasure in eating, but that the food he took merely served to keep him in health and strength, without ministering any further than this to his enjoyment. His palate, we suppose, has no sense of taste. His food keeps him alive and in vigour, and that is all. He has no relish, neither has he any repugnance, to any kind of food: all is equally indifferent. Now, in so far as eating is concerned, what would this person's end or object or supreme good be? It would be to keep himself in life, and, moreover, in bodily soundness and activity. That would be his proper end or aim; and what would his duty be? His duty would consist in eating those meats which conduced most effectually to that end, and to eschew the viands which impaired his powers of life and diminished his activity and strength. In abstaining from the latter, and in pursuing the former, he would be walking in the path of duty, because he would be in the way of attaining to his proper end, the preservation of his life and the maintenance and perfecting of his health and strength. This individual, his end, and his duty, illustrate in a lower matter the analogous case in the moral world of which I spoke, and which I called *man simply*.

30. Let us continue our observation of this individual. Suppose that after a time his food no longer merely keeps him alive and well, but affords a positive and no inconsiderable pleasure to his palate.

And let us further suppose that some of those dishes which minister most to his enjoyment are exceedingly prejudicial to his health, while some of those which are rather bitter in the mouth make amends for their repulsiveness by filling him with redundant life, activity, and strength. Now he is in a condition analogous to the position of man considered as susceptible of happiness and misery. But let us ask what change in the end at which he aims, and what change in the duty which guides him in the pursuit, are likely to be brought about by this altered state of things? The following change, I apprehend, is very likely to ensue. He will be very apt to set up the personal pleasure derived from eating and drinking as his end, instead of the old end, a vigorous and active life: and, aiming at this new end, he will be inclined to devour those meats which contribute most to his enjoyment, without caring how injurious they are to his life and health, while, heedless of its sanitary properties, he will avoid that food which offers no great temptation to his palate. This change in the end will be very apt to bring along with it a change in his conception of duty. Enjoyment being now fixed as his end, he will be very apt to suppose that his duty must consist in attaining to that end at all hazards; and thus he will be led, as I said, to indulge his gluttonous propensities, not keeping his eye on that other end, his health, which the new object of his desire, the new *summum bonum*, has thrown into the shade.

31. To carry on the illustration. Here, then, we have two ends soliciting this individual,—the old end, life, health, and strength; and the new end, the enjoyment arising from eating and drinking. These two ends are also frequently incompatible with each other. In cases where enjoyment is pursued, health must frequently be sacrificed; while health again is sometimes to be purchased only by the relinquishment of pleasure. In these circumstances, the question is, Which is the end to be pursued? Is health to be postponed to enjoyment, or is enjoyment to be postponed to health? or is there any way in which the two ends can be reconciled? Three answers may be returned to this question. *First*, it may be said that health is to be postponed to enjoyment; that enjoyment is the chief, and health only the subordinate end. This position may illustrate the scheme of such utilitarians or Eudaimonists as set up happiness (with little or no regard to virtue) as the end. Or, *secondly*, it may be said that enjoyment is to be postponed to health; that health is the chief, and enjoyment only the subordinate end, not properly an end at all. This position may illustrate the scheme of those moralists who set up virtue (with little or no regard to happiness) as the end. Or, *thirdly*, it may be said that both health and enjoyment may be set up as the chief end; that they admit of conciliation, and that rules may be laid down for their extrication when they come into conflict. This position will illustrate the scheme which, though often

attempted, is still a desideratum in the science of morals.

32. I continue the illustration. I go on to show you what the rules are by which the extrication just referred to may be effected. In the matter of eating and drinking, the *first* rule is, that life and health and strength are above all things to be attended to. These are the paramount considerations; for these are in fact our very existence as physical beings. This rule is so fundamental and elementary, that it may be said to precede or underlie any gastronomical code; any code, that is, that may be formed on the subject of eating and drinking, and the accompanying pleasures. This rule being understood and taken for granted, the next rule is, that every enjoyment which eating and drinking can procure may be freely indulged in, so far as they do not violate the aforesaid rule. I am considering man at present as a purely physical being, and I say that, health and strength being taken for granted as endowments which must on no account be impaired, pleasure may very well be set up as the great and chief end of eating and drinking, and in so far as duty may be alluded to in connection with so insignificant a matter, we may say that it is our duty to get all the enjoyment that we can out of the occupations of the table, subject to the restriction referred to. We thus perceive that, although life and health and strength must never be violated by any excess

in eating or drinking, it is nevertheless quite reasonable to set forth enjoyment as the end, and even as the chief end, which we have in view in taking food. The other end—life, namely, and health—having been laid down as an end to be taken for granted, as an end which must be attained in the very preservation of our existence, our attention will now be very properly fixed on enjoyment as our great and ultimate aim; it will be our duty to apply ourselves to the food for which we have the greatest liking, and to shun that for which we have the greatest loathing; subject, I again say, to the restriction already spoken of, but subject to no other limitation.

33. Still to continue the illustration. We see that the individual, whom we are supposing to have now two ends set before him, has two standards to direct him. He has the old standard, his life, namely, and health and strength. This was his standard when he was supposed to derive no enjoyment from eating and drinking; and he has the new standard, the enjoyment, namely, which after a time we supposed him to acquire. The old standard still retains its force, but so long as it is not violated, so long as life and health are preserved entire, it remains quiescent, and allows the new standard to prevail. This new standard rules the day, it directs the man, it carries everything before it; and it properly does so, provided the fundamental law of his life and health be preserved inviolate. Thus I conceive the two

ends, which we also called standards, are reconciled. In the matter of eating and drinking, health permits enjoyment to put herself forward as the ultimate aim, provided her claims be not compromised, while enjoyment finds her advantage in conciliating health by never being inordinate in her excesses.

34. The application of this somewhat lengthened illustration is this, that just as the preservation of life and health, and the attainment of enjoyment in regard to our body, are two ends quite compatible with each other in the humble and perhaps rather ignoble occupation of eating and drinking; so the maintenance of our rational life, and of the health of the soul, is an end quite consistent with that other, and generally more eagerly pursued end, which goes by the name of happiness. It also sometimes happens that the pursuit of what we regard as happiness is not consistent with the rational life and health of the soul, in which case happiness must be foregone in favour of the soul's preservation, just as in analogous cases pleasure must be surrendered out of consideration for the health of the body. But this being understood, it being understood that man, in the affections which he harbours, and in the actions which he performs, is bound not to do violence to his true and rational nature, this being taken for granted, the other end, his own happiness, namely, and that of others, may now be set full in his view as the proper and only object of his pursuit; and to

the eager pursuit and active diffusion of this happiness, he may be exhorted as a duty which cannot be too abundantly fulfilled.

35. We thus see that a complete body of ethics should embrace two codes, two systems of rules, the one of which we may call the fundamental or antecedent, or under-ground ethics, as underlying the other; and the other of which we may call the upper or subsequent, or above-ground ethics, as resting on, and modified by the former. The under-ground ethics would inculcate on man the necessity of being what he truly is, namely, a creature of reason and of thought; in short, the necessity of being a man, and of preserving to himself this status. Here the end is virtue, that is, the life and health of the soul, and nothing but this. The above-ground ethics would inculcate on man the necessity of being a *happy* man. It is not enough for man *to be;* he must, moreover, if possible, *be happy.* The fundamental ethics look merely to his being, *i. e.*, his being rational; the upper ethics look principally to his being happy, but they are bound to take care that in all his happiness he does nothing to violate his rationality, the health and virtue of the soul.

36. We now see more clearly than we have yet done the error into which the anti-utilitarians fall. They make the under-ground ethics all in all. They allow no end but virtue. They shut off happiness

rom being the ultimate aim, the proper object of our ursuit. They deal with the one half of morals to he exclusion of the other. On the other hand, he utilitarians fall into the opposite error. They eal only with the upper or above-ground ethics; hey overlook the groundwork. They do not see hat, before a man can be a happy man, he must irst of all be a man, that is, a rational being. In heir scheme no provision is made for his being nan, but only for his being happy. Happiness, n short, is laid down as the end or chief good of nan, without any guarantee being given that this osition holds true only in so far as man's rational nd fundamental nature is not compromised by its cceptance. Such a guarantee is provided in what ve have called the under or fundamental ethics of is condition.

PLATO.

1. We now enter on the study of a philosophy which has attracted more notice and excited a deeper interest than any other within the whole compass of antiquity—I mean the philosophy of Plato. The best way to attain to a distinct understanding of the general scope and character of this, and indeed of every other philosophy, is by attending to the errors and oversights which it was designed to correct and supplement. Upheld by the ability of the Sophists, sensationalism was the dominant system, as it was the prevailing error, of the time, and accordingly it was against sensationalism and its conclusions that the philosophy of Plato was directed. Sensationalism is supported by the natural sentiments of mankind; it is the scheme which suggests itself most readily to the untutored understanding; it is a product of ordinary thinking. When left to ourselves, we are naturally of opinion that all our knowledge comes to us through the senses, that the senses are the main, indeed the sole means and instruments of cognition, and this opinion is nothing but the doctrine of sensationalism.

So that the system against which the philosophy of Plato was directed, presented itself in a twofold character: it was a vulgar error, an inadvertency incident to our natural and unreflective thinking; and it was, moreover, an error supported and ratified and reduced to system by the exertions of the Sophistical philosophers. And corresponding to the twofold character of this sensational scheme, the philosophy of Plato had a twofold aim: it had to correct sensationalism considered as a product of ordinary thinking, as the creed of the unreflective mind; and also considered as a philosophical and systematised speculation. Platonism, therefore, in its general character, is to be regarded as at once a rectification of the inadvertencies incident to natural or ordinary thinking, and of the aberrations into which the popular philosophy of the day (the system, namely, of the Sophists) had run. To correct these inadvertencies and errors, it advocated the claims of thought against those of sensation. It showed how impotent the senses are without the aid of the intellect. It put forward its great theory of ideas and idealism in opposition to the current theory of sensations and sensationalism. Such was the general character, both negative and positive, both combative and constructive, of the Platonic philosophy, as gathered from the general consideration of the system of doctrine to which it stood opposed.

2. This philosophy has exercised a very deep and

extensive influence on the thoughts and interests of mankind, more so, probably, than any other, either in ancient or in modern times. Aristotle is the only other name that can be put in comparison with that of Plato. The ascendancy of Aristotle may for some centuries have been more despotic, but I am inclined to think that the genius of Plato has from first to last ruled the minds of thinking men with a more living and penetrating sway. Not to speak of his immediate followers, the rise of Neo-platonism, principally in Alexandria, in the centuries immediately subsequent to the Christian era, attests the depth and extent of Plato's influence. His writings, moreover, were much admired, and closely studied by many of the early Christian fathers. Justin Martyr, Clemens Alexandrinus, Origen, Eusebius, and St Augustin, these founders of the Church regarded Plato as actually inspired, so profoundly were they impressed by the divine character of his instructions; while others were of opinion that he had derived his wisdom from an acquaintance with the Hebrew Scriptures, an opinion, I need scarcely say, which rests on very insufficient evidence. Throughout the dark ages, that is to say, from the sixth to the tenth or eleventh century, an eclipse passed over the light of Plato, as it did over every other light in the firmament of philosophy and literature. From the tenth until the fourteenth century, Aristotle, and not Plato, was in the ascendant. This is the period usually called the middle ages. During its continuance, the only phil-

osophy in vogue consisted of portions of Aristotle (chiefly his logical treatises), served up in crude Latin translations. At this time the knowledge of the Greek language had died out, or very nearly so, in Europe, and was not recovered until the downfall of Constantinople which was captured by the Turks in 1453. This event had a most auspicious effect on the interests of learning in the West. The downfall of Constantinople dispersed over Europe a multitude of learned men who possessed Greek MSS., and who were skilled in the Greek tongue. The study of Greek literature began to be vigorously prosecuted in Europe. Plato attracted a large share of attention. This happened in the fifteenth century of our era; and Italy was the country over which the light of the renovated learning first broke. Here Plato was enthusiastically studied. Marsilius Ficinus translated and commented on his works. Under the auspices of this learned Florentine, Platonism enjoyed a second revival. The enthusiasm spread to other countries, and from that day down to the present the authority of the Platonic writings has never ceased to influence the course of speculation, and to tell even on the general literature of all civilised communities, although it has operated more powerfully and been felt more vividly at one time than it has at another. During the eighteenth century, for example, the influence of Plato had declined. But in the present age the close study of his writings has again revived in our own country, in France, and in Germany.

3. The philosophy of Plato is so multifarious and unsystematic, that it would be difficult, or rather impossible, to reduce its contents to any very exact classification. It may be sufficient at present to mention the ordinary scheme which divides it into the three branches, ethics, physics, and dialectics. These are the three sciences which are treated of in the writings of Plato. His ethics are a carrying out and enforcement of the ethical opinions of his great master Socrates. His physics are for the most part crude and fanciful, although marked here and there by very profound and luminous observations. The science of dialectic is supposed to belong more peculiarly to Plato, and his philosophy centres in it more essentially than in either of the other two departments; it therefore behoves us to inquire more particularly into the meaning or purport of the Platonic dialectic.

4. We ask, then, what is dialectic the science of? The answer is, that it is the science of ideas. Ideas, as all the world knows, play a most important part in the philosophy of Plato. He was indeed the first philosopher who treated expressly of these mysterious entities, endeavouring to explain their nature, to establish them as the true constituents of the universe, and to displace by their means the sensible phenomena from the hold which they have on the opinions of mankind generally as the only realities which exist. Ideas are the Alpha and Omega in the

philosophy of Plato. It is not surprising, therefore, that a special name should have been awarded by their expositor to the science which treats of them. That special name is called by him dialectic, a word which, looking to its derivation, has no connection with ideas, but which is derived from διαλέγεσθαι, to discourse or discuss in the way of dialogue; so that the name of the science seems to have been suggested by the conversational way in which the ideas were discussed, rather than by anything connected with the nature of the ideas themselves; or the word dialectic may signify that silent dialogue which the mind carries on within itself whenever it is engaged in meditation. We shall have occasion hereafter to go more deeply into this science of ideas. Meanwhile I am dealing with little more than the nomenclature of the Platonic speculations.

5. I may here mention some of the principal Dialogues which deal respectively with the three sciences, dialectic, ethics, and physics. Dialectic shows itself in the Meno, the Theætetus, the Sophista, the Parmenides, the Philebus, the Phædrus, the Phædo, and the Republic. Ethics are treated of principally in the Philebus and the Republic, to which may be added the Euthyphro. The physics are contained for the most part in the Timæus. From this enumeration you will perceive that ethics and dialectic are sometimes treated of in the same Dialogue. The classification, however, is, I think, sufficiently accu-

rate to let you know generally which of Plato's Dialogues are *dialectical*, which *ethical*, and which *physical*. I have mentioned only the principal Dialogues on the three branches of science.

6. Much controversy has prevailed in regard to the genuineness of the Platonic writings. Some inquirers, actuated by a spirit of extreme scepticism have admitted as genuine a very meagre proportion of his Dialogues, while others, influenced by a contrary spirit of extreme credulity, have accepted as his everything which has come down to us in his name. The truth seems to be, that while several of the compositions which are incorporated with all the editions of Plato's works must be pronounced spurious, all the more important Dialogues are genuine. The following is a list of the writings which have been generally regarded as spurious by those who are most competent to judge on this question. The Platonic *Epistles* (although these, I believe, are defended as genuine by so high an authority as Mr. Grote*). The *Epinomis*, the second *Alcibiades*, the *Theages*, *Anterastæ*, or the rivals in love, *Hipparchus*, *Minos*, and *Clitophon*.† With the exception of these few and comparatively insignificant pieces, the entire body of the Platonic writings may be relied on as genuine, as the authentic utterances of the great disciple of Socrates. They are compositions which, whether we look to their style or their substance, far

* Thompson on Butler's 'Ancient Phil.' ii. 16. † Ib. 48.

surpassed in beauty and in depth everything which had preceded them in philosophy, and they have been followed by very few works which will bear any comparison with their excellence. In the Platonic writings the form of dialogue was used probably for the first time as the vehicle of philosophical thought, and it started at once into perfection. In grace and ease, in poetical beauty and dramatic spirit, these Dialogues have never been equalled. In modern times they have frequently been imitated; and in our own country, the two philosophers who have imitated them most successfully, although they fall far short of their great original, are Berkeley and Shaftesbury.

7. The dialectic is the first part of the Platonic philosophy which must engage our attention. Dialectic, as I have said, is the science of ideas. We shall therefore have to inquire and ascertain as clearly as we can what ideas are in the Platonic sense of the term. This is an inquiry in which, from first to last, much labour has been expended. I am of opinion that, although the exertions of those who have explored this field are far from having been fruitless, much research and reflection are still required in order to set forth the nature of ideas in a perfectly distinct light, and in order to appreciate, at its true value, the Platonic theory which deals with them. But, before entering on this research, I shall call your attention to a few preliminaries which come before us at the threshold.

8. One point for preliminary consideration is this: By ideas, two things may be meant. Ideas may either be a name for thought or knowledge in its simplest, lowest, easiest, or most elementary form; in that form in which knowledge is possessed by all human beings, even the most uninstructed; or ideas may be a name for that higher and more complex kind of knowledge called science, which is the possession of comparatively few. In which of these acceptations, then, does Plato employ the term? Do his ideas mean knowledge of the simplest character, knowledge which no man can open his eyes without receiving? or do they mean knowledge of a loftier order, and which it requires some exertion to attain to?

9. The true answer, I believe, is, that by ideas Plato intends to designate both kinds of knowledge, the lower and the higher. But as he employs the word more frequently, and with greater emphasis, in reference to our higher than to our lower knowledge, one is apt to think that this theory of ideas is rather a theory of science in its loftiest pretensions, than a theory of thought and knowledge simply, and in their humblest and commonest manifestations. The consequence has been, that his expositors have usually expounded the ideas as more peculiarly the property of the scientific mind, and as acquisitions which it required a large amount of philosophic culture to get possession of.

10. This explanation of the Platonic ideas, though not positively false, is exceedingly misleading. It is not positively false, because ideas are in truth the truth, the light of all science. But it is exceedingly misleading, because it conveys the impression that they are not equally essential to our simplest acts of thought and knowledge, and that there may be a lower species of knowledge into which ideas do not enter. The truth, however, is, that ideas are just as essential to our ordinary and most familiar cognitions, as they are to our most recondite and elaborate sciences, and it is in their relation to common thinking that they ought to be studied much more than in their relation to scientific cognition. We shall perceive their necessity, we shall understand them as part and parcel of ourselves, much more clearly when we view them as conditions without which no thought or knowledge of any kind is possible, than we should do if we viewed them merely as certain requisites which contributed to the construction of science. Plato speaks of them, as I have said, very frequently under the latter relation. But there is sufficient evidence that he regarded them under the former as well, under that relation which I venture to think is much the more important of the two. Leaving his expositors, then, to interpret the ideas as essential to the constitution of science, I shall explain them principally, if not exclusively, as necessary to the existence of our simplest knowledge, and as that without which no thinking of any kind could take place.

11. I have said that Plato dwells principally on ideas in their higher function as instrumental in the construction of science, and that he seems to insist with less emphasis on the necessity with which they are present in all, even in our humblest cognitions. I have also said that the importance of ideas, and the value of the theory which expounds them, are much more conspicuous when we look at them in the latter, than when we look at them in the former character. When we regard them as the light of all thought and all knowledge, the theory is admirable (as I hope to show you); when we regard them merely as the light of science, and as the property merely of scientific men, the theory is shorn of its significance. The following remark may perhaps help to clear up or remove the ambiguity which Plato has himself thrown around the theory. Every human being in the simplest act of knowledge makes use of ideas; ideas are present to his mind; but he is not cognisant of their nature and character; he is not aware even of their existence. *They* are in possession of *him*, rather than *he* of *them;* he is unconscious of their necessary and unfailing presence. To make him conscious of this presence, to make him aware of the necessity and the nature of ideas, a special and difficult science is required, the science of Dialectic. Now, in broaching his theory of ideas, I conceive that what Plato means to inculcate is not that it is difficult for the mind to get hold of ideas, or that any science is required to put us in possession

of them, or that they are the property only of the favoured few who have been highly gifted and highly educated. That, I say, is not what he means to inculcate, but rather this, that the mind being already in possession of ideas, it is the hardest of all tasks, and requires the most persevering meditation for the mind to make itself cognisant of these possessions, and to understand the nature of these ideas. From the manner, however, in which he frequently expresses himself, one might readily mistake his drift, and might suppose that he was pressing on his readers the necessity of their acquiring ideas, if they wished to be men of science or philosophers; whereas the truth is that he is merely pressing on them the necessity of their acquiring a knowledge of the ideas which they already possess, and which are at once the enlightening principle of their own minds, and the staple of the universe. The difference between the mind which is informed by dialectic, and the mind which is not so informed, is simply this: that the ordinary or uninformed mind has ideas, while the dialectic mind knows that it has them, and understands what they are. The other interpretation, that usually adopted by the Platonic expositors, seems rather to be this: that the ordinary mind has no ideas at all, but is informed by a lower species of knowledge, into which ideas do not enter, while the dialectic mind alone both has ideas and is cognisant of their presence and nature. This interpretation is, I conceive, quite wrong.

12. Another preliminary point requiring some notice, is the consideration of those sciences which draw away the mind from the contemplation of sensible objects, and turn it to the study of universal truth. Among these are to be reckoned arithmetic and geometry; sciences which, according to Plato, are the best preparation by which the mind can be trained to the higher study of dialectic. Speaking of geometry, he says (the words are put into the mouth of Socrates): "You also know," says Socrates, "that the geometricians summon to their aid visible forms and discourse about them, though their thoughts are busy, not with these forms, but with their originals, and though they discourse not with a view to the particular square and diameter which they draw, but with a view to the absolute square and the absolute diameter, and so on. For while they employ by way of images those figures and diagrams aforesaid (which again have their shadows and images in water), they are really endeavouring to behold those things * which a person can only see with the eye of thought," that is to say, not this or that circle, or this or that square, but square and circle viewed universally, which they cannot be by sense or imagination, but only by the intellect (*διάνοια*). Again, speaking of geometry, the Platonic Socrates says: "It is indeed no easy matter to believe that, in the midst of these mathematical studies, an organ

* Not "abstractions," as wrongly rendered by the Cambridge translation.—Rep. vi. 510.

of our soul is being purged from the blindness, and quickened from the deadness, occasioned by other pursuits—an organ whose preservation is of more importance than a thousand eyes, because only by it can truth be seen. Consequently, those who think with us will bestow unqualified approbation on these studies." * These extracts may be sufficient to show the importance which Plato attached to mathematical science as a training of the mind for the study and reception of the purer and loftier truth revealed to it by dialectic. The words, however, which Plato is said to have inscribed over the gate of the academy where his discussions were held, "Let no one who is not a geometrician enter these walls"—*μηδεὶς ἀγεωμέτρητος εἰσίτω*, are erroneously attributed to the philosopher, although they are quite in accordance with the tone and spirit of his instructions.

13. The following passage from the 7th Book of the Republic, contains the celebrated similitude in which Plato allegorises the conversion of the mind from the world of sense to the world of ideas. I read it to you as preparatory to our discussion of his theory of ideas.†

"Suppose," says Socrates, "a set of men in a subterraneous cavern, which opens to the day by a long straight wide passage, and that they have been kept in this cavern from childhood, fettered so that they

* Rep. vii. 527.

† Rep. vii. 514; Whewell's Translation, iii. 297.

cannot turn even their necks, but with their heads fixed so that they can look only towards the lower end of the cave. Suppose, further, that there is a great fire lit opposite to the mouth of the cavern (so as to throw the shadows of objects on the lower end of the cave), and that there is a road which runs past the cavern between the fire and the captives. Suppose, too, that along this road runs a low wall, like the partition over which puppet-showmen exhibit their figures. And now suppose that along this wall, and so as to be shown above it, pass men and other figures, some silent, some speaking. You think this is a strange imagination. Yet these captives exactly represent the condition of us men who see nothing but the shadows of realities. And these captives, in talking with one, would give names to the shadows as if they were realities. And if, further, this prison-house had an echo opposite to it, so that when the passers-by spoke the sound was reflected (from the same wall on which the shadows were seen), they would, of course, think that the shadows spoke. And, in short, in every way they would be led to think there were no realities except these shadows.

"Now consider how these captives might be freed from these illusions. If one of them were loosed from his bonds, and made to turn round and to walk towards the light and look at it; at first he would be pained and dazzled by the glare, and unable to see clearly. He would be perplexed if he

were told that what he saw before were nonentities, and that now, being brought nearer to the reality and turned towards it, he saw better than before; and even if any of the passers-by were pointed out to him and made to answer questions, and to say what he is, he would still think that what he saw before was more true than what was shown to him now. He would shun the excessive light, and turn away to that which he *could* see, and think it more visible than the objects which had been shown him.

"But if he were dragged to the light, up the steep and rough passage which opens to the cave, and fairly brought out into the light of the sun, he would be still more pained and more angry, and be at first so blinded that he would not be able to see real objects. It would require time and use to enable him to see things in daylight. At first he would be able to see shadows, then the reflected images of objects, and then objects themselves; and afterwards he might be able to look at the heavens by night, and see the heavenly bodies, the stars and the moon; and finally be able to look at the sun; not merely at a reflection of him in water, but at the sun himself in his own place. And then he might be led to reason about the sun, and see that he regulates seasons and years, and governs everything in this visible world, and is in a certain sense the cause of all the things which they in their captivity saw.

"And then when he recollected his first abode, and the illusions of that place, and of his fellow-captives, he would naturally congratulate himself upon the change, and pity those he had left there. And if there were among them any honours and rewards given to him who was most sharp-sighted in scanning the passing shadows, and readiest in recollecting which of them habitually went before, and which after, and which together, and who hence was most skilful in predicting what could happen in future, he would not be likely to covet these honours and rewards. He would rather say with the shade of Achilles in Homer, that it is better to be a day-labourer in the region of life and day, than the greatest monarch in the realm of shadows. He would rather suffer anything than live as he did before.

"And consider this further. If such a one should redescend into the cavern, and resume his former seat, his eyes would be purblind, coming out of sunshine into darkness. And while his eyes are still dark, and before they have recovered their power, if he had to discuss those shadows with those who had always remained there captive (a state of things which might last a considerable time), he would be utterly laughed at, and they would say that his eyesight was ruined, and that it was not worth anybody's while to go up out of the cave. And if any one tried to set them at liberty, and to

lead them to the light, they would, if they could get him into their power, kill him.

"Now this image, my dear Glaucon, is to be applied to the case we were speaking of before. We must liken the visible world to the dark cavern, and the fire which makes objects visible to the sun. The ascent upwards, and the vision of the objects th[re]s the advance of the mind into the intellig[ible] world; at least such is my faith and hope, and [th]ese you wished me to give an account. G[od] knows if my faith is well founded. And, accordi[ng] to my view, the idea of the Supreme Good is see[n] last of all, and with the greatest difficulty; and whe[n] seen, is apprehended as the cause of all that is right and excellent. This idea produces in the visible world light, and the sun the cause of light; in the intellectual world it is the cause (source) of truth and of the intuition of truth. And this idea he w[ho] is to act wisely either in private or in public matt[ers] must get possession of.

"And now, as you agree with me in this vi[ew] you will agree with me further, that it is not to [be] wondered at that those who have advanced into that higher region are not willing to be involved in the affairs of men; their souls wish to dwell for ever in that upper region. Nor is it wonderful if any one coming down from divine contemplations to the wretched concerns of men blunders and is laughed at; while he is still purblind, and before his eyes

are accustomed to the surrounding darkness, he is compelled, it may be, to fight in courts of justice, or elsewhere, the battle, not about justice, but about the shadows of justice, or the images which make the shadows; he is compelled to wrangle about the way in which these shadows are apprehended by those who never had a view of justice herself. If one has any sense, he will recollect that there two kinds of confused vision arising from two posite sources; that which happens when men go t of light into darkness, and that which happens hen they go out of darkness into light; and the ase is exactly the same with the mind. And when such a one sees a mind confused and unable to discern anything clearly, he will not laugh without consideration; he will consider whether in that case the mind is darkened by coming out of a clearer ht into unaccustomed darkness, or, going from orance to clearer knowledge, is struck with con ion by the brightened splendour. And in the er case he would think that mind happy in its nstitution and condition, and pity the other; and if he were disposed to laugh at it, his laughter would be far less in a temper of ridicule than his laughter at him who comes from above below, from the light into the dark."

14. In the following quotation from the 10th Book of the Republic, the ideas are explained and illustrated by Plato himself. Here he represents

them as the models or archetypes according to which the Deity fabricates all things. The speakers are discoursing on the subject of imitation.*

"What is imitation? We are accustomed to say that all the things which have the same name belong to one kind. Take anything for an example. There are many chairs and many tables; but there is only one *idea* of a chair and one idea of a table. And the artificer who makes each of these pieces of furniture looks to his idea of a chair or a table, and so makes the chairs and the tables which we use. The man does not make the idea, he only copies it.

"But now, what do you call an artificer who makes all the things which any of the (kinds of) handicraftsmen make, and not only all articles of furniture, but all the plants which grow out of the earth, all animals, and himself; and moreover the earth, the heavens, the gods, and all that is in heaven, and all that is in Hades under the earth? You think this must be a wonderful artist? There may be a workman who can make all these things in a certain sense, and in a certain sense cannot. You yourself might make all these things in a certain sense; for instance, if you take a looking-glass, and turn it on all sides, you may forthwith make the sun and the sky, and the earth, and yourself, and animals, and plants, and articles of furniture, such as we have been speaking of. You say that you make their

* Rep. x. 596; Whewell, iii. 327.

appearances only, not the things themselves. That is just the point I wish to come to.

"And so the painter can make things in the same way; he does not make the real thing. He makes an apparent table, not a real table.

"But the carpenter—does he make a real table? We have just agreed that he does not make that which is *essentially* a table, but only a kind of table. He does not make the thing that *is*, but only something that is like it. If any one says that the thing produced by any handicraftsman really is, he makes a mistake. The things which are thus produced are dim shadows of the truth.

"Now, let us see what is meant by imitation. There are, for instance, three kinds of tables. The first the essential ideal one, which God himself makes; then the one which the carpenter makes; and then the one which the painter makes. The painter, the carpenter, God; these are the three makers of the three kinds of tables. The one made by God is single, unique; there are not and will not be more than one. There cannot be two or more. If He had made two or more ideas of kinds of tables there would be a third—the idea of *table* in general, and this would be the real idea of table. And thus God is the real author of the real table, but not of any particular table, so as to be a table-maker.

"But the carpenter also makes a table; what is he? He is a table-maker.

"And the painter; does he made a table? No;

he *imitates* a table. And so the man who makes the third copy of the original is an *imitator*."

15. I shall conclude the preliminaries and preparations for the closer study of the Platonic dialectic by reading you an extract from the lectures of the late Professor Butler of Dublin, in which he explains his conception of the Platonic theory of ideas. He explains ideas as the *laws* according to which God regulates the universe; a view not erroneous, but only rather vague, and conveying the impression that ideas do not enter into all our knowledge, but are the animating principle of our higher cogitions only.

"You can now enter easily into the aim of the theory of Ideas. That man's soul is made to contain not merely a consistent scheme of its own notions, but a direct apprehension of *real and eternal laws beyond it*, is not too absurd to be maintained. That these real and eternal laws are things *intelligible*, and not things sensible, is not very extravagant either. That these laws, impressed upon creation by its Creator, and apprehended by man, are something different equally from the Creator and from man, and that the whole mass of them may be fairly termed the world of things purely intelligible, is surely allowable. Nay, further, that there are qualities in the supreme and ultimate Cause of all, which are manifested in His creation, and not merely manifested, but, in a manner—after being brought out of His super-

essential nature into the stage of being below Him, but next to Him—are then, by the causative act of creation, deposited in things, differencing them one from the other, so that the things participate of them (*μετέχουσι*), communicate with them (*κοινωνοῦσι*); this likewise seems to present no incredible account of the relation of the world to its Author. That the intelligence of man, excited to reflection by the impressions of these objects, thus (though themselves transitory) participant of a divine quality, should rise to higher conceptions of the perfections thus faintly exhibited; and inasmuch as these perfections are unquestionably *real* existences, and *known* to be such in the very act of contemplation—that this should be regarded as a direct intellectual apperception of them, a union of the reason with the ideas in that sphere of being which is common to both—this is certainly no preposterous notion in substance, and by those who deeply study it, will perhaps be deemed no unwarrantable form of phrase. Finally, that the reason, in proportion as it learns to contemplate the perfect and eternal, *desires* the enjoyment of such contemplations in a more consummate degree, and cannot be fully satisfied except in the perfect fruition of the perfect itself, this seems not to contradict any received principle of psychology, or any known law of human nature. Yet these suppositions, taken together, constitute the famous 'Theory of Ideas;' and thus stated, may surely be pronounced to form no very appropriate object for

the contempt of even the most accomplished of our modern 'physiologists of mind.'"—(Butler's 'Lectures on Philosophy,' vol. ii. pp. 117-18-19.)

16. Before entering on the exposition of Plato's dialectic or theory of ideas, I thought it right to call your attention to certain preliminary considerations. These were the settlement of the question, Are the Platonic ideas the necessary constituents of *all* knowledge, or only of *scientific* knowledge? My conclusion is that they are, according to Plato, the necessary constituents of all knowledge, although it must be confessed that he has left this point somewhat ambiguous, and has thereby misled his expositors, who frequently regard the ideas as belonging more properly to scientific than to ordinary cognition. The true interpretation is, that while all minds have ideas, the instructed mind both has and knows that it has them. I then mentioned the sciences which, in the opinion of Plato, were the best preparation for dialectic; these were arithmetic and the mathematical sciences, particularly geometry. These, when rightly cultivated, lead the mind to look at truth, not in the particular, but in the universal, and thus furnish a proper training for the higher study of ideas. As a further introduction to dialectic, and in order to familiarise you with the main object of Plato's philosophy, which is to turn the mind from the comparative unrealities of sense to the realities of reason, which ideas are, I read to you his cele-

brated similitude of the Cave, in which this conversion is allegorised. I then read to you an extract from Plato, the purport of which was to show that, just as an existing sensible object has a higher degree of reality than a mere painting of it, so the divine and eternal idea of that object has a higher degree of reality than the object itself, and that, just as we may very well consider the painting unreal when compared with the object, so we may very properly regard the object as unreal when compared with its eternal idea. And, finally, my object in reading to you a few extracts from Professor Butler was to make you acquainted with the somewhat vague and unsatisfactory interpretation of the Platonic ideas which is generally current.

17. Having disposed of these introductory matters, I now enter on the dialectic of Plato. And as this science is the science of ideas, we have first of all to consider what ideas are in themselves. We must try to fathom their nature as much by our own reflections as by means of the light which Plato has contributed to the research. It is not so much by reading Plato as by studying our own minds that we can find out what ideas are, and perceive the significance of the theory which expounds them. It is, as I formerly said, only by verifying in our own consciousness the discoveries of antecedent philosophers that we can hope rightly to understand their doctrines or appreciate the value and importance of their specu-

lations. We must endeavour to apply this rule to the present case.

18. In dealing with the philosophy of Socrates, I touched on several truths which carry us a considerable way, I think, towards a right understanding of the Platonic ideas; these were the universality of ideas as contrasted with the particularity of sensations, the activity and freedom of the mind, its emancipation from the bondage of sensation, evinced in its rising into the region of ideas even in its lowest and most ordinary cognitions. I am not sure that I have very much to add to the explanation of ideas there given, but I shall endeavour to present it in a somewhat new light, and under a somewhat different point of view.

19. Let me dwell, first of all, on the necessity of ideas, the necessary truth which is their main characteristic. You have all heard of necessary truth, and understand, I daresay, something of its nature. Necessary truth is truth which the mind cannot help acquiescing in; it is truth for all minds, and not truth merely for this or that particular kind or order of minds. Such truths are the axioms of geometry, and indeed all mathematical truth. Necessary truths are those of which the opposites are absurd, inconceivable, contradictory. In explaining, then, the necessity of ideas, what I wish to show you is, that ideas are essential, are absolutely indispensable to

the operations of thought, and to the very existence of intelligence. No thinking can possibly go on without them; to suppose that it can is to suppose an absurdity and a contradiction. The necessity that characterises ideas is of the highest and most stringent order. And, accordingly, the theory which expounds them must be accepted, not as a doctrine which may possibly be erroneous, but as a system of truth which cannot possibly be mistaken. In its expression, this theory may probably be defective; indeed it may be impossible to express it in terms which are not more or less imperfect, but in itself, and substantially, it cannot be fallacious.

20. The necessity, the necessary truth, which is the main characteristic of ideas, and which marks this theory, will become conspicuous if we make the attempt to carry on thinking without the instrumentality of ideas, that is, of universals. This attempt will show how essential ideas are to the operations of thought, and how impossible it is for thought to be performed without them. Let us, then, make the attempt; let us try whether we can think without anything more than sensation coming into play. I have a sensation of light, and a bright object, say a gas-lamp, is before my eyes. Now, so long as I am merely in a state of feeling, I am tied down to this particular sensation; my sensation does not overstep one hair's-breadth the sensation which I experience. The sensation is exactly that sensation, and nothing

else, nothing either more or less. The problem is to make me not only feel but think this sensation, and to think it without getting out of sensation, *i.e.*, without getting into the region of ideas; for I wish to show that it is impossible for me to do this, and thus by a *reductio ad absurdum* to prove the necessity of ideas. I think the sensation then, the sensation of light and the bright object before me. Now what has taken place here different from mere feeling? This has taken place: in thinking the sensation, I think that it *is*, and that the bright object *is*. Perhaps I think of more than this, but this, *at least*, is what I think. I repeat it: I think that the sensation *is*, and that the object *is*. In thinking them at all, I must think that they are. But you will very likely say, What is there here more than mere feeling? When a man feels a pain, does he not feel that it *is*? I answer that it may do very well in ordinary language, to say of a man in pain that he feels that it *is*, but such a statement (viewed philosophically) is exceedingly incorrect. The precise statement is this, that the man merely feels the pain; he thinks or knows that it *is* (you will understand this more clearly immediately). I again affirm that in thinking the sensation (as an act distinct from merely feeling it), I think that it *is*. That is my first step in thinking it; that is the least which I do. We have now to ask what is involved in thinking that the sensation *is*. There is this involved in it, that I transcend or go beyond the sensation, and

bring down a category or universal upon it, the category or universal called Being. But Being is an idea. Being is not identical or commensurate with my sensation, it embraces infinitely more. Being is not my sensation, but something different from it; and being something different from sensation, it properly obtains a different name; it is called an idea. We thus see that in the simplest and earliest operation of thinking, we are forced, whether we will or no, into the region of ideas, and that thinking is impossible without them. Thinking is, in fact, nothing else than the application of ideas or universals to the sensible phenomena of the universe. And the theory which declares this to be the case (as Plato's theory does) is not so much a theory as a fact; a fact which it is impossible to dispute or deny, without falling into the grossest absurdities and contradictions.

21. To this argument proving the necessity of ideas, the objection may perhaps be raised that it is a mere truism, equivalent to the assertion that it is impossible to think without having thoughts, a proposition which no one would ever dream of denying, but which does not advance us far in our pursuit of truth. I answer that the argument does amount to that proposition, but it also amounts to a great deal more. It not only shows that we cannot think without having thoughts or ideas, but it moreover explains what ideas are; it sets them forth as universals, and thus essentially distinguishes them from

sensations, which are of necessity particular. A man certainly learns nothing from being told that he cannot think without ideas, but he may learn something, or rather (to take the Socratic view of education) he may teach himself something from being told that he cannot think without passing from the particular to the universal. What was proved in the preceding paragraph was not merely that a man cannot think without having ideas, but that he cannot think without going beyond the particular and passing into the universal, a profound truth. The one of these statements is a mere truism, but the other, I venture to maintain, is one of the profoundest truths that ever addressed itself to the capacities of thinking men, and summoned them to put forth their utmost capacities to unravel it. Let us endeavour to get somewhat deeper into the purport of this truth—this truth which is expressed in the proposition, that to think is to pass from the singular or particular to the idea or the universal.

22. It is an accredited maxim in the Lockian or sensational schools of philosophy, that we can think only of that of which we have had experience. And this dogma seems to recommend itself at once to the common sense of mankind, for where, it may be asked, can we get the materials of our thinking except from experience, either external or internal? Now, irresistible as this dogma appears, I venture to set up in opposition to it this counter-proposition,

that it is impossible for us to think *only* of that of which we have had experience. This is merely another form of the assertion just made, that all thinking is necessarily a passing from the singular to the universal. I shall endeavour, by means of a very simple illustration, to explicate what this proposition involves. I wish to show you more particularly what is meant by the universality of ideas. A man sees an object for the first time, let us say a chair. Now so long as he merely sees it, his state is purely sensational, he is limited to the particular, he is shut up in the region of the singular. Let us now suppose that he thinks it. What is the exact nature of the mental operation here performed? I conceive it to be this: In thinking the chair, the man views it as an instance of which there may be, or are, other instances. Suppose that the man had never seen anything except this chair, in thinking it, he would still think it as something; that is (even although he had no language to express his thoughts), he would nevertheless place it under the category of thing; in other words, he would think other possible chairs (and other possible things) as well. If he thinks the chair, I affirm that he cannot think *merely it*, but must think something more. Here then is a marvellous consideration: The man has had experience only of one chair, of one thing; but in thinking it, he has thought other chairs, other things; in short, he has thought something of which he has had *no* experience. This is an astonishing

position, and looks very paradoxical; but it is nevertheless the fact, and we must accept it as we find it. It utterly overthrows the Lockian school of philosophy, for it proves that there is something in the mind which neither entered by the way of outward experience, nor was generated by internal experience, or by what Locke calls reflection on our own mental operations. That on the presentation of *one* object I should be able, indeed, that I should be necessitated, to think of *another* object as well, this is a fact which discredits altogether the philosophy of sensational experience. If this philosophy would make good its ground, it must prove that we cannot think of more than we have actually experienced, and that if, in the course of our experience, we had only seen twelve men, it would be impossible for us to think of a thirteenth; but such a proof is manifestly impossible, and such a conclusion would be absurd. My position is, that supposing we had never seen more than one man, we must, in thinking him, view him as an instance, and viewing him thus, we must virtually think an indefinite number of men. This is so far an explanation of what is meant by all thought being a passing from the singular to the universal.

23. In attempting to expound the nature of ideas, with the special view of throwing light on what Plato understood by them, I touched, in the concluding paragraphs of my last lecture, on two of their chief characteristics; these were, their necessity and

their universality. Ideas are necessary, because no thinking can take place without them. They are universal, inasmuch as they are completely divested of the particularity which characterises all the phenomena of mere sensation. To grasp the nature of this universality is not easy. Perhaps the best means by which this end may be compassed is by contrasting it with the particular. It is not difficult to understand that a sensation, a phenomenon of sense, is never more than the particular phenomenon which it is. As such, that is, in its strict particularity, it is absolutely unthinkable. In the very act of being thought something more than it emerges, and this something more cannot be again the particular, for in that case something more would again emerge, and so on for ever. For example, suppose that in thinking a particular object, the additional something which I thought of were *one other* particular object or *ten other* particular objects; in that case I maintain that no thinking would have taken place, for I would still be confined to the particular; ten particulars, *per se*, cannot be thought of any more than one particular can be thought of. When ten particulars, or ten hundred particulars, are thought of, there always emerges in thought an additional something, which is the possibility of other particulars to an indefinite extent. In the operation of thinking, any given number of particulars are always reduced to so many instances, and the indefinite outstanding something which they are *instances* of is a universal.

There is thus a contrast in thought between two elements, the universal and the particular, and both of these are essential, I conceive, to the process of thinking. The particular element is usually a sensation, or sensible thing. The universal element is called by Plato an idea.

14. We may perhaps get still further light on the nature of ideas if we view the matter in this way. Every object that we behold is *an instance*, that is, it is looked upon as not the only case of the kind; other instances are either actual or possible. But all instances must be instances of something. What is that something? That something is an idea. We require a different term from the word *instance* to mark that of which the instance is, and for this purpose we employ the term *idea*. The particular thing before us (suppose it is a tree) is an instance; an instance of what? It is an instance of a tree; but is the tree before us of which this is an instance? Certainly it is not. The particular tree is before us; but that of which it is an instance is not before us, not before us as a particular, is not visible to our sense of sight, although present to the mind as an idea or universal. We thus make a distinction between an instance and that of which it is an instance. In fact, here again we find the two elements which are essential to all thought, the particular and the universal. The terms by which we have just designated them are, the instance, and that of which the

instance is. A thing cannot be an instance without being an instance of something; in so far as it is an instance, it is particular. The something of which it is an instance is a universal, an idea. Plato calls it also *παράδειγμα*.

25. I must put you on your guard against supposing that it is possible for you to form any sort of representation of the idea or universal, or paradeigma. This cannot be done. The idea or universal cannot by any possibility be pictured in the imagination, for this would at once reduce it to the particular; this would destroy it as an idea, and convert it into an instance, which instance being of course an instance of something, would again require to be supplemented in thought by that of which it was an instance, namely, by an idea or universal. Much confusion is caused when we attempt to construe the idea to our mind as any sort of imaginary object. We must be satisfied, therefore, with thinking the idea or universal as a fact of intellect which is necessary as a foil or offset or complement to the other element of our cognition, the particular instance, namely; but which cannot be apprehended either by the senses or by the imagination, which derives all its *data* from the senses, and copies their impressions. This inability to form any sort of picture or representation of an idea does not proceed from any imperfection or limitation of our faculties, but is a quality inherent in the very nature of intelligence.

A contradiction is involved in the supposition that an idea or universal can become the object either of sense or of the imagination. An idea is thus diametrically opposed to an image, although in ordinary, and even in philosophical language, the two terms are frequently confounded, and regarded as synonymous with each other.

26. I have hitherto spoken of necessity and universality as two main characteristics of our ideas. I have now to remark that ideas are essential to the unity of our cognitions. They are not merely indefinite possibilities which no given number of instances can exhaust, but they are principles by which the variety and multifariousness of our sensible impressions are reduced to unity and order. Resemblance, for example, is the great principle of arrangement and classification. We class things together under genera and species according to their resemblance. But resemblance does not come to us through the senses, or by the way of sensation; it is no sensible impression, it is a pure idea. When two trees are before us, we see the trees, but we do not see their resemblance. This is a thought, not an object of sense. Resemblance is a relation, and, as such, it cannot be seen, or touched, or apprehended by any of the senses. These apprehend only the things. Their relations of resemblance and difference are apprehended only by the intellect. If the mind had no idea of resemblance, and no idea of difference, if we

had not these principles to guide us in the arrangement and classification of our knowledge, it is manifest that our cognitions would have no unity, order, or coherence; our mental state would be no better than a chaotic dream. So essential are ideas to the existence of knowledge, so impotent are sensations, without ideas, to instruct us even in the most elementary truths.

27. This may further serve to illustrate a subject on which Plato has bestowed a good deal of elaborate treatment, the conversion, namely, of the human soul from ignorance to true knowledge. The ignorant and unconverted soul supposes that its knowledge of sensible objects is due to the impressions which it receives; the converted soul is aware that this knowledge is due, not to these impressions, but to the ideas of resemblance and difference (and some other ideas) by which these impressions are accompanied, but with which they are not by any means identical; in fact, that our whole knowledge of outward things is based entirely upon ideas, and is effected solely by their mediation.

28. From what has been already said in regard to the distinction and opposition between the particularity of sensation, and the universality of intellect, it is obvious that ideas cannot be the products of our sensible experience. Hence they must be referred to some other origin; they must be pronounced

nate; innate inasmuch as we do not derive them om without, but from some source which is either e mind itself, or intimately allied to the mind. Ve find, accordingly, that Plato held ideas to be nate; that they were not imparted to the mind om without, although they were elicited into con- ciousness on the occasion of some outward impres- ion. Plato thus stands forth in the history of hilosophy as the first and principal philosopher by whom the doctrine of innate ideas was expressly advocated. He followed Socrates in the opinion that the seeds of all rational knowledge pre-existed in the mind, that they might be drawn forth into full growth and development from within, but could not be imparted to us from without. He held, moreover, with Socrates, that the true art of education consisted in educing from the pupil's own mind its own native treasures, by stimulating his reflective capacities. The Sophists, on the contrary, regarded the mind as a *tabula rasa*, on which no original characters were inscribed; and their boast was, that they could communicate to the minds of their pupils any amount or any kind of knowledge that was required.

29. That the doctrine of innate ideas is true in some sense, and to some extent, is undeniable; and therefore Locke's repudiation of the docrine, as one which could not be accepted on any terms, must be set aside as shortsighted and injudicious. It is still,

however, a question in what sense and to what exten is this doctrine to be accepted. It may be asked, fo example, in what sense are the conceptions expresse by the word *animal, man, tree,* to be regarded a innate? I answer, that these conceptions are no innate, if we suppose them to denote, as most peopl do, some faint or vague representation of anima man, or tree; nothing which is representable as a object is in any degree innate, and therefore thes conceptions, if they are innate, must not express anything which can be represented as an object. What, then, do these terms denote? They denote the fact that, on the occasion of an animal, a man, or a tree being presented to the mind, the mind thinks not merely of the one man, the one animal, or the one tree, but of something wider; in short, of a class, which class is to be construed to the mind not as an object, but as a fact or law; a fact or law by means of which unity is given to a number of our resembling impressions. Viewed in this way, the conception man may be said, with perfect truth, to be innate. When a man is placed before me, and when I think him (as distinguished from merely seeing him), I place him under a class, that is, under an idea wider than himself. And this idea or class I do not construe to my mind as made up of a number of individuals, for these again, however numerous, I should be again compelled by the necessity of thought to place under a class, and so on for ever. When I think a man, I think him as an instance of some-

thing of which there are or may be other instances to an indefinite extent. This something is innate; it is the principle, the presiding fact or law of the arrangement by which men, and other things, are placed under classes. But it cannot, as I said, be represented or placed before the mind as an object. When viewed as an object, its innate character is destroyed.

30. From what has been said in regard to the Platonic ideas being innate, it might be inferred that they were also subjective, or the proper and peculiar endowments of the human mind. This, however, is not the doctrine which Plato maintains. Ideas are not subjective in the sense of belonging peculiarly to the mind of man; they are rather objective, inasmuch as they are the light of all intellect, the principles of universal reason. No intelligence can operate without ideas, that is, without a capacity of apprehending resemblances and differences, and without obeying those laws of unity and arrangement which declare themselves in genera and species. All intellect must think under the conditions of resemblance and difference, genus and species. These laws, therefore, are objective and not subjective; they are the laws of things as well as the laws of thought. For the universe and all that it contains are constructed in conformity with these ideas, they are constructed under the laws of resemblance and difference, genus and species, and could not

have been fabricated on any other principles. You must not suppose that when we say that ideas are objective, we mean to assign to them any sort of outward existence. Objective in the sense of outward, is certainly not to be applied to them.

31. That these laws and ideas have a reality, a binding and irresistible authority, need scarcely be insisted on as part of the Platonic theory. This follows necessarily from all that has been said in regard to their nature. They are, in fact, the most real existences in the universe, for without them there would either be no universe at all, or that universe would be without form and void, an absolute chaos. To repeat, then, in a very few words, the chief characteristics of the Platonic ideas, they are these: *first*, their necessity; *secondly*, their universality; *thirdly*, their power of giving unity to our multifarious cognitions; *fourthly*, their innateness; *fifthly*, their objectivity; and, *sixthly*, their reality.

32. It has been a disputed point among philosophers, whether, according to Plato, ideas were dependent on the will of the Deity, whether they were, in fact, portions of the Divine reason, or whether they were antecedent to and independent of the will and existence of the Deity. Some have held that Plato regarded them as constituents of the Divine reason, others that he viewed them as independent

entities. The latter seems, on the whole, when rightly explained, to be the truer interpretation, and it may be explained by saying that the ideas are laws to which even the will and reason of the Deity conforms; for example, there is a law, *i.e.*, idea, of good and right according to which the will even of the Deity shapes itself, and this doctrine would make the law or idea of right to be in some sense antecedent to and independent of the Deity. In the dialogue called Euthyphro, the principal question discussed is this: Is an action good and holy because the gods approve of it, or do the gods approve of it because it is good and holy? If we say an action is good and holy because the gods approve of it, that would be equivalent to saying that good and evil depend on the arbitrary will of the gods: in this case their will would determine what was right and what was wrong. But if we say that an action is approved of by the gods because it is good and holy, this makes the idea of good and holy to be prior to the will of the gods; to be independent of their arbitration; to be rather that which determines their will, than that which their will determines. This, rather than the other, is the doctrine to which Plato and Socrates incline. Ideas may, in the Platonic theory, be perhaps coeval with the Divine will and reason; but if there be in either case a priority, the ideas are to be regarded as existing antecedent even to the mind of the Deity. But all that is really meant by this assertion is, that God approves of what is right

because it is right in itself, and not because He by His arbitrary decree has made it right.

33. I shall conclude this sketch of the Platonic dialectic with the remark, that in answer to the question, What is the absolute and universal truth, the truth for all intellect?—for this, you will remember, is the question which philosophy raises and endeavours to resolve—in reply to this question, Plato's answer would be: Ideas are the absolute and universal truth, the groundwork of all things; they are apprehended by all intellect, and, therefore, if that which addresses itself to all intellect, if that which all intellect apprehends, be the truest and most real, ideas must be the truest and most real of all things, for no intelligence can be intelligent except by participating in their light; they are the grounds of all conceivability, and of all intelligible or cognisable existence; the necessary laws or principles on which all Being and all Knowing are dependent. Such is the realism of Plato, a doctrine much truer and more profound than either the nominalism or conceptualism by which it has been succeeded.

34. The physics of Plato may be passed over as presenting few points of interest or intelligibility. His ethics have a much stronger claim on our attention. I shall in this paragraph give you a short summary of their scope and purport, and shall then

go into their details. Plato's moral philosophy will be best understood by being confronted with that of the Sophists, against which it was specially directed, just as his theory of ideas was designed to refute their theory of knowledge. If man be nothing but an aggregate of sensations, he can have no other end than sensational enjoyment, and no other principle of action than selfishness. Such, accordingly, was the general purport of the Sophistical morality, although some of its expounders recoiled from the extreme conclusions to which their principles led. Others, however, were less scrupulous. They explained the origin of justice in this curious fashion. The *best* condition, they said, in which a man can be placed is that in which he can injure others with impunity; the *worst* is that in which he can be injured without the power of defence or retaliation. But men cannot always assure themselves of the best condition, or guard against falling into the worst. This consideration leads them to a compromise, in which they consent to abandon the former condition in order to escape the latter, the evils of which outweigh the advantages of the other state. This compromise is itself justice, and such are the circumstances in which that virtue originates. From this it follows that the semblance of justice is better than the reality; because the semblance will prevent others from injuring us, while it will yet enable us to injure them to our heart's content.—(Republic, ii. pp. 358-9.)

35. In answer to this Sophistical deduction, Plato argues that justice is not (as this doctrine assumes) an unessential attribute, but is itself the health and organisation of the soul. The semblance of justice, he says, without the reality, is no more a good thing for its possessor than the semblance of order is a good thing in a nation, when all its ranks are in a condition of anarchy and rebellion, or than the appearance of health is a good thing in the human body, when all its organs are really in a state of disease. It is principally for the purpose of showing that virtue must be a reality, and not a sham, that Plato, in his Republic, has drawn a parallel between the soul of man and the political constitution of a state. Just as a state cannot exist unless it is sustained by political justice—that is to say, unless the rightful rulers rule, and are aided by the military, and unless the inferior orders obey—so the individual soul does not truly and healthfully exist unless it is the embodiment of private or personal justice, that is to say, unless reason rules the lower appetites, and is aided in its government by the more heroic passions of our nature. In short, just as a state without justice, that is, without the due subjection of the governed to the governing powers, is a state disorganised, so a soul without justice, that is, without the proper subordination of the inferior to the superior principles of our constitution, is a soul undone. A character which wears the mask without having the substance of virtue is no better, indeed is worse, off

than a sick body which presents the mere appearance of health.

36. Such is the scope (in so far as a few sentences can give it) of the moral philosophy of Plato, in its more popular aspect, as presented to us in the Republic. He treats the subject more metaphysically in the Philebus. But the result reached is in both cases the same. The maintenance of that organisation of the soul in which reason rules and passion obeys, this is the end to be aimed at by man, rather than happiness or pleasure.

37. But more important than any results, either moral or metaphysical, which have been brought to maturity by Plato, are the inexhaustible germs of latent wealth which his writings contain. Every time his pages are turned they throw forth new seeds of wisdom, new scintillations of thought, so teeming is the fertility, so irrepressible the fulness of his genius. All philosophy, speculative and practical, has been foreshadowed by his prophetic intelligence; often dimly, but always so attractively as to whet the curiosity and stimulate the ardour of those who have chosen him for their guide.

38. Plato's ethical doctrines are presented in their clearest and most detailed form in his great work, entitled the 'Republic.'* In this treatise his main

* The 'Republic' has been translated with remarkable fidelity

object is to show what justice is, and the result of his inquiry is, that justice is in fact the true nature, the true constitution of the soul. It is not something which appertains to the soul as an accidental quality, or as a property which can be assumed or laid aside at pleasure without affecting the innermost life of our intelligent nature. It is, on the contrary, the very essence of the soul. It denotes the equipoise which must be preserved among the different principles of our nature, if that nature is to remain true to itself, and fulfil the functions for which it was designed. And hence, inasmuch as justice is merely another word for the true nature of the soul, and inasmuch as the true nature of a thing is merely another word for the virtue of that thing, justice is to be regarded as emphatically the virtue of the soul.

39. Plato says that this doctrine of justice will be best understood, and that its truth will become more apparent, when we consider it upon a great scale. He says, that by knowing what justice is when we see it as the virtue of a state, we shall more clearly understand what it is when represented as the virtue of an individual. We can readily understand how a state or society of men must go to ruin

and spirit by Messrs Vaughan and Davies of Cambridge. And Dr Whewell has done good service to the cause of Platonic literature by abridging (with explanations) the more important dialogues, and clothing them in a garb of masculine and idiomatic English, which cannot fail to introduce them to many readers to whom they might otherwise have been uninteresting or inaccessible.

which is not governed according to the principles of justice; and we ought just as readily to understand how the soul of an individual man must go equally to ruin when his disposition is not regulated and his conduct guided by the principles of justice. At the outset of the inquiry, Plato had found himself beset with difficulties when he attempted to explain justice as it appears in the individual man; but by looking at it as manifested on a great scale in the organisation of the state, and then by holding that man is but a miniature of society, he is enabled to clear away the obstacles which had obstructed his course, and to carry through his argument in a very masterly and convincing fashion.

40. To explain, then, the nature of individual virtue, individual justice, Plato asks what is political virtue, political justice. Find out this, and then you will know what justice is, considered as the virtue of the soul. Understand the virtue of the state as shown in the true constitution of the state, and then you will understand the virtue of the soul as shown in the true constitution of the soul. Now, political justice, the virtue of the state, distributes to every member of the community his proper province of action, and seeks to prevent one citizen from encroaching upon another. That is the business of the state, and when it is rightly executed a true system or organisation of society is the result. There are three orders in the state. First, the working order,

the artisans, or, as they are nowadays termed, the operatives; secondly, the military or auxiliary order; and, thirdly, the legislative order. In regard to the first of these classes, their object is gain; they minister to wants and enjoyments of themselves and the community generally; this, the working order, may also be termed the *quæstuary* class, from *quæstus*, the Latin for gain, or the *chrematistic* class, from *χρήματα*, the Greek for money or wealth, this being the end which they aim at. In regard to the second of these classes, the military order, this is superior to the artisans. It exists for the purpose of preserving internal tranquillity and of repelling foreign agression. It is called the auxiliary class, because its principal function is to aid the legislative order in repressing all such insubordination on the part of the working class as would imperil the existence, or compromise the safety, of the state. Then in regard to the legislative order, its business is to govern the other classes; and it consists of those members of the community who, by their wisdom and probity, are the best qualified to discharge that office. When each of these orders fulfils its proper function, and when none of them attempts to usurp or encroach on the province of the others—when neither the artisans nor the military strive to displace the governing or legislative power, and when the legislative power does not succumb to either of these—the state is duly organised, its true constitution is preserved. It is, in fact, a state; and it possesses and presents the

virtue of a state. Political justice is embodied and shown forth.

41. Now, answering to these three orders in the state, there are in the soul of man three distinct faculties. 1. Appetite or desire, *i.e.*, the concupiscible faculty; 2. Spirit or indignation, *i.e.*, the irascible faculty; 3. Reason or the rational faculty. The first of these, the concupiscible faculty, in Greek, *ἐπιθυμία*, corresponds to the operative or quæstuary or chrematistic class in the state. Just as this class aims at the attainment of wealth, so does that faculty pursue pleasure as its end. The second of these, the irascible faculty, in Greek, *θυμὸς*, a term which, perhaps, might be tolerably well translated by our common word *pluck*—this faculty comprises the more heroïc principles and impulses of our nature; and it corresponds to the military or auxiliary order in the state. Just as the military are called in to aid the legislative authority in putting down mob insurrections, so the irascible faculty, that is, the nobler passions, and the reason, unite in resisting the solicitations of the lower appetites. The third of these is the rational faculty, in Greek, *νοῦς*. This is the governing principle in the mind, *τὸ ἡγεμονικόν*, just as the legislative is the governing power in the state.

42. Such is the way in which Plato works out the analogy between the soul of man and the constitution

of a civil community. By nature the concupiscible is designed to obey the rational, just as in the state the working classes are designed to obey the legislative power; and the irascible is created to assist the rational, just as the military exist to aid and support the legislative. Thus, as there are three orders in the state, so are there three faculties in the soul, each answering to each—the concupiscible to the working order, the irascible to the military, and the rational to the legislative. The virtue of the concupiscible is temperance; in other words, the submission of the concupiscible to the rational is the virtue of temperance. The virtue of the irascible is fortitude; the virtue of the rational is wisdom or prudence. When consent and harmony prevail among the three, then that complete virtue which Plato calls justice arises. And this virtue is higher than either temperance taken by itself, or than fortitude taken by itself, or than wisdom taken by itself, for it is the complement of the whole three, and is the result of the harmonious and properly balanced operation of the three faculties of the soul. Just as justice pervades the state, and the wellbeing of the community is the result when each order keeps its own place, and executes its appointed function, so justice pervades the soul, and health and strength of mind are the result when each of the faculties preserves the relation towards the other faculties in which nature placed it, and in which nature intended it to stand. When this relation is preserved, the outward life and

conduct of the individual will not fail to correspond with his internal condition. You thus perceive that Plato makes individual justice, or the highest virtue of the soul, to be itself the very constitution of the soul, just as political justice, or the subordination of the mass to certain governing powers, is itself the very constitution of the state. A remarkable passage from the fourth book of the Republic will show you how it is by close observation to the facts of our nature that Plato discriminates these three powers of the mind, and shows that they are really distinct.—(Rep., iv. p. 439; p. 160 in Vaughan and Davies's translation.)

43. We have now to show against whom was Plato's doctrine of justice, and of the constitution of human nature, intended to be directed. It was directed against the sophists, and he argued thus: if the nature of justice be such that it is necessarily inherent in the constitution of the human soul, is, in fact, itself that constitution, then is the sophistry of the sophists, and of all other cavillers, at once overthrown. The sophists argued that injustice might in many cases be preferable to justice: they argued that justice was good, and was esteemed, merely because it brought wealth, security, honour, and praise, so that if a man could with consummate art simulate justice, while he was in his soul unjust, he might reap the full reward of justice among men, and be to that extent happy; and, so far as regarded

the gods, he need not, the sophists said, give himself much trouble about them, for they could be propitiated with sacrifices, and kept quiet by means of a few grains of frankincense. In this way the sophists endeavoured to make out that injustice might be a real good to its possessor while justice might prove a real evil. Or, at any rate, they argued that men were just merely because they found it to redound to their advantage, in a worldly point of view, to be so, and that if they could procure the same or greater advantages by being unjust, unjust they would undoubtedly be. They argued very much in the spirit of Hobbes, that men were deterred from *committing* injustice merely by their dislike of *suffering* injustice, and knowing that if they perpetrated wrong on others they must be prepared to endure wrong from others in return.

44. In Book i. p. 359, the explanation which the sophists gave of law and justice (and which you will see resembles very closely the doctrine of Hobbes) is set forth, and the argument illustrated by the story of the ring which the ancestor of Gyges had possessed. Thus the sophists argued that if every man had the ring of Gyges, by which he could make himself invisible at pleasure, then every man would do wrong whenever he felt inclined, and would do right only in so far as it would promote his own happiness. So that the life of an unjust man who can perfectly conceal his motives (as many men can

and do, even without this magic ring) may be fairly set up as more desirable than that of a just man; and thus injustice may in many cases be preferable to justice, on account of the greater happiness which it brings, and of this every man must judge for himself. The advantage of probity, therefore, according to the sophists, who sometimes reasoned boldly on these points, although at other times they endeavoured to hide the extreme to which their principles carried them, did not centre in itself, but in what was exterior to itself, namely, in the honours and rewards which probity procured for the man who practised it. Probity might be said to consist not in *being*, but in *seeming* to be honest. The appearance was quite as good as the reality. By all means, said the sophists, be just and virtuous, if justice and virtue make you happy.; but if vice and injustice make another man happy, why should not he too follow the bent of his inclinations? In doing so, he will obey the dictates of *his* nature, will fulfil the law of *his* being, just as much as you who pursue a contrary course are obeying the dictates and fulfilling the law of *your* being.

45. This is precisely the point where Plato enters his dissent, and it was to meet this point that his doctrine of the soul, as made up of three faculties, arranged in the order of superiority and inferiority, and illustrated by the analogous constitution of a social community, was set forth and enforced with all

the power of his genius. Insist on these sophistical opinions as you choose, says Plato, I overthrow them all at one swoop, by asserting and by proving a certain construction or organisation of the soul, to which organisation we must look apart altogether from external considerations of honour or advantage. If justice consists in the due harmony of the three faculties of the soul, that is, in the obedience and submission of the inferior to the superior principles, no man can be just by appearing to be so when he is not, any more than a nation or state could delude a neighbouring nation or state, if the soldiers, the legislators, and the people, were in a state of anarchy; *i.e.*, if the people were not working, if the military were in revolt, or the legislature overcome by imbecility. A soul in which the inferior principles reigned supreme, or one which presented the mere semblance, but not the reality, of justice, would be a soul disorganised, a soul untrue to its own constitution—a soul, in fact, which was not a soul; just as a state in which the relation of the governed and the governors was reversed, would be a state which had crumbled into dust. And even suppose the dissimulation to have been carried so far that both the soul and the state appear to be in health and preservation, surely both the man himself and the state itself would know that no balance of power, no true strength, no true life was within them, and that no security was theirs. Injustice, or the want of a proper equipoise among their various elements, would set them at variance

with themselves, and lay them open to the assaults of all around. Therefore, justice is the strength, the true nature of every soul, just as it is of every political constitution; and, accordingly, when this simpler and more truthful system of morals was given to the world by Plato, the doctrine of the sophists fell to the ground as an edifice which had no solid foundation.

46. Plato goes on to enforce and illustrate his views by showing that justice is the health, and consequently the happiness, of the soul, and that the mere semblance of justice is no more the health and happiness of the soul, than the mere semblance of bodily vigour is the health and happiness of the body. How, asks Plato, is bodily health produced? It is produced when the ongoings of our physical frame proceed as they have been established by nature; disease inevitably arises when any part of the system is out of joint, or is not governed according to nature. In the same way disease arises in the soul, when any of its parts do not conform to the design of the whole. But justice is itself a conformity with this design, is a working in accordance with it, just as injustice is the reverse. Therefore injustice, although its external accompaniments and consequences may be honours and rewards, is the disease, the deformity, the misery, the bad habit of the soul; while justice, even though it should meet with no corresponding external advantages, is the

health, the beauty, the happiness, the good habit of the soul. We speak of a bad habit of body when its parts are in disorder and at variance with each other, and of a good habit of body when its different parts are in harmony. So vice, independently of external considerations, is the disease, the deformity, the corruption, the pollution, the slavery of the soul, inasmuch as it indicates that the intellectual system is disordered, and that those principles have usurped the government which were created only to obey: and so virtue, and, in particular, justice, is the health, the perfection, the freedom of the soul, inasmuch as it indicates that the intellectual system is well ordered, is regulated according to its nature, and that those principles are governing which were intended to govern, while those are obeying which were intended to obey. Farther, if the state of the body when diseased be such as to render life a burthen, though it may be surrounded with all the luxuries which wealth can procure, so when the state of the soul is thoroughly corrupted by injustice, it can enjoy no true happiness, no real satisfaction, although crowned with worldly honours and advantages; as Juvenal says:—

> "Cur tamen hos tu
> Evassisse putes quos diri conscia facti
> Mens habet attonitos, et surdo verbere cædit,
> Occultum quatiente animo tortore flagellum."
>
> —JUVENAL, xiii. 192.

See especially the passage where Plato speaks of the rightly balanced condition of the soul, which con-

stitutes justice.—(Plato, Rep., B. iv. pp. 443, 444; pp. 167, 168, 169 in English translation.)

47. You will thus perceive that Plato argues in favour of justice as the true condition of humanity, by looking, not to any external advantages or disadvantages which justice may confer, but by looking to the internal economy of human nature itself, and by showing that justice is nothing more or less than the maintenance of that economy in the order which nature has established, just as bodily health is nothing more or less than the maintenance of the order and arrangement which nature has established among the various organs of our physical framework.

48. The object with which Plato instituted the analogy or comparison between the soul of man and the constitution of a political state was this: it was to show that just as there can be no political state without justice, that is, without a proper balance and subordination being preserved among the different orders of society; so there can be no soul, or true rational life, in man, without justice, *i.e.*, without a proper balance and subordination being preserved among the different parts and principles of the soul. Justice in a man has its analogies on a large scale in justice in a state; and just as the state ceases to be a state and goes to ruin so soon as justice deserts it, *i.e.*, so soon as confusion and insubordination prevail among its ranks; so the soul goes

to ruin so soon as justice departs from it, *i.e.*, so soon as its inferior principles prevail over its superior ones, so soon as what was meant to obey presumes to take the office of governor.

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49. The philosophical school founded by Plato is known in the history of philosophy as the Academy, so called from the groves of Academus where Plato was in the habit of addressing his disciples. The Academy is usually divided into three, the old, the middle, and new. The latter two may occupy our attention for a brief period hereafter: meanwhile I speak merely of the old Academy, which embraced and was presided over by the immediate followers of Plato. None of the writings of these older Platonists have come down to us. All that is known of their opinions is gathered from a few brief and incidental notices which occur in certain ancient authors. We are not, therefore, in a position to speak with any certainty of the manner in which they may have modified or carried forward the philosophy of their master. I shall merely make mention of Plato's three more immediate followers, Speusippus, Xenocrates, and Polemon, who succeeded him as the heads of the Academy.

50. Speusippus was the nephew of Plato. He was born probably about 400 B.C.—a calculation which makes him about thirty years younger than his

uncle. He was a native of Athens. He accompanied Plato on his third journey to Syracuse, and is said to have shown much prudence and address amid the troubled atmosphere of the court of Dionysius. His active and moral powers were by all accounts greater than his intellectual acuteness. On the death of Plato in 347, he became his successor in the Academy, having been so nominated by Plato himself. Aristotle may have looked forward to that elevation as a position to which he was well entitled to aspire. But Aristotle was destined for higher things than to be the follower even of so great a philosopher as Plato. Although he has much in common with his master, he was rather fitted to found a new dynasty in philosophy than to be the continuator of an old one. Aristotle, not long afterwards, became the founder of the peripatetic school of philosophy, which held its meetings in the Lyceum. Speusippus continued president of the Academy for about eight years. He was compelled by a lingering illness to relinquish the office some time before his death, which probably took place about 330 B.C., or it may be somewhat earlier. He is said, in particular, to have lectured against the hedonism of Aristippus.

51. Xenocrates, who succeeded Speusippus as president of the Academy about 340 B.C., was a native of Chalcedon, a city on the shores of the Bosporus. He was born in 396. In early life he came to Athens, and attached himself to Plato. Like Spe

sippus, he accompanied the philosopher on one of his visits to Syracuse. After Plato's death, Xenocrates went, in company with Aristotle, to the court of Hermias, the ruler of Atarneus, in Mysia, a province of Asia Minor. He cannot have remained very long in this retreat; for we are told that he was frequently sent by the Athenians on embassies to Philip of Macedon, with whom they were at this time embroiled, and by whom, in the year 338, they were ultimately subjugated. When the failing health of Speusippus compelled him to resign the presidency of the Academy, Xenocrates was summoned to the vacant post, and this office he occupied from about 340 B.C. until his death in 314, when he was in the eighty-third year of his age. The temperament and the morals of Xenocrates were grave, not to say austere, in the extreme. His name was quoted in antiquity as almost a synonym for unselfishness, modesty, temperance, and continence. None of his works have come down to us, so that we cannot speak very particularly in regard to his opinions. Only their titles are extant, and these are sufficiently tantalising. From them we learn that he prosecuted diligently the researches in which his great master had led the way. He wrote on dialectic, on knowledge, on ideas, on the existent and the one, on the opposite, on the indefinite, on the soul, on the passions, on happiness and virtue, on the state, and several other topics. These writings are extremely multifarious in their subject; and that the sub-

jects were treated of by Xenocrates in an able and interesting manner, we may infer from the fact that Aristotle thought it worth his while to write commentaries on some of these treatises. Xenocrates is said to have insisted particularly on the distinction laid down by Plato between *αἴσθησις*, *δόξα*, and *ἐπιστήμη*. By *αἴσθησις* he probably understood the relative and contingent truths of the senses; by *δόξα* the relative and contingent truths of the understanding; and by *ἐπιστήμη* the absolute and necessary truths of the reason—the truths, *i.e.*, for *all*, and not merely for some, intelligence.

52. The name of Polemon must be ever associated with that of Xenocrates in the history of philosophy. Polemon was notorious for his profligacy and dissipation; but happening one day to enter the Academy with a crowd of gay companions with whom he had been revelling, he was so much struck by the discourse of Xenocrates, who was lecturing on the advantages of temperance, that he tore from his head the chaplet of flowers with which he was crowned, and determined then and for ever to renounce his former way of life. He continued true to his resolution: he became the most temperate of the temperate, and studied philosophy so assiduously that he became the successor of Xenocrates in the presidency of the Academy in the year 314 B.C. He died in 273, having been born about 345.

ARISTOTLE.

1. THE writings of Aristotle, even in the imperfect state in which they have come down to us, are exceedingly multifarious. They are usually divided by his commentators into three departments: 1st, Logical; 2d, Theoretical; and, 3d, Practical. Under the *logical* division are comprised the treatises called the Organon. Under the *theoretical* division are placed the physics, mathematics, metaphysics, and the treatise on the soul. Under the *practical* division are comprehended ethics and politics. There also extant a work by Aristotle on rhetoric, another on poetics, and several minor treatises. The only works of Aristotle on which I propose to touch in these lectures are the logic, the metaphysics, the treatise on the soul, and the ethics, and of these the ethics alone shall engage a considerable share of our attention.

2. The logic which you have already studied elsewhere is derived entirely from Aristotelian sources: and therefore, as I may presume that you are already familiar with its details, I shall touch very cursorily on this part of Aristotle's philosophy. The logic of

Aristotle is usually termed formal or deductive, to distinguish it from the inductive logic, for which Bacon usually gets the credit. It was at one time, and not very long ago, supposed that the inductive logic, which studied real nature, was much more valuable than the deductive logic, which merely scrutinised mental processes; but it is now generally acknowledged that both sciences are equally worthy of our attention. In point of technical precision, the logic of Aristotle, and in particular his doctrine of the syllogism, is unrivalled; and it is not a little remarkable that it should have sprung at once into perfection. The industry and ingenuity of more than two thousand years have added little or nothing to the symmetrical beauty, the finished excellence, of the logical system of the mighty Stagirite. Aristotle's logical treatises have been collected together under the general title of the Organon. The Organon comprises treatises on the Categories (*κατηγορίαι*), and on the interpretation or expression of thought, *περὶ ἑρμηνείας* (the genuineness of these writings, however, has been doubted). It contains a treatise called the Prior Analytics (*ἀναλυτικὰ πρότερα*), which deals with propositions, and another entitled *ἀναλυτικὰ ὕστερα*, which deals with proof, definition, and division. It also contains *τοπικὰ*, or topics, a treatise on probable reasoning, and a treatise on sophistical fallacies and their solution (*περὶ σοφιστικῶν ἐλέγχων*). These are the logical writings of Aristotle. They deal with the method of science, and are therefore

classed together as the Organon or instrument of inquiry. The Categories, or general heads under which all things may be classed, are the following ten: *οὐσία*, or substance: *ποσὸν*, quantity; *ποιὸν*, quality; *πρός τι*, relation; *ποῦ*, where; *ποτὲ*, when; *κεῖσθαι*, position; *ἔχειν*, having; *ποιεῖν*, doing; *πάσχειν*, suffering. These might be reduced to two, substance and accident; or, viewed logically, subject and predicate: thus *οὐσία* is the subject, for example "man," and all the other categories denote what may be predicated of man. Thus, whatever we say of man must be either something about his size, or his qualities, or his relation to other things, or the place *where* he is or was, or the time *when* he is or was, or his attitude, or his possessions, or his actings or sufferings. Aristotle's scheme of the Categories must be pronounced crude and imperfect, whether we regard it as a table of things or as a classification of the forms of predication.

3. In his work, entitled the 'Metaphysics,' or first philosophy, as he himself calls it, Aristotle treats of the principles common to all things, the universal constituents of Being. The term metaphysics is not employed by Aristotle. The explanation usually given of the origin of this word is, that some early commentator on Aristotle, finding certain treatises placed after the physics in the arrangement of his master's works, gave to these treatises the superscription *τὰ μετὰ τὰ φυσικὰ*, the writings that

come after the physics. In bestowing on them this name, however, it is uncertain whether he was influenced solely by the fact that these writings followed the others in a certain arbitrary arrangement, or whether he was guided partly by the consideration that these writings dealt with matters which were higher than mere physical truth, and which lay beyond the apprehension of our mere sensible experience. You will find this work frequently described as dealing with Being in so far as it is Being, with *ens quatenus ens est*, the meaning of which rather obscure words is simply this, that in this investigation Aristotle does not consider Being as this or that particular Being, but simply as Being, that is, as presenting the attributes or conditions common to all Being, differences being left out of view. These universal elements of Being are, according to Aristotle, four. *First*, Matter or substratum; in Greek, ἡ ὕλη or τὸ ὑποκείμενον. *Secondly*, Form or essence; in Greek, οὐσία, εἶδος, μορφὴ, or τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι. *Third*, the moving or efficient cause; in Greek, ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς κινήσεως. *Fourth*, the end or final cause, also called the good; τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα, τὸ τέλος, or τὸ ἀγαθόν. These four principles are, according to Aristotle, the most general causes of things, and enter into the constitution of everything. They are truths for all intellect. He held that former systems had erred in not embracing the whole of these principles. Every antecedent system had left some of them out of its reckoning; hence they were all partial and

incomplete. I may say a few words on each of them.

4. In regard to the *first* of these, matter or ὕλη, Aristotle's doctrine is this: Matter is not, properly speaking, the existent; neither is it the absolutely non-existent: it is mere potentiality (δύναμις), a capability of passing into the actual. When form, οὐσία εἶδος, supervenes to matter or ὕλη, the potential is converted into the actual, and the result is completed existence. This perfected existence, at least when organised, is called by Aristotle ἐντελέχεια, and also ἐνέργεια. Thus, δύναμις and ὕλη are nearly synonymous in the Aristotelic philosophy. They denote a mere capacity of existence; ἐντελέχεια and ἐνέργεια are also nearly synonymous, and denote the actuality of existence, existence realised. These words play an important part in the system of Aristotle, metaphysical, physical, and moral. There is another important word which I may mention here, στέρησις, privation. Matter devoid of all form would be in a state of στέρησις or privation. Thus, στέρησις is the opposite of ἐντελέχεια, for this latter term expresses the union of matter and form (ὕλη and οὐσία). It is not to be supposed that matter is ever in a state of absolute privation. Such a state is a mere mental abstraction, or rather it is a nonsensical, inconceivable condition.

5. The *second* principle which Aristotle lays down

is one of the universal constituents of Being is Form or Essence (*οὐσία*), a principle on which I have touched in the preceding section. This principle was advanced by Aristotle in the place of the Platonic ideas which he endeavours to displace and refute. Whether he dealt altogether fairly with the Platonic theory is still a somewhat unsettled question. Aristotle understood Plato to maintain that the ideas existed by themselves apart (*χωριστά*) from the individual things which were formed after their pattern. That Plato maintained this in literal strictness is not by any means certain. Such, however, was Aristotle's understanding of him. And interpreting him this way, he objected to the doctrine of ideas on the following grounds: *First*, that such a doctrine is a mere doubling of sensible existences; the ideas are conceived as merely attenuated material objects. Aristotle calls them also *αἰσθητὰ ἀΐδια*, that is, everlasting sensibles. *Secondly*, he says that the ideas not being *in* things, cannot be the causes of motion or change, and therefore serve no purpose as explanatory of the phenomena of change. *Thirdly*, that not being *in* things, they cannot help us to any knowledge of things, and are therefore of no use as explanatory of the phenomenon of knowledge. *Fourthly*, that they are contradictory, inasmuch as they are represented as the essence of things, and yet as existing separate from things, as if it were possible that the essence of a thing could be separated from the thing of which it was the essence. *Fifthly*, that the

doctrine of ideas is a poetical fancy, and that it is merely by a metaphor that things are said to be copies of ideas. And, *sixthly*, supposing the ideas to exist, they and the things which are their copies would require to be subsumed and reduced to unity under a higher idea, which is absurd; for example, if the idea man exists as something apart from actual men, we must have a higher idea to embrace both the ideal man and the actual men. This objection is called the argument of the τρίτος ἄνθρωπος, the third man; the other two being the idea of man and the reality of man. This argument, however, had been foreseen and stated by Plato himself. Such, stated shortly, is the tenor of Aristotle's argumentation against Plato's theory of ideas. All his objections are offshoots from his leading objection to the Platonic assertion (or what he regards as such), that the ideas are existences apart (χωριστὰ) from the things of which they are said to be the models.

6. But although Aristotle contested the Platonic doctrine, he advanced an ideal theory of his own. He did not hold that ideas were mere subjective conceptions, the fabrications of our own minds. He held that there was a correlative reality in the object answering to the conception in our minds, and this correlative reality he calls the form or essence, οὐσία. This essence is not an object of sense, but of intellect. It is, in fact, the Platonic idea under another name. So that we may say that Aristotle adopted the Platonic

doctrine, with this modification, that whereas Plato (at least as understood by Aristotle) promulgated a doctrine in which ideas were represented as existing by themselves, and apart from things, Aristotle represented them as implicated in things, and as forming their most essential constituent. The idea, for example, considered as the one does not exist *together with* the many, but it exists *in* the many. Unity is essential to multiplicity. If we view ideas as laws, we might say that while Plato, at least as interpreted by Aristotle, regarded the laws as subsisting by themselves, and as constituting a world apart, Aristotle regarded them as inseparably united with the things of which they were the laws. (The *individual* is the essence in the first and proper sense of the word; only in a secondary sense can the *genus* be called the essence.) The genus has no existence apart from the individuals, yet although the genus or universal has no existence in and for itself, but only an existence in individuals, it is nevertheless the most significant, and in its nature the most knowable, and the proper object of knowledge. There can be no knowledge without it.

7. Aristotle's third and fourth principles are efficient cause and final cause. Every change from the potential to the actual is brought about by a cause, and this cause is distinguished by Aristotle as the moving or efficient cause, *τὸ κινῆσαν*. It may either operate from within, as in the case of organised ex-

istences, or from without, as when an artist forms a statue. In either case, there is an operative cause, through which the materials are moulded into form. Then, lastly, there is the end or final cause. Everything exists for some purpose. We may not know for what purpose, but we must think that everything exists for some purpose, and this purpose is called its end or final cause. A final cause always implies intelligence, which an efficient cause does not necessarily imply.

8. The three latter principles, essence, efficient cause, and end, are said by Aristotle to be very closely united, and often, indeed, to run into one. It is not difficult to see the identity of essence and end. Thus, for example, the possession of reason is the essence of man, and the possession of reason is also his end, or the most important part of his end. But it is not easy to identify efficient cause with the other two principles. I may here remark that Aristotle's conception of ends differs from that of Paley and other modern philosophers in being more comprehensive than theirs. Paley dwelt on the useful contrivances observable in the structure of organised bodies, and from thence inferred the existence of an intelligent designer. The same argument is implied in Aristotle. But he, moreover, holds that in everything that exists there is an indwelling end or purpose, and that this end or purpose is as much involved, although not so obtrusive or conspicuous, in such simple structures as

a blade of grass, as it is in the most complicated organisations.

9. Aristotle's philosophy terminates in a sublime theology. Although matter never exists without form, and although the forms or essence of matter never exist apart from matter, there is nevertheless a form or essence which exists separate from all matter; and this is the first great cause of all that is, the intelligent and moving energy which originally sets in motion the whole machinery of the universe, and evolves potentiality into actuality. This cause is the Deity, the Godhead, which moves all, but is itself unmoved, pure matterless activity, the eternal self-thinking reason, the absolute spirit, in speaking of which Aristotle says, in the words of Homer, that the rule of many is not good, but that there is and should be only one sovereign over all;

Οὐκ ἀγαθὸν πολυκοιρανίη· εἷς κοίρανος ἔστω.

10. Aristotle's treatise *περὶ ψυχῆς* falls under the head of his theoretical philosophy, and properly falls under the subdivision of that head which is entitled physics. It is only in reference to this treatise on the soul of man, which he considers chiefly from a physical point of view (in his work *περὶ ψυχῆς*), that I shall speak of the physics of Aristotle. The word *soul*, *ψυχή*, is in his vocabulary not by any means limited to intelligence. It signifies, in its widest sense, the power or principle of life; and in this sense it is

what he calls the ἐντελέχεια, or perfected organisation of the body. There is a scale or series of these organisations in nature, rising one above another; and of these the higher forms always contain the lower. Thus, there is, *first* and lowest, a plant soul, or life in vegetables. This is a mere principle of nutrition and reproduction, τὸ θρεπτικόν. Plants are able to assimilate what is necessary to support them, and to continue their like. Then, *secondly*, there is an animal soul, a principle of animal life, which consists in sensation, desire, and locomotion, τὸ αἰσθητικόν, τὸ ὀρεκτικόν, τὸ κινητικόν (κατὰ τόπον). The functions of this principle are directed and checked by a moderating power (ἀρχή), which is altogether wanting in plants. The higher animals have some degree of fancy (φαντασία) and involuntary memory (μνήμη). Then, *thirdly*, there is the soul of man, which comprehends, in addition to all these principles, the power of reason (νοῦς). This reason is partly passive, determined, and temporal or transitory; partly active, determining, and immortal. So that the soul of man comprises, according to Aristotle, a power of nutrition and reproduction, a power of sensation, desire, and locomotion, a power of imagination and memory, a power of reason, and, in so far as reason is active and determining, a power of free will.

11. The ethics of Aristotle commence with the remark that the actions of all rational creatures aim at some end. Ends are of two kinds, subordinate

and ultimate. The various arts and sciences have subordinate ends in view. The art of medicine, for example, has health for its end. The art of ship-building has a ship, and the art of war has victory for its end. These are subordinate ends. But there is an ultimate end, an end in reference to which these, and all other subordinate ends, may be considered as means, a chief end or *summum bonum* which is desired for its own sake, and not for the sake of anything beyond it. What is this end? This is the question with which political science has to deal; for Aristotle uses the word πολιτικὴ as comprising what we more usually term ethics.

12. The name of this ultimate end is very easily given. There is no dispute about that. Both philosophers and the vulgar agree in calling it *happiness*. Happiness is the chief good, the ultimate end at which all human beings aim.

13. But there is a great diversity of opinion as to what happiness is. Philosophers differ from the vulgar; they differ, too, among themselves as to the nature of happiness. There are four theories of happiness, or good, which may be briefly mentioned: *first*, "that the good is an abstract something which exists independently, and through which all things that are good are constituted good;" *secondly*, that "it is sensual pleasure;" *thirdly*, that it is honour as attained in society; and *fourthly*, that "it consists

in a life of intellectual contemplation." Such are the four opinions enumerated by Aristotle as the theories of happiness most in vogue at the time when he wrote.

14. He expresses his dissatisfaction with them all. The *first* is the Platonic doctrine, according to Aristotle's interpretation of it. It is too abstruse and mystical to be of any practical value. The *second* theory may suit brute animals, but it is not applicable to man. The *third* is true to some extent, but is incomplete. The *fourth* is the truest of the four, and is adopted by Aristotle as part of his own doctrine; but it too is incomplete, and requires to be largely supplemented before it can be embraced.

15. Aristotle then proceeds to declare his own views as to the nature of happiness, and as to the way in which the inquiry after it should be conducted. To find out what man's happiness is, we must first of all, he says, find out what man's proper work, or function, or vocation is. When we have discovered this, we shall have no difficulty in discovering wherein his happiness consists. For the function which a man has to fulfil, the work which he has to do, being known, his happiness will be seen to centre in the discharge of that function, in the performance of that work.

16. We ask, then, what is man's proper work or

office? It may help us to find out this if we consider what his proper work *is not*. Man's proper work is not the maintenance of a mere organic life, for that, we may say, is the proper work of vegetables; but man is not a vegetable. Nor is the attainment and maintenance of pleasurable sensations the proper work of a man, for that is the proper business of mere animals, but man is not a mere animal. The proper work of man, therefore, is not mere life, because he is not a creature that merely lives; and it is not mere sensation, because he is not a creature that merely feels.

17. What, then, is the proper work of a man? To ascertain this we must ascertain what man's peculiar property or attribute is. His peculiar property or attribute is reason. He has life in common with all organised creatures; he has sensation in common with all animated creatures; but he has reason as an endowment, which is peculiar to himself. Man's proper work, therefore, the vocation he has to discharge, must stand closely related to the peculiar characteristic, namely, the rational nature, with which he has been endowed; and hence man's true work or function, as defined by Aristotle, is as follows—"The work of man is a conscious and active life of the soul in accordance with reason." * This, he says,

* Ἀνθρώπου δὲ τίθεμεν ἔργον ζωήν τινα, ταύτην δὲ ψυχῆς ἐνέργειαν καὶ πράξεις μετὰ λόγου (σπουδαίου δ' ἀνδρὸς εὖ ταῦτα καὶ καλῶς).—Eth. Nic., 1. 7.

is the proper work of all men; it is the endeavour of the good man to lead this life in the most noble and perfect manner possible.

18. Man's proper vocation having been thus defined by Aristotle, he then defines his proper happiness in accordance with that definition. The definition of happiness is this—"Man's good or happiness is a conscious and active and rational life of the soul in accordance with virtue or excellence, and carried on in favourable external circumstances." * You will perceive that this definition embraces in its latter clause those elements of happiness, namely, the good gifts of fortune, which the world at large is apt to regard as forming almost the sole constituents of felicity, but which some schools of morality, the Stoics, for example, were inclined to exclude altogether from the conception of happiness.

19. It is obvious that there is but little difference between these two definitions, the definition of man's work and the definition of his happiness. Man's work is defined in almost the same terms in which man's happiness is defined; and it may be thought that this close resemblance of the two shows rather a want of discrimination on the part of Aristotle. But a small degree of reflection may satisfy us

* Τὸ ἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθὸν ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια γίνεται κατ' ἀρετήν, (εἰ δὲ πλείους αἱ ἀρεταὶ, κατὰ τὴν ἀρίστην καὶ τελειοτάτην). Ἔτι δ' ἐν βίῳ τελείῳ.

that the two definitions must bear a close resemblance to each other, and that their perfection consists in their differing from each other but slightly; for, observe, if man's proper work be a certain kind of life or mode of action, then his proper happiness must consist in doing that work well. His vocation is a particular kind of life; his happiness, therefore, is his living that kind of life in the best way possible. For example, if it is the proper business of a tree to put forth blossoms and to produce fruits, then we might say it will be that the happiness of the tree would consist in doing this abundantly and well. So that Aristotle, having defined man's proper work as consisting in a particular kind of life, is strictly logical in his procedure when he defines his happiness as consisting in living that life well. The two definitions stated in their simplest forms will stand thus: *first*, in regard to man's work, man's proper work is living reasonably; *second*, in regard to man's happiness, man's happiness is his living reasonably, in the best and noblest manner, and in the midst of favourable external conditions.

20. These definitions, which may appear to be little better than truisms, and which look rather clumsy in any English translation that can be made of them, will lead us immediately into an inquiry of greater interest and importance. But first let us note the elements which are involved in Aristotle's definition of happiness. *First*, it is mental, and not

bodily; it centres in reason, and not in sense; *secondly*, it implies excellence, that is, virtue; *thirdly*, it is an activity, or energy, and not a mere potentiality of our nature; and *fourthly*, it implies a life favourably situated in regard to its external lot. All these conditions must combine in order to render human happiness complete; and Aristotle holds that his definition is the only one which embraces within it the whole of them.

21. It has been said, in the terms of our definition, that man's proper office is to live rationally, and that his happiness consists in living rationally in the best or most excellent way. Hence the new question arises, What is the best or most excellent way of living rationally? To answer this question, we must again inquire into the constitution of human nature. This constitution is made up mainly of two parts. *First*, the principle of reason; and *secondly*, the principle of desire. Stated shortly, reason and passion are the two principal constituents of man's ψυχή, or immaterial part. In regard to reason, it has an excellence of its own in which the intellectual virtues consist. (These we leave out of view at present.) The matter which requires our consideration is the relation between reason and the passions. It is the office of reason to control the passions. The passions are able to obey, but they have also a tendency to resist the influence of reason. The passions, we may say, quicken and arouse the reason; the reason

checks and guides the passions; and the action of the one of these upon the other constitutes the moral nature of man. The due and proper working of this moral nature constitutes man's excellence or virtue. So that the answer to our question, What is the best and most excellent way of living rationally? is this, That the best and most excellent way of living rationally is by maintaining the due and proper working of our moral nature, a nature made up, as has been said, of reason and passion.

22. This answer gives rise to the new question, But what is the due and proper working of man's moral nature? (I may here remark in passing, that in thus carrying on the inquiry by the way of question and answer, I am going to work more formally and methodically even than Aristotle himself. But this procedure may conduce, I think, to distinctness of exposition.) The obvious answer to this question is, that the due and proper working of man's moral nature must consist in such an adjustment between reason and passion, as that the one of these, the reason, shall guide and govern, and that the other, the passions, shall obey even while they contrive to impel. When this adjustment is effected, the right working of man's moral nature is secured; in other words, moral virtue is the result, while happiness is at the same time attained, inasmuch as man is now living a rational life in the best and noblest way in

which such a life can be led—in accordance, namely, with excellence or virtue.

23. But a new question arises out of the answer which has just been given. That answer was this, that the right working of man's moral nature was an arrangement in which reason ruled and passion obeyed. This answer brings forward the new question, But how is such an arrangement or adjustment to be brought about? in other words, How is moral virtue to be produced?

24. To this question Aristotle answers in one word, that moral virtue is produced or acquired by habit. Practise the virtues and you will acquire them; and you can acquire them in no other way. This answer is more important and more profound than it appears. It is opposed at once to the doctrine that virtue is implanted in us by nature, or comes to us merely from nature, and to the doctrine which Plato seems to have favoured, that virtue might be merely theoretical, might consist in a mere knowledge of what is right. Both of these doctrines were impugned by Aristotle in the assertion that the practice of virtue, its habitual exercise, was necessary to the attainment and existence of virtue.

25. The following remarks, in which Aristotle shows that the moral virtues are not ours by nature, but are acquired by custom, are well worthy of your

consideration. Near the commencement of book second he says *—

"Not one of the moral virtues comes to be in us merely by nature; because of such things as exist by nature, none can be changed by custom; a stone, for instance, by nature gravitating downwards, could never by custom be brought to ascend, not even if one were to try and accustom it by throwing it up ten thousand times; nor could fire again be brought to descend, nor in fact could anything whose nature is in one way be brought by custom to be in another. The virtues, then, come to be in us neither by nature nor against nature; but we are naturally disposed to receive them, and are perfected in them by habit.

"Again, all the things that come to us by nature we possess first as *faculties* (δυνάμεις); afterwards we exhibit them in actual operation (τὰς ἐνέργειας). This is clear with regard to the senses, for we did not get our senses by hearing often and seeing often, but, on the contrary, we had them and then used them; we did not have them by using them. But the virtues we gain by having acted first, as is the case with the arts also, for those things which one must learn before one can do, one learns by doing; as, for instance, by building, builders are formed, and by harping, harpers. So too, by doing just things we become just; by doing temperate things, temperate; by doing brave things, brave.

* The translation is partly taken from Mr Chase, partly from Sir A. Grant.

"And to the truth of this, testimony is borne by what takes place in communities; because the lawgivers make the individual members good men by habituation: and this is the intention, certainly, of every lawgiver, and all who do it not well fail of their intent; and herein consists the difference between a good government and a bad one.

"Again, from the same given circumstances, and by the same means used, all excellence is both produced and destroyed, for by harp-playing both the good and the bad harpers are formed; and similarly of builders and all the rest, for by building well, men will become good builders, by building badly, bad ones; in fact, if this had not been so there would have been no need of instructors, but all men would have been at once good or bad in their several arts without them.

"So, too, is it with the virtues; for by acting in the various relations in which we are thrown with our fellow-men, we come to be, some just, some unjust; and by acting in dangerous positions, and being habituated to feel confidence or fear, we become, some brave, others cowards.

"Similarly also it is with respect to occasions of desire and anger, for some men become perfected in self-control, others become incontinent and passionate, the former by acting in certain circumstances in one way, and the latter by acting in similar circumstances in a different way. In one word, habits (ἕξεις) are formed out of corresponding acts (ἐνέργειαι), where-

fore it is proper that the acts should be of a right quality, in order that the habits which they generate may be of a right quality too. And it makes no small, but a great, yea, the greatest of differences, whether we are accustomed to act in this or in that particular way, even from our earliest childhood."

26. I go on to offer a few words of comment on the quotation from Aristotle's Ethics brought before you in the preceding section. His doctrine in regard to our having no natural capacity, *δύναμις*, or virtue may require some slight explanation, in order to prevent it from being misconceived. There are, according to Aristotle, two kinds of *δύναμις*, a *δύναμις* properly so called, and a *δύναμις* less properly so called. The *δύναμις* properly so called is a natural power, always followed by a constant and uniform species of *ἐνέργεια*; the *δύναμις* less properly so called, may issue in two opposite species of *ἐνέργεια*. The former may be called a *δύναμις* restricted to one issue; the latter may be called a *δύναμις* capable of two opposite issues; it is in fact called so by Aristotle, *δύναμις τῶν ἐναντίων*. To illustrate these two, taking Aristotle's as well as other examples, a stone has a *δύναμις* of falling downwards to the earth; it is limited to that one issue; it has no *δύναμις* of falling upwards. When the *δύναμις* passes into act or *ἐνέργεια*, the stone takes a downward course, *δύναμις* proper. A grain of wheat has a *δύναμις* of passing into the green blade and then into the full ear. It has no

power of doing the opposite. Its *ἐνέργεια* cannot issue either in a withholding of its increase or in the production of a noxious weed. So in regard to our senses. This is a case of *δύναμις* proper. The *δύναμις* of seeing or of hearing cannot issue in a result the opposite of hearing or of seeing. The capacities of seeing or of hearing terminate respectively in the acts of seeing or of hearing, and cannot terminate in blindness or in deafness, as alternatives equally open to them. These, then, are illustrations of *δύναμις* properly so called, that is, of *δύναμις* restricted to one issue. And that issue follows or obeys the law of the *δύναμις*, that is to say, nothing more than the *δύναμις* is required to bring about the resulting *ἐνέργεια*.

27. But suppose that a stone had a capacity for falling upwards as well as downwards. Suppose that wheat had a capacity, not only to grow but to refuse to grow, or that it had a capacity of growing into a noxious weed. Suppose that our eyes when in their normal state, and when wide open, had a capacity of being blind as well as a capacity for seeing. Suppose that our ears, when their function was entire, had a capacity for being deaf as well as a capacity for hearing. In these cases we should have so many illustrations of what Aristotle calls the *δύναμις τῶν ἐναντίων*, which, properly speaking, is not a *δύναμις* at all. These cases are fictitious; but there are real cases of *δύναμις τῶν ἐναντίων*, the capacity of contraries;

and such an example is found in the moral nature of man. We are capable of becoming *either* virtuous *or* vicious, and in the same circumstances too. And hence we have no capacity of virtue in the sense in which a stone has a capacity of falling downwards, or in which a man has a capacity of seeing. Of two seeds of the same kind, and placed in the same circumstances, the one cannot grow up an ear of corn and the other a useless weed; but of two men placed in the same circumstances, the one may grow up a virtuous and the other a vicious character. Hence the moral capacity of these two men, and we may say of man generally, is quite different from the physical capacity of things, and quite different from man's physical capacities, all of which are restricted to one issue, and are properly called *δυνάμεις*, because the acts (*ἐνέργειαι*) are determined by these capacities and arise out of them. But the others, the *δυνάμεις τῶν ἐναντίων*, being capable of issuing in two opposite acts or *ἐνέργειαι*, are not rightly regarded as *δυνάμεις* at all. At any rate you must keep in mind the broad distinction between them and the natural *δυνάμεις*. The *δύναμις τῶν ἐναντίων* being open indifferently to two issues, has obviously no power of determining its own issue. That issue is determined, not by the *δύναμις*, but by something else; that something else being, in the case of the moral virtues, the principle of free-will, of which I shall say a word immediately, and the power of custom.

28. You will now, I think, understand the sense in which Aristotle alleges that we have no natural capacity for virtue; we have no natural capacity for it in the way in which we have a capacity for seeing, or in which a stone has a capacity for falling to the earth. We have a capacity for virtue only in the sense that this capacity is also a capacity for vice. It may perhaps be convenient to retain the word capacity in this signification, but we must keep in mind that the word thus used signifies something very different from what is indicated by the other employment of the term. According to Aristotle, then, we have no natural capacity for virtue or for vice, but only what may be improperly termed a capacity for either of these indifferently. In certain circumstances a man may become virtuous; in the same circumstances he may also become vicious. This shows that man has no natural capacity for either of these. For out of a natural capacity the only issue that can come in the form of acts must be of one constant and uniform kind.

29. Out of this doctrine that man has no natural capacity for virtue, arises Aristotle's doctrine of free-will, *προαίρεσις*, deliberate purpose, determination, or choice. If man had a capacity for virtue, that is, a natural tendency, which was irresistible, and which carried him to virtue whether he would or not, he could, of course, have no free-will or power of choice. The law of the *δύναμις* would determine the act as

its inevitable consequence. But man's capacity for virtue being equally a capacity for vice, in other words, not strictly speaking a capacity at all, it follows that man must be determined either to virtue or to vice, by something different from such a capacity, and that by which he is determined is the power or principle of free-will (*προαίρεσις*).

30. Inasmuch, then, as man has no natural capacity of virtue, but only a capacity of being either virtuous or vicious, the question arises, How does man become determined either to a virtuous or to a vicious course of action? The answer is, that he is determined to the one or other of these through a power of free-will or choice (*προαίρεσις*), and not through any natural capacity. But this power of choice is not sufficient to make him either virtuous or vicious. He must acquire the one or the other of these dispositions through custom, as has been already pointed out to you. By the practice of virtue he acquires the habit, *ἕξις*, of virtue; by the practice of vice he acquires the habit of vice. In fact, this is a case in which *δύναμις* rather follows *ἐνέργεια*. In the case of the natural *δύναμις*, the power or capacity precedes, the act, *ἐνέργεια*, follows, and the *ἐνέργεια* does not react, or reacts but little, on the *δύναμις* in the way of strengthening or confirming it. But in the virtues, and also in the operations involved in the different acts, *ἐνέργεια* comes first, and *δύναμις* follows; the capacity is created by the practice, the practice

does not arise out of the capacity. When the capacity has been created by the practice, we may then say that we have a capacity or power of virtue, *δύναμις τῆς ἀρετῆς*; but Aristotle calls this power, not *δύναμις*, but *ἕξις*, or habit, which, however, is nothing but an acquired *δύναμις*.

31. These explanations having been given, we shall have no great difficulty in removing a certain objection which may be taken to this doctrine, of the origin of virtue. Aristotle has himself taken notice of the objection I refer to; it is this:—The objector says that some sort of paradox, or at least confusion, is involved in the doctrine that virtue is a habit. We are told, says he, that virtue is properly a habit, and then we are told that, in order to acquire this habit, we must first of all practise virtue. But how can we practise virtue, if, in order to practise it, we must have already practised it? How can we get a beginning? Or, if we can practise virtue before we have acquired the habit of virtue, how can it be said that virtue is properly a habit? For example, how can it be said that we *become* just, by doing just things? If we can do just things, in order to acquire the virtue of justice, we are surely just already, and antecedent to the practice of justice. Aristotle's solution of this difficulty or confusion seems to be as follows:—

32. "Virtue follows the analogy of the arts, in

which the first essays of the learner may by chance, or by the guidance of his master (*ἀπὸ τύχης καὶ ἄλλου ὑποθεμένου*), attain a sort of success or an artistic appearance, but the learner is no artist as yet." * Playing on the fiddle, for example, is an art, and the power or capacity of playing on the fiddle may be called a habit—a habit acquired, and only to be acquired, by practising on that instrument. Thus we may say without a paradox, that a fiddler becomes a fiddler (*i.e.*, a master on that instrument) by being already a fiddler (that is, a learner or imperfect performer on that instrument); and so of all the other arts, they are all acquired only by our already *being* to some extent that which we desire *to become* to a greater extent, and it is only after we have *become completely* what we already *are imperfectly*, that we are entitled to the name of artist. Thus we may say that painting is a habit, and that he alone who has acquired this habit as a confirmed power of mind and of hand, is a painter; and yet it would be quite true to say that he could acquire this habit only by the practice of painting; in other words, that he could become a painter only by already being a painter, although his first essays might be unworthy of the name of painting.

33. So in regard to virtue, it is a habit, and it is acquired by means of certain virtuous acts; but these acts are as yet imperfect, are as little entitled

* Eth. Nic., B. II. 4; Grant, p. 75, 1st ed., vol. i. p. 415, 2d ed.

to be called virtuous acts as the first harsh essays on the fiddle by a musical tyro are entitled to be called tunes; or as the first pair of leathern encumbrances fabricated by an apprentice to St Crispin are deserving of the appellation of shoes. "The first acts by which we acquire justice, are, according to Aristotle, not really and properly just: they want the moral qualification of that settled internal character in the heart and mind of the agent without which no external act is virtuous in the highest sense of the term." They are helps and tendencies towards the acquirement of this character, as the first essays of the artist are towards the acquirement of an art. But they are not to be confounded with those moral acts which flow from the character when developed and fixed.

34. Aristotle's doctrine in regard to virtue being a habit (in Greek ἕξις) will be better understood if we consider it in relation to what he calls δύναμις, that is, power or capacity, and to what he calls ἐνέργεια, that is, energy or actuality. All men are born with certain natural powers or capacities (δυνάμεις); they have a δύναμις or capacity of growth, of feeling pleasure and pain, of seeing, hearing, and of using their other senses. When from this capacity to grow growth actually ensues, the δύναμις passes into ἐνέργεια or actuality. When man's capacity to feel pleasure and pain, his capacity to see, hear, and so forth, become the actual feeling of pleasure or pain, become

actual seeing, actual hearing, and so forth, the δύναμις has passed into ἐνέργεια. Now, observe that in such cases the ἐνέργεια does not react upon the δύναμις. Actual seeing (ἐνέργεια) does not create the capacity of seeing. The capacity exists first: the practical operation is its consequence. This is to be particularly borne in mind in considering these natural δυνάμεις or capacities, and the practical operations that arise out of them: this, I say, is to be borne in mind, that the capacities come first and the operations second, and that the latter do not react, or react but very slightly, on the former. As I have said, it is not by using his eyes that a man acquires the power of seeing, it is not by actually feeling pleasure that a man acquires the power of feeling pleasure; he already has from nature the power of seeing and the power of feeling pleasure, and when these powers pass into act (ἐνέργεια), he sees and he feels pleasure. These are cases in which δύναμις comes first and ἐνέργεια follows.

35. Now, it has here to be asked, does this analogy hold good in regard to man's capacity of virtue and his practice of virtue? Has man first a power or capacity of virtue, and then a practice conformable thereto, just as he has a power of seeing and of performing other operations, and a practice arising out of these powers? Aristotle answers, No; the analogy does not hold good; the cases are entirely different. Instead of the practice of virtue (ἐνέργεια)

arising out of the capacity or δύναμις of virtue, it is rather the δύναμις which arises out of the ἐνέργεια or practice. To acquire the power or capacity or disposition of virtue, we must first of all be virtuous. The practice of virtue reacts so powerfully on the capacity of virtue, that it may be said almost to create that capacity. In this respect, then, the δύναμις and ἐνέργεια of virtue are very different from the natural δυνάμεις and ἐνέργειαι before spoken of. In the latter cases the actuality proceeds out of the capacity; in the former the capacity is first formed by means of the actuality. Now a δύναμις, or power or capacity, acquired by practice, is called by Aristotle ἕξις, a habit or permanent condition; and this is what he says the true character of virtue is: it is not δύναμις, or natural power issuing in certain natural actions, but it is ἕξις, a moral habit acquired by the practice of certain actions, and issuing anew in the performance of actions which possess a higher moral significance on account of the habit out of which they flow.

36. Perhaps you will here ask, Has, then, man, according to Aristotle, no natural capacity of virtue? and if he has not, how does he ever put forth those acts by means of which he is said to acquire the habit, or disposition, or capacity of virtue? The answer seems to be, that man has no original capacity of virtue, but he has an original capacity of acquiring that capacity. Man has no original capacity of

virtue as he has an original capacity of seeing; but although we cannot say that man has a natural or original capacity for virtue, we may nevertheless say that he has an original capacity of acquiring that capacity, just as he has an original capacity of acquiring a capacity of painting. Let me illustrate this.

37. Sir Joshua Reynolds has a capacity of painting. Is that an original capacity? No; all that he had originally was a capacity of acquiring that capacity. His capacity of painting he acquired by long study and repeated efforts; but no doubt he had an original capacity which enabled him to make these efforts. Now, this original capacity is, in Aristotle's language, a δύναμις, a natural power; the acquired capacity, the capacity of painting resulting from these repeated efforts, this, in Aristotle's language, is a ἕξις, or confirmed habit; and it is in virtue of this, and not in virtue of the original power, that Sir Joshua is entitled to the name of a painter. So, in regard to virtue, all men have by nature the capacity of acquiring the capacity of virtue. But all men do not acquire this capacity. Those only acquire it who persevere in the practice of virtue, just as those only acquire the capacity of painting who labour assiduously with the brush and the pallet. There is in man a natural power, or capacity, or δύναμις, which enables him to perform those actions by which the capacity of virtue is gradually acquired; but this

natural power is not itself that capacity; or at any rate it is not this until it has been so reacted upon by the practice of virtue as to have become a confirmed habit, or ἕξις, of the mind. The main points, then, comprehended under Aristotle's assertion that virtue is a habit may be summed up as follows:—

38. There is, *first*, an unconfirmed or indefinite power of acting either rightly or wrongly. This may be called a δύναμις in the sense already explained; but δύναμις more properly applies to powers which are limited by nature to one issue, which the power in question is not: it is open indifferently either to virtue or vice. Then, *secondly*, there is προαίρεσις, a power of choice, involving freedom, reflection, deliberation, and will. This power may for a time be guided by instructors. But its proper function is that of self-determination: a man is self-determined to be either virtuous or vicious. Then, *thirdly*, there is ἐνέργεια. This is the act, or rather the continually-repeated act, the practice or custom through which, *fourthly*, the ἕξις, or habit of virtue (or vice) is formed. This practice is the most important element in the process: through it the ἕξις, or habit, or disposition, is built up. It is the sap which feeds and supports the life of our moral nature. Ἕξις includes an insight or recognition of the worth and excellence of this habit, and of the actions by which it has been formed. There is, *fifthly*, the conduct which flows out of this ἕξις, conduct to which alone the

epithet of virtuous, in the highest sense of the word, can be applied.

39. A further point to be noticed in treating of the ethics of Aristotle is this, that virtue is voluntary, that is, it is dependent on ourselves. In other words, it is a matter of choice and election. We have it in our power to prefer and practise the right, and to reject and eschew the wrong. This position, in which there is certainly no great originality, seems to have been advanced in opposition to those who saw no other ground for morality than blind obedience to the dictates of law; to the sophistical opinion that the actions of men are prompted by a blind and irresistible instinct; that men always pursue what *appears* to them *at the time* to be for their own good; that they are not the masters or the makers of their own conception of good; that nature has fixed this for them; and that if they pursue evil under the appearance or semblance of good, the fault is not theirs but hers. In fact, even at this early period the doctrine seems to have been broached that man, in all his actions, was the slave or victim of necessity, that his conduct was determined by a power over which he had no control, and that therefore he could not justly be held responsible for his actions, or regarded as amenable to punishment when he had done wrong. In opposition to this doctrine, Aristotle maintains that man's conduct is voluntary; that he is a free as well as an intelligent agent; and that there-

fore he, and not nature, is the source and originator of his actions; and that, by a further consequence, he is accountable for the good or the evil which he does, and is a proper subject of praise and reward when he has done well, of reprobation and punishment when he has done ill. Aristotle admits that after men's dispositions are formed, after they have acquired a settled habit, either of virtue or of vice, that then they have little or no control over their conduct; that it is difficult, if not impossible, for the thoroughly depraved to reform. At the same time he holds that their character, at one period, was in their own hands; that the formation of their disposition was originally in their own power; that in acquiring the habit, whether of virtue or of vice, they were at first entirely free; that, by the early practice of virtuous actions, they might have attained, and would have attained, to that habit of mind which it is now too late for them to acquire; and therefore their plea of irresponsibility, grounded on their alleged want of control over their own conduct, can no more be listened to than can the argument of him who, after having thrown a stone, and been challenged for the damage he has done, should plead that he had no control over the stone after it had left his hand. The answer is, That may be very true, but why did it ever leave your hand? As long as it remained in it, you had over it a perfect control. Compare Jeremy Taylor, 'On the Nature and Causes of Good and Evil,' c. 1: —"The will is the mistress of all our actions. . . .

The action itself is good or bad by its conformity to, or difformity from, the rule of conscience; but the man is good or bad by the will;" and foll. (Vol. iii. p. 630, ed. London, 1836.)

40. In connection with this topic, I may introduce a short discussion, which has application not to the ethics of Aristotle only, but to all ethical systems whatever. I ask, what is it that we pronounce our moral judgments upon? And I answer, that it is always upon *the will,* either of ourselves or others, that these judgments are directed. This may not always appear to be the case; for sometimes we seem to be judging the act without considering the will at all. How is this to be explained? How does it happen that the act *appears* frequently to be that which we judge, while in truth it is always the *will* of the agent on which a judgment is really pronounced. The answer is, or at least part of the answer is, that it is only by and through the act that we can know the mind or will of the agent. We can read no heart but our own, and even our own we read but imperfectly. The spirit of man lies enshrouded in secrecy till it leaps forth into action. Thus we only know the mind of others when shown in some act exterior to themselves, and in which the inner workings of their spirits have been made as we think visible. Our love and hate are thus suspended at first, at least, not directly on the will of the person whom we judge, but on the exterior symbols or evi-

dences of that will. If we could read directly the minds of other men, we should judge them by their own inherent beauty and deformity, and not by that beauty and deformity as shown in their outward conduct and demeanour. But we cannot do this. We can only judge of what is within from our observation of what is without, and from that which shows itself overtly we judge of the hidden character. Hence it is that we often seem, even to ourselves, to be expending all our indignation on vicious *actions*, when in reality it is the vicious *will* of the agent which moves our resentment.

41. In explaining this apparent transference of our judgment from the will to the act, there is another circumstance of still greater importance to be attended to, this, namely, that the act is only the will completed. Till the moment of action, the last decision of the will is uncertain. A man knows not what he has the heart to do till the moment of action arrive. He goes forth armed for the execution of his purpose, but it is possible that compunction or remorse may hold him back; and hence, while the action is unperformed, the intention, too, of the agent must be regarded as uncertain, and we cannot pronounce an infallible judgment until the action has tested it. So long as the hand is restrained, the mind remains free; the will may still recoil from the deed of guilt on which it may have resolved. But when the act is consummated, all doubt is put an end to;

the will is completed. Before this it was only incipient or inchoate; now it has put forth the full fruit of guilt. Hence a man's acts are of great importance in determining our judgments of his conduct, although it is really his will that we judge.

42. Further, in conceiving the manner in which our thoughts are inevitably affected by the act, as something distinct and separate from the mind and will of the agent, we cannot help considering the state in which a man has placed himself by his act, in comparison with the state he held before its perpetration. We suppose the act to be some deed of guilt. Before this act he occupied a respectable place in society. Now, the moment the act is over, he is, it may be, a murderer, and he feels the irrevocable doom that awaits him. One moment ago, his whole futurity hung in suspense before him: it was still possible for that futurity to be filled with virtue and happiness. That moment is past; the deed is done; there is no *locus pœnitentiæ* for him now, in so far, at least, as man is concerned; and the result must go with him for evermore. The indignation of his fellow-men pursues him from place to place; the phantom of an ignominious death haunts him till its shadow becomes a reality. All these horrors his one act has in a moment brought upon him. All these accompany the act, they intensify our imagination of it. But still, though our mind naturally fastens on the act, and on

these its results, it is not these that are the objects of our judgment. It is the will of the agent that we condemn. But then we must look also to the act and to the circumstances, because it is by these only that the will is consummated or made known to us.

43. You may thus see how very different degrees of guilt and of reprehension attach to a will which, though wickedly inclined, shrinks from the commission of a meditated crime, and one which goes forward without flinching to the fulfilment of its purpose. Nature herself has raised barriers which the will, irresolute in wickedness, fears to overleap. This man has not passed the fatal Rubicon of crime. He still may be restored. His hand may have let fall the dagger when in the very act of striking the blow. He may have made up his mind to commit the murder, but he does not commit it. Our judgment of this man is very different from that which we pronounce on him whose will has gone forward to the perpetration of the deed. And our judgments are thus different: our judgment in the one case is much more lenient than in the other, because, although in both cases a guilty will is the subject of our condemnation, still the will of the one man did not pass into act, did not show that it was fully formed and complete, while that of the other did; and hence there is nothing inconsistent in our maintaining that it is the will alone on which our moral judgments are pronounced, although acts must also

be looked to as the only evidence we can have of the matured existence of the will.

44. Shakespeare has a fine description in the following passage of the unsettled state of the mind when the will is hesitating about the perpetration of a great crime, and when the passions are threatening to overpower, and do eventually overpower, the reason and the conscience. Brutus, meditating on the conspiracy by which Julius Cæsar is slain, and in which he was to bear a prominent part, thus expresses himself:—

> "Between the acting of a dreadful thing
> And the first motion, all the interim is
> Like a phantasma, or a hideous dream:
> *The Genius and the mortal instruments*
> Are then in council; and the state of man,
> Like to a little kingdom, suffers then
> The nature of an insurrection."

One might have supposed that Shakespeare knew Plato.

45. I am endeavouring to give you as connected a view as possible of the ethics of Aristotle. The best way, perhaps, of overtaking this end is by presenting to you the system in a series of questions and answers, so couched that each answer calls up into view a new question, until the whole series has been gone through. Before bringing forward the question which arises out of our last answer, I shall recapitulate very shortly the catechism, as I may call it,

which we have already gone over. First, What is the main purpose of ethical, or, as Aristotle frequently calls it, political science? Answer, To ascertain the chief and ultimate end of human action, and to point out the means of its attainment. Second question, What is the chief and ultimate end of human action? Answer, Human happiness. This raises the third question, *What is human happiness?* Answer: In order to reply to this question, we must ascertain what is the proper work or function of a man: for the happiness of any being must be intimately connected with the function which it has to discharge. What, then, is the function or proper work of a man? A conscious and active and rational life of the soul, or, more shortly, *living reasonably*, is the proper work of a man. Out of this definition arises the answer to our third question. That third question was, What is human happiness? And the answer as now obtained is, Human happiness is living reasonably *in the best and noblest manner* (κατ' ἀρετὴν is Aristotle's expression), and in agreeable circumstances, for the happiness or *well*-being of every creature must consist in doing *well* that which is its proper work or vocation. This answer instantly raises the fourth question, But what is the best and noblest manner of living reasonably? Answer, By so regulating our moral nature, which is made up of reason and the passions, that reason shall govern and passion obey; in other words, by so regulating our moral nature as to develop the virtues: for the

virtues arise out of the governance which reason exercises over the passions. This answer calls forward the fifth question, But how is this adjustment to be effected? by what means are the moral virtues to be developed? Answer, By means of custom. The practice of virtue, a practice which is sooner or later determined and directed by free-will, this practice produces the habit or disposition of virtue. While this habit is *being* formed the virtues are more or less incomplete. It is only when the habit *is* fully formed that they are complete, and are entitled to be called virtues in the highest and strictest sense of the word. But I must abstain from all discussion. The short answer to the fifth question is, The virtues are developed by means of custom or repeated practice. This answer brings up a new question, one on which I have not yet touched. I proceed to lay it before you.

46. Virtue, we have said, is a habit acquired through custom or practice. The new or sixth question which arises out of this answer is this, What is the kind of custom or practice which gives rise to the virtues? Answer, The practice out of which the virtues arise is a practice, to state it in short and somewhat technical language, a practice of aiming at the mean. Virtue is a middle between two extremes. Accustom yourselves to that middle, and you will settle down in the virtues. Perhaps a simpler and less formal answer to our question, What is the

custom or practice which gives rise to the virtues? would be this, The practice which produces virtues is "the avoidance of excess and defect." *Medio tutissimus ibis.* And thus the answer to our sixth question, which, I think, is closely and logically affiliated to the questions which have gone before it, brings us to the celebrated Aristotelic position, that virtue is a mean or middle between two extremes, which in themselves are vices. We shall consider this position for a few minutes.

47. We are now able to define virtue, which we could not do until this sixth question was answered. Previous to that question we had declared that virtue was a habit. But there are other habits besides the virtuous. Vice may be called a habit. Habit, therefore, is only the genus under which virtue falls. We want its differentia. Do we obtain this when we say that virtue is a habit produced by practice? We certainly do not, for all habits are produced by practice. But we do obtain this differentia when we look to the answer to the sixth question, and when we say, Virtue is a habit which aims at the mean. Every habit which steers clear of excess on the one hand, and of defect on the other hand, partakes of the quality of virtue. And accordingly, Aristotle's definition of virtue is, that it is a disposition or state or habit (genus) of aiming at the mean between two opposite vices (difference).

48. Virtue, according to Aristotle, consists in a medium between two extremes. This is a sound practical doctrine, and, viewed as a metaphysical truth, it is more profound than it appears. It of course means that any virtue, by being carried too far, either in the direction of excess or of deficiency, loses the character, and becomes undeserving of the name of virtue. Thus courage, *ἀνδρεία*, is a mean between cowardice and rashness. The man who flies from all danger is a coward; the man who rushes on all dangers is madly rash. But the brave man is he who neither flies from all dangers, nor rushes on all dangers, but who faces all dangers which reason directs him in the circumstances to encounter. The virtue of courage is thus a mean between the extremes of cowardice and rashness. So he who gives himself up to all pleasures is a voluptuary; and he who refuses all pleasures is austere, insensible, or unsociable. The virtue of temperance, *σωφροσύνη*, therefore lies in the middle between sensuality and asceticism; sensuality is the excess of self-indulgence; *σωφροσύνη* is the middle, self-control or temperance; asceticism or insensibility or repugnance to all pleasure is the defect on the opposite side. Aristotle regards this deficiency rather as imaginary than real, for insensibility to pleasure can very seldom or never be laid to the charge of human nature. Indeed, it may be said generally, that all the virtues incline more towards one of the two terms which

are laid down as their extremes than towards the other; and therefore the statement is not perfectly accurate which represents each virtue as a mid-point between two extremes, if we mean by a mid-point a point exactly in the middle. For courage certainly inclines more towards rashness than it does towards cowardice; generosity inclines more towards profusion than towards stinginess; and so I believe in regard to every virtue that could be named; the one extreme always lies at a greater distance than the other from the virtue which is placed between them. But, no doubt, for practical purposes, it is a very true account of the virtues to represent them as occupying a middle place between two extremes, the extreme of excess and the extreme of deficiency. From this account of the virtues, you may perceive that Aristotle, like Adam Smith, makes their general characteristic to be propriety, *i.e.*, a state in which they are not pushed to the extreme, either of extravagant excess or of still more reprehensible deficiency. In the same way Plato places the essence of virtue in propriety, *i.e.*, in the equilibrium of the soul, which was described in preceding lectures.

49. This doctrine is of a much earlier date than the days of Aristotle. Indeed, it would seem to require no very advanced state of philosophy for men to discover the maxim that "moderation is best," that "excess is to be avoided." Thus, so far

back as Hesiod, we find the praise of *μέτρια ἔργα*, moderate acts. The era of the seven sages produced the saying, afterwards inscribed on the temple of Delphi, *μηδὲν ἄγαν*, nothing in excess. Now, all that is contained in these popular and prudential sayings is of course also contained in the principle of *μεσότης*, or the mean which is so conspicuous in the ethics of Aristotle. But Aristotle's principle contains something deeper than this; it is not a mere application of the doctrine of moderation to the subject-matter of the various separate virtues. It takes us back to the Pythagorean ethics, one of the principles of which was, that evil was of the nature of the infinite (the unlimited, the immoderate), that good was of the nature of the finite (the bounded, the moderate). To say that the infinite is evil, and that the finite is good, may seem an entire contradiction to our modern ways of thinking. It is a mode of speech and of thought which may nevertheless be justified. The Pythagoreans held that number or limit was the origin of all intelligibility, of all order; and that whatever was infinite or unlimited (*τὸ ἄπειρον*) or incalculable, was unintelligible, chaotic, or, as we should say, nonsensical. Limit, *τὸ πέρας*, therefore, or that which made things finite, or gave them order, this it was which also made them good, just as the want of limit was that which left them in a state of disorder, and, consequently, in a condition of evil. Limit, in fact, was considered as identical with form or law, and the finite or limited was that which was

obedient to law; while the unlimited or infinite was that which no law controlled. Out of the union of these two principles, the limited and the unlimited, the universe arose according to the Pythagoreans. The limiting principle does not limit that which is already limited; such a statement would be absurd. It limits that which in its own nature is unlimited; and out of this combination the beauty and harmony of the universe are formed.

50. Now, this doctrine of the limit and the unlimited (*πέρας* and *τὸ ἄπειρον*), which the Pythagoreans applied to all things, this doctrine applied to morals gives rise to the Aristotelic doctrine of the *μεσότης*, or of virtue as a mean between two extremes. Many passions are in themselves of the nature of the infinite, the unlimited, the excessive; consequently, in themselves they are bad; they are vices. But when checked and controlled by the limit, they become good, they acquire the character of virtues. In fact, all the passions in excess are mere madnesses, and it is their nature to be in excess. But when reduced to finitude, to limit, they become the springs which move the world, the sources out of which all human happiness and all human greatness proceed. Reason or thought is the power which fixes a limit to passion. When this limit is fixed the passion shows as a *μεσότης*, or mean between two extremes. Such is the metaphysical, and also historical, explanation of Aristotle's doctrine of the *μεσότης*. He bor-

rowed it from the Pythagoreans. I should not omit to mention that Plato also has this doctrine; in the Dialogue entitled 'Philebus' it is distinctly propounded.

51. In close connection with our sixth question and answer, this, the seventh question, comes before us: By what test shall a man know whether he has attained to the perfect habit of virtue, or whether he is still but a stumbler in the ways of virtue? This is a question of some practical moment. And Aristotle answers it by saying that a man may know how far he is a proficient in virtue, by reflecting on the ease and satisfaction, or the difficulty and dislike, with which he performs virtuous actions. If the practice of virtue gives him pleasure, his virtuous habit is perfect, or nearly so. If the practice of virtue gives him pain or dissatisfaction, if he feels that it involves a struggle or sacrifice, in that case his virtue is far from perfect, the habit is by no means confirmed. For example, a man denies himself sensual indulgences; he is temperate, and he rejoices and finds pleasure in his temperance. His habit of mind is such that intemperance would give him pain. Such a man has truly attained the virtue of temperance. Again, another man denies himself all sensual gratifications, but he feels pain in doing so; he is grieved by such self-denial; it is to him a sacrifice; he has no pleasure in his temperance. Such a man, according to Aristotle, although he may be, indeed is, on the right road to the acquisition of a virtuous

habit, has not yet attained to it; he is, in fact, a voluptuary still, for satisfaction does not accompany the practice of his temperance; and this, according to Aristotle, is the test of virtue, the test which proves whether temperance, or whatever the virtue may be, has truly been attained to or not. In short, if a man has no pleasure in his temperance, such temperance does not deserve the name of virtue. With this doctrine we may agree so far, I think, as to admit that the test which Aristotle lays down is indeed the criterion of the very highest virtue; in other words, that virtue of the most perfect kind always affords pleasure to him who practises it, and that unless it does this it cannot be of the highest order. At the same time, I think it would be unfair to refuse the name of virtuous to that disposition which, in the performance of virtuous actions, could not feel much pleasure, but, on the contrary, felt that some degree of self-sacrifice was involved in their performance. Such a restriction would, I think, be unfair; because such a disposition, though its virtue may not be altogether perfect, may nevertheless be very noble and magnanimous, and an object of our approbation all the more on account of the sacrifice which it is undergoing in the practice of virtue.

52. I believe that Aristotle himself would not have withheld the name of virtuous in a restricted sense to a mind which was struggling to be virtuous, but whose efforts were still accompanied by some degree

of pain or self-sacrifice, although in accordance with the theory which makes virtue a habit, he could not admit that such a mind was virtuous in the highest, or indeed in any very high, degree. All habits, when acquired, issue in acts which are easy and agreeable to the agent; if they do not issue in such acts, the habits are not acquired, they are still in a state of formation. The performer is a tyro, but no proficient. He may be skilled in his art up to a certain point, but he is not yet perfect. This is true in regard to all the arts. The musician who plays with difficulty, even though he plays tolerably well, has still much to learn. So the virtuous man, whose virtue is a fight and a struggle, is still more or less in the gall of bitterness and the bonds of iniquity, and he may know that he is so just from the pain which accompanies his acts of virtue, as he may know that he has broken loose from these bonds entirely when pleasure mingles with his virtuous exercises. The delight, then, which a man finds in virtue, the misery which he finds in vice, this, according to Aristotle, is the test or criterion by which a man may try whether his virtue is perfect or not, and whether or not he has attained to the assured habit and disposition of virtue.

53. In concluding this account of the chief points
[illegible] in the ethical system of Aristotle, I may
[illegible] one word on his doctrine concerning happi-
[illegible]appiness was with him, as with all the ancient

moralists, the great end of man. This is the highest good, the *summum bonum*; the end for which all beings live, the object which they all pursue. But Aristotle's standard of happiness is high and noble. It consists in the satisfaction, not of the inferior propensities, but of the loftier principles and capacities of our nature. The pleasures which arise when any of our lower desires are gratified, are satisfactions which man shares in common with the brutes. These, therefore, are not peculiar to man. In these human happiness, the happiness which is proper to man, is not to be found. The felicity appropriate to man is to be looked for only in the satisfactions which are aimed at not by a mere animal, but by an intelligent and rational existence. Now, all intelligence seeks and finds its happiness in the unimpeded energies of a life devoted either to action or to contemplation. Human happiness, therefore, consists in a wellbeing of the reason, which finds scope for the unrestrained exercise of its power in a life either of practical action, or of speculative contemplation, both of which lives are states both of wellbeing and of welldoing. In short, Aristotle keeps in view the two ends which I have set forth as constituting the proper goal of all human action, both the εὐπραξία and the εὐδαιμονία. We must first of all live according to our true nature; we must fulfil the proper law of our being. We must preserve our status as rational beings, as manly characters; and then, this being secured, we may draw as largely as we can upon the sources of external happiness.

54. In going over the main points of Aristotle's ethics, I have shown you what, according to him, the ultimate end of human action is, and what the means of its attainment are. We have seen, to state the matter in very simple language, that human happiness, or man's ultimate end, consists in living reasonably in the best way possible, and that the best way of living reasonably, is by subjugating our passions to reason. We have seen that this subjugation is effected through custom, and that the custom here practised is that which aims at the mean between two extremes. We have also seen what the test is by which a man may know whether he is truly virtuous or not. A man, according to Aristotle, may perform virtuous actions without being himself virtuous, because he may perform these occasionally, or by fits and starts, without possessing that fixed habit which alone constitutes virtue, in which case he is not properly regarded as a virtuous character.

55. I shall conclude this exposition with a few remarks quoted from Book x. of Aristotle's Ethics, in which he shows that happiness is to be found rather in a life of contemplation, than in a life of practical activity.* He says—"Now if happiness be a working in the way of excellence, of course that excellence must be the highest, that is to say, must be the excellence of the best principle of our nature. Whether, then, this best principle is intellect, or some other

* C. 7 and 8. Cited mainly from Chase's translation, p. 362 and foll.

which is thought naturally to rule, and to lead, and to conceive of noble and divine things; whether being in its own nature divine, or the most divine of all our internal principles, the working of this principle in accordance with its own proper excellence, or the working of this principle in the best way possible, must be the most perfect happiness.

"That this happiness is contemplative, has been already said, and this would seem to be consistent with truth, for this, in the first place, contemplative working is of the highest kind, our intellect being the highest of our internal principles; and the subjects, moreover, with which it is conversant, are the highest that fall within the range of our knowledge.

"Next, this happiness is also the most continuous, for we are better able to contemplate than to do anything else whatever continuously.

"Again, pleasure must be in some way an ingredient of happiness, but speculation, and the pursuit of science, contain pleasures admirable for purity and permanence.

"Self-sufficiency, too, will attach chiefly to the activity of contemplation; for while all other men require companionship and co-operation, the man of pure science can contemplate and speculate even when quite alone, and the more entirely he deserves this appellation, the more able is he to do so; it may be he can do better for having fellow-workers, but still he is certainly most self-sufficient.

"Again, contemplation alone seems to be desired

for its own sake, and, therefore, is alone an end in itself. Again, this life of contemplation seems to constitute each man's *proper self*, and being so, it would be absurd for a man not to choose his own life.

"Further, that the most perfect happiness must be a kind of contemplative activity (*θεωρία*), may appear also from the following consideration: our conception of the gods is, that they are, above all, blessed and happy. Now, what kind of moral actions are we to attribute to them? Those of justice? Nay, will they not be set in a ridiculous light, if represented as forming contracts, and restoring deposits, and so on? Well, then, shall we picture them performing brave actions, withstanding objects of fear, and meeting dangers because it is noble to do so? or liberal ones? but to whom shall they be giving? In short, if one followed this subject into all details, the circumstances connected with moral actions will appear trivial and unworthy of the gods.

"Still every one believes that they live, and therefore that they work, because it is not supposed that they sleep their time away like Endymion: now, if from a living being you take away action, still more if creation, what remains but contemplation? So then the working of the gods, eminent in blessedness, will be one apt for contemplative speculation: and of all human workings, that will have the greatest capacity for happiness which is nearest akin to this."

STOICS AND EPICUREANS.

1. In the present lecture I propose to place before you, as clearly as the lights which I have been able to collect on the subject will enable me, the moral philosophy of the Stoics.

2. Zeno, the founder of the Stoical sect, was born in the island of Cyprus. The dates of his birth and death are uncertain. He is said to have been alive, in an extreme old age, in the year 260 B.C., so that we may assume 300 B.C., or thereabouts, as the period when he flourished, or was in the active exercise of his powers. The place in Athens where he harangued his pupils was *stoa*, the porch; the Variegated Porch, as it was called, from the paintings of Polygnotus which adorned its walls, and which represented the victories gained by the Athenians over the Persians. From this meeting-place his adherents received the name of Stoics; that is, the philosophers of the porch. The successors of Zeno were Cleanthes and Chrysippus, the latter of whom is mentioned by Horace in the lines in which he gives the preference

to Homer as a teacher of moral wisdom over all other instructors, saying of the great poet, the "Trojani belli scriptorem," that he was a man

> "Qui quid sit pulchrum, quid turpe, quid utile, quid non,
> Planius ac melius Chrysippo et Crantore dicit."

3. Zeno the founder of the Stoical philosophy, is, of course, not to be confounded with Zeno the philosopher of the Eleatic school, of whom I have spoken above (see p. 102). It has been said that while a man's speculative opinions frequently depend on the age in which he lives, and on the modes of thought in the midst of which he has been brought up, his ethical views, on the other hand, generally depend more on his own natural temperament, or moral idiosyncrasy, or worldly fortunes. Hence a biographical account of Zeno the founder of the Stoics, a narrative of his life and fortunes, would probably throw much light on the moral doctrines that he inculcated. Little more, however, is known of him than this, that having been shipwrecked near Athens, and thereby reduced to poverty, he was so much disgusted by the loss of all his worldly substance that he attached himself to the philosophy of the Cynics. Zeno, however, we are told, was soon repelled by the grossness of manners, the intellectual narrowness, and incapacity of this sect, and established a school for himself. He is said to have lived, partly perhaps because he could not help it, upon a very spare diet, consisting of figs, bread, and honey, and the severity

of his life was reflected in the moral principles which he promulgated; principles, however, which were not without grandeur and truth, could we but get them exhibited to us in a clear and systematic exposition.

4. So scattered and fragmentary are the notices of the Stoical philosophy that have come down to us, so declamatory and incoherent is every exposition of their ethical opinions, that it is by no means easy to give any account of their moral philosophy which shall be either intelligible or interesting. The germ of the Stoical morality seems to lie in some such proposition as this: All good, all happiness, all virtue, consists in a conformity to law, just as all evil, all misery, all vice, consists in lawlessness, in a repudiation or violation or defiance of law. Submission to law, acquiescence in the established order of the universe, this seems to be the principle, and, indeed, the sum and substance, of their moral code. That being, I think, the general root of their system, we have now to consider the details into which it branches. And I ask what is the law, a conformity with which is equivalent to good, is equivalent to happiness, is equivalent to virtue? The answer, so far as man is concerned, seems to be this: To be virtuous and happy, man must conform *first* to the law of his own nature; *secondly*, he must conform to the law by which society is held together; *thirdly*, he must conform to the law of Providence. A life in conformity with these three laws, or rather three

classes of laws, is, and must be, a life of virtue and happiness. But here it has to be asked, By means of what principle is man to find out these laws? how is he to discover what they are, and what they enjoin? By what principle is he to know when he is obeying the laws of his own nature, and when he is violating them? By what principle is he to know when he is obeying the laws of society, and when he is violating them? By what principle is he to know when he is obeying the laws of God, and when he is violating them? He is enabled to know this, the Stoics say, by the principle of reason; so that their general ethical doctrine, stated more explicitly, amounts to this, "Man is happy and virtuous in proportion to the degree in which, under the guidance and enlightenment of reason and knowledge, he conforms or accommodates himself, *first*, to the law of his own nature; *secondly*, to the law of society; *thirdly*, to the law of Providence." The perfect man of the Stoics, their completely wise man, is represented as living in strict conformity with these laws. Under the guidance of a perfect reason he yields an entire submission to the law of his own being, he fulfils to the letter all that his true nature enjoins. He yields an entire submission to the great laws by which society is held together and advanced; he yields an entire submission to the will of his Creator, and acts in strict accordance with the designs of an overruling and all-governing Providence; and doing so, his happiness as well as his virtue is supreme. But this picture is

obviously ideal. Horace has ridiculed the wise and perfect man of the Stoics in these words:

> "Sapiens uno minor est Jove; dives,
> Liber, honoratus, pulcher, rex denique regum,
> Præcipue sanus, nisi cum pituita molesta est."
> —Ep. I. i. 106.

But Horace has here construed their abstract man into the concrete. They do not affirm that their pattern man ever existed on the earth; and therefore, when Horace remarks that all the magnificent virtues and high-sounding pretensions of this perfect sage are scattered to the winds by an attack of phlegm, they might have retorted that they had taken care never to place him in a situation where there was any danger of his catching cold.

5. In regard to the *first* of the conformities now spoken of, namely, the conformity with the law of our own nature, I have just to remark that there is a close consonance, indeed an absolute coincidence, between this doctrine and that propounded by Socrates, Plato, and Butler, in regard to the government of the passions. Aristotle also teaches the same doctrine. Both Plato and Aristotle set forth reason as the born ruler of the passions. They hold that the law of our nature is not conformed to, but is violated, when this relation is reversed, and when the passions get the upper hand. Indeed, so universal is this doctrine that it is promulgated in every system; and, as we saw yesterday, Shakespeare, without any

Greek, has got hold of it. When in the council which is held by the mortal instruments, as he denominates the passions, and the genius, as he terms the higher principle of reason or conscience, when in this council the mortal instruments prevail over the genius, the state of man, like to a little kingdom, suffers then the nature of an insurrection; in other words, the law of our constitution is violated, the man goes to wreck, crime and misery ensue. The Stoical precept was, *vivere convenienter naturæ;* in Greek, ὁμολογουμένως τῇ φύσει ζῆν, which means, to maintain the law of our being, live conformably to that law. The meaning of which again is simply this, that we must allow that relation of superiority and inferiority to subsist which nature herself has established among the different principles of our constitution, and that in doing so we shall attain to both virtue and happiness. And this, as we have seen, is no other than the foundation on which the whole of Bishop Butler's ethical system reposes. It is unnecessary for me, therefore, to enlarge further on the submission which we must yield to the law of our being if we would attain to virtue and happiness.

6. There is this, however, to be observed, that, unlike Butler, the Stoics make self-love to be the elementary principle of human action. This is a natural principle which leads man, and indeed all animated creatures, to adopt means by which their own preservation and welfare may be secured. To

the operation of this principle their wellbeing has been intrusted. Man, however, is endowed with reason, and hence he is able to arrange in a scale, according to their different degrees of eligibility, as pointed out by reason, the natural good things by which his wellbeing is promoted; and the first steps which he takes towards a life of virtue and happiness are to be found in the preference which he gives to those things which, in the estimation of reason, are the *more* eligible over those which are the *less* eligible. These natural good things, and the scale in which they stand, are described by Adam Smith in his 'Theory of Moral Sentiments,' part vii. sec. 2, chap. 1, p. 215, &c., ed. London, 1792.

7. In explanation of the second of the conformities spoken of in the ethical scheme of the Stoics, our conformity, namely, to the law of society, a few words have to be said. The law of society signifies simply the means, whatever these may be, by which society is best held together, and its general interests most effectually promoted. Reason and experience, that is, either personal observation or knowledge gathered from the history of mankind in the different eras of civilisation, these are the guides which will point out to us what the means are by which the good of society may be promoted, and its interests advanced. Hence it is incumbent on the wise man to listen to reason and experience, and to adopt and use to the utmost of his power whatever expedients these lights

may reveal as conducive to the general good, taking care, by the strict governance of his own passions, to avoid all those excesses by which the social order is violated, and the wellbeing of the state impaired. Should, however, the constitution of society be such that its amendment is hopeless, in that case it is the duty of the wise man to adjust himself as well as he can to the adverse circumstances in which he is placed, to make the best of a bad position, and to acquiesce in the arrangements by which he is environed, not doubting that Providence has some wise end to fulfil in permitting the continuance of a state of things so much at variance with the short-sighted wisdom of man. For this, a resignation to the will of the Supreme Ruler of the universe, a bringing of the human will into subjection to whatever He may have ordained, this conformity with the divine law is what the Stoics inculcate as the highest species of virtue. So that, in laying down a conformity with nature as the rule of life, and as the road to virtue and happiness, the doctrine of the Stoics is, that the wise man *first* conforms to his own nature, adjusts himself in such a way as not to violate the economy of his own constitution; *secondly*, he conforms to the law of society, that is to say, he so adjusts himself to the world by which he is surrounded, as not to violate by any passionate excess the fundamental principles by which society is held together, and if he cannot amend or improve this society, he at any rate takes care not to make it worse than it is; and,

lastly, he seeks to conform himself to that sovereign will, of which the whole constitution of the universe is only the manifestation, and to fulfil and be in consonance with which must therefore be the highest virtue. Such is the threefold idea of that temper of mind which constituted virtue, and to which the Stoics conceived that it was possible for man not perhaps to attain, but certainly to approximate. And they argued that if this resigned and fortified disposition of the soul were attained, it could not be destroyed nor impaired, nor could its happiness be taken away by anything external to itself. No misfortunes could shake the soul of their ideal sage, no perturbations of passion could overthrow his reason. Hence their doctrine that pain was no evil; and that all calamities were indifferent. Their ideal wise man carried his own happiness with him in the subjugation of his passions, in his ceaseless endeavours to promote the welfare of others, in his perfect acquiescence in whatever fortune might have in store for him, and in his thorough conviction that all things, in the long-run, worked together for good.

8. The main and central idea of the moral philosophy of the Stoics may be presented in this way. The universe, they may be supposed to say—indeed this is the very essence of their teaching—the universe is a vast machine pervaded by an almighty reason, which directs all its ongoings. This great spirit of reason permeates all things, giving law and

order to the parts and the whole. But man, too, man, who is a part of this mighty machine, man, too, is endowed with reason, and hence it is his business also to diffuse law and order as far as his power can reach; and this he does, or this at least he ought to do, by striving to act in conformity with the laws of his own being, with the laws by which social order is preserved and promoted, and the laws by which God's universe is regulated and maintained. The individual man is thus like a small peg or pivot in some gigantic machine, which small pivot has to attend to and govern itself, *first*, in reference to its own structure; *secondly*, in reference to the parts of the machine with which it is more immediately in contact; and, *thirdly*, in reference to the whole machine to which it belongs. When this is done, then, and then only, does this small peg or pivot fulfil the end for which it was designed by the creator of the machine; and when man demeans himself in an analogous manner, then, and then only, does he fulfil the end for which he was designed by the great Artificer of that mighty machine called the universe; then, and only then, is his virtue perfect and his happiness secured.

9. The exposition which I gave you yesterday of the leading principles of the Stoical ethics, may enable you to understand those strong and somewhat startling assertions which have been called by Cicero and others the *Paradoxes of the Stoics*. It will be

found that these assertions are the necessary consequences of the premises from which they start; that perhaps these paradoxes are not so paradoxical after all; and that although they may appear at first sight to revolt the common sense of mankind, they are not altogether irreconcilable with reason and with truth. Of these paradoxes it may be sufficient if I make mention of three.

10. Among the paradoxes or lofty assertions of the Stoics, there was one to the effect that nothing could happen contrary to the will of the wise man. Now that position, from what we know of their ideal wise man, is perfectly intelligible, for the highest endeavour of the wise man is to conform himself to the divine will; and therefore whatever he sees to be inevitable, that is, to be manifestly appointed by the supreme will, becomes to him the object of his cheerful acquiescence, or rather of his desire. Whatever his reason told him was ordained by God, to that his will conformed, because what he sought for and desired above all things was the accomplishment of the divine will. With this will his will worked in accordance, and therefore, inasmuch as reason assured him that nothing that happened happened contrary to the will of God, but that everything took place in accordance to that will; so nothing that happened could happen contrary to the wise man's will, inasmuch as his will had been brought into conformity with the will and designs of Omnipotence. The

Stoics held that if the wise man, in endeavouring to attain to perfect wisdom, that is, to make the divine will habitually his own, permitted any opposition to that will to exist within him, he acted absurdly. Again compare Adam Smith, p. 221: "A wise man never complains of the destiny of Providence and fate." There is, then, nothing so very paradoxical in the assertion that nothing can happen contrary to the will of the wise man: Christianity proclaims the same truth, and in terms equally emphatic.

11. Another paradox of the Stoics was that pain is no evil. To suppose that in this assertion they meant to maintain that pain is not painful, is not disagreeable, is not to be avoided, would be to do them grievous wrong. They merely meant to say that natural or physical pain was not moral evil, that calamity was not identical with wickedness, that there was a difference between sin and suffering. To the truly wise man of the Stoics there was no evil except moral evil; that is, except vice; that is, again, except some derangement either of a man's own system, or of the universal system, brought about by his own voluntary act. Pain might arise out of such derangement, but this pain was not itself evil; the evil lay in the derangement or rather in the voluntary act by which it had been brought about. The pain was the effect of the evil, but was not itself the evil: the evil was, as I have said, the derangement and the act which produced it. Then, again, when

pain or misfortune overtook a man, not through his own misdeeds, but through the inscrutable decrees of Providence, such pain was not to be regarded by the wise man as evil, for to him there is no evil except vice, no good except virtue. And it is obvious that such pain or calamity is not in itself moral evil; it is not wickedness, it is only distress, distress either of body or of mind, and by the endurance and resignation which it calls forth it may be the means of eliciting the loftiest virtues of the soul.

12. A third paradox of the Stoics is that they inculcated apathy, *ἀπάθεια*, as the highest condition of the wise and virtuous mind. This is a point of some importance, for their doctrine of apathy (*ἀπάθεια*) has frequently been misunderstood. By apathy they are frequently supposed to mean an entire deadening of the affections, a total suppression or extirpation of the passions; in short, a state of cold and heartless insensibility. That some of the Stoics, both by their theory and their practice, may have afforded grounds for such an interpretation of their doctrine, is quite possible. But it is still more certain that the Stoical apathy admits of a very different interpretation, and that no such paradoxical doctrine as that which is here indicated was taught by the genuine philosopher of that sect. Let us inquire, then, what the Stoics meant by apathy.

13. The Greek word *πάθος*, which is usually trans-

lated by the word *passion*, is always rendered by Cicero, when speaking in the language of the Stoics, by the term *perturbatio*, or perturbation. In considering the philosophy of the Stoics, the word πάθος should always be held equivalent to perturbation. The definition, indeed, of the term πάθος, as given by the Stoics, was ὁρμὴ πλεονάζουσα, translated by Cicero *appetitus vehementior*. Πάθος means, not passion in a state of moderation, but passion in a state of excess, a tendency or motion of the soul which is excessive and beyond bounds. This explanation of the word πάθος as a perturbation or state of mind which was always in excess, is confirmed by Stobæus, who, in his collection of philosophical fragments, says that "Zeno does not call a πάθος something merely capable by nature to pass into excess, but something actually in excess already, or having its essence not in mere capacity, but in actuality."—(Ecl. Eth., p. 159.)

14. Apathy therefore means, not an entire extinction of passion, but merely a liberation from immoderate and excessive passion. This being explained, it follows that their wise man, the man of perfect character, must of necessity be ἀπαθὴς, apathetic or void of perturbation, not in the sense of being devoid of all feeling, but in the sense of being free from those disturbances which cloud the reason and pervert the judgment.

15. That this was the sense in which the Stoics un-

derstood the term apathy we have their authority for saying, as given to us by Diogenes Laertius. He says, "According to the Stoics, the wise man is apathetic; that is, is free from perturbation, by being superior to error or false judgment; not, as many people (absurdly) interpret their statement, by being superior to all sense, emotion, feeling, or affection. The Stoics, indeed, have specially guarded themselves against this misinterpretation of their doctrine." "There is also," says Epictetus, one of the most distinguished writers, "there is also another sort of apathetic man who is bad, who is the same in character as the hard and inflexible." This, however, is not the apathetic man of the Stoics. Epictetus goes on to say, "I am not to be apathetic like a stone or a statue; but I am withal to observe relations, both the natural and adventitious, as the man of religion, as the son, as the brother, as the father, and as the citizen."—(Arr. Epict., 1. 3, c. 2, p. 359.)

16. In considering, then, this third paradox of the Stoics, which represents a passionless or apathetic condition as the highest virtue of the soul, we must remember that their apathy did not consist in insensibility, or in a deadness of feeling; it did not consist in an extinction or eradication of the passions. On the contrary, in the character of their virtuous man they included rational desire and aversion; they included love and parental affection, friendship, and a general charity and benevolence to all mankind; they con-

sidered it as a duty arising out of our very nature not to neglect the welfare of public society, but to be ever ready, according to our station or capacity, to act either the magistrate or the private citizen. Their apathy was no more than a freedom from perturbations, from irrational and excessive agitations of the soul; it was an antagonism put forth against the passions, not with a view of extinguishing them, but merely of preventing them from running into excess; and consequently that paradoxical apathy commonly laid to their charge, and in the demolishing of which so many imaginary triumphs have been achieved, was an imaginary apathy for which they were in no way accountable.

17. Epicurus, the founder of the Epicurean school of philosophy, and from whose name the common and somewhat opprobrious word epicure is derived, was born in the island of Samos, in the year 342 B.C. We may assume him to have been in his prime about the year 300. He was thus contemporary with Zeno, and the two schools of Stoicism and Epicurism arose and flourished simultaneously in ancient Greece. Epicurus came to Athens when he was 18 years old. After residing here for a short time, and studying probably under Xenocrates, who was then at the head of the Platonic school of philosophy, Epicurus went to Colophon, and afterwards to Mytilene and Lampsacus, where he was engaged for five years in studying and in teaching philosophy. In

the year 306 B.C., at the age of 35, he returned to Athens, and established a philosophical school in a garden which he had purchased near that city. These gardens, the *κῆποι Ἐπικούρου*, have become as famous as the *στοὰ* or porch of the Stoics, or as the *ἀκαδήμεια* of Plato and his followers, or as the Lyceum of Aristotle and the Peripatetics. In these groves Epicurus spent the remainder of his life surrounded by numerous friends and pupils. His mode of life was simple and temperate, and the aspersions of satirists, and the calumnies of those who describe him as a man devoted to sensual pleasures, are not entitled to the smallest degree of credit. However erroneous his doctrines may have been, and whatever mischief they may have occasioned, the character of the philosopher himself seems to have been very unjustly impeached by the voice of slander. He died in the year 270 B.C., at the age of 72, after a painful and lingering illness, which he endured with a philosophical fortitude which a Stoic might have envied and admired, but which he could not have surpassed.

18. In the present lecture I shall endeavour to give you some account of the moral philosophy of Epicurus, exhibiting his opinions rather as they stand contrasted with those of the Stoics than as they are in themselves, and irrespective of that contrast. The contrast which I propose to draw, and of which I have already given you the outline, between

Stoicism and Epicurism, will perhaps bring out the respective doctrines of these sects, or at least the principles and scope of their systems, in a clearer light than we could obtain if we studied them in their isolation, and out of relation to each other.

19. As Zeno had adopted in part the doctrines of a previous sect, the Cynics, so the ethical theory of Epicurus and his followers was founded on the principles of an antecedent sect called the Cyrenaics, who held that pleasure is the *summum bonum*, the end of all human endeavour. The lines of Horace are well known, in which he represents himself as an eclectic in moral philosophy.—Ep. I. i. 14.

> "Nullius addictus jurare in verba magistri,
> Quo me cunque rapit tempestas deferor hospes:
> Nunc agilis fio et mersor civilibus undis
> Virtutis veræ custos rigidusque satelles;
> Nunc in Aristippi furtim præcepta relabor
> Et mihi res, non me rebus, subjungere conor."

Or, as it is in Pope's imitation—

> "But ask not to what doctors I apply,
> Sworn to no master, of no sect am I:
> As drives the storm at any door I knock,
> And house with Montaigne now, or now with Locke;
> Sometimes a patriot, active in debate,
> Mix with the world, and battle for the State.
> Free as young Littleton her cause pursue,
> Still true to virtue, and as warm as true;
> Sometimes with Aristippus or St Paul,
> Indulge my candour, and grow all to all;
> Back to my native moderation glide,
> And win my way by yielding to the tide."

The last line of Horace seems to give expression

rather to a Stoical than to an Epicurean principle. It might mean, I endeavour to bend or subdue things to myself rather than myself to things; I endeavour to rise superior to circumstances, and refuse to allow my happiness and peace of mind to be dependent on the caprices of fortune. It might mean that; but that is a Stoical position, which Horace in this line is very far from intending to express. The meaning, therefore, must be, I endeavour to make outward things and events minister to my pleasure and contentment. Instead of submitting to be a mere tool in the hands of circumstances, I endeavour to take these circumstances into my own hands, and to convert them into the instruments of my happiness.

20. The radical difference between Stoicism and Epicurism is one which has announced itself in metaphysics no less than in morals, in speculative no less than in practical philosophy. The distinction is expressed in the antithetical terms feeling and thought, sensation and reason, sensualism and naturalism, passion and intellect; and when looked at from a moral and religious point of view, in the antithesis of the flesh and the spirit, carnal-mindedness and spiritual-mindedness. All these expressions point to a distinction which has divided the world, and the adjustment and explanation of which has occupied the attention of philosophers, both speculative and practical, from the earliest times.

21. Stoicism and Epicurism have their roots in this distinction, and are to be regarded merely as a new and marked form in which the distinction was propounded and enforced. The Stoic assigns pre-eminence to thought, reason, the spirit. The Epicurean gives the chief place to feeling, sensation, the flesh. When Stoicism is carried to excess, it leads to pride, and asceticism, and pharisaism. When Epicurism is carried to excess, it degenerates into effeminacy and carnality.

22. But we should form a very erroneous estimate of these two schemes if we looked at them merely in their excess. Pride and austerity are the abuses of Stoicism. Effeminacy and sensuality are the vices of Epicurism. By looking to these abuses we certainly obtain some notion of the tendencies of these systems, but we gain no insight into their true principles and essential characteristics.

23. To form a correct estimate, then, of Stoicism and Epicurism we must study them, not as they appear when carried to an extreme, but as they develop themselves when inculcated with propriety and moderation. Let us ask, first of all, in what respect they agree? They agree in holding that happiness, of one kind or another, is the great end of man. With both of them happiness or satisfaction is the *summum bonum*. They further agree in holding that a life according to nature is the means, and the only means,

by which happiness, the *summum bonum*, may be attained. They further agree in holding that a life according to nature is a life of virtue. It is a life of virtue, of rectitude, because it is the right way leading to the true end of man, viz., to felicity. Nature has fixed happiness as the end of man; a life, therefore, according to nature must lead to this end; and a life according to nature must be a virtuous, that is, a rightly directed life, because it leads to this end. The points of agreement, then, are these: 1st, The end of man is happiness; 2dly, The mean to this end is the life according to nature; 3dly, The life according to nature is virtue, and is right, because it leads us right to the end for which we were destined by nature, viz., happiness. On the other hand, the life adverse to nature is vicious, because it leads us away from our proper destination, and causes us to miss the end for which we were created.

24. These being the chief points of agreement between the Stoics and the Epicureans, we have now to consider wherein it is that they differ. They differ in their opinions concerning happiness, and concerning the nature of man, and also concerning the character of virtue; and these are very important points in which to differ. Agreeing that happiness is the end, that the life of nature is the means, and that the life of nature and the life of virtue are coincident or identical, they by no means agree in regard to what happiness is, or in regard to what man's

nature is, nor in regard to what man's virtue is. All, or nearly all, moralists agree in holding that happiness is, in some sense, the end of man; that the life of nature and of virtue are the means to this end. The question on which much difference of opinion has prevailed is, *What* is this happiness which we admit to be the end of man? *What* is this natural and virtuous life which we admit to be the means to this end? It is a question, not about the *that*, but about the *what*. On this question moralists have differed widely, and among them the Stoics and the Epicureans have more particularly differed.

25. We ask, then, in what respect do the Stoics and the Epicureans differ in their doctrines respecting happiness, and nature, and virtue? We shall ascertain the fundamental point of disagreement between them if we revert to the distinction referred to a short way back, the distinction between feeling and thought, sensation and reason, the flesh and the spirit, or, if you choose so to express it, the body and the soul. When a man says, as all men do, that happiness is the chief end of man, does he mean that man's chief end is the happiness of the feelings, the happiness of sensation, the satisfaction of the passions, of the flesh, of the body? or does he mean that man's chief end is the happiness of thought, of reason, of the spirit, of the soul? The latter should be rather called the perfecting, than the happiness, of his nature; but let us call it happiness at present. You

will observe that different kinds of happiness (or at least a happiness of which the ingredients are combined in different proportions) will be indicated according to the answers we return to this question. Again, does the nature of man consist in feeling, in sensation, in the passions, in the flesh? or does it consist in thought, in reason, in intellect, in the spirit? According as this question is answered, the nature of man will be differently understood and interpreted, and a life conformable to nature will mean two different things according as the question is answered in the one way or in the other. Again, when we say that the virtuous life is coincident or identical with the natural life, do we mean that it is coincident with the life according to feeling, to sensation, to the flesh? or do we mean that the virtuous life is identical with the life according to thought, to reason, to the spirit? And here, too, according as this question is answered do we obtain different conceptions in regard to the character and nature of virtue.

26. Now we shall obtain a broad, and general, and fundamental conception of the distinctive characteristics of Stoicism and Epicurism, if we regard them as taking up these questions and answering them in opposite ways. According to Stoicism, it is the happiness of thought, of reason, the satisfaction of the spirit, which is the great end of man. According to Epicurism, it is the happiness of the feelings, of sensation, of the flesh, which is the great end of man.

This at least is the indispensable condition or groundwork of happiness. According to Stoicism, man's proper nature is thought, reason, the spirit, and a life conformable to what these prescribe is a life of nature and of virtue. According to Epicurism, man's proper nature is feeling, sensation, the flesh; and a life conformable to these, not recklessly, but prudently conformable to these, is a life of nature. Again, according to Stoicism, the virtuous life is coincident with the natural life when it is identical with the life according to thought, to reason, and to the spirit; while, according to Epicurism, the virtuous life is coincident with the natural life when it is in prudent and properly regulated conformity with feeling, sensation, and the flesh. Thus Stoicism inculcates that rational happiness, the happiness of reason, spiritual felicity, is the great end of man; their happiness is, perfection; that the life of reason, the life according to the spirit, being the life of nature, is the means to this end, and that the rational life is the virtuous life. On the other hand, Epicurism inculcates that sensational happiness, the happiness of the feelings, the satisfaction of the passions, bodily felicity, is the great end of man; that the life of agreeable sensations being the life according to nature, is the means by which this end is attained; and that thus the life of prudent pleasure is the virtuous life. The whole difference between them thus hinges ultimately upon the distinction between thought and feeling, reason and sensation, the spirit and the flesh.

On the ground of this distinction they may be understood to take up opposite positions, the one party founding their system on what they conceive to be the superior claims of the soul, and the other party founding their scheme on what they hold to be the more stringent demands of the body.

27. Assuming happiness to be in both cases the goal, we perceive that the happiness which the Stoics represent as the end at which man should aim, is very different from the felicity which the Epicureans propose as his aim. The Stoical happiness is a perfection of the mind in which we rise above the thraldom of the passions. It is an inner life in which we are conscious of our intellectual freedom and independency. It is a victorious antagonism exerted against sensation, passion, and desire; and in this victory our true being is realised. And thus our wellbeing consists, not in the gratification of our natural impulses, but in the limits which, by an act of freedom and of will, we impose on these impulses, a limit which prevents them from monopolising us completely, and which affords room for our free personality to be developed and to work along with them. It is not in the passion, or in its indulgence, that our happiness and perfection consist: it is in the limit, the check, which, in our very character as rational and conscious beings, we impose upon the passion: it is in this that our true wellbeing is to be looked for. Epicurism, on the other hand,

makes our happiness to centre, not in the check which the passion receives, but in the passion itself which is checked. Epicurism admits that our passions must be restrained, restrained on account of prudential considerations, or because their over-indulgence would entail on us a balance of lasting misery greater than the transient happiness which that over-indulgence had bestowed. Both systems agree in holding that the passions must be held in check and prevented from running into excess. But they differ in this respect in their doctrines concerning happiness. It is in virtue of the check, says the Stoic, that man attains to felicity. The limit is the essential constituent in man's wellbeing. The passion itself is the accidental, the non-essential. The limit is the important factor. The passion itself and its indulgence are insignificant. In other words, man's happiness is composed of two elements: a desire or impulse, and a limit or boundary to that impulse. I maintain, says the Stoic, that the limit, and not the impulse, is the primary constituent, is the more important element of the two. On the other hand, the Epicurean argues that the passion, desire, or impulse, and not the limit, is the fundamental and essential constituent. This is the primary element; the check which the impulse receives is accidental, and non-essential to the constitution of our happiness. It is due entirely to prudential considerations, and is not involved, as the Stoics maintain, in the very conception of rational happiness and

perfection. By keeping in mind these two factors, the limit and the passion, as the constituents of happiness, and by considering that the Stoics make the former, and the Epicureans the latter, to be the essential ingredient, you will obtain, I think, a sufficiently clear conception of their respective doctrines in regard to happiness. This view at least seems to me to lay open the fundamental difference of the two doctrines.

28. To illustrate this difference, you may suppose a dispute to arise as to whether the matter or the form of a statue be the more essential of the two in the composition of the statue. One man might argue that the matter, the marble, was the essential and primary element; that the form, the limit, was the secondary and accidental factor. Another man might argue that the form, the limiting outline, was the essential, and that the matter, the marble, was the non-essential, element. So in regard to happiness. Is it the matter, the passions and their indulgence, is it this that makes us happy? or do we owe our happiness to the form, the limit, the restraint by which our passions are controlled? Epicurism contends for the first of these positions, Stoicism argues in favour of the second.

29. I cannot but think that the Stoical doctrine has here a great advantage over the Epicurean, in being founded on a deeper and truer insight into the

constitution of human nature. At first sight the Epicurean opinion seems more consonant with our customary convictions. It seems more agreeable to truth and to common-sense to say that our happiness arises out of the gratification of our desires themselves, and depends on our sensations themselves, than to say that it is caused, not by desire or passion itself, but by the *limitation* of passion and desire. It seems somewhat paradoxical to affirm that it is because both passion and pleasure are *bounded*, and not because they are either passion or pleasure, that they conduce to happiness. Nevertheless, paradoxical as this position may seem, and however much it may be at variance with our ordinary habits of thought, it is, I believe, profoundly and philosophically true, and it receives ample confirmation from the facts of our constitution, when these are properly examined and understood. This in particular must be borne in mind, that our very existence as self-conscious and rational beings is brought about by that act of free activity which limits our natural passions and prevents them from monopolising us completely, and to the exclusion, we may say, of our proper selves. Therefore our happiness depends on this limitation, inasmuch as our very rational existence depends upon it.

30. This Stoical doctrine, that it is not passion which is essentially good, or its indulgence which is essentially conducive to our wellbeing, but that it is

the limit which is essentially good, the check which the passion receives that is essentially conducive to wellbeing, this doctrine is, I think, merely another form of Aristotle's doctrine of the μεσότης, or the mean. Virtue, according to Aristotle, is a mean between two extremes, both of which are vices, or at least irregularities; in other words, impose a limit on a vice, and you produce a virtue; set bounds to rashness, or set bounds to cowardice, and in either case you produce courage. In the same way, all our passions and pleasures are in themselves irregular and boundless; they are in themselves without form and without law; they stretch into the chaotic, the infinite, the evil. Impose upon them a law and a limit, and out of the two, out of the passion and the limit, you create a virtue. Virtue is thus generated, not out of the passion itself, but out of the law or limit which holds it in check. Happiness, too, our proper happiness as rational beings, is also generated, not out of the pleasure which accompanies the indulgence of our passions, but out of the limit which prevents that pleasure from being carried too far. The essence, then, of virtue and of happiness is to be placed, not in passion or in pleasure itself, but in the limiting act by which passion is subjugated, and by which pleasure is moderated and restrained.

31. I have said, in the conclusion of my last lecture, that our happiness might be regarded as made up of two elements, the operation of our passions and

desires, or natural impulses, on the one hand, and a limit, or check, or measure imposed on that operation, on the other hand. The passion without the limit is lawless and unbounded; viewed in itself, or *per se*, it is to be regarded as a form of insanity, and as not conducive to felicity. Again, the limit without the passion is empty and unsubstantial; viewed *per se*, it is a form without any contents, just as the passion *per se* is contents without any form: each, therefore, is required in order to supplement the other. The question is, which is the more essential element of the two in the formation of our wellbeing? The Stoics, as I understand them, maintain the limit is the essential element, and that the passion itself is the accidental constituent, just as we might suppose a person to hold that the beauty of a statue was essentially due to the form, and not to the matter of which it was composed; while the Epicureans, on the contrary, maintain that the passion is the essential element, and that the limit is the accidental constituent, just as we may suppose another person to maintain that the beauty of a statue essentially depends, not on the form, but on the matter of which it is composed.

32. This difference of opinion in regard to the constitution of happiness or wellbeing—a difference of opinion which goes to this extent, that the Stoic regards as essential what the Epicurean regards as accidental, while, conversely, the Epicurean regards as

essential what the Stoic regards as accidental—this difference of opinion in regard to happiness is founded on a difference of opinion in regard to the nature of man, and it leads at once to a difference of opinion in regard to virtue and in regard to the practical conduct of life. Let me speak of these in their order; and, *first*, in regard to the difference of opinion between the Stoics and the Epicureans as to the nature of man, and as to the life which is conformable to that nature.

33. According to the Epicureans, the essential staple of man's nature consists of sensations, appetites, passions, and desires. These constitute man's proper nature. They do not deny that thought and reason are also a part of man's nature, but these they regard as accidental and secondary; and accordingly a life prudently conformable to these impulses is a life of nature. It is a life according to nature, because it is a life which leads to the end for which nature designed us, to that happiness, namely, which springs from a prudent indulgence in the passions.

34. On the other hand, according to the Stoics, the essential staple of man's nature consists, not of his sensations, appetites, passions, and desires, but of thought and reason; in other words, of the limits by which these are held in check. It is the limit, and not the passion, which constitutes man's proper and peculiar nature; and accordingly a life conformable,

not to the impulses which urge us on, but rather to the restraints which hold us back, a life conformable, not to the driving principle, but to the controlling principle, of our constitution, is the life of nature. It is a life according to nature, because it is a life which leads to the end for which nature designed us, to that happiness, namely, which springs from a limitation and subjugation of the passions.

35. Such, then, in a very few words, seems to be the leading difference of opinion between the Stoics and Epicureans as to the nature of man, and as to the life which is conformable to that nature. This difference turns on the same principle as that on which their difference of opinion as to man's happiness hinges. The one party regards as essential what the other party regards as accidental, and conversely. Just as the Epicurean holds that the passion and not the limit is the essential element in the constitution of man's happiness, so he holds that the passion and not the limit is the essential element in man's nature, and in the life which is in conformity with that nature; and again, just as the Stoic holds that the limit and not the passion is the essential element in the constitution of man's happiness, so he holds that the limit and not the passion is the essential element in man's nature, and in the life which is conformable thereto.

36. In the next place, the Stoics and the Epicureans differ in their opinions as to virtue, and as

to the practical rule of life; and this difference turns, as before, on the same principle as that on which their difference of opinion as to man's happiness, and as to man's nature, hinges. In their estimate of virtue, and in laying down the practical rule of life, the one party regards as essential what the other regards as accidental, and conversely. According to the Epicureans, virtue consists in an indulgence of the passions in so far as prudence permits; and their rule of life would be, Indulge the passions, but from motives of prudence indulge them only in moderation. Here a yielding to the passions is inculcated as the essential and primary circumstance in the practice of virtue. The limit, the resistance, to the passion is set forth as the accidental and secondary circumstance. According to the Stoics, on the other hand, virtue consists in a limitation or subjugation of the passions, in so far as our nature allows; and their rule of life would be, Restrain or moderate the passions, but on prudential grounds (the wiser among them may be supposed to say)—on prudential grounds, do not carry this restraint too far. Do not carry it so far as to extinguish or eradicate the passions altogether. Here the subjugation of the passion is set forth as the primary and essential circumstance in the practice of virtue, while the indulgence of the passion is set forth as the secondary and non-essential circumstance. The Epicurean, regarding the passion and not the restraint as the essential in the practice of virtue, lays the emphasis on the indulgence, and may

be supposed to say, Indulge the passions, subject to certain limitations. The Stoic, again, who regards the restraint and not the passion as the essential in the practice of virtue, lays the emphasis on the restraint, and may be supposed to say, Restrain the passions, subject to certain indulgences. In the latter case restraint is laid down as the rule and indulgence as the exception; in the former case indulgence is laid down as the rule and restraint as the exception.

37. Taking this view of the fundamental characteristics by which Stoicism and Epicurism are distinguished from each other, we may easily understand how liable either system is to be driven to an extreme. Although the two systems are founded on very different principles, and arise out of estimates of human nature essentially distinct, inasmuch as the one makes man's true nature to centre in the spirit and the reason, and the other in the flesh and the passions, they have, nevertheless, much in common, in so far as their practical instructions are concerned. They both lead to the same result in inculcating, as they both do, the government and subordination of the passions. At the same time, from the explanations given—explanations, you will bear in mind, which turn on the one party regarding as unessential what the other party regards as essential—from these explanations you may, as I have said, readily understand how susceptible either system is of being pushed to an extreme. Let the accidental

in either case be regarded as of no account, or as a thing to be got entirely rid of, and let the essential be made all in all, and you have either system, as the case may be, developed in its most extreme form. Let the Stoic insist, not mainly but exclusively, on the limit, the restraint, as that which should be encouraged and enforced, and you obtain a system of thoroughgoing asceticism, a system of penance and mortification of the flesh. This is the extreme into which Stoicism has run in the fastings and vigils and other austere practices of certain religious bodies. This is the form in which it has shown itself among certain orders of Roman Catholic monks, and also to some extent among the Protestant Puritans of our own country. In these bodies we frequently see Stoicism carried to an excess, because they have made the essential to be all in all, and have allowed no influence whatever to the accidental. The passions are extinguished, and the limits are set up to rule and to reign alone. On the other hand, let the Epicurean insist, not mainly but exclusively, on the passions as that which should be indulged in, and you obtain a system of thoroughgoing sensuality. This is the extreme into which Epicurism has run in many a profligate period of the world's history. Here, too, Epicurism has run into excess, because it has made what it regards as the essential to be all in all, and has allowed no influence whatever to what it regards as the accidental. As in extreme Stoicism the limit absorbs

and annihilates the passion, so in extreme Epicurism the passion swallows up and destroys the limit. The restraints are extinguished, and the passions are set up to rule and to reign alone.

38. It might now be shown, in conclusion, from a survey of the human constitution, that the Stoics are more in the right than the Epicureans; that the facts of our nature, when rightly investigated and understood, bear out the Stoical doctrines to a much greater extent than they do those of the Epicureans. A careful examination of our nature shows us that there is a vital and radical antagonism between our sensations, passions, and desires on the one hand, and our reason and power of thought on the other; our power of thought as shown more particularly in that act through which our personality and self-consciousness are realised. This antagonism shows that our sensations, passions, and desires, so far from constituting our true and essential nature, do rather, on the contrary, tend to prevent that true nature from being realised; while that true nature, our will and personality, in actualising itself, displaces to some extent our sensations, passions, and desires, and abridges their influence, which would otherwise be overwhelming. But I have already said enough on these points, and I think that by means of your own reflections you may be able to work out more fully for yourselves the views which I have been engaged in laying before you.

THE SUCCESSORS OF PLATO AND ARISTOTLE, ZENO AND EPICURUS.

1. AFTER the deaths of Plato and Aristotle, of Zeno and Epicurus, the schools founded by these philosophers continued to be known as the Academic, the Peripatetic, the Stoic, and the Epicurean. These schools, of which the Academic and the Peripatetic preceded the other two by some forty or fifty years, existed in a state of greater or of less animation until the very close of the Greek philosophy. But the period when they principally flourished was in the interval between their birth, say, in round numbers, about 300 years B.C. or somewhat earlier, and the rise of the Alexandrian or Neoplatonic philosophy about 200 years after Christ, an interval of about 500 years. During this protracted period, philosophy, although illustrated by some eminent writers, exhibited no very great accession of originality, and put forth few evidences of power. Athens continued to be the headquarters of the schools I have enumerated. But, by degrees, a more general diffusion of philosophical opinions took place.

About the year 146 B.C., Greece was reduced to the condition of a Roman province. And then the arms of Rome, we may say, began to be interchanged for the arts of Athens. Philosophy now migrated for the first time to the Eternal City.

2. Panætius, who was born at Rhodes, was the philosopher who indoctrinated the Romans with the principles of Stoicism. At this time (that is, about 145 or 150 B.C.) the Republic was in its most flourishing condition. It was the era of the third Punic war. The arms of Rome were everywhere victorious; and the rudeness of her primitive manners had begun to be tempered by more polished tastes. Literature had sprung up in the poetry of Ennius and Lucilius, and in the plays of Plautus and Terence, the latter of whom was but recently dead. Scipio Africanus the younger, the conqueror of Carthage, and Lælius, whom Cicero has immortalised in his treatise 'De Senectute,' were warm patrons of philosophy and all liberal accomplishments. Under the auspices of these illustrious men, with whom he lived on terms of intimate friendship, Panætius introduced Stoicism to the Romans. This happened, as I said, about 145 B.C. The antiphilosophical party, with Cato at their head, protested in vain against the importation of Greek philosophy. Fostered by the great names of Scipio and Lælius, the doctrines of Panætius took root and flourished. His Stoicism was of a modified and moderate character. He avoided the extreme

opinions of the early Stoics. He softened their severity and harshness; he abjured their "insensibility and apathy" (Aulus Gellius, 12, 5), and skilfully incorporated with their doctrines many of the opinions of Plato, Aristotle, Xenocrates, and Theophrastus. In opposition to the credulity of most of his sect, he scouted the predictions of astrologers, and exercised in everything a sound judgment, no less than an eloquence, which fitted him to recommend the doctrines he professed to so practical a people as the Romans. This philosophy was, in itself, peculiarly adapted to their genius, whether in their greatness or in their decline. In the palmy days of the Republic, it animated them with the fortitude of power; in the tragic gloom and sinking fortunes of the Empire, it upheld them with the fortitude of despair. It is with the spring-time of Roman Stoicism that the name of Panætius is associated. None of his writings have come down to us; but how highly they were esteemed in their day is proved by the fact that so great a writer as Cicero thought it not beneath him to copy his own treatise, 'De Officiis,' from one of the works of Panætius. Panætius died at Athens about 112 B.C.

3. Cicero, as indicated in the last sentence, was an admirer and expounder of the doctrines of the Stoics. He was, at the same time, an adherent of the Academical philosophy, a philosophy which inculcated the necessity of great caution, not to say scepticism,

in the deliverance of scientific judgments. The fame of Cicero as an orator and statesman has overshadowed his reputation as a philosopher. In philosophy, indeed, he has no pretensions to originality: he was rather an amateur than one of the regular and professional fraternity. Yet his philosophical writings are able and eloquent digests of the opinions of preceding philosophers, and are well worthy of our study. His dialogues, 'De Amicitia' and 'De Senectute,' have a deep ethical interest, and have besides "a fine mellow tone of colouring, which sets them, perhaps, above all his other works in point of originality and beauty." Cicero was born 106 B.C., and died, or rather was murdered, 43 B.C., during the troubled times of the triumvirate between Augustus, Antony, and Lepidus. In regard to the Epicurean philosophy, its tenets were adopted and its praises sounded by the Roman poet Lucretius (b. 95 B.C., d. 51 B.C.) And no doubt many of the luxurious Romans adopted the creed of Epicurus.

4. At a somewhat later period Stoicism was upheld at Rome by the example and writings of Seneca, one of the most distinguished adherents of whom this sect can boast. Seneca was a person of some importance as the tutor of Nero, and his history is connected with the dark reign of that hideous tyrant. He was falsely charged with being privy to the conspiracy of Piso, and the emperor's commands were conveyed to him, signifying that he must prepare for

death. He heard his doom unmoved, and his bearing showed that he could practise, as well as preach, the principles of an exalted Stoicism. His veins were opened, and he expired in a warm bath, endeavouring, as his life ebbed away, to assuage by his exhortations the sorrow of his surrounding friends, and to confirm their virtue by his example. He died A.D. 65.—(Tacit. Annal., xv. 62.)

5. In regard to the character of Seneca opinions have been divided. By some he has been represented as vain and avaricious, as a time-server and a hypocrite. It is truer, as well as more charitable, to suppose that his faults were incident to his situation rather than indigenous to himself; that in circumstances the most inimical to virtue he preserved his virtue, if not spotless, still tolerably entire; and that, true to the principles of his philosophy, he succeeded in making the best of a very bad position. Stoicism, as expounded by Seneca, and as practised by him and other noble Romans, was the one redeeming feature in this, the worst of times. It inculcated a reliance on the wisdom, and an acquiescence in the decrees, of Providence; and at a time when the lives, the liberties, and the possessions of men were in the highest degree unstable and precarious, when the whole Roman Empire was broken-hearted and in despair, it taught that to overcome the fear of death was to stand superior to every earthly calamity; and that to be conscious of an inner and spiritual free-

dom as the true life of the soul, and as a possession which the power of the imperial tyrant and his minions could never reach, was to enjoy a peace which the world could neither give nor take away. Such is the purport of the philosophy which Seneca enforces, often with eloquence and solemnity, although his style is generally deficient in natural grace, and somewhat too antithetical. The work in modern times which most closely resembles the writings of Seneca, both in thought and in expression, is Young's 'Night Thoughts.'

6. Having made these slight observations on the influence of Epicurism and Stoicism among the Romans, I must now say a few words in regard to the followers of Plato and Aristotle, the frequenters of the Academy and the Lyceum. Of Plato's immediate successors, Speusippus, Xenocrates, and Polemon, I have already spoken. These, with their master, may be reckoned as constituting what is called the *old* Academy. They were succeeded by what is called the second or middle Academy, the founder of which was Arcesilaus, who lived from about 318 to 250 B.C. The Academy was again renovated by Carneades, who lived from about 213 to 129 B.C. So that the philosophical school called the Academy comes before us under three modifications. *First*, the old Academy; *secondly*, the middle Academy; and, *thirdly*, the new Academy. In regard to their differences of doctrine, it may be sufficient to remark, that the second Academy

was more sceptical than the first, and that the third seems to have been more sceptical than the second. Of the Peripatetics or disciples of Aristotle I shall merely signalise his immediate successor, Theophrastus, who ably expounded the opinions of his master. Some of his writings have come down to us, but they relate principally to physics. Among them, however, is a small work of more general interest, entitled 'Ethical Characters.' It contains many vivid but coarsely-painted portraits, and presents curious illustrations of the manners of the time.

7. Contemporary with these four sects there was a fifth, of which some mention must now be made. This was the Sceptical school of philosophy. The founder of this sect was Pyrrho, a native of Elis in the Peloponnesus. When he was born is uncertain, but as he is said to have accompanied the expedition of Alexander the Great into India, it is probable that his birth took place near the middle of the fourth century, B.C., and that he flourished about 300 B.C. Pyrrho, as the founder of the Sceptics, was thus contemporary, or nearly so, with Zeno and Epicurus, and but little later than the early Academics and Peripatetics. We may regard the five schools as existing simultaneously.

8. Pyrrho left no writings behind him, at least none that have come down to our times. Indeed, if we except a few incidental notices which occur in the

writings of Cicero, the only record of the Sceptical opinions which we possess is the work of Sextus Empiricus, a physician who lived in the first half of the third century of the Christian era, that is to say, several centuries after Pyrrho and his followers. Sextus, however, must have had access to sufficient sources of information, for his compilation is ample, and appears to give a faithful and authentic expression to the opinions which it registers. It is an immense repository of doubts. Part of the work is entitled 'Outlines of Pyrrhonism, or Sceptical Commentaries.' The other part is entitled 'Disputations against the Mathematicians.' It is an attack on all positive or dogmatic philosophy. Sextus was himself an advocate of the opinions which he recorded.

9. The principle on which the Pyrrhonic Scepticism, as expounded by Sextus, is founded, is the relativity of all knowledge, feeling, and sensation, the relativity of all truth, sensible, moral, and intellectual. Scepticism is in fact merely a more fully developed, more systematic, and more thoroughgoing Sophistic. Substantially the Sceptics added but little to the maxim which expresses the relativity of all human cognition, that man is the measure of the universe; but they carried out this maxim into a multiplicity of directions and details, and enforced it with abundant and superabundant illustrations. They dwelt more than the Sophists had done on the uncertainty and utter ignorance as to objective and inde-

pendent truth under which we labour, in consequence of the relative character of all our sensible, intellectual, and moral impressions. It was rather to magnify the power and supremacy of man that the Sophists, or some of them at least, represented him as the measure of the universe; it was rather to convict him of an ignorance altogether irremediable, and to prove that he was utterly incompetent to attain to any degree of objective certainty and truth, that the Sceptics represented him in the same light.

10. Stated plainly, the question which Pyrrho, or we may say the Sceptic generally, raises is this: Are our faculties competent to give us any certain information as to what anything is *in itself*, and out of its relation to us? And the answer is, that our faculties are not competent. They can only declare what a thing is in relation to themselves. And further, our faculties do so alter and modify things in conformity with their own structure, that it is impossible for us to know them as they are in themselves. Hence real and objective truth is placed altogether beyond our reach. We can be certain of the phenomenon, we can be certain that the appearance is as it appears, but we can have no certainty as to the *νοούμενον* or transcendental something which lies at the back of the phenomenon. We cannot know what this is in itself. For instance, when I look at a laurel leaf, I am certain that I see what I see—viz., a smooth and shining surface. No Sceptic ever doubted that. I

certainly see a smooth and shining surface, but is this leaf *in itself* a smooth and shining surface? Most probably it is not, indeed we may say with certainty it is not; because, alter the structure of my eyes, or place the leaf under a powerful magnifier, and it will become rough and dull. Is it then rough and dull *in itself?* Not one whit more than it was smooth and shining. Its dulness and roughness are just as phenomenal as its shining and smoothness, because to a differently constituted eye it would present an appearance quite different from either of the other two. And this new appearance would, of course, not bring us one whit nearer to what the leaf was *in itself.* All that sentient beings can be certain of, is the appearance which the leaf presents to them: in short, all that we can be certain of is, what it is in relation to us, not what it is *in itself;* that is to say, not what it is verily and in truth.

11. The Sceptics may be supposed to put their case in this way: Nothing is hot *in itself,* because, what one being regards as hot, another being regards, or may regard, as cold. Nothing is cold *in itself,* because, what one being regards as cold, another regards, or may regard, as hot. Nothing is green or blue *in itself,* because, to a retina of a different degree of susceptibility, the green would not be green, but some other colour; and the blue would not be blue, but some other colour. Again, nothing is large *in itself,* because, what a small being thinks large, a

being of much greater dimensions would regard as small. Nor is anything small *in itself*, because, what a large being thinks small, will appear large to a very diminutive creature. These may be accepted as illustrations of the manner in which the Sceptics deprived the qualities of things of all objective reality, and made them merely relative, or dependent on the different sentient or intellectual structures of the beings to whom they were presented. What the reality of things was *in itself*, and out of relation to sentient observers, or whether there was any such independent reality at all, the Sceptic held that all men were for ever debarred from knowing, or from even remotely conjecturing. I may just remind you parenthetically, and in passing, that the division of the qualities of matter into primary and secondary, was devised chiefly as a means of overruling the conclusions of the Sceptics. It was thought that the primary qualities, extension, figure, and solidity, were objective, and belonged to things themselves; while the secondary, such as colour, heat, cold, sound, and so forth, were mere subjective sensations. Opinions however, have differed as to the value and importance of this distinction. It may be doubted whether it has accomplished the purpose which it had in view

12. The arguments by which Pyrrho, as expounded by Sextus, enforced the conclusions of Scepticism, were called τρόποι, a word sometimes translated tropes, although that term is more frequently employed to

express a figure of speech. Of these tropes or Sceptical arguments Sextus enumerates ten as belonging to the earlier Sceptics, of whom Pyrrho was the chief, and five as belonging to the later Sceptics, fifteen in all. Of the ten *tropoi* of Pyrrho, I may cite two or three specimens. The *first* is, that the tribes of living creatures, including man, are so various, and are organised so differently, that they must and do derive very different impressions from the same objects, that no one of these impressions has a better title than any other to be regarded as representing the real nature of the object, and that, therefore, we must remain for ever in ignorance of what the object in itself is. A *second* argument is, that, putting other creatures aside, the senses and intelligences even of human beings are found to differ widely, and therefore, inasmuch as the reports of all of them cannot be true in reference to the same objects, and further, inasmuch as no one man has a better title than any other to set himself up as the standard of what is true, the conclusion is that objective reality is beyond our grasp. A *third* argument is, that our senses are not consistent with themselves, for one sense will relish what another sense dislikes, and conversely. Hence we cannot say whether the thing is agreeable or disagreeable in itself. (This argument seems a poor one.) A *fourth* argument is, that things affect us differently, according as we are in health or out of health. To a man suffering from jaundice, all things taste bitter. They are not bitter, however, in

themselves; he makes them bitter. For the *tenth tropos* the same sort of argument is applied to morals. Morality is entirely conventional and acquired. Different nations differ widely in their estimate of moral distinctions. Hence these distinctions are altogether relative. We can form no conception of anything as good or as bad *in itself*, but only a conception of it as good or as bad in relation to ourselves. These specimens may be sufficient as examples of the Sceptical line of argumentation. Some of them, it may be owned, are rather frivolous, and on that account, as well as from the consideration that they are all reducible, as I have said, to the principle of relativity it is not necessary to make any further mention of the τρόποι, either of the earlier or of the later Sceptics.

13. The Sceptical conclusions may be summed up thus: *first*, There is no possibility of knowledge, in the strict sense of the word, because we can never know things as they are in themselves, but only as they are coloured and modified by our faculties of cognition, that is, we cannot know them as they *are*, but only as they *are not*; *secondly*, There is no standard or criterion of truth, because the senses and understanding of different beings differ widely, and no one of them has a better title than any other to set itself up as the criterion of the truth; *thirdly*, There is no stability in definitions, because a definition of a thing which may recommend itself to one intelligence will not recommend itself to a differently

constituted intelligence; *fourthly,* The object of thought or cognition is different from the thought or cognition of which it is the object; the thought or cognition is that alone of which we can be certain; we can have no certainty in regard to the object, for here there is a wide interval between the objective and the subjective; *fifthly,* There is no standard of morality, because this will shift with the varying tastes and sensibilities of individuals or of nations.

14. You may ask for what end or purpose these arguments leading to these conclusions have been set on foot? The answer is, that these arguments are designed to bring us into a condition of indisturbance or quietude of mind, *ἀταραξία.* Seeing the fact established by good reasons, that nothing is to be known, that certainty is unattainable, we shall be disposed to settle down in placid contentment with a lot from which there is no escape, and an ill for which there is no remedy. Perceiving our ignorance to be inevitable, we shall live in a state of *ἀταραξία,* or mental indisturbance; and of *μετριοπάθεια,* or moderation of the desires. That, say the Sceptics, is the good end which is brought about by our Sceptical exercitations.

15. In this paragraph I shall merely enumerate the names of the schools which flourished between the death of Aristotle and the rise of the Neoplatonic or Alexandrian philosophy. These schools were the Academic, founded by Plato; the Peripatetic, founded

by Aristotle; the Stoic, founded by Zeno; the Epicurean, founded by Epicurus; and the Sceptical, founded by Pyrrho. These schools continued to exist until the very close of the Greek philosophy in 529 A.D.; but their independence was probably merged or eclipsed in the vast and mystical splendour of the Alexandrian philosophy, of which I now propose to give you some account.

NEOPLATONISTS.

I. AMMONIUS, called Saccas, or the Sack-carrier, from the occupation at which he originally toiled, gets the credit of being the founder of the Neoplatonic or Alexandrian philosophy. He was born about 160, and died about 240 of the Christian era. He lived and taught at Alexandria. He is said by some to have combined Christianity with his philosophy, and to have continued a Christian to the last; by others he is said to have apostatised from the faith. Very little, however, is known about him; his philosophic position is very obscure and insignificant when placed in comparison with the claims of his pupil and follower, Plotinus, whom we must regard as by far the greatest representative of the Alexandrian philosophy, and of whom I now proceed to speak.

2. Plotinus, the chief of the Alexandrian Platonists, is said to have always refused to divulge the names of his parents, and the time and place of his birth, so little reason did he think he had to congratulate himself on having been born. The secret,

however, seems to have transpired, for it is related that he first saw the light at Lycopolis in Egypt, A.D. 205. At the age of twenty he went to study in Alexandria, which for long had been celebrated for its commercial prosperity, and for the variety and activity of its literary institutions. In the first centuries of the Christian era this city was the gathering-point of the learning of the East and of the West. Here were collected together, as in a vast reservoir, the Greek philosophy, the oriental mysticism, the ancient superstitions of heathendom, the rising power of Christianity, the heresies of gnosticism, and the doctrines of the Jewish kabala; and in the midst of the fermentation of these elements, the Alexandrian philosophy arose. Although not set up in express rivalry or antagonism to the new religion, it was no doubt inspired, in part at least, by the desire to question and reduce its pretensions. It was an effort on the part of expiring paganism to rally and organise her forces, in order to show the world that the heathen sages had not preached, and that the heathen devotees had not practised, in vain; that there was still some fire in the ancient ashes, still some life and health in the old philosophical and mythological traditions; and that they did not merit the hatred and contempt with which they were now frequently assailed.

3. When Plotinus came to Alexandria, Ammonius Saccas was at the head of this philosophy, was, in-

deed, its reputed founder, although it is probable that the system had been set on foot, and had begun to take shape, before his time. Some years elapsed before Plotinus made the acquaintance of this philosopher, and during that time his soul was disquieted by the thirst of knowledge unappeased. He found peace so soon as he was introduced to Ammonius, whose devoted disciple he became, and to whose instructions he listened assiduously for eleven years.

4. In his thirty-ninth year, Plotinus, being anxious to extend his knowledge by a more intimate acquaintance with the philosophy of the East, joined an expedition which the Roman Emperor Gordian had equipped for the invasion of Persia. The issue of the expedition was disastrous. Gordian was assassinated in Mesopotamia, and Plotinus with difficulty escaped with his life. This expedition having brought him into close relations with the Romans, he betook himself to Rome in the fortieth year of his age. Here he resided until his death, expounding the Alexandrian philosophy, of which he has a better title than Ammonius to be regarded as the originator. At any rate, he amplified it greatly, and by him it has been handed down to posterity. He had a project of founding a city in Campania, on the model of Plato's republic, but the ministers of the Emperor wisely refused to give any encouragement to the scheme. He died at Rome in his sixty-sixth year, A.D. 270.

5. Plotinus had many pupils and admirers, of these the most faithful and intelligent was Porphyry, and to him he intrusted the arrangement and publication of his writings. They consisted of fifty-four books, which Porphyry divided, according to their subjects, into six parts. Each of these parts contained nine books, which he called Enneads, from the Greek word signifying nine. The philosophy of Plotinus is styled Neo-Platonism, because it is a revival of the Platonic doctrines, and also Eclecticism, because it aimed at combining with Platonism whatever was worthy of adoption in the tenets of other philosophers. Its prevailing tone, however, is derived from the element which it borrowed from the East, a mysticism which blends the Creator with the creation, and confounds the human and the divine.

6. The philosophy of Plotinus, divested of its mystical complexion, presents to us the following principal points, which may be shortly exhibited in the form of question and answer:—*First*, What does philosophy aim at? At absolute truth. *Secondly*, What kind of truth is that? Truth for *all* intelligence, that is, for intellect considered simply as intellect, and not as this or any kind of intellect: a truth which any intellect is necessarily shut out from knowing is not an absolute truth. *Thirdly*, What is the truth for all intelligence? Unity; the oneness of all things. *Fourthly*, How so? Because, while

the diversity of things is addressed to what is peculiar to each order of intellect, their unity can be taken up only by what is common to all orders of intellect. Unity is thus the object of philosophical pursuit, inasmuch as it is the truth for all, in other words, the absolutely true. *Fifthly*, But what is this unity? The Alexandrian philosophy is driven in upon the answer that *thought* is the unity of the universe. Hence the knowledge of self, the thought of thought, the reflection of reason upon itself, is inculcated by Plotinus as the highest duty, and as the noblest source of purification and enlightenment. This is the sum and substance of his teaching, in so far as it can be intelligibly reported.

7. To the system thus concisely exhibited, some explanation must be appended, showing, *first*, the grounds on which Plotinus and the Platonists generally refused to acknowledge the material world as the absolutely real; *secondly*, in what respect the Alexandrian philosophy differs from antecedent systems; and, *thirdly*, how Plotinus was led to lay down thought as the absolutely real, and as constituting the unity in all things. A few words on each of these points.

8. I.—The consideration that the truth which philosophy aims at is the truth for *all*, disposed at once of the claim of the material world to be regarded as absolutely true; for matter is not a truth for all intellect, but only for intellect furnished with such

senses as ours. I have explained this point sufficiently on former occasions. Matter was thus put out of court, as being not the absolutely true. This, we may say, was the verdict of philosophers generally, and pronounced at a very early period in speculation.

9. II.—Matter being set aside as not the absolutely real, the absolute had now to be looked for elsewhere, and accordingly philosophers proceeded to search for it, not in the region of sense, but in that of intellect. Pythagoras proclaimed *number* as the truth for all. The Eleatics took their stand upon *Being*. Heraclitus contended for *Becoming* or change. Plato advanced his theory of *ideas* (resemblance, difference, the good, &c.) It is obvious, however, that these are rather the *objects* of thought than *thought* itself. There is some distinction between number and the thought of number, between being and the thought of being; and on this ground it might be argued that number, being, and the others, might perhaps not be absolute truths. Whatever is different from thought is not necessarily true for all thought. Number, being, and other universals, are different from thought, and are therefore not true for all thought. The subject and the object are here separated, and Scepticism takes advantage of the separation to represent the objective as uncertain. This position, indeed, the separation of subject and object, was the stronghold of Scepticism, the fortress from which it strove to

break down the strength of Platonism, and to strip all philosophy of its assured conviction that it had reached the ultimately real. It was necessary, therefore, to shift the ground of the absolutely true from the *thing* thought of to the *thought itself* of the thing. This was what Plotinus did, and it is in this respect that the Alexandrian scheme differs from all the systems which preceded it. They placed the absolute truth in something which thought embraced. This system placed it in the thought itself by which this something is taken hold of.

10. III.—Such appears to be the leading position occupied by Plotinus when the mists of his system are blown aside. He was led to it by the inconsequence of which Scepticism had convicted all antecedent systems. A paralogism or fallacy might be involved in the assertion that the *contents* of any thought must be a truth for all intellect; but no paralogism could be involved in the assertion that thought itself is the truth for all intellect, because thought and intellect are one. Here, to speak the language of modern philosophy, the object thought of and the thinking subject are the same, and that interval between the two does not exist which Scepticism represents as an impassable gulf separating [illegible] from the truth.

11. Thought, then, is the truth, the unity in all things, the only absolute and assured reality in the

universe, because it is a truth, and the only truth which every intellect must entertain, and which no scepticism can invalidate. So reasoned Plotinus.

12. In recommending self-reflection, or the study of thought, as the noblest of all pursuits, Plotinus intended that men should habituate themselves to the contemplation of thought in its universality, that they should see and understand that it is not properly their own. The passions and desires of man are subjective and their own, but thought is objective still more than it is subjective; it is the common medium which brings the human mind into relation with an intelligence infinitely higher than itself, from which all things are emanations, just as the infinite intelligence itself is an emanation from a unity still more inconceivable and ineffable. But here the system loses itself in mysticism, and we shall not attempt to follow it through its [illegible] and unintelligible processions of spiritual and material creation.

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